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PREFACE 
This project began during my final theological studies at Lund University way 
back in 2003. It was suggested that I read the American theologian Walter 
Brueggemann. Reading his Theology of The Old Testament was an overwhelm-
ing experience. I was then - and continue to be - formed both by a passionate 
love of the Bible as Scripture, but also by the sovereign majesty of the histor-
ical-critical method passed on to me by my professors Tryggve Mettinger, Sten 
Hidal, and Fredrik Lindström. There is, however, often quite a tension between 
passion and sovereignty and the two readings of Scripture mentioned above do 
not always converge. The groundwork leading to my way of reaching towards 
a harmonious balance between academic scholarship and a passionate love for 
the Scripture was laid by the academic student society Theofil, a student Centre 
for theological studies, situated in the heart of Lund. This house has helped to 
shape many priests within Church of Sweden and continues to be a source of 
inspiration and academic education. My thanks go to Henrik Gustavsson, who 
supported me to combine reason and faith and to love the Bible with my whole 
heart, soul, and mind.  
My reading of Brueggemann has positively challenged my theological think-
ing. I finished my masters program in 2003 and after ordination in the Church 
of Sweden, (the Diocese of Växjö and the Parish in Älmhult) in 2006 I became 
acquainted with the Swedish speaking university in Finland, Åbo Akademi 
University Finland and subsequently began my doctoral studies there in 2007. 
It was and still is wonderful to take the overnight ferry from Stockholm and 
wake up in the morning in Åbo/Turku. The education program in Finland, the 
excellence of performance at the Åbo Akademi University under the charge of 
Professor Antti Laato has been a blessing. As a priest in the Church of Sweden, 
I have related Brueggemann to my pastoral reality. This reality is often marked 
by exile and amnesia, but, by help of a prophetic imagination, latent in the 
Catholic Church, a transformation of the word of God can change reality so 
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that new horizons can be caught on the holy pilgrimage of the church to the 
new Jerusalem. 
My deepest thanks must go to Walter Brueggemann. For the last ten years, I 
have been able to stand on the shoulders of a giant, and if I have seen anything, 
it is from the position of his scholarly effort.  
The work on this dissertation has benefitted immensely from the input and 
support of various people. Sten Rydå (Ph.D.) has made my English more read-
able. Johannes Börjesson (Ph.D.) has also been of the utmost importance in 
this regard and, as well, when it comes to theological conclusions. Finally, 
Lorna Koskela has proof read this work and polished it. They, as many others, 
have given me insights and comments that have positively affected this study. 
I extend my warmest thanks for their enduring support.  
Funding for this research came from Åbo Akademi University, Stockholm’s 
Kristliga Ynglingaförening, the Church of Sweden, the Diocese of Växjö, the 
Parish in Älmhult, the Vicarage in Göteryd, and the staff at the Library at Älm-
hult. I offer my warmest thanks to each for their generous support. I am full of 
gratitude to the student theological society Theofil in Lund (part of IFES, In-
ternational Fellowship of Evangelical Students), the staff at the C. Benton 
Kline, Jr. Special Collections and Archives, John Bulow Campbell Library at 
Columbia Theological Seminary. I express my deepest thanks to the members 
of the Old and New Testament seminary at Åbo Akademi University for many 
fruitful discussions. Finally, I am immensely grateful for the tireless support 
of my supervisor, Professor Antti Laato, who has guided me through this pro-
cess with care, knowledge, wisdom, patience, and positive thinking. 
My wife Jenny! I stand in debt to her! I want to thank my wife for her faith in 
the enterprise and the sacrifices that she has made in order to ensure its accom-
plishment. I dedicate this dissertation in memory of my parents, Agneta (1943-
2006) and Georg Wallerstein (1942-2009). 
The Holy Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, above, in, with, and within the 
fray, remain to be thanked.  
Karl-Henrik Wallerstein, Diö, Sweden. August 2019. 
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ABSTRACT 
Every theological expression of the Old Testament stands in a search for an 
epistemology and hermeneutical approach that can match the feature of the Old 
Testament. In this study, Walter Brueggemann’s epistemology, hermeneutics, 
and theological conclusions are analyzed with specific attention paid to his 
Theology of the Old Testament, Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy, published in 
1997. The title of this study, In Search of Solid Ground, came as a conclusion 
of this study. Walter Brueggemann, since the beginning of his academical ca-
reer, has been in search for a new solid ground after the collapse of history and 
ontology. The hymn that was sang at his inauguration as professor of the Old 
Testament, “The Church’s one Foundation Is Jesus Christ her Lord…” reflects 
that for a Christian professor the foundation is in Christ alone.1 Nevertheless, 
Brueggemann challenged the academical guild and the pastoral society when 
he presented a concept of the God of the Old Testament that involves a tension 
The rhetorical tension in the text, according to him, also has a theological cor-
respondence, so that God in the Old Testament, YHWH, cannot easily be de-
scribed in classical dogmatic terms.2 In light of his position as a role model for 
the discipline of the Old Testament, his approach merits specific interest. 
Brueggemann’s theology as described in Theology of the Old Testament con-
cerns the way in which the backbone in his theology – i.e. his epistemology 
and hermeneutics – paves the way for his theology. In this study I describe his 
epistemology as testimonial foundationalism which means that I argue that he 
has a weak foundational standpoint. His hermeneutics, based on the metaphor 
of the testimony, imagination and the Jewish traditions, is best described as 
simultaneously non-referential and extra-referential. His theology is based on 
the fact that there is no convergences between the various testimonies within 
                                                     
1 Walter Brueggemann, unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, Box 22, Folder 163. 
2 The Tetragrammaton is in this study transliterated as YHWH. When I quote from ToT I follow 
Brueggemann’s use of the Tetragrammaton, i.e. “Yahweh”. I use the name YHWH as refering 
to the God of Israel. Sometimes the term God is used in a more general sense.  
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the Old Testament. In the end, Brueggemann concludes that the rhetorical ten-
sion also becomes a theological tension. 
Prior to Theology of the Old Testament Brueggemann presented a theological 
distinction between God above the fray and God in the fray where above stands 
for transcendence and in stands for immanence. In Theology of the Old Testa-
ment there is an obvious shift towards stressing YHWH as distinctively in the 
fray. This study argues that Brueggemann’s tension between Soverginity and 
passion within YHWH could rather be formulated as God above the fray and 
Israel in the fray. This means that the God of Israel, YHWH, is immanent, in 
the fray through his chosen people. This theological conclusion emerges from 
encounters with the obvious counter-testimonies in the Old Testament, as for-
mulated by Brueggemann, and the presupposition that the Rule of Faith comes 
prior to the encounter with the biblical text.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE STUDY 
The task of this study is to analyze Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology as 
presented in Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy 
(published in 1997, hereinafter abbreviated as ToT). This study then, conforms 
to what John Barton concludes in his study of James Barr’s (1924–2006) The 
Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old Testament Approach (published in 
1996). According to Barton, Barr’s contribution to the field of Old Testament 
Theology was that he could ask questions such as: “What are we doing when 
we are doing biblical theology?”3 In a similar way this study aims at analyzing 
what Brueggemann is doing when he presents his theology in ToT. This study 
will deal especially with the question of how God is presented in his theologi-
cal system. A purpose of this study is then firstly, descriptive: to depict as 
clearly as possible how Brueggemann reaches forward to his concept of God. 
Secondly, this study has an analytical purpose which can be formulated as a 
question: what is Brueggemann actually doing when he concludes his concept 
of God in ToT on the basis of the Old Testament text.  
Relating this study to Rolf Knierim, who addresses some  problems for the 
discipline of Old Testament theology, Knierim first of all points out that the 
task for an Old Testament theology must be related to - and simultaneously 
distinguished from - exegetical, epistemological, and hermeneutical questions. 
This study aims at understanding how Brueggemann’s epistemology and her-
meneutics underpin his concept of God. Secondly, Knierim situates the disci-
pline of Old Testament theology within the “eternal” question of the relation-
ship between the Old and the New Testament, and because Brueggemann 
stands in a pastoral reality the issue of a search for a Christian reading becomes 
apparent in his approach. This study of Brueggemann’s pastoral and theologi-
                                                     
3 John Barton, “James Barr and the Future of Biblical Theology,” Int 70 (2016): 264–74. 
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cal approach serves as an evaluation of how a postmodern Old Testament the-
ology has been accomplished. Thirdly and finally, according to Knierim, the 
discipline of Old Testament theology must apply the ethical question of social 
justice and Brueggemann strongly emphasizes justice as the normative goal for 
a postmodern Old Testament theology.4 In sum, Knierim’s analysis of the task 
for the discipline of the Old Testament emphasizes that understanding 
Brueggemann’s theology becomes a study of how a role model theologian 
searches for a solid ground for understanding God in the Old Testament, 
YHWH.  
1.2 WHY IS BRUEGGEMANN’S THEOLOGY CONTROVER-
SIAL? 
Brueggemann was born March 11, 1933 in Tilden, Nebraska. His father, Rev. 
August L. Brueggemann, was a German evangelical pastor of the United 
Church of Christ. Brueggemann´s theological education began at Elmhurst 
College, Illinois 1951–55. He then went to Eden Theological Seminary, St 
Louis 1955–58 where he took a B. A (equivalent to today’s M. Div.). He con-
tinued for his Th.D. at Union Seminary, New York 1958–61, and undertook 
his Ph.D. at St. Louis University, 1970–71.5 His doctoral dissertation (Ph.D.) 
was entitled A Form of Critical Analysis of the Cultic Traditions of Israel’s 
Early Worship. While teaching at Eden, in 1974, he also earned a Ph.D. in 
education at St. Louis University. He worked at the faculty of Eden Theologi-
cal Seminary 1961–1986 (as Dean 1968–1982). In 1986, he was inaugurated 
as William Marcellus McPheeters professor of theology at Columbia Theolog-
ical Seminary, and held this position until his retirement in 2003.6 
Brueggemann is a believing Christian. His reading of the Old Testament is 
                                                     
4 See Rolf P. Knierim, The Task of Old Testament theology: Substance, Method and Case (Mich-
igan: Eerdmans, 1995), 1-145. 
5 Walter Brueggemann, Unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, Box 25, 387. 
6 See http://www.walterbrueggemann.com/ last accessed 10 June 2018. 
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always open to the presence of God.7 The portrait of him in The Encyclopedia 
of Christian Literature, Volume 2 (2010), presents his broad authorship:  
Through his teaching, lecturing, and writing, Brueggemann has 
made an attempt at integrating academic studies with the life of 
the church and the work for the ministry, and as a result, he has 
produced work on religious education, preaching, prayer, mis-
sions, evangelism, discipleship, worship, and urban renewal. As 
an exegete, Brueggemann has written commentaries on a number 
of books of the Scripture.8 
With regard to Brueggemann it is important to see that he started his scholarly 
career in the early 70s at a time when Brevard Childs (1923–2007) and Barr 
were raising critical questions towards the discipline of Old Testament theol-
ogy. Brueggemann was influenced by them, and has emphasized that the dis-
cipline should apply methods that are applicable to the postmodern context as 
well as to the text itself. That he has lived in the interface between academy 
and Church is significant when it comes to describing his enterprise in general.9 
He argues that neither the historical-critical method nor classical church theol-
ogy has been able to comprehend the theological density that is inherent in the 
text of the Old Testament. His approach is then distanced from, on the one 
hand, the fideism of “scholastic conservatism” and church theology, and, on 
the other hand, the skepticism of “liberal rationalism” and the historical-critical 
                                                     
7 See Bruce C. Birch et al., eds., A Theological Introduction to the Old Testament (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 2005), 2: “To read the Old Testament theologically is to seek in its texts wis-
dom on the ways of God that allows us to submit ourselves and our actions to the same God in 
the effort to be faithful communities in the world.” See also Walter Brueggemann, The Message 
of the Psalms, A Theological Commentary (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1984), 
171. See also; Brevard Childs, “Some Reflections on the Search for a Biblical Theology,” HBT 
4 (1982): 1-12. According to Childs, Brueggemann “has powerfully made the case that the be-
lieving community is an important and indispensable reference for doing biblical theology. He 
does not suggest this to the neglect or disregard of the academy, nor do I.”  
8 Claude Mariottini, “Walter Brueggemann,” in The Encyclopedia of Christian Literature, Vol 
2. (ed. G.T. Kurian and J.D. III Smith. Scarecrow Press, 2010), 226. 
9 According to Brueggemann, the term church theology is a reading of the Old Testament 
through a dogmatic, classical, and conservative Christian perspective, either Catholic or Lu-
theran/Reformed. 
14 
 
method.10 If these methods are allowed to prevail within Church and academy, 
YHWH, the central character in the Old Testament, will not appear properly. 
Instead, Brueggemann argues that “theological interpretation must be done in 
the faithful articulation of the character and agency of God, who authorizes 
and summons to an alternative.”11  
In order to understand why ToT has caused such a lively debate among schol-
ars, it is important to mention some of the controversial ideas which 
Brueggemann presents in his work. These ideas would hardly have caused so 
much discussion had fewer scholars regarded his enterprise as being success-
ful. He is widely considered as “one of the foremost Old Testament scholars 
of the last several decades”, and “perhaps the most widely-known Old Testa-
ment specialist” among pastors.12 In a broad sense, therefore, ToT is a theolog-
ical presentation of the Old Testament with the purpose of describing God in 
the Old Testament, YHWH, on the solid basis of four different testimonies. 
The book is framed by a masterly introduction wherein Brueggemann de-
scribes the theological discipline of the Old Testament from its dawn with Jo-
han Philip Gabler in the 1830s to the contemporary era. A retrospect section 
ends the book, wherein Brueggemann justifies his approach and argues for the 
necessity of an Old Testament theological discipline in a postmodern context. 
The main body of the book is devoted to a characterization of YHWH in the 
Old Testament. By means of a courtroom metaphor, used in a unique way, he 
has created a tool to incorporate various testimonies of YHWH; in sum, the 
four testimonies, the core-, the counter-, the embodied- and the unsolicited- 
testimonies, describe YHWH from different contexts, genres, aspects, using 
different words and emphases. His main emphasis is that all four testimonies 
share the same story, with different versions, and thus together they present the 
                                                     
10 Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Min-
neapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 747: “Neither liberal rationalism nor scholastic conservatism 
will yield any energy or freedom for serious, sustained obedience or for buoyant elemental 
trust.” 
11 Brueggemann, Unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, Box 37, 1315. 
12 James Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old Testament Perspective (London: SCM 
Press, 1999), 541. 
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true characterization of YHWH. These truth must be held together, but accord-
ing to Brueggemann, there is no easily convergence. There are two ditches for 
those who searches to describe the God in the bible; either God becomes a 
platonic, non-emotional God, or the same God becomes the suffering God, 
who falls short on the idea of sovereignty. Brueggemann’s characterization of 
the God of the Old Testament is a challenge because he stresses a sovereign 
God who encompasses passion, but passion in an uncontrolled way.  
If Brueggemann’s ToT is a challenge for the discipline of Old Testament the-
ology it has to be mentioned that the discipline itself is somewhat controversial. 
Most apparent is that the discipline has never reached a methodological con-
sensus. Barr stresses the fact that there is no objective method: 
The question, often posed, of ‘methodology’ in writing a work 
on biblical theology is thus a relatively unimportant one. There 
is no such thing as a ‘right’ methodology for carrying out such a 
task.
13
 
This fact has even led scholars to argue for the impossibility of undertaking 
Old Testament theology.14 Leo Perdue describes the situation within the disci-
pline of Old Testament theology at the end of the 20th century as a methodo-
logical crisis. There is, he argues, a historical collapse which means that… 
… for a quarter of a century at least, there has been an active 
revolt against the domination of history (particularly in its posi-
tivistic expression) and historical method in accessing the mean-
ing of the Hebrew Bible and the birthing of Old Testament the-
ology.
15
 
                                                     
13 James Barr, “‘Real’ Theology in Biblica Theology,” in Ben C. Ollenburger, Old Testament 
Theology: Flowering and Future (Wiona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2004), 449-62.  
14 E.g. Rainer Albertz, “Religionsgeschichte Israels Oder Theologie des Alten Testaments? 
Plädoyer für eine forschungsgeschichtliche Umorientierung, Theologie des Alten Testaments 
oder Religionsgeschichte Israels?” JBTh 10 (1995): 3-24.  
15 Leo Perdue, Reconstructing Old Testament Theology after the Collapse of History (Philadel-
phia: Fortress Press, 2005), 4. 
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I would argue that this collapse functions as a larger motivation for 
Brueggemann’s search for a new methodological approach in ToT, beyond his-
torical and ontological discussions. His attempt, Jill Middlemas writes, is to 
start with the testimony as the basis for his theology: 
Brueggemann sets forth his accumulated knowledge and assess-
ment of the current state of Old Testament theology as well as 
his understanding of how to do Old Testament theology on the 
basis of the witness of the rhetorics of the biblical text.
16
 
There is then no doubt that his approach is controversial because it yields a 
concept of God with a profound tension within YHWH. However, the same 
could be said concerning his most important source of inspiration and simulta-
neously his antipole, Childs. At least Brueggemann argues that Childs’ ap-
proach is disputative, because he actually seems to present a concept of God 
that is determined prior to any encounter with Scripture, the ultimate source 
for describing God.  
The critical question arises: how should a theological interpretation of the Old 
Testament be properly described? Brueggemann stands in a pastoral reality 
wherein every instance of preaching in a congregation formulates that “God is 
love” as explicitly set down in 1 John 4:16. For him, God’s love could be de-
scribed as Israel’s core-testimony. Such a testimony is indisputable for almost 
every Christian. At least, everyone wants to believe in a God of love. However, 
a mutual pastoral experience is the existence of a so called counter-testimony, 
i.e. according to Brueggemann, a testimony visible in the Old Testament which 
expresses a serious challenge to the proposed core-testimony of a loving God. 
Even a revised Sunday-school Bible reveals a biblical history of brutal violence 
and human testimonies that call a compassionate God into question. The God 
                                                     
16 Jill Middlemas, “Introduction,” in The Centre and the Periphery—A European Tribute to 
Walter Brueggemann (ed. J. Middlemas et al. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2010), 1-6. 
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in the Old Testament stands in close proximity to wrath and furious anger.17 
Brueggemann suggests that there is no possible convergence between God’s 
love and God’s wrath. Instead, the visible tensions in the Old Testament text 
have a corresponding theological tension within God, YHWH. What he means 
is that any serious theological attempt to interpret the Old Testament text must 
pay attention to this double feature in the testimonies, the final result of which 
is a theological tension. Brueggemann cannot accept any presentation of the 
core-testimony at the expense of the counter-testimony, and therefore, his con-
cept of God diverges from previous attempts in that he describes a tension at 
the core of the concept of God. In 1997, he published ToT wherein he suggests 
that in order to describe the God of Israel, YHWH in the Old Testament, it 
must be done without reference to historical and ontological claims prior to the 
text. For him, this means that God—the central character of the Old Testa-
ment—should be understood solely on the basis of the text, without any, or at 
least with as few claims of God prior to the text as possible. Historical and 
ontological propositions of God are not made prior to the text, but subsequently 
in the hermeneutical process of interpretation. The character of God, in his 
view, involves an unresolved tension. As a major contribution to the field of 
Old Testament theology, Brueggemann’s approach warrants investigation.  
                                                     
17 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 244: “It is likely that the violence assigned to 
Yahweh is to be understood as counterviolence, which functions primarily as a critical principle 
in order to undermine and destabilize other violence.” 
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THE RESPONSE FROM ACADEMY AND CHURCH 
Brueggemann’s approach has received an impressive response18 from both the 
academic guild and the churches, from Catholics19 as well as Protestants, and 
has germinated many questions. In the following, I will present some of these 
responses. Moreover, I will relate this study to central hermeneutical and epis-
temological questions raised and discussed in the response. Gilbert L. Barthol-
omew, in Homiletic (1998), states that in ToT Brueggemann presents a com-
plementary view of God: “Through the method and the metaphor, a comple-
mentary image of God has now become more clearly visible, an image that has 
often been refused through church history.”20 Timothy F. Simpson, in Journal 
for Preachers (1997), regards ToT as “the benchmark by which all future rhe-
torically-based theologies will be judged.”21 On the other hand, the criticism 
of ToT is serious. Paul D. Hanson criticizes Brueggemann’s concept of God.22 
                                                     
18 See e.g. Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 541-62; John Bergsma, “Useful for the 
Church? A Critique of Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament,” CTJ 35 (2000): 
105-35; Brevard Childs, “Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament. Testimony, 
Dispute, Advocacy”, SJT 53 (2000): 228-33; followed by Walter Brueggemann, “A response to 
Professor Childs,” SJT 53 (2000): 228-33; Joep Dubbink, “Reality is Highly Overrated, God in 
Language and Reality in Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament,” Communio viatorum 
51 (2009): 240-49; Terence Fretheim, “Some Reflections on Brueggemann’s God,” in God in 
The Fray: festschrift W. Brueggemann (ed. T. Linafelt and T. K. Beal; Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1998), 24-37; Norman T. Gottwald, “Rhetorical, Historical, and Ontological Counter-
points in Doing Old Testament Theology”, in God in the Fray: festschrift W. Brueggemann (ed. 
T. Linafelt and T. K. Beal; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 11-23; Donald E. Gowan, review 
of Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, HBT 20 (1998): 89-98; J. S. Kaminsky 
- M. S. Odell - R. Rendtorff, reviews of W. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, RBL 
1 (1999) 1-21 [Kaminsky 1-6; Odell 6-11; Rendtorff 11-17. Response by Brueggemann 17-21]; 
Jon D. Levenson, “Is Really Brueggemann a Pluralist,” HTR Vol. 93, No. 3 (2000): 265-94, 
Gordon Wenham, “Walter Brueggemann - An Old Testament Theology for the New Millen-
nium?” 169-76. 
19 The archbishop of Milwaukee, Richard J Sklba, review of Brueggemann, Theology of the Old 
Testament, TS 59 (1998): 722: “This volume is enjoyable reading and very valuable. I recom-
mend it wholeheartedly.” 
20 Craig Bartholomew, review of Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, Homi-
letic 23 1 (1998): 26. 
21 Simpson, review of Brueggemann, 45. 
22 Paul D. Hanson, “A New Challenge to Biblical Theology,” JAAR 67 (1999): 451-52: 
“Brueggemann’s model of the religious community preserving its traditional language as a dis-
crete system and hence calling for no effort on the part of the modern interpreter to engage in 
historical criticism, comparative studies, or ontological! reflection, seems quite incongruent with 
biblical Israel, a community open to the religious metaphors and insights of other cultures as a 
part of an ongoing, dynamic process of spiritual discovery.” See also same article, 453-54: “How 
can one claim that the very God presented by the testimony of Israel is self-conflicted when the 
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Childs was also very critical of ToT and argued that Brueggemann presented a 
theology based on a gnostic foundation.23 Even eleven years after its publica-
tion, in 2008 at the SBL annual meeting in Boston, ToT was intensely debated. 
Bruce K. Waltke considered Brueggemann’s theological conclusions to be 
blasphemous and heretical.24 In sum, Brueggemann highlights many theologi-
cal problems, and challenges many previous approaches, interpretations and 
theological systematizations of God in the Old Testament, above all within 
classical, conservative communities but also within academic circles fostered 
by the historical-critical method.  
THREE MODELS THAT DOMINATE THE DISCIPLINE  
The Swedish Old Testament scholar, LarsOlov Eriksson, when sketching three 
different theological models dominating the discipline of Old Testament the-
ology during the 20th century, highlights Brueggemann’s approach together 
with those of Walther Eichrodt (1890–1978) and Gerhard von Rad (1901–
1971).25 According to Eriksson, the first theological model is closely connected 
with Eichrodt’s. This model pays attention to common ideas and themes in the 
texts of the Old Testament. The main point here is the God who makes cove-
nants. The second model, represented by von Rad, examines how the theology 
of the Old Testament is formed throughout the history of Israel. The focus here 
is on the God who acts. The third model pays attention to the rhetorical feature 
of the text, as a source for describing the concept of God, i.e. the God who 
                                                     
canonical shape of the Torah, the Psalms, and the prophets give ample evidence of the efforts of 
Israel’s tradents to present a morally consistent view of God?” 
23 Childs, “Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament. Testimony, Dispute, Advo-
cacy,” 229-33. See also the response by Walter Brueggemann, “A Response to Professor Childs 
by Walter Brueggemann,” in Brueggemann, The Book that Breathes New Life (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 2005), 175-79. 
Brueggemann, The Book that Breathes New Life, 174-75.  
24 Bruce Waltke with Charles Yun, An Old Testament Theology, An Exegetical, Canonical, and 
Thematic Approach (Michigan: Zondervan, 2007), 71. Reprinted in Bruce Waltke, review of 
Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, CRUX: Vol. 41, No. 2 (2005): 44. 
25 See LarsOlov Eriksson & Åke Viberg, Gud och det Utvalda Folket, Inledning till Gamla 
Testamentet (Stockholm: Verbum, 2009), 212. For an introduction to the methodological prob-
lem of the discipline of Old Testament theology, see e.g. Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 
Gerhard Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate (Fourth Editions, 
Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1991); John Sailhamer, Introduction to Old Testament Theology, A 
Canonical Approach (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995), 29-36. 
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speaks. According to Eriksson, Brueggemann, in the same way as Eichrodt and 
von Rad, stands as a role model for this rhetorical approach.26 This model could 
also be labeled postmodern, referring to – among others – Childs, who links 
this term to Brueggemann’s approach.27 The Norwegian theologian Halvar 
Hagelia has paid attention to Brueggemann specifically from the backdrop of 
the impressive response to ToT.28 According to Hagelia, the response proves 
that Brueggemann’s theology stands as a kind of role model within the disci-
pline of Old Testament theology. 
1.3 BIBLICAL REFERENTIALITY 
The following important hermeneutical question must be analyzed in order to 
understand Brueggemann’s concept of God: 
- Does Brueggemann’s interpretation of YHWH in the Old Testament 
intend to refer to YHWH as an ontological proposition (extra-referen-
tial) or does his interpretation of YHWH intend to refer to a narrative 
or drama for the ecclesial community (non-referential)? The term non-
referential is equivalent to immanent, intrasemiotic, intratextual or 
textual ontology.  
If we can affirm that Brueggemann intends to refer to YHWH as an ontological 
proposition a theological problem arises, the problem of a tension within 
YHWH. To illustrate the difference between an extra-referential and non-ref-
erential understanding of Brueggemann’s interpretation, the difference be-
tween a religious painting and a Greek orthodox icon is a good example. Each 
painting refers to the observer in different ways, i.e. they differ with regard to 
referentiality. A religious painting intends to refer meaning to the observer 
                                                     
26 Eriksson & Viberg, Gud och det Utvalda Folket, 213. 
27 Brevard Childs, The Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 292. 
28 See Halvar Hagelia, Three Old Testament Theologies for Today: Helge S. Kvanvig, Walter 
Brueggemann and Erhard Gerstenberger (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2012), 183: “The in-
vestigation of the scholars presented in this book has demonstrated that it is Brueggemann, of 
the three, who has generated most debate. The series of reviews and other responses to 
Brueggemann’s Theology is imposing.” 
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without claiming to refer to God in an ontological sense. A Greek orthodox 
icon however, as used in the liturgy, is intended by the ecclesial community to 
refer to God as a window to heaven. In an analogical way, the question in this 
study is whether Brueggemann intends to describe YHWH in the Old Testa-
ment as a painting or as an icon. In the introduction to Biblical Theology of the 
Old and New Testaments, Childs thoroughly discusses how words refer to the 
ontological reality and describes it as a fundamental problem that there is often 
“an assumed hermeneutics” at work behind the discipline:  
First of all, the proposal to raise these issues brings into the fore-
ground of the discussion a fundamental problem which has either 
been pushed into the background or consigned to an interpreter’s 
hidden agenda. Seldom has the issue of the substance of the wit-
ness, that is, its reality, been dealt with above board and clearly, 
but rather some sort of assumed hermeneutic has been silently 
operative.
29
 
Childs also lists five examples of this “assumed hermeneutics” which – ac-
cording to him, in different ways – unsuccessfully try to solve how various 
witnesses in the Old Testament refer to the reality outside the text: 1) Von 
Rad’s Heilsgeschicte, 2) Rudolf Bultmann’s existentialist approach, 3) various 
narrative theologies e.g. George Lindbeck’s linguistic approach, 4) some im-
aginative construals, and 5) Gerhard Ebeling’s contrast between substance and 
accident in Old Testament theology. These five models seem to indicate that 
Brueggemann’s theological approach also tries to solve the same problem.30 
The question is if he succeeds. Another interesting part of Brueggemann’s ap-
proach that indirectly is related to the above discussion of biblical referentiality 
is that Brueggemann wants to apply the same theological value to seemingly 
                                                     
29 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 80. 
30 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 117: “The primal subject of an Old Testament 
theology is of course God.” 
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contradictory passages in the Old Testament and treat every sentence as spe-
cifically theological testimony. Exemplifying a seemingly conflicting passage, 
Psalm 44:22 and Psalm 92:15b is illuminative. In Psalm 92:15b it is written: 
He is my rock, and there is no unrighteousness in him. 
This verse states that YHWH is completely steadfast. As a consequence of this 
fact, the author praises YHWH. However, in sharp contrast, Psalm 44:22 reads: 
Because of you we are being killed all day long, and accounted 
as sheep for the slaughter. 
In Psalm 44:22 YHWH seems to be like a butcher who slaughters his chosen 
people. The interesting thing with Brueggemann is that he stresses that these 
two verses must be treated as equally important theological testimonies con-
cerning who YHWH is. In making such a claim, his approach becomes in-
volved in difficult epistemological and hermeneutical questions. He is aware 
of this fact and in ToT: He explains it well: 
It belongs to the nature of Old Testament theological interpreta-
tion that we are not permitted to be so sure as we once thought 
we were about such critical matters. This unsettlement is in part 
a result of our so-called postmodern epistemological situation. 
Underneath that reality, however, the unsettlement is a reflection 
of the nature of the Old Testament text itself and, speaking theo-
logically, of the unsettled Character who stands at the center of 
the text. Thus the unsettlement is not simply a cultural or episte-
mological one, but in the end it is a theological one.
31
 
This quotation signals that Brueggemann traces a nexus between epistemology 
(the postmodern epistemological situation), hermeneutics (the unsettlement as 
part of the reflection of the nature of the Old Testament text itself) and theology 
(speaking theologically, of the unsettled Character who stands at the center of 
                                                     
31 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, xv. 
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the Old Testament text). His approach, in the new postmodern context, 
searches to detect God on the agenda again. In this study I argue that in order 
to understand the backbone of Brueggemann’s theological enterprise, one has 
to comprehend his epistemology and hermeneutics that stand prior to the en-
counter with the text—the primary source of his theology. 
1.4 METHOD OF THE STUDY  
In order to clarify Brueggemann’s method in this study, I follow a five-stage 
methodology labeled as follows: I. Concept, II. Presupposition, III. Proposi-
tion, IV. Argumentation, and V. Structure. This five-stage methodology has 
not been adapted to structure the disposition of this study, but I have based my 
observation on ToT around these terms. These five terms have functioned as 
tools for analyzing Brueggemann’s approach, and by using them I have been 
able to suggest a coherent analysis of ToT. A detailed presentation of these five 
terms is necessary: 
CONCEPT 
Every theological approach to the Old Testament is based on various concepts 
that both inform and control the conclusions. For example, it is obvious that 
the concept “testimony” functions as a basic concept for Brueggemann in ToT. 
Moreover, this term is closely related to the courtroom metaphor. The meta-
phor of the court is comparable with corresponding concepts used by e.g. Ei-
chrodt (the Covenant), von Rad (the Creed) and Childs (the Canon). The search 
for a unifying concept is a common feature within the discipline of Old Testa-
ment theology and various attempts have been presented.32 Brueggemann’s 
unifying concept deserves to be analyzed. Moreover, it is also important to 
note that a concept is always related to content so that the search for a concept 
of an Old Testament theology is connected to the content of the Old Testament. 
This connection between content and concept is stressed in Barr’s book The 
Concept of Biblical Theology and this study searches to understand how 
                                                     
32 See Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, 163. 
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Brueggemann’s concept, i.e. the courtroom metaphor, relates to the content of 
the Old Testament.  
Around the primary concept of the courtroom metaphor other important con-
cepts must also be analyzed in order to present a coherent picture of ToT. In 
sum, his approach will be related to each of the following concepts underpin-
ning the basic concept of courtroom metaphor:  
Postmodernism: Brueggemann uses this term quite frequently in ToT. He is 
fostered within an American context, and can be designated as a postmodern 
scholar for those supporting a theological interpretation of the Old Testament 
in the 20th century. The term postmodernism and its further meaning and 
Brueggemann’s position are analyzed more closely in Chapter 3.  
Foundationalism: This term is an important epistemological concept which is 
discussed in ToT. I will analyze it more closely in Chapter 4.  
The Rule of Faith. Brueggemann relates his own approach to that of Childs. 
The understanding of the Rule of Faith as a lens or as result in the hermeneu-
tical process is the focus in Chapter 6. 
Finally, God above and in the fray is a theological concept. This is demon-
strated in Chapter 7.  
PRESUPPOSITION 
With the term “presupposition” I mean the philosophical, idea-historical, cul-
tural, and contextual factors which are behind ToT. Many of these factors are 
not obvious in ToT or discussed in detail but nonetheless form Brueggemann’s 
thinking. In chapter 3 I have understood that e.g. the postmodern situation and 
foundationalism are crucial in order to understand ToT. More specially, we 
have to understand in what ways a postmodern paradigm affects 
Brueggemann’s epistemology and subsequently his biblical interpretation? 
Concerning postmodernism, Perdue writes that… 
… postmodernism understands epistemology as the process by 
which the knower and the known are together involved in human 
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understanding. Thus, the position is false that argues for the ob-
jectivity of the interpreter.
33
 
Perdue’s definition of postmodernism stresses a change of epistemology, her-
meneutics, and theology. A relevant question then, is the following: in what 
way is Brueggemann formed by the postmodern hallmarks of interpretation 
and how does his approach relate to the text and the community that interprets 
the text. The metaphor of testimony is, moreover, related to the courtroom met-
aphor, wherein many witnesses present their testimony. For him, the courtroom 
metaphor functions as a concept for evaluating biblical texts and putting them 
into different categories of testimonies. This means, finally, that there is a sub-
jective element which determines the definition of the testimony. 
PROPOSITION 
I use this term to clarify how to understand those important statements that 
Brueggemann presents in ToT. The most important proposition from 
Brueggemann is that the rhetorical tension in the text has a corresponding the-
ological tension. Another proposition is that speech and reality coexist (see 
chapter 5). This means that God is revealed to the community only in, with, 
and under the biblical text. Nevertheless, Brueggemann reaches outside of the 
drama of the text, especially in the so-called embodied testimony, and in this 
way, his proposal for an Old Testament theology evokes the question: Does 
God exist only within the texts or also outside them? This evokes further im-
portant questions: can visible textual tensions in the Old Testament be inter-
                                                     
33 Perdue, Reconstructing Old Testament Theology after the Collapse of History, 242. Perdue 
writes that in contrast to historical research, postmodernism argues that there are many more 
important contexts than the historical context to consider. 
See also Hagelia, Three Old Testament Theologies for Today, 187: “Nevertheless, postmodern-
ism is here, with postmodernists claiming their rights and ‘preserve’, also within biblical schol-
arship and Old Testament theology, with all its implications. Will postmodernism result in a de-
historicized Old Testament theology? At least Brueggemann demonstrates a lack of interest in 
‘what happened’, as frequently noticed.” 
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preted univocally? Are there hermeneutic tools for bringing seemingly dispu-
tative texts into a theological consistency? Is Brueggemann’s proposition of a 
corresponding rhetorical and theological tension a justified proposition?  
ARGUMENTATION 
Brueggemann relates the discipline of Old Testament theology closely to epis-
temological and hermeneutical questions because the discipline intends to 
summarize, structuralize, and conceptualize the content of the Old Testament. 
Therefore, in order to understand how his various propositions become justi-
fied, his epistemology and hermeneutics must be analyzed. Specifically, this 
means that I want to understand how Brueggemann argues for his use of testi-
mony as an epistemological foundation. Moreover, I want to understand his 
hermeneutics that is based on his epistemology and finally, how his theology 
should be analyzed in relation to important themes such as the Rule of Faith 
and biblical referentiality. 
STRUCTURE 
Finally, this study aims to describe the structured backbone of ToT. I here pre-
suppose that there is an important connection between Brueggemann’s episte-
mology and hermeneutics that affects his theology. This means taking an X-
ray analysis of ToT, where the whole skeleton is made visible by describing 
these basic ideas, i.e. his epistemology and hermeneutics, which have struc-
tured his Old Testament theology.  
1.5 GOD ABOVE AND IN THE FRAY 
Brueggemann stresses the importance of embracing all texts in the Old Testa-
ment as specifically theological testimonies. This theological intention is sum-
marized in the distinction between God above the fray and God in the fray. 
Fray is in Brueggemann’s theology best translated as battle and is used as the 
theological distinction that concludes his dialectic between core and counter-
testimonies, where core-testimonies are equivalent to God above the fray and 
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counter-testimony refers to God in the fray.34 More precisely, according to him, 
God above the fray refers to texts in the Old Testament that support order and 
structure in the creation and in society—God as transcendent and above human 
battle and suffering. God in the fray, on the other hand, refers to texts that 
embrace pain and suffering—God as immanent and in the battle of suffering 
with and for mankind.35 As already noted, in ToT Brueggemann argues, on the 
basis of the existence of a counter-testimony, that there is a tension in the con-
cept of God: “Israel had to reckon with a theological discernment that consists 
in a profound disjunction that is not only a matter of lived experience but also 
a crucial theological datum.”36 This conclusion, that there is a profound dis-
junction, is not necessary to accept. However, it is understandable that 
Brueggemann draws the conclusion that his understanding of God in the fray 
leads to the existential question of theodicy: 
The dialogical-dialectical quality of the text that keeps God “in 
the fray” brings one inevitably to the question of theodicy.37 
When God is in the fray, the question arises: is God in the Old Testament, 
YHWH, unfair? In this study I argue that it is possible to solve “the profound 
disjunction” within YHWH by using a modified version of Brueggemann’s 
theological distinction. I suggest that God in the fray could be reformulated 
and given the term Israel in the fray. In this way, YHWH becomes incarnated 
in his chosen people—Israel, the people who is in the fray with God.38 This 
means that the theological relationship between God and Israel reveals a God 
who always stands in relation to someone. More precisely, YHWH stands in a 
                                                     
34 See Walter Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, l: Structure Legitimation,” 
CBQ 47 (1985): 28-46; and idem, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II: Embrace of Pain,” 
CBQ 47 (1985): 395-415. These two articles are reprinted in Old Testament Theology: Essays 
on Structure, Theme, and Text (ed. Patrick D. Miller: Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). 
35 Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 23: “Although this theology (the common theology 
of the ancient Near East, my emphasis) speaks of God’s rule as settled and ‘above the fray,’ this 
theology is always worked out and concerned with being ‘in the fray’: that is, this constractual 
theology is never disinterested, detached, objectively clear, or perfectly obvious.” 
36 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 310. 
37 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 83. 
38 For this distinction I am indebted to Johannes P. E. Börjesson. 
28 
 
close relationship to Israel. It is YHWH who identifies himself with the suffer-
ing of the persecuted Israel.  
1.6 SOURCES 
OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES OF BRUEGGEMANN AND ToT 
Some comments on the sources used in this study will now be presented. Aca-
demic reflection on Brueggemann’s approach is ongoing, and some sources 
are mentioned here because they refer specifically to the topic of this study. To 
date, no study has focused attention on his concept of God in relation to his 
epistemology and hermeneutics. In 1998, a festschrift entitled God in the Fray: 
A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann (ed. Tod Linafelt and Timothy Beal) was 
published. In this book, many of his colleagues and students contributed im-
portant articles to his theology. Concerning Brueggemann’s concept of God 
and specifically his argument that there is a tension within YHWH, Nathan 
Tiessen has published the article “A Theology of Ruth: The Dialectic of Coun-
tertestimony and Core Testimony” in Direction 39/2 (2010). In this article, 
Tiessen applies Brueggemann’s core and counter-testimony as a hermeneutical 
tool to the book of Ruth. Mattew R Schlimm published an important article 
that specifically concerns Brueggemann’s concept of God: “Different Perspec-
tives on Divine Pathos: An Examination of Hermeneutics in Biblical Theol-
ogy.” (CBQ 69, 2007). Finally, I want to mention Carey Walsh’s article “The 
Wisdom in Rupture, Brueggemann’s Notion of Countertestimony for Post-
modern Biblical Theology” because it stands out in the argumentation that 
Brueggemann’s hermeneutics should be understood as extra-referential. 39 In 
2010, a European festschrift to Brueggemann entitled The Centre and the Pe-
riphery: A European Tribute to Walter Brueggemann (ed. Jill Middlemas, Da-
vid J.A. Clines, and Else K. Holt) was published. This book was a European 
tribute to Brueggemann and many of the contributors themselves inspired him 
in his work with ToT. The festschrift pays attention to the fact that he has 
                                                     
39 See Carey Walsh “The Wisdom in Rupture, Brueggemann’s Notion of Countertestimony for 
Postmodern Biblical Theology.” in Biblical Theology: Past, Present, and Future, (ed. Carey 
Walsh, and Mark W. Elliott: Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2016), 167-76. 
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worked in the interface between central methods and methods in the margin, 
i.e. on the periphery. Finally, in 2015, another dedication to him, the book Im-
agination, Ideology and Inspiration, Echoes of Brueggemann in a New Gener-
ation (ed. by Jonathan Kaplan and Robert Williamson) was published. This 
work pays attention to the transmission of Brueggemann’s approach within 
both the academic guild and pastoral communities. These works are referred 
to in this study because they specifically or partly relate to Brueggemann’s 
concept of God. There are also other books that have made important contri-
butions to other areas within his vast and impressive publications. To deserve 
mentioning: firstly, in 2001, Vaughn S Thompson published a dissertation on 
Brueggemann’s work with imagination. Reading with Imagination: A Study of 
the Imagination in the Work of Walter Brueggemann with Special Reference 
to Amos 9:11–15 (published at Denver Seminary, US, Carey S Thomas Li-
brary, Littleton). Secondly, in 2012, Hagelia published the volume Three Old 
Testament Theologies for Today: Helge S. Kvanvig, Walter Brueggemann and 
Erhard Gerstenberger (Hebrew Scripture Monographs, 44; Sheffield: Shef-
field Phoenix Press, 2012). This impressive study by Hagelia pays attention to 
three different conceptions of how an Old Testament theology can be arranged, 
where Brueggemann functions as a model for a rhetorical approach. 
PRIMARY PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED BOOKS 
This present study could be defined as a meta-study. I use the term meta be-
cause the current project does not primarily focus on a specific biblical text or 
book, but is rather a study of how one scholar interprets the Old Testament 
text. Within Brueggemann’s broad authorship, as presented here, ToT func-
tions as the most relevant source for an understanding of his theological think-
ing. Understanding Brueggemann’s theology in this study therefore converges 
in many ways in understanding ToT. Other sources have, however, been con-
sulted as well. Important sources in this regard are those who respond to ToT 
in articles, reviews, debates and letters. In addition to these sources, 
Brueggemann has written over 100 books (2017: 117) and numerous articles 
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and reviews. All of them are important contributions to the academy as well as 
to the Church. However, with regard to his epistemological, hermeneutical and 
theological thinking, some books, commentaries, and articles have been espe-
cially important.40 The first book in this regard is The Land – Place as Gift, 
Promise, and Challenge in Biblical Faith published in 1977.41 This book 
makes the motif of the land the theological prism for interpreting the Old Tes-
tament and in this way demarcates against a historical approach and orients 
towards the text as the primary source for Old Testament theology. For 
Brueggemann, the hermeneutical conclusion at the end of this book functions 
as an interesting alternative to a historical-theological approach as formulated 
by Von Rad and George E. Wright (1909–1974). A second important book is 
The Prophetic Imagination, published in 1978.42 In this work, Brueggemann 
describes imagination as a hermeneutical tool for Old Testament theology. He 
describes imagination, partly as an immanent aspect visible in the final form 
of the text, and partly as a way of thinking for the interpreter or the preacher 
of the biblical text. Imagination in this twofold sense, together with a rhetorical 
concern, forms much of his further thinking and has made his theological ap-
proach so interesting. A third important book is Texts under Negotiation: The 
Scripture and Postmodern Imagination (1993), in which his interpretative pro-
gram is presented. This book marks the intensive process four years prior to 
ToT. In addition to these three books, briefly described here, Brueggemann 
also wrote some important commentaries, such as Genesis (1982), I Kings and 
II Kings (1982), Message of the Psalms, A Theological commentary (1984), 
                                                     
40 Charles Conroy, Professor of Old Testament at Gregorian University, Rome, has published a 
very helpful homepage of the most important books, articles, and reviews on Walter 
Brueggemann and his theology, see http://www.cjconroy.net/bib/ott-bruegg.htm#one (accessed 
March 13, 2017). Other important books by Brueggemann for the formation of ToT, see e.g. 
Walter Brueggemann, The Creative Word: Canon as a Model for Biblical Education (Philadel-
phia: Fortress Press, 1982); David’s Truth: In Israel’s Imagination and Memory (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1985); Hopeful Imagination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1986); Interpretation 
and Obedience, From Faithful Reading to Faithful Living (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); 
A Social Reading of the Old Testament: Prophetic Approaches to Israel’s Communal Life (Min-
neapolis: Fortress Press, 1994).  
41 A second edition was published in 2003. 
42 Walter Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, Second Edition (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2001). 
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First and Second Samuel – A Scripture Commentary for Teaching and Preach-
ing (1990) and To Build, to Plant: A Commentary on the Book of Jeremiah 26-
52 (1991). In these commentaries, despite important internal variations—e.g. 
the Psalms commentary is a thematic commentary, whereas the Genesis com-
mentary is a chapter to chapter commentary—he consistently highlights the 
final form of the text as the primary source for Old Testament theology. These 
commentaries can then be seen in the process towards ToT as implanting a 
textual theological thinking, and as a theological thematization of various Old 
Testament books. One year after ToT was published, in 1998, Brueggemann 
published his two commentaries on Isaiah (Commentary of Isaiah Vol. 1: 
Chapters 1-39 and Commentary of Isaiah Vol. 2 40-66). He is deeply influ-
enced by this biblical book, especially when it comes to his use of the court-
room metaphor as a tool for biblical interpretation.  
With regard to articles by Brueggemann, many share a common focus on meth-
odological issues. Some have been collected and edited by Patrick D. Miller in 
three volumes: Old Testament Theology: Essays on Structure, Theme, and Text 
(1992); A Social Reading of the Old Testament: Prophetic Approaches to Is-
rael’s Communal Life (1994) and The Psalms and The Life of Faith (1995). 
The articles in these three volumes have paved the way and functioned as pre-
cursors for ToT in various ways. Brueggemann here traces the roots of the dis-
cipline and suggests new trajectories for it. He also argues for a new method 
for the discipline: one that pays attention to both the historical and cultural 
structures of the ancient world and, simultaneously, embraces the pain that sur-
rounds human life.43 In 1997, he crowned his productive career with ToT. ToT 
was translated into German in 2004. Apparently the translation of the German 
ToT is so ambiguous that it includes sixteen essays that relate to ToT, providing 
a background for understanding the methodological difficulties that surround 
                                                     
43 Walter Brueggemann, “A Convergence in Recent Old Testament Theologies,” JSOT 18 
(1980): 2-18; “Futures in Old Testament Theology,” HBT 6 (1984): 1-11; “A Shape for Old 
Testament Theology I: Structure Legitimation,” CBQ 47 (1985): 28-46 (Reprinted in 
Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 1-21); “A Shape for Old Testament Theology II: Em-
brace of Pain,” CBQ 47 (1985): 395-415 (Reprinted in Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 
22-44). 
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ToT.44 ToT has also been translated into Hungarian with an introduction by 
Brueggemann wherein he responds and defends his methodological ap-
proach.45 ToT was also translated into Spanish in 2007.46 This overview of 
sources for this study shows that ToT was anticipated in many ways. It began 
in the 70s and then, in a process of continuity, came to a theological conclusion 
in 1997. In this study I have also used some unpublished letters and lecture 
notes with permission from Benton Kline, Jr. Special Collections and Ar-
chives, Jon Bulow Campbell Library, Columbia Theological Seminary. I will 
refer to these sources throughout this study. 
1.7 THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This study has three main parts, each divided into two chapters. The first part, 
chapters 2 and 3, is entitled TOT AND ITS CONTEXTS. In Chapter 2, ToT is 
described with special attention to the counter-testimony and its response from 
the scholarly guild. Chapter 3 deals with Brueggemann’s theology, within the 
broader context of the history of the discipline of Old Testament theology, as 
I highlight seven important contexts that demarcate and characterize 
Brueggemann and ToT within the discipline. These seven contexts also provide 
insight into his development as a theologian, from his early studies at Elmhurst 
in 1955 to his publication of ToT in 1997. I argue that his theological profile 
has developed in a process of continuity described as imaginative and rhetori-
cal.  
The second part, chapters 4 and 5, is entitled BRUEGGEMANN’S FOUNDA-
TIONS. Chapter 4 concentrates on whether his epistemology should be defined 
                                                     
44 Walter Brueggemann, Polyphonie und Einbildungskraft: zur Theologie des Alten Testaments, 
Wiener Alttestamentliche Studien, 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004). 
45 Walter Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy Re-
visited,” CBQ 74 (2012): 28-38. Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy. Encountering the Theology of 
Walter Brueggemann. (ed. Csaba Balogh // In Hungarian: Tanúságtétel, vita, pártfogás. Talá-
lkozások Walter Brueggemann teológiájával. Kolozsvár: Exit 2014. 214 pages of ToT has been 
translated into Hungarian. 
46 Walter Brueggemann, Teologia del Antiguo Testamento (Biblioteca De Estudios Biblicos, 
2007). 
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as non-foundational or as weak foundational. I argue that his focus on the tes-
timony as a ground of certitude indicates an epistemology that could be defined 
as a variant of weak foundationalism. In chapter 5, Brueggemann’s hermeneu-
tical approach is examined. In the first part (5.2–5.4) the focus is on depicting 
his hermeneutics around three elements: the written testimony within an eccle-
sial community, imagination and the Jewish tradition. These elements consti-
tute Brueggemann’s hermeneutics. The second part of the chapter (5.5–5.6) 
relates his hermeneutics to the topic of biblical referentiality, and as noted 
above, the problem how Brueggemann refers to YHWH; in an extra-referential 
or an immanent way, or both. The third part, chapters 6 and 7, is entitled A 
THEOLOGY OF THE FRAY. Brueggemann’s theological interpretation of 
YHWH is analyzed here. I demonstrate and analyze his theological conclu-
sions. Interaction with previous epistemological and hermeneutical conclu-
sions is made. In chapter 6, his method is compared with that of Childs. Simi-
larities as well as differences are presented and special emphasis is given to the 
function of the Rule of Faith within biblical theology. In chapter 7 I pay atten-
tion to his theology with the help of an analysis of Psalm 44. 
In chapter 8 the main conclusions are presented and a suggestion how the coun-
ter-testimony could be understood; as a theological testimony without claiming 
a tension within YHWH, a testimony where God above the fray has an uncon-
ditional relationship to Israel in the fray. 
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PART I TOT AND ITS CONTEXTS 
In this part, I will describe ToT from the angle of its most essential ideas. It 
will be a descriptive part for the coming analysis in what follows. In chapter 2 
I will present a critical summary of ToT and pay special attention to the coun-
ter-testimony. In Chapter 3 I will pay attention to those contexts that embrace 
Brueggemann as a theologian. These seven contexts present a historical per-
spective on his development as a theologian where ToT functions as theologi-
cal conclusion of his thinking. In sum, these two chapters present the necessary 
background for the two more analytical parts of the study which follow. 
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CHAPTER 2 A SUMMARY OF TOT 
2.1 POLYPHONIC NORMATIVE THEOLOGY  
According to Brueggemann, there are four major testimonies in the Old Testa-
ment that present different versions of YHWH, and all are true—they describe 
complementary testimonies that function as sources for composing a rendering 
of whom YHWH is. His theology could be described as a polyphonic norma-
tive theology, where polyphonic refers to the four testimonies within the court-
room metaphor and normative refers to the fact that he wants to present a nor-
mative rendering of God for the church. In Brueggemann’s thinking the testi-
monies are transformed to present YHWH as a theological agent. Describing 
YHWH as agent is crucial for Brueggemann. I would argue that this is the most 
essential aspect for understanding him. When it comes to describe YHWH as 
agent, we can take as a point of departure, Brueggemann’s suggestion how 
God’s anger in the Old Testament can be understood: 
- God’s anger can be legitimized as an act of vengeance. 
- God’s anger can be seen as an act in favor of Israel where God’s anger 
is performed for Israel’s wellbeing. 
- God’s anger can be defined as rather marginal within Israel’s testimo-
nies of God.  
He rejects all three and argues instead that God’s anger must be understood as 
a kind of self-expression, i.e. as a realistic description of who God in the Old 
Testament, YHWH, really is: 
There is, in addition to legitimated sovereignty and determined fidelity, 
an element of Yahweh’s power that seems occasionally, in the imagina-
tive testimony of Israel, to spill over into Yahweh’s rather self-indulgent 
self-expression. I do not wish to overstate this element in the rhetoric, 
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but I also do not want to ignore the remarkable assertions in the mouth 
of Yahweh.
47 
The phrase “in the mouth of Yahweh” clearly intends that Brueggemann wants 
to stress the theological aspect of the testimonies. On another place he writes: 
“I fully recognize that to claim ‘Yahweh as agent’ is enormously problem-
atic.”48 In the footnote to this quotation he writes: “To refer to ‘Yahweh as 
agent’ reintroduces the whole vexed issue of the theology of ‘God who acts.’”49 
The theology of “God who acts” was first initiated by George E. Wright in his 
book God Who Acts; Biblical Theology as Recital (1952). This work was a 
conservative response to both liberal theology and its counterpart in America 
at that time, fundamentalism.50 Wright belonged to the Biblical Theology 
Movement (hereinafter abbreviated as BThM) which Brueggemann was also 
fostered. Despite many differences, Brueggemann and Wright then share a 
common feature; to present a theology of the Old Testament and when in ToT 
Brueggemann introduces the term “Yahweh as agent” he intends to present 
YHWH, not from a historical perspective, as Wright proposes,51 but from a 
postmodern perspective. A postmodern perspective means treating YHWH as 
both “agent and subject of contestation as the testimony of Israel attempts to 
articulate this character who defies every easy articulation.”52  
  
                                                     
47 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 276. 
48 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 727. 
49 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 727, note 5. 
50 See James Barr, Fundamentalism (London: SCM Press, 1981).  
51 George E. Wright, God Who Acts, Biblical Theology as Recital (London: SCM Press, 1952), 
57. 
52 Walter Brueggemann, “Testimony That Breaks the Silence of Totalism,” Int 70 (2016): 275. 
37 
 
2.2 THE COURTROOM METAPHOR 
Brueggemann builds his theology solely on the final text of the Old Testament 
and it is for this reason he introduces the courtroom metaphor: 
We are now able to see why Paul Ricoeur’s metaphor of trial is 
such a suggestive perspective from which to begin our exposition 
of Old Testament theology.
53
 
This courtroom metaphor should be seen as a hermeneutical tool in his theol-
ogy. For the use of this metaphor he is inspired by Ricoeur and second part of 
Isaiah (40–66).54 Some reviewers of ToT critically argue that the courtroom 
metaphor is imposed onto the biblical text material, because the metaphor col-
lects testimonies from different genres and contexts and forces them into a new 
context.55 This critique, I would argue, is only partially true, because it is no 
doubt that the courtroom metaphor is essentially biblical, clearly visible in par-
ticular Isaiah who uses the courtroom, the Hebrew verb ב׳ר (riv), as a metaphor 
to describe the confrontation between YHWH and Israel. The main reason for 
Brueggemann to use this metaphor is that it functions as a shield against any 
kind of theological reduction. The metaphor also protects the testimonies from 
historical and ontological questions prior to the text:  
… This means that theological interpretation does not go behind 
the witness with questions of history, wondering ‘what hap-
pened.’56 
                                                     
53 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 134, 119-20. 
54 The book of Isaiah occupies a privileged place in Brueggemann’s theology. See e.g. 
Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 120: “Specifically, the disputation speech is a 
dominant form of witness in Second Isaiah, precisely in the exile when truth is in crisis and 
evidence is uncertain.”  
55 See Stordalen, “Gammaltestamentlig Teologi anno 2002,” 18. See also Hanson “A New Chal-
lenge to Biblical Theology,” 452. 
56 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 206. 
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… Old Testament theology is endlessly seduced by the ancient 
Hellenistic lust for Being, for establishing ontological reference 
behind the text.
57  
In the Hungarian introduction to ToT, he admits that his use of the courtroom 
metaphor could have been more carefully formulated. However, he adamantly 
refuses to change it. He explains that his starting point was chosen both for 
practical reasons, to clear the way for the testimony, and for theological rea-
sons, to let the texts explain God in the Old Testament as clearly as possible: 
The point of keeping the God of Israel [and subsequently of the Church] 
deeply linked to the text is to assure that God may continue to practice 
the radical disjunction and hyperbolic freedom and transformative new-
ness that lead domesticated rationalists and fideists to talk about ‘anthro-
pomorphisms.’ It is of course a danger to confine God to the pages of 
this testimony. I knew that when I wrote it. In my judgment, however, it 
is a greater danger to reduce this peculiar God to the commonplace and 
the generic.
58
 
With the help of the courtroom metaphor, Brueggemann creates a theological 
basic structure for the testimonies. The courtroom metaphor is of course 
closely connected to another important metaphor, the testimony. It is important 
to comment that in contrast to modernists, with their negative understanding 
of this term, Brueggemann uses the term in a very positive sense. It is worth 
noting that the English philosopher David Hume, (1711–1776), founder of 
classical, empirical, and foundational epistemology, had a very critical under-
standing of testimony.59 Craig Keener, in his analysis of Hume, writes that 
“Hume’s intellectual context forced him to challenge the reliability of testi-
mony, because it was the primary basis on which the early empirics argued for 
                                                     
57 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 714. 
58 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 9. 
59 See Craig S. Keener, Miracles, The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts Vol. 1 (Mich-
igan: Baker Academic, 2011), 143-50. 
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miracles.”60 In sharp contrast to a critical modern understanding of testimony, 
Brueggemann writes: 
In the work offered here, I have attempted to fashion an approach that hon-
ors precisely the variegated nature of the texts themselves. The hallmark of 
this approach is the governing metaphor of testimony.
61
 
I suggest that the largest rubric under which we can consider Is-
rael’s speech about God is that of testimony. Appeal to testimony 
as a mode of knowledge, and inevitably as a mode of certainty 
that is accepted as revelatory, requires a wholesale break with all 
positivistic epistemology in the ancient world or in the contem-
porary world. In an appeal to testimony, one must begin at a dif-
ferent place and so end up with a different sort of certitude.
62
 
Paying attention to the metaphor of the testimony, Brueggemann focuses at-
tention on the sentences and not individual words as the substance for theolog-
ical information about God: “It is Barr’s now well-established urging that 
words can only be understood in the context of their usage in sentences.”63 
Testimony functions as Brueggemann’s theological foundation and, as noted 
in the quotation above, this “appeal” gives a “different sort of certitude.” For 
him, the theological reality comes to life in, with, and under the metaphor of 
the testimony.64 
2.3 MILITARY CONSUMERISM 
Another important term to understand in Brueggemann’s thinking is military 
consumerism. This term is best understood in relation to the meaning of 
metanarrative.65 He refers to Jean-François Lyotard for the use and definition 
                                                     
60 See Keener, Miracles vol. 1, 143. 
61 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 713. 
62 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 119. 
63 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 123, note 14. 
64 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 715. 
65 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 558-59. The term metanarrative plays an im-
portant role for Brueggemann. He refers to Jean-Francois Lyotard for the use of the term. See 
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
40 
 
of this latter term. A metanarrative is equal to a certain ideology or epistemol-
ogy which dominates within a specific community and culture. Brueggemann 
believes that the dominant metanarratives in western society have lost their 
authority. Instead, many different metanarratives compete against each other 
and this constitutes one feature of the postmodern situation. His intention with 
ToT can be described as a basic material for a new metanarrative, a narrative 
that stands in sharp contrast to other metanarratives, and especially the 
metanarrative of military consumerism. He defines this term as follows:  
By “military consumerism” I refer to a construal of the world in 
which individual persons are reckoned as the primary units of 
meaning and reference, and individual persons, in unfettered 
freedom, are authorized (self-authorized) to pursue well-being, 
security, and happiness as they choose.
66
  
Brueggemann’s normative intention for his theology should be understood pri-
marily in relation to military consumerism, or more precisely, his theology pre-
sents as a sharp contrast to the worldview of military consumerism. The un-
dergirding epistemology of military consumerism is a secular world, a world 
without God, based on human authority. This epistemology funds the thinking 
behind the historical-critical method and also partly church theology, even 
though in one sense the latter precedes the historical-critical method. 
Brueggemann dismisses both these methods as incompatible with the text itself 
and also, even though these methods also are incompatible with each other, as 
methodological foundations for constructing the worldview that can challenge 
military consumerism. He argues that both the historical-critical method and 
church theology prevent the reader from grasping the text and, consequently, 
“the rendering of God.” To conclude, it is therefore logical to presume that 
                                                     
Press, 1984). According to Brueggemann, the term refers to the fact that there is no longer a 
given or common metanarrative that creates identity within the western society. Instead there 
are competing metanarratives. Brueggemann’s intention with ToT is to present material for a 
postmodern metanarrative for the discipline of Old Testament theology. 
66 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 718. 
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Brueggemann as an Old Testament theologian also raises positive energy to 
form an alternative epistemology and hermeneutics in order to present the basic 
theological material for a new meta narrative. In contrast to the historical-crit-
ical method, he does not focus on historical questions, such as “what hap-
pened?” In contrast to church theology, he does not ask ontological questions, 
such as “what exists?” Instead, he chooses a rhetorical point of departure for 
his theology. He concentrates exclusively on “what is written” about God. 
With this background, he wants to present a new theology. Let us now study 
how he arranges his various testimonies. 
2.4 THE CORE-TESTIMONY 
The core-testimony is Israel’s standard testimony and is one of thanksgiving, 
todah, uttered by Israel as worship.67 An example of a core-testimony is Psalm 
9:1-2: 
I will give thanks to the Lord with all my heart; I will tell of all 
Your wonders.  
I will be glad and exult in You; I will sing praise to Your name, 
O Most High.  
The core-testimony is not equal to the earliest historical testimony. Instead, 
according to him, a core-testimony is in accordance with Israel’s most common 
speech about YHWH: 
Rather, by characteristic, I mean the most usual modes of 
speech, so that one test is the quantity of use. Beyond quantity, I 
mean by characteristic the way Israel spoke in its most freighted, 
exalted, or exposed situations. Israel’s most characteristic testi-
mony is the speech to which Israel reverted when circumstances 
required its most habituated speech.
68
 
                                                     
67 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 128: “I propose that the tôdah (a public act of 
thanksgiving) is the context in which the grammar of Israel’s faith (that is, the verb of transfor-
mation, Yahweh as the active subject, and the direct object who is acted on) is fully uttered.” 
68 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 122. 
42 
 
Therefore, Brueggemann can characterize Psalm 22:27, a Psalm of com-
plaint/accusation, as a core-testimony: 
All the ends of the earth will remember and turn to the Lord, And 
all the families of the nations will worship before You.
69
  
Israel’s core-testimony is recognized as a sentence wherein YHWH is charac-
teristically the subject of an active verb, usually in hiph’il stem whose object 
often is Israel.70 Brueggemann also enumerates various verbs (chapter 4, Tes-
timony in Verbal Sentences, pp. 145–213) adjectives (chapter 5, Yahweh with 
Characteristic Markings pp. 213–28) and nouns (chapter 6, Yahweh as Con-
stant, pp. 229–66) as belonging to the genre of the core-testimony. Together 
these verbs, adjectives and nouns provide the material for a thematization of 
YHWH (chapter 7, Yahweh Fully Uttered, pp. 267–316). His theological con-
clusion of the core-testimony is that YHWH is incomparable.71 This incompa-
rable description is a theological conclusion that is based on a thematization 
wherein the rhetorical tension has a corresponding theological tension within 
YHWH and this tension is apparent already in the core testimony. This tension 
is “most crucial and decisive and peculiar for Israel’s life with Yahweh.”72 
Brueggemann bases this conclusion on four observations. Firstly, Exodus 
34:6–7 plays an important role:  
6 The LORD passed before him, and proclaimed, 
“The LORD, the LORD, 
A God merciful and gracious, 
                                                     
69 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 128. 
70 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 144: “Thus we have attempted to define the 
grammar of Israel (full sentences, governed by strong verbs, dominated by the subject of the 
verbs who is an active agent, effecting changes in various direct objects), and we have consid-
ered the extreme and most sweeping testimony given to Yahweh, namely incomparability.” 
71 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 206: “In all of this variegated, rather disordered 
picture, this jumble of testimonies, we arrive at the conclusion already considered above, the 
conclusion that is Israel’s characteristic theological intention: Yahweh is incomparable!” See 
also 228: “It is no wonder that Israel’s ultimate testimony to Yahweh concerns Yahweh’s in-
comparability.” See also 266: “The noun-metaphors for Yahweh are an enactment of Israel’s 
testimony of Yahweh as incomparable.” 
72 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 275: “Thus I propose that in the full utterance 
of Yahweh, the thematization of Yahweh is as the powerful governor and orderer of life who is 
capable of generous and gracious concern, but this same Yahweh has a potential for extraordi-
nary destructiveness.” 
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Slow to anger, 
And abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, 
7 keeping steadfast love for the thousandth generation, 
Forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, 
Yet by no means clearing the guilty, 
But visiting the iniquity of the parents 
Upon the children 
And the children’s children, 
To the third and the fourth generation.” 
The tension starts in 7b, with “yet He will by no means leave the guilty unpun-
ished”. Brueggemann offers this comment on the verse:  
I can find no evident way in which the two parts of this formula-
tion can be readily and fully harmonized. The faithful God who 
forgives [ns’] iniquity is the same God who visits [pqd] offenders 
for their iniquity.
73
  
His conclusion is therefore that there is a disjunction within YHWH:  
My thesis for thematization of Israel’s testimony concerning 
Yahweh is this: Yahweh is a Character and Agent who is evi-
denced in the life of Israel as an Actor marked by unlimited sov-
ereignty and risky solidarity, in whom this sovereignty and soli-
darity often converge, but for whom, on occasion, sovereignty 
and solidarity are shown to be in an unsettled tension or in an 
acute imbalance. The substance of Israel’s testimony concerning 
Yahweh, I propose, yields a Character who has a profound dis-
junction at the core of the Subject’s life.74 
Secondly, Brueggemann also finds a tension in the metaphors. The metaphors 
in the Old Testament are dynamic by nature, i.e. they have different connota-
tions at different times in the texts. Examples of such dynamic metaphors are 
YHWH as artist, doctor, mother or shepherd.75 These metaphors can describe 
                                                     
73 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 270. 
74 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 268. 
75 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 277 ff. 
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YHWH in a personal way but can also express a change in YHWH which 
means that YHWH becomes what he had not been before because of the action 
of the object, mostly Israel. These metaphors imply that YHWH has expecta-
tions towards Israel. YHWH is a mighty judge, the preserver of life, generous 
and open-handed, but at the same time a God who can perform acts that lead 
to extraordinary destructiveness. The conclusion Brueggemann draws is that 
the dynamic feature in these metaphors yields a theological tension, in the char-
acter of YHWH: 
The tension, oddness, incongruity, contradiction, and lack of set-
tlement are to be understood, not in terms of literature or history, 
but as the central data of the character of Yahweh.
76
  
Thirdly, he highlights a tension in Israel’s history, more precisely in the exile. 
A number of exile texts describe what Brueggemann calls a two-stage se-
quence. In the first stage of the sequence, YHWH acts in a way that is destruc-
tive for Israel. In the second sequence, YHWH shows his mercy upon Israel 
by maintaining the covenant (Isaiah 47:6; Jeremiah 31:28).77 The urgent ques-
tion, based upon the two-stage sequence, is if during the exile period YHWH 
continues to be faithful to the covenantal obligations to Israel and to practice 
love towards Israel? There are textual evidences that move in this direction 
(see Isaiah 49:11), but there are other texts that indicate that YHWH abandoned 
Israel during the exile (Isaiah 54:7-8). For Brueggemann, this means that there 
is a tension between YHWH’s sovereignty and his mercy and Israel must learn 
to live with this problematic tension: 
Israel had to reckon with a theological discernment that consists 
in a profound disjunction that is not only a matter of lived expe-
rience but also a crucial theological datum. Thus, in my judg-
ment, serious theological interpretation must reckon not only 
                                                     
76 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 282. 
77 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 308. 
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with evidence of the convergence of Yahweh’s sovereignty and 
Yahweh’s covenantal fidelity, but also with the tension between 
these inclinations, tension that on occasion becomes unbearable 
and unmanageable for Israel.
78
 
Fourthly and finally, Brueggemann pays attention to the theme of passion, e.g. 
Lamentations 5:20–22, Isaiah 54:7–8, Hosea 2:10–13 and Hosea 11:8–9. The 
theme of passion stands in close correspondence with solidarity. YHWH is a 
God of solidarity who deliberately moves in the direction of passion with and 
for his people. Brueggemann cannot find proofs in the Old Testament that there 
is a convergence between HHWH’s sovereignty and passion. He writes: 
But Israel´s text and Israel’s lived experience keep facing the re-
ality that Yahweh’s self-regard keeps surfacing in demanding 
ways… It is this propensity in Yahweh, Yahweh’s determination 
to be taken seriously on Yahweh’s own terms, that precludes any 
final equation of sovereignty with covenantal love or with pa-
thos.
79  
In sum, throughout ToT Brueggemann maintains that YHWH encompasses 
solidarity and sovereignty, but conversely he also emphasizes, already within 
the core-testimony, a theological tension located in the very character of 
YHWH that is a distinct feature of the core-testimony.80 
2.5 THE COUNTER-TESTIMONY AND ITS EVALUATION 
Because Brueggemann stresses a rhetorical tension between core and counter-
testimony and because he also argues that this tension must be described as a 
theological tension, the counter-testimony and its evaluation is important to 
                                                     
78 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 310. 
79 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 303.  
80 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 271: “…what is most crucial, I submit, is that 
Yahweh’s capacity for solidarity and for sovereignty is the primary reality that Israel finds in 
the character of Yahweh.” See also 143: “What is most important is the recognition that for 
Israel, power and solidarity are held together, and that both are crucial for Israel’s normative 
utterance about Yahweh.” 
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understand. We shall firstly describe the counter-testimony as described by 
Brueggemann. Secondly, we shall study part of the response from the academ-
ical guild. Thirdly, we shall understand how Brueggemann motivates a cross-
examination of the core and counter-testimony which, fourthly, lead forward 
to his concept of God as a God in the fray. 
WHAT IS A COUNTER-TESTIMONY? 
According to Brueggemann, the counter-testimony constitutes an indispensa-
ble part of Israel’s testimonies of YHWH in the Old Testament. Ecclesiastes, 
Job and the Psalms of accusation provide the primary biblical evidence for the 
counter-testimony.81 Historically, Brueggemann places the exile as the histor-
ical place of Israel’s counter-testimony. The following verses are examples of 
counter-testimonies: 
Psalm 6:3  And my soul is greatly dismayed; But You, O LORD—how 
long? 
Psalm 35:11  Malicious witnesses rise up; They ask me of things that I 
do not know. 12 They repay me evil for good, To the be-
reavement of my soul.  
Psalm 39:5  Behold, You have made my days as handbreadths, And my 
lifetime as nothing in Your sight; Surely every man at his 
best is a mere breath. Selah. 
Psalm 42:3  My tears have been my food day and night, While they say 
to me all day long, “Where is your God?”  
Isaiah 63:17-19  Why, O LORD, do You cause us to stray from Your ways 
And harden our heart from fearing You? Return for the 
sake of Your servants, the tribes of Your heritage. Your 
holy people possessed Your sanctuary for a little while, Our 
adversaries have trodden it down. We have become like 
those over whom You have never ruled, Like those who 
were not called by Your name. 
Ezekiel 16:32  You adulteress wife, who takes strangers instead of her 
husband!  
Ezekiel 16:38  Thus I will judge you like women who commit adultery or 
shed blood are judged; and I will bring on you the blood of 
wrath and jealousy.  
                                                     
81 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 325, note 5: “Perhaps the culminating example 
of this disputatious quality is in Job 42:7-8…” 
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According to Brueggemann, an important task for the counter-testimony is to 
perform a cross-examination of the core-testimony, i.e. it argues, mostly in sit-
uations of lament, that YHWH does not help when help is expected:  
… when Israel faces situations of desperate need, as in the case 
of unbearable injustice. Israel’s characteristic assumption is that 
if Yahweh’s power and fidelity are operative, as the core witness 
asserts, there would be no such desperate need and no unbearable 
injustice. Yahweh makes all the difference, and when Yahweh is 
not present and engaged on behalf of Israel, things go awry.
82
 
The counter-testimony stands both in a dialectical and a theological relation-
ship to the core-testimony. According to Brueggemann, the presupposition for 
Israel is that YHWH’s power and faithfulness will save Israel. Yet, Israel en-
counters suffering and injustice and does so out of all proportion. Therefore, 
the counter-testimony argues that from time to time YHWH is ambivalent and 
unjust. The counter-testimony, however, does not always argue against 
YHWH. It can also describe YHWH as hidden in a more neutral sense, as part 
of God’s providence. This form of counter-testimony, e.g. in the wisdom liter-
ature, expresses that YHWH does not always actively intervene but acts 
through natural moral laws. When a person violates the will of YHWH, the act 
itself leads to misery. Returning to the more problematic feature within the 
counter-testimony, this testimony frankly argues that YHWH is unreliable. Is-
rael’s counter-testimony poses questions which YHWH answers: 
                                                     
82 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 321. Fredrik Lindström presents the idea that 
evil forces prevail when YHWH is absent, see Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 
159: “Fredrik Lindström has shown, moreover, how in many psalms such deathliness makes 
headway in the midst of Israel only when and where Yahweh is absent, neglectful, or inatten-
tive.” See also Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 375: “Israel is helpless against 
those enemies, and so must count on Yahweh to cope with them on its behalf. When Yahweh 
does not do so, as Yahweh has pledged to do, the enemies will prevail.” Brueggemann positively 
affirms Lindström’s conclusion in ToT. This seems contradictive because Brueggemann, as a 
reformed theologian stresses God’s sovereignty, see e.g. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old 
Testament, 220: The God of steadfast love is no wimp, but will act in the service of God’s own 
sovereignty, which in this case is to the enormous benefit of Israel.” 
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How long? Yahweh answers: Until I am ready.  
Why have you forsaken me? My reasons are my own and will 
not be given to you.  
Is Yahweh among us? Yes, in decisive ways, but not in ways that 
will suit you. 
However, there are also times in the Old Testament when Israel 
seems to be alone, totally alone.
83
 
However, there are also times when Israel receives no answer and therefore 
feels “totally alone.” The counter-testimony “experiences the negativity of 
Yahweh in seemingly great disproportion to disobedience, affront, or mock-
ing.”84 The counter-testimony accuses YHWH of not holding to and thus not 
honoring the covenant. YHWH is unfair and the suffering of the people is too 
great.85 Evidence emerges from Israel’s history, e.g. the narrative of Samuel, 
David and Saul. Brueggemann argues that Saul is being unfairly treated by 
YHWH. Saul seeks forgiveness in vain from Samuel for a sin (1 Samuel 15:24–
25). David, however, is forgiven (2 Samuel 12:13). YHWH abandons Saul be-
cause of his passivity against the Amalekites (1 Samuel 15:18–21), but David’s 
similar action is ignored by YHWH (1 Samuel 30:19–20). To sum up, accord-
ing to Brueggemann, the counter-testimony does not actually contradict the 
core-testimony, but more correctly, disputes the core-testimony, and in this 
way presents the complete and essential truth about YHWH. 
THE ACADEMICAL RESPONSE TO THE COUNTER-TESTIMONY  
The response from other theologians is impressive, as already noted. I will in 
this part pay special attention to the response that have observed how the con-
cept of God should be understood in light of Brueggemann’s counter-testi-
mony. Concerning Job, Mark Gray argues that it is necessary to incorporate 
“Job’s suffering as part God’s responsibility.”86 This means that Gray argues 
that Job’s suffering must be related to YHWH. Carey Walsh also comments 
                                                     
83 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 357. 
84 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 373. 
85 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 378: “Yahweh is not faithful or reliable, and 
the dysfunction that has come into Israel’s life is indeed Yahweh’s failure.” 
86 Mark Gray, “Justice with Reconciliation: A Text for our Times. The Rhetoric of Isaiah 58:6-
10,” in The Centre and the Periphery—A European Tribute to Brueggemann Walter (ed. J. Mid-
dlemas et al. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2010), 172. 
49 
 
on this idea in his analysis of the counter-testimony. This testimony, as de-
scribed by Brueggemann, highlights the problematic aspect of being Israel in 
relation to YHWH:  
A chief benefit to biblical theology of countertestimony, then, is 
its realism; it speaks to a dynamic, living relationship that allows 
for the expression of difficulties.
87
 
Walsh argues that the function of the counter-testimony is to be understood as 
a realistic source on behalf of the community of Israel used to understand that 
Israel’s God, YHWH, stands in total freedom and is impossible to comprehend 
in Western philosophical terms of omnipotence: 
Negativity in texts, then, can serve a vital function by protecting 
divine freedom to exist and flourish beyond the conceptual cate-
gories enlisted by biblical writers and theologians alike. This em-
phasis on uncertainty in knowledge, and the limits and even de-
constructive quality of language finds a receptive audience in 
postmodern theological discourse.88 
Notably, Brent A. Strawn comments on the fact that there are no references in 
ToT “from Ruth, Ester or Obadiah; but one passing reference to the Song of 
Songs; and only three references to Jonah, Joel and Ezra.”89 Also important to 
highlight is theologians such as Blumenthal and Fredrik Lindström who pro-
vide much material for Brueggemann’s characterization of the counter-testi-
mony.90  
                                                     
87 Walsh, “The Wisdom in Rupture,” 167. 
88 Walsh, “The Wisdom in Rupture,” 167. 
89 See Brent Strawn, “On Brueggemann. (A Personal) Testimony, (Three) Dispute(s), (and on) 
Advocacy,” in Imagination, Ideology & Inspiration Echoes of Brueggemann in a New Genera-
tion (ed. J. Kaplan, and R. Jr. Williamson. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2015), 49. 
See Strawn, “On Walter Brueggemann,” 25. 
90 See David R. Blumenthal, Facing the Abusive God, A Theology of Protest (Kentucky: West-
minster/John Knox Press, 1993). See also Fredrik Lindström, Suffering and Sin: Interpretations 
of Illness in the Individual Complaint Psalms (Lund: Coniectanea Biblica: Old Testament Series 
37, 1994). 
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Of special interest is the debate that took place in 1999 and began in 1999 
where Professor Hanson responded critically on ToT in AAR (American Acad-
emy of Religion). Hanson was serving as professor at Harvard University at the 
time ToT was published and Brueggemann refers positively to him in ToT.91 
This article started a debate wherein Hanson accused Brueggemann of turning 
the discipline of the Old Testament into a new and negative direction. The fo-
cus in Hanson’s article was to understand if the counter-testimony claimed to 
present an extra-referential description of YHWH. Hanson suggests that 
Brueggemann’s counter-testimony should be understood as a human testimony 
that refers to YHWH in a figurative way, i.e. in a non-referential way. Han-
son’s critique is that Brueggemann has made an interpretation of YHWH that 
yields a gnostic God: 
… his description of God could reinforce a tendency deeply 
rooted in Christendom of contrasting an Old Testament God of 
wrath with a New Testament God of love. First, a brief descrip-
tion of Brueggemann's treatment. Yahweh has two sides. A care-
ful syntactical analysis of wide-ranging texts presents a God who 
creates, lives true to promises, delivers, and sustains, a God in 
whom Israel can trust. But that trust is undermined by another 
side of Yahweh: one has the sense that all of these qualities of 
Yahweh are pervaded by a hovering danger in which Yahweh’s 
self-regard finally will not be limited, even by the reality of Is-
rael. One never knows whether Yahweh will turn out to be a 
loose cannon, or whether Yahweh’s commitment to Israel will 
make a difference.
92 
Hanson argues that the biblical texts highlighted by Brueggemann must be in-
terpreted as figurative testimonies coming from different groups in different 
times and circumstances in the history of Israel. Brueggemann should also 
                                                     
91 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 50, 52, 98, 172, 306, 444, 638, 693. 
92 Hanson, “A New Challenge to Biblical Theology,” 454-55. 
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have made a more specific distinction between “human descriptions of God 
and the “real” God:  
A major qualifier is built into Israel’s understanding of divinity 
that seems compatible with the distinction in modern theology 
between human descriptions of God and ’real’ God. If instead of 
viewing the speech forms of the Scripture as the rhetoric of an 
ahistorical meta-court in which the pro’s and con’s regarding 
God’s character are presented, one rather interprets texts within 
their concrete settings within the life of Israel, the conflicting 
views of God will be traced to the struggling efforts of finite hu-
mans to understand the Infinite in their midst and to inevitably 
ensuing phenomena like controversies between different reli-
gious and political parties, priestly families, and regional repre-
sentatives.
93 
Hanson highlights Ezekiel 7:2–4 to show that it is possible to present a com-
plete balance between the core and the counter-testimony. In Ezekiel 7:2–4, it 
is stated that the presence of YHWH is leaving the temple because of the heavy 
sin of the people: 
You, O mortal, thus says the Lord GOD to the land of Israel: 
An end! The end has come upon the four corners of the land. 
Now the end is upon you, 
I will let loose my anger upon you; 
I will judge you according to your ways, 
I will punish you for all your abominations. 
My eye will not spare you, I will have no pity. 
I will punish you for your ways, 
while your abominations are among you.  
Then you shall know that I am the LORD. 
Hanson asks whether Ezekiel 7 really questions the mercy of God. The answer 
is no. This text expresses a clear biblical thought; without judgment that leads 
to repentance, YHWH’s promise later in Ezekiel 36:33 will be unthinkable. In 
sum, Hanson argues that even though the Old Testament texts are complex 
                                                     
93 Hanson, “A New Challenge to Biblical Theology,” 455. 
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they must be understood in the light of God as “the mysterious Otherness.”94 
Another scholar, Donald Gowan also favors a figurative interpretation 
of the counter-testimony. In contrast to Hanson, however, he refers pos-
itively to Brueggemann’s conclusions. According to Gowan, 
Brueggemann does “not make the direct claim that the God represented by the 
text is really God.” Brueggemann’s portrayal of God should be understood 
positively as a figurative interpretation. Gowan describes Brueggemann’s con-
cept of God as a… 
… great strength with the book. Brueggemann shows that the di-
versity in The Old Testament must not be tamed, solved or ig-
nored, but should be seen as an accurate reflection of what life in 
this world is really like and a reflection of a God who is both 
daunting and intensely fascinating.
95 
Another understanding of the counter-testimony comes from Brian R. McCar-
thy. He argues that it should be understood as a theological testimony. He de-
fends Brueggemann’s approach against Hanson’s criticism and writes: “Why 
does Hanson fall back to read the divine wrath as figurative expressions of 
God’s righteousness?”96 McCarthy gives several examples of God as agent of 
disaster in the Old Testament (the flood, Sodom and Gomorra, Exodus, Job, 
Saul and the Amalekites):  
After the Holocaust only scholars who are blinded by theological 
prejudice, or who have become pure technicians who put aside 
their conscience and ethical sensibilities when they work profes-
sionally, can pass over such passages with indifference.
97 
                                                     
94 Hanson, “A New Challenge to Biblical Theology,” 459. 
95 Gowan, review of Brueggemann, 96. 
96 Brian R. McCarthy, “Response, Brueggemann and Hanson on God in the Hebrew Scriptures,” 
JAAR 68 (2000): 615-20. 
97 McCarthy, “Response, Brueggemann and Hanson on God in the Hebrew Scriptures,” 618. 
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In a letter to McCarthy, Brueggemann thanks him for his approval of ToT and 
his defense against Hanson’s criticism.98 McCarthy’s conclusion is an interme-
diate position between Hanson and Brueggemann. He argues that 
Brueggemann is correct in stressing the dark side of God. However, McCarthy 
finds it difficult to motivate believers to accept God’s dark side as an ontolog-
ical reality. Brueggemann “cannot justify his position that believers must 
simply learn to live with this dark side and accept this incoherence.”99 On the 
other hand, McCarthy argues that Hanson fails to explain away God’s dark 
side merely as figurative expressions. His own solution is that human reason 
must value and “discern and to accept and reject:” 
a) engage biblical texts in their specificity with a maximum of 
imaginative availability to their challenge, as Brueggemann 
urges, but b) then in a second moment go on, as Brueggemann 
refuses to do, i) to bring the texts into contestation with one an-
other, with all the theo-ethical sensitivity and intellectual alert-
ness and integrity that the texts themselves and their vigorous 
comparison call forth, and ii) to exercise their inescapable re-
sponsibility to discern and to accept and reject.
100
  
To sum up, the AAR debate points to an important question. Should the coun-
ter-testimony be understood as a human figurative testimony, or as an ontolog-
ical extra-referential testimony?  
A TENSION WITHIN YHWH 
According to Brueggemann, a cross-examination means that the core and 
counter-testimonies are heard without being interrupted, and the outcome of 
                                                     
98 In a personal letter to Brian R. McCarthy, see Brueggemann, Letter to McCarthy, 2000, 
Brueggemann compares Hanson with William F. Albright (1891- 1971), and the Albright 
school, an American archaeologist and a front figure within the BThM. According to 
Brueggemann, Hanson falls into the category of scholars who represents ‘the Old Albright line’ 
and his criticism must be seen, Brueggemann comments, as a “cover up in the name of ortho-
doxy.” 
99 McCarthy, “Response, Brueggemann and Hanson on God in the Hebrew Scriptures,” 619. 
100 McCarthy, “Response, Brueggemann and Hanson on God in the Hebrew Scriptures,” 619. 
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this examination constitutes the theological foundation for a concept of God.101 
Such an approach, i.e. paying attention to the discrepancies in the text created 
by the cross-examination, shares an affinity with a Jewish reading of the text.102 
Brueggemann’s interpretation of Amos 9:8, together with Exodus 34:6–7 is a 
good example of how his theology takes form:103 In Amos 9:8 it is written:  
The eyes of the Lord God are 
Upon the sinful kingdom, 
And I will destroy it 
From the face of the earth… 
YHWH declares a radical judgment in the verse. However, the verse continues: 
…expect that I will not utterly  
Destroy the house of Jacob, says the Lord. 
Brueggemann argues that the first and second parts of verse 8 form a literal 
unit, and contain intrinsic theological information about YHWH. In sum, for 
him the theological message of verse 8 functions as a strong argument for a 
“revised narrative about Yahweh.”104 He draws the following conclusion: 
On many occasions in its canonized testimony, Israel asserts that 
the sustainer is not always reliable and the transformer is some-
times ineffective. In many texts, but in exemplar fashion in Exo-
dus 34:6-7, we have seen that, if the text is to be taken as ‘wit-
nesses to the real,’ the ground of dispute is not to be found simply 
in modern, undisciplined pluralism or in Israel’s ancient dispu-
tatiousness, but in the very character of Yahweh.
105
 
Brueggemann argues that the interpretation of the cross-examination presents 
a problematic theological conclusion for Israel: 
                                                     
101 E.g. Bergsma, “Useful for the Church?” 110: “The core- and countertestimony divisions of 
Brueggemann’s theology really constitute the center of his theological argument and the scope 
of his theology proper, i.e., his doctrine of God.” 
102 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 325.  
103 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 326. 
104 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 324. 
105 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 715. 
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If we take such textual matters as theological data about the 
Character in the narrative who has continuity and constancy, then 
we may rightly wonder about the ongoing significance of this 
remembered violence in Yahweh’s life and character.106 
BRUEGGEMANN’S CONCEPT OF GOD: GOD IN THE FRAY 
Brueggemann’s concept of God in ToT does not fit into classical systematic 
categories. According to him, Israel describes YHWH as a God who is in the 
midst of human suffering—a God in the fray who embraces pain.107 The term 
God in the fray is used by him as early as 1979 to describe a concept of God 
that is dialectic—YHWH is both a God of order and a God that embraces 
pain.108 In 1985, he wrote: “Old Testament theology must be bipolar. It is not 
only about structure legitimacy but also about the embrace of pain that changes 
the calculus.”109 Inspired by Childs, he emphasizes that Israel’s God stands for 
transcendence, control, and order. This is God above the fray. Inspired by Nor-
man Gottwald, he also emphasizes a theology that pays attention to the social 
structures of power and struggle. This is God in the fray.110 His thesis is that 
Israel tries to become liberated from the God above the fray by embracing pain 
and in this way Israel argues that God becomes in the fray for the oppressed 
and suffering Israel. Herein lies the dynamics of Old Testament theology—the 
tension between the God above the fray and the God in the fray. Brueggemann 
argues that Israel’s capacity to embrace pain in her testimony constitutes the 
                                                     
106 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 328.  
107 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 83: “By this I mean that the God of Israel is 
characteristically ‘in the fray’ and at risk in the ongoing life with Israel.” The term in the Fray 
Brueggemann uses to argue that an authentic Old Testament theology must be dialectical and 
not transcendental. Mikhail Bakhtin and Jacques Derrida are important philosophers that 
Brueggemann positively refers to. Concerning Bakhtin, Brueggemann writes, see Theology of 
the Old Testament, 83: “Bakhtin’s attentiveness to multi-voiced possibility and dialogic interac-
tion within the text gives the lie to any single, settled meaning.” See also Brueggemann, “Testi-
mony that Breaks the Silence of Totalism,” 280. 
108 Walter Brueggemann, “Trajectories in Old Testament Literature and the Sociology of An-
cient Israel,” JBL 98 (1979): 161-85. 
109 Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 25. 
110 Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 3. See also Fretheim, “Some Reflections on 
Brueggemann’s God,” 27. According to Fretheim, God above the fray expresses God’s tran-
scendence and God in the fray God’s immanence. 
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wedge that cuts through the common theology and reveals its shortcomings.111 
What is important to note is that the distinction between God above and in the 
fray in ToT is partly lost. God is apparently in the fray at the expense of God 
above the fray.  
2.6 THE UNSOLICITED AND THE EMBODIED TESTIMONIES 
There are two more testimonies in ToT. These two differ somewhat from the 
core and counter-testimony because they do not stand in tension or in a dialec-
tical relationship to the others. These testimonies are instead centered on how 
YHWH becomes present within the community of Israel. The unsolicited tes-
timony is best described as a complementary testimony to the core and counter-
testimonies. Brueggemann writes: “Israel wants to be helpful, to be sure that 
the court has the full picture.”112 Israel’s unsolicited testimony is built around 
the idea that the God of Israel, YHWH, always stands in relation to someone.113 
YHWH has different relationships, different partners. YHWH’s partners are 
Israel, Humans, Nations and the Creation. Examples of unsolicited testimonies 
in the Old Testament are:  
Jeremiah 31:3  The LORD appeared to him from afar, say-
ing, “I have loved you with an everlasting 
love; Therefore I have drawn you with lov-
ing kindness. 
Deuteronomy 10:15  Yet on your fathers did the LORD set His 
affection to love them, and He chose their 
descendants after them, even you above all 
peoples, as it is this day. 
The embodied testimony is also centered on the partners, but here the 
partners are described as mediators. The embodied testimony makes 
YHWH present to Israel. These mediators are the Torah, the King, the 
                                                     
111 Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 20. 
112 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 408. 
113 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 409: “Thus Rolf Knierim rightly asserts: ‘The 
Old Testament, strictly speaking, does not speak about Yahweh. It speaks about the relationship 
between Yahweh or God and reality.’” 
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Prophet, the Cult, and the Wisdom.114 Brueggemann also describes them 
as sacramental mediators.115 Central biblical passages that describe 
YHWH as King are e.g. Deuteronomy 17:14–20, 1 Kings 9:4–8, 1 Kings 
11:9–11, Psalms 2, 89, 101,110, 132, Jeremiah 22:2–5). 2 Samuel 7 is 
also of importance in this regard.116 This text functions as “the beginning 
point for graciousness without qualification.”117 Another interesting as-
sertion connected to kingship comes from Jeremiah 22:15–16. Here the 
prophet Jeremiah “equates judging the cause of the poor and needy with 
‘knowing’ Yahweh.” Brueggemann argues that “when the king engages 
in these practices in the administration of public power, knowledge of 
Yahweh is indeed mediated in the community of Israel.”118 The Torah, 
King, Prophet and Cult are all - in different ways - mediators of YHWH 
which makes YHWH accessible in the community of Israel. As already 
mention in chapter 1 in this study, Brueggemann argues that YHWH is 
revealed in, with, and under the text and nowhere else. It is, however, 
evident in the embodied testimony that there is a kind of sacramental 
force apparent which makes his theology reach outside the text: 
It has been my wont to say that Yahweh’s ‘natural habitat’ is the 
text of the Old Testament, and there is no Yahweh outside this 
text. Now I intend to push behind that textual-rhetorical claim, 
to say that Yahweh’s habitat is in these practices. Where Israel 
engages in these practices, Yahweh is connected to Israel.
119
 
                                                     
114 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 698. 
115 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 576: “Said another way, these modes of me-
diation have a sacramental force. As my childhood Eucharistic liturgy affirmed: ‘We have to do 
here not merely with these signs, but with the realities that these signs represent.’” 
116 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 604. 
117 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament. 605. See also 2 Sam. 7:13: “When he [the 
King my emphasis] commits iniquity, I will punish him with a rod such as mortals use, with 
blows inflicted by human beings. But I will not take my steadfast love from him…” 
118 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 613. 
119 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 576-77. 
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In this case Israel, as the community, forms a proper context in which 
Brueggemann can situate the text. For him, the text is in, with, and under the 
context of the community and the reader-response between the text and the 
community reveals YHWH reaching outside the text. A minority of scholars 
have focused attention on the unsolicited and the embodied testimony. R. E 
Clements characterizes these two testimonies as pastoral testimonies.120 Mark 
Hahlen appreciates how Brueggemann treats the drama of YHWH’s partner-
ship with Israel, the human person, the nations and creation.121 Strawn is of the 
opinion that the embodied testimony does not fit within the courtroom meta-
phor.122 Thomas B. Dozeman critically points out that Israel’s unsolicited tes-
timony actually calls into question the very foundations upon which the truth 
claims of the core-testimony depend.123 In the core-testimony God is working 
in free ways to fulfill his will, but in the unsolicited testimony God uses part-
ners to exercise his will. According to Dozeman, this would actually result in 
an unsolved tension between the two testimonies; the two are not only in ten-
sion with each other but they are incompatible, as described by Brueggemann 
in ToT. My own comment is firstly, that the embodied testimony relates to one 
of Knierim’s tasks of determining how an Old Testament theology could be 
constructed. According to Knierim, the discipline should “examine the seman-
tic structure of the relationship between Yahweh and his world.”124 
Brueggemann has fulfilled such a task here and has shown that YHWH always 
stands in relation to his creation and likewise often works through different 
kinds of mediators. Secondly, this relational concept of YHWH in 
                                                     
120 Clements thinks that the cult, which forms part of the embodied testimony, should have come 
earlier in the presentation of ToT: “To a reviewer convinced that the cult was essentially the 
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consciousness.” See Clements, review of Brueggemann, 180. 
121 Mark Hahlen, review of Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, SCJ 2 (fall, 
1999): 282: “This metanarrative offers God’s limitless generosity versus a theory of scarcity.” 
122 See Strawn, “On Walter Brueggemann,” 23, note 48.  
123 Tomas Dozeman, review of Walter Brueggemann, JR 79 (1999): 484-87. 
124 Knierim, The Task of Old Testament theology, 16. 
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Brueggemann’s theology has an interesting connection to the orthodox theolo-
gian John Zizioulas, and his book Being as Communion: Studies in Person-
hood and the Church (1985), which Brueggemann refers positively to.125 We 
will come back to Zizioulas in chapter 7.  
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Brueggemann presents a theology that is based on the final text of the Old 
Testament. He stresses a tension in the text that corresponds to a theological 
tension in YHWH. He describes YHWH as incomparable, with the application 
that there is a problematic tension within YHWH that is impossible to resolve. 
When suffering stands in unjust proportion to the covenants between YHWH 
and Israel, this tension becomes problematic for Israel. The critical question 
from the response of the counter-testimony is how this testimony should be 
understood. Does Brueggemann really claim that YHWH has an ontological 
tension? Is this tension necessary to accept? This question is central in this 
study. I will suggest (see chapter 7) that it is possible to give credit to both the 
visible textual tension at hand but, at the same time, avoiding to relate this 
tension within the concept of God.  
  
                                                     
125 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 118: “John D. Zizioulas, Being as Commun-
ion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: Dartman, Longman and Todd, 1985), re-
sists the monistic, closed ontology of the ancient Greeks and insists that the early church fathers 
broke with Hellenistic ontology in seeing that the personal, communal propensities of God, who 
acts as a person in freedom, are prior to any substance or being. Jean-Luc Marion, God without 
Being, Hors-Texte (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), follows Martin Heidegger in 
liberating God from the question of being, for the question of being is restrictive of God’s free-
dom and of itself ends in idolatry.” 
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CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL CONTEXTS OF ToT 
In this chapter I will argue that Brueggemann in many ways has a postmodern 
epistemology, hermeneutics, and theology. My argumentation is based on var-
ious contexts that Brueggemann interacts with. According to Erhard S. Ger-
stenberger, in his book Theologies of the Old Testament, every theologian must 
consider how “our theological understanding is conditioned by our time and 
our society.”126 Every theologian, including Brueggemann, is formed by vari-
ous contexts and interacts and reacts both in alignment and against them. The 
purpose of this chapter is to describe precisely those contexts that surround his 
theology. I presuppose that these contexts provide an important historical back-
ground for understanding ToT and additionally help locate his approach within 
the discipline of Old Testament theology. Brueggemann writes: “My effort at 
OT theology needs to be understood in the context of U.S. scholarship and U.S. 
culture.”127 This context is of course quite obvious, but there are more contexts 
in which he writes, and these seven that I provide in this chapter give important 
historical, theological and philosophical information for understanding ToT.  
3.1 CONTEXT I) SOLA SCRIPTURA 
The first context is described well by Joep Dubbink. Brueggemann’s approach 
is a “…radical version of sola scriptura of the Reformation.”128 Dubbink em-
phasizes that Brueggemann specifies the Reformation as the natural starting 
point for a theological articulation of the Old Testament. Brueggemann refers 
                                                     
126 Erhard Gerstenberger, Theologies of the Old Testament (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002), 6. 
Gerstenberger concludes that “the question of the author’s own position is usually criminally 
ignored in exegetical and theological work”. 
127 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 28. 
128 Dubbink, “Reality is Highly Overrated,” 243: “Now I propose we have to see this as a radical 
version of the sola scriptura of the Reformation. The Reformers argued, against the mainstream 
theology of their days: knowledge of God is only to be found in the Scriptures. But even among 
the Reformers this was not undisputed, if we think of the way John Calvin takes his starting 
point from a duplex cognitio Dei.
 
Brueggemann radicalizes this principle by not only stating that 
knowledge of God is not to be found outside the Scriptures but adding that God himself is only 
to be found in the text, and nowhere else.” See also Dennis T. Olson, “Biblical Theology as 
Provisional Monologization: A Dialogue with Childs, Brueggemann and Bakhtin,” BibLeb 6, 
No. 2 (1998): 175: “Ironically, Brueggemann appeals to the Protestant doctrine or tradition of 
sola scriptura in order to argue that Christian doctrine or tradition has no role to play in biblical 
theology!” 
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to Luther as “first of all a biblical interpreter” as opposed to the “reductionist 
reading of church theology that made God simply an integral part of a church-
administered system of salvation.”129 Brueggemann’s overview of the history 
of the discipline of Old Testament theology (“Retrospect 1, From the Begin-
ning to the End of a Generative Period”) is impressive; he begins in the Refor-
mation, and ends with a description of the rhetorical-critical method in the 
early 1950s.130 This retrospectively shows that Luther stands as a key repre-
sentative for defending Scripture’s own voice. In this way “Luther’s intellec-
tual, interpretative courage set the work of biblical theology in a wholly new 
direction.”131 Brueggemann’s emphasis on sola scriptura has an important im-
plication; to actualize the indissoluble difference between an honest reading of 
the Old Testament and a reading that is formed by church theology. Sola scrip-
tura functions in this regard as the first theological context for understanding 
his approach: 
It is the work of a serious theological interpreter of the Scripture 
to pay close and careful attention to what is in the text, regardless 
of how it coheres with the theological habit of the church. This 
is particularly true of the churches of the Reformation that stand 
roughly in the tradition of sola scriptura. The truth of the matter, 
on any careful reading and without any tendentiousness, is that 
Old Testament theological articulation does not conform to es-
tablished church faith, either in its official declaration or in its 
more popular propensities.
132
 
Simultaneously, however, the principal of sola scriptura raises a hermeneuti-
cal problem within Old Testament Theology. For example, Scott Hafemann 
argues that Childs, Brueggemann’s primary counterpart, actually dismisses the 
                                                     
129 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 2. 
130 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 1-60. 
131 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 3. 
132 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 107. 
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possibility of a unity in the Old Testament: “And at the heart of Childs’s at-
tempt to create a unity out of diversity remains the theological polarity inher-
ited from the Reformation.”133 Hafemann argues that Childs stresses a diversity 
that stands at the center of describing the Old Testament: “In the end, the em-
phasis of Childs’s work is not on the unity of the Bible, but on its diversity.”134 
In many ways, Childs and Brueggemann seems to agree at this point. In con-
trast, however, Brueggemann describes the Reformation as the beginning point 
for a fresh theological interpretation of the Old Testament, whereas Hafemann 
and Childs suggest a re-orientation of the discipline of Biblical theology to-
wards a pre-reformational focus. Hafemann’s conclusion is that the principle 
of sola scriptura creates a difficult problem: namely how the ecclesial com-
munity and the biblical text should be related to each other. Hafemann writes 
that there is a “difficult relationship between the Scripture and Church theol-
ogy; in other words, between text and reading community.”135  
Brueggemann is, however, well aware that the Scripture must be understood 
within an interpretative community. The problem with church theology136 is 
that this approach of interpreting the Old Testament has made the Scripture 
captive under a dogmatic reading. I argue that Brueggemann’s critique against 
church theology is based on the presupposition of the results of the Refor-
mation. As Konrad Schmid describes very well, there was a hermeneutical 
change through the arrival of the Reformation and, moreover, there was a 
change of meaning with regard to understanding the concept theology: 
                                                     
133 Scott Hafemann, “What´s the Point of Biblical Theology? Reflections prompted by Brevard 
Childs,” In Biblical Theology: Past, Present, and Future (ed. Carey Walsh, and Mark W. Elliott, 
Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2016).  
134 Hafemann, “What´s the Point of Biblical Theology?” 110. 
135 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 5. 
136 Brueggemann is critical towards both church theology and the historical-critical method. See 
chapter 4 in this study for his critic of the historical-critical method. See also Brueggemann, 
Theology of the Old Testament, 105: “In my judgment, in contrast to that of Childs, the relation 
of Old Testament theology to church doctrine is proximately as problematic as is the relation to 
historical criticism.” See also Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 107: “Neither is an 
enemy of Old Testament Theology, but in quite parallel ways, neither is a permanent partner nor 
an easy ally of Old Testament Theology.” 
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Die reformatorische Neudefinition von Theologie hat eine ihrer Ursa-
chen in einer neuen Wahrnehmung der Bibel, die einer neuen Lektüre 
als Zeugnis von Glaubenserfahrungen zugeführt wurde. Es oblag nicht 
mehr der Bibel, die bereits gesetzte Richtigkeit der Dogmatik nur mehr 
zu illustrieren, sondern umgekehrt hatte die Dogmatik Sich an der Bibel 
messen zu lassen—nicht zuletzt im Blick darauf, wie die christliche 
Lehre insgesamt zu verstehen ist.137 
Regarding Schmid’s observation of Neudefinition and Hafemann’s observa-
tion pertaining to sola scriptura, I would argue that Brueggemann stands in 
conformity with this Neudefinition, because he argues that biblical doctrines 
should be defined in accordance with Scripture and not the other way around. 
Moreover, I would argue that Brueggemann bases his theology on the principle 
of sola scriptura while simultaneously stressing a close relationship between 
the text and community. For him, the Old Testament text is situated within the 
context of an ecclesial community and thus can only be understood within an 
ecclesial community.138 Even though he highlights the start of the Reformation 
as being highly positive for biblical studies, it must also be said that he hesitates 
to claim too much in terms of its normative results. This is because its further 
development took a negative direction in the post-reformation era. With the 
settlement of the Lutheran orthodoxy there came a new dogmatic Church the-
ological reading of the Bible.139  
                                                     
137 Konrad Schmid, Gibt es Theologie im Alten Testament? (Zürich: Theologische Studien, TVZ, 
2013), 17. 
138 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 746: “I suggest that Old Testament the-
ology in an ecclesial community of interpretation is interpretation done in an idiom that is con-
gruent with the life setting of the community, but that is drawn from, informed by, and author-
ized by the idiom of the testimony of the text.” 
139 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 4. 
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3.2 CONTEXT II) THE STARTING POINT OF THE DISCI-
PLINE  
The modern founder of the discipline of Old Testament theology is Johann 
Philipp Gabler (1753–1826). Knierim writes concerning Gabler: “If philoso-
phy is a series of footnotes to Plato, then Old Testament theology is a series of 
very expansive footnotes to Gabler.”140 Brueggemann stresses that Gabler 
searched for a new epistemological foundation and did so through reason 
alone.141 While Luther and the Reformation understood theology as insepara-
ble from biblical history, Gabler’s new epistemological foundation had one 
important effect; it separated biblical studies into two disciplines; historical 
theology and dogmatic theology.142 Brueggemann is critical towards Gabler’s 
separation in this regard. In an unpublished lecture, he defines Gabler’s famous 
lecture in 1787 as “the date when scholars quit doing OT theology.”143 In con-
trast to Gabler, who stressed the historical dimension as primary for a correct 
theological interpretation, Brueggemann argues that a theological interpreta-
tion must focus on the rhetorical aspects in the text.144 Despite his comment in 
                                                     
140 Ben C. Ollenburger, Old Testament Theology, Flowering and Future (Indiana: Eisenbrauns, 
2004), 489: “The methodological discussion within the discipline of Old Testament traces its 
root back to Gabler’s famous inaugural lecture as professor of theology at the University of 
Altdorf, Switzerland in March 1787. The lecture where the title Oratio de justo discrimine the-
ologiae biblicae et dogmaticae regundisque recte utroisque finibus [trans. On the Correct Dis-
tinction between Dogmatic and Biblical Theology and the Right Definition of Their Goals]. The 
lecture by Gabler is published in English in the above quoted volume at pages 493-502.” 
141 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 13: “The approach championed by Gabler, 
which reflected the spirit of the age with its unfettered, emancipated objective knowledge did 
indeed seek to establish what was normative. It did so, however, not on the basis of established 
church authority and interpretation, but by an appeal to emancipated reason that could produce 
‘universal’ norms.” 
142 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 8: “It was Descartes´ achievement to provide 
an alternative epistemology to that which appealed to the interpretative authority of the church 
and its claim of revelation. The alternative epistemology focused on the human agent as the 
unfettered, unencumbered doubter and knower who could by objective reason come to know 
what is true and reliable.” 
143 Brueggemann, Unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, Box 37, 1315. 
144 See Gabler “On the Correct Distinction between Dogmatic and Biblical Theology and the 
Right Definition of Their Goals,” in Old Testament Theology: Flowering and Future (ed. Ben 
C. Ollenburger, Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2004), 499: “Given this agreement of all these reli-
gious opinions, why then do these points of contention arise? Why these fatal discords of the 
various sects? Doubtless this dissension originates in part from the occasional obscurity of the 
sacred Scriptures themselves; in part from that depraved custom of reading one’s own opinions 
and judgments into the Scripture, or from a servile manner of interpreting it. Doubtless the dis-
sension also arises from the neglected distinction between religion and theology; and finally it 
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this regard on Gabler, there is a broad consensus within the discipline that since 
Gabler theologians have been standing without methodological consensus and 
struggling with various methodological attempts.145 Phyllis Trible and Childs 
summarize the situation well. Trible first: “Biblical theologians... …have never 
agreed on the definition, method, organization, subject matter, point of view, 
or purpose of their enterprise.”146 Childs shares the same analysis: 
From its inception, it was characteristic of Old Testament theology that 
it always had to contend with serious methodological uncertainties. Alt-
hough it was often called the crowning achievement of the whole disci-
pline, it appeared as though its leading practitioners were always glanc-
ing warily about at other sub-disciplines, full of concern that some new 
literary, historical, or philological discovery might threaten the enter-
prise.… Not only was the discipline loosely defined and constantly shift-
ing, but certain fundamental tensions continue to pose questions as to 
what form an Old Testament theology should take. Is this academic dis-
cipline only descriptive, or does it necessarily include an element of con-
structive theology? What is the relation between an Old Testament the-
ology and a history of Israel? Are its structuring principles historical, 
systematic, or an eclectic combination of both? And finally: what is the 
relation between Jewish and Christian theological interpretations of the 
Hebrew Scriptures?
147
 
In the light of this inherent methodological confusion within the discipline, it 
is understandable that Brueggemann pays close attention to methodological 
                                                     
arises from an inappropriate combination of the simplicity and ease of biblical theology with the 
subtlety and difficulty of dogmatic theology.” 
145 See Rolf Rendtorff, “Approaches to the Old Testament” in Problems in Biblical Theology: 
Essays in Honor of Rolf Knierim (ed. Henry T. C. Sun, Keith L. Eades. Eerdmans, 1997), 13-
27; Andreas Köstenberger, “Editorial,” JETS 55/1: (2012): 1-5; Rolf Knierim, The Task of Old 
Testament Theology, 555: “One natural development after Gabler was that the discipline was 
divided into Old and New Testament theology.”  
146 Phillis Trible, “Five Loaves and Two Fishes: Feminist Hermeneutics and Biblical Theology,” 
JTS 50 (1989): 282. 
147 Brevard Childs, “Die Bedeutung des jüdischen Kanons in der alttestamentlichen Theologie,” 
in Mitte der Schrift: Ein jüdisch-christliches Gespräch— Texte des Berner Symposions vom 6– 
12 Januar 1985 (ed. M. Klopfenstein et al; trans. U. Luz and E. Ringler; Judaica et Christiana 
11; Frankfurt: Lang, 1987), 271-72. 
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matters in ToT. His introduction, 117 pages, could be seen as apologetics for 
his own approach; to present an Old Testament theology that is aware of the 
historical situation within the discipline and continues on a search for a new 
foundation. 
3.3 CONTEXT III) INFLUENTIAL THEOLOGIANS 
Brueggemann’s positive affirmation of sola scriptura and his analysis of Ga-
bler provide important attributes for understanding ToT. However, it has to be 
emphasized that his theological approach is, foremost, formulated in relation 
to the contemporary theological communities of the 20th century. These theo-
logians form the third context for understanding ToT, and have influenced him 
in different ways, forming and determining his method in a significant way.  
BARTH AND TESTIMONY 
Karl Barth, founder of neo-orthodox theology, gave a renewed priority to the 
concept of revelation.148 Columbia theological seminary, the seminary where 
Brueggemann served as professor for 20 years, was, and continues to be, highly 
influenced by Barth. Brueggemann writes that Barth was “front and center at 
the seminar where I taught in Atlanta.”149 There is no doubt that he was very 
much affected by him.150 Brueggemann recognizes Barth’s influence on Old 
Testament theology in the mid-20th century as crucial for the whole discipline. 
Especially important for him is Barth’s break with 19th century evolutionary 
liberal theology and especially its epistemology. Brueggemann writes:  
                                                     
148 Roland K. Harrison, Introduction to the Old Testament. Including a Comprehensive Review 
of Old Testament Studies and a Special Supplement on the Apocrypha (Eerdmans: Hendriksson 
Publishing, 2004), 462. 
149 See Odell, reviews of Brueggemann, 7. See also email correspondence with Walter 
Brueggemann. From: Karl-Henrik Wallerstein Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 2:34 PM To: 
Walter Brueggemann Subject: SV: SV: Walter Brueggemann and Karl Barth. “Columbia The-
ological seminary is a Presbyterian seminary, educating pastors from all over US. Us such the 
theology of Barth plays a predominant role within the seminary.” 
150 In ToT, Brueggemann pays special attention to Barth’s Church Dogmatics, Der Römerbrief 
and Anselm: Fides quaerens Intellectum. See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 16-
20. 
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Thus Barth created the rhetoric and the space in which normative 
[that is, ‘true’] statements about biblical faith can be made, not 
to be adjudicated on the basis of the naturalistic epistemology of 
autonomy.
151
 
Brueggemann also declares that Barth, together with Ricoeur, is the primary 
source for his understanding of the term testimony: 
In appealing to the categories of testimony I have, of course, 
been influenced by Karl Barth, an influence that pervades my 
work and that is to some extent mediated for me by Paul Ric-
oeur.
152
 
As I will argue in the next chapter, the combination of Barth and testimony is 
crucial for understanding the formation of Brueggemann’s epistemology. 
Moreover, Like Barth, who argued that the Bible is a “human witness to reve-
lation”, Brueggemann argues that testimony becomes revelation.153 A crucial 
point to consider is on which grounds precisely do the testimony become rev-
elation. 
HISTORICAL THEOLOGIANS 
Brueggemann partly draws on and is partly critical towards those European 
theologians, e.g. Albrecht Alt (1883–1956) and Martin Noth (1902–1968), and 
American theologians, e.g. William Albright (1891–1971), G. Ernest Wright, 
and George Mendenhall (1916–2016), who in various ways, stressed the im-
portance of a theological interpretation of the Old Testament:  
                                                     
151 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 18. 
152 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 30, note 4: “Specifically Paul 
Ricoeur’s notion of ‘second naiveté’ is crucial to what I have attempted. On the concept, see 
Mark I. Wallace, The Second Naiveté: Barth, Ricoeur, and the New Yale School [Studies in 
American Biblical Hermeneutics 6; Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1990].” 
153 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 121. Compare with John Webster, Karl 
Barth 2nd Edition Outstanding Christian Thinkers (London: Continium, 2000), 83. Barth argued 
that the testimony should be read “as what it is, it must be read with an eye to its function of 
testifying to revelation.” 
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For purposes of our subsequent reflection, it is important to rec-
ognize that these several scholars understood themselves to be 
historians. That is, they assumed they were investigating ‘how it 
was’ and ‘what had happened.’ In their investigation, the biblical 
text itself was important, but the Scripture was not important on 
its own terms and for its own sake. It was important as a comment 
on or a clue to what was true ‘on the ground’—that is, logically 
and empirically. A kind of innocent realism is at work here…154 
Brueggemann is of course positive towards their theological intention. How-
ever, they based their theology on a historical foundation, focusing on the bib-
lical text as a reliable source of the real historical event, while neglecting to 
see the text itself as theologically interesting. According to Brueggemann, the 
problem with various historical-critical tools has been that students have not 
read the text because they have been… 
…believing that matters of real interest lay behind the text, to 
which the text only referred or to which it bore remote witness. 
This inattentiveness to the text is evident in the characteristic 
way that historical questions have been posed in Scripture 
study… Thus in both historical investigation and in theological 
interpretation, reality was assumed to be elsewhere than in the 
text.
155
 
Even though Brueggemann often argues that a historical approach cannot solve 
the methodological problem within the discipline, he shows appreciation for 
Alt’s historical studies, e.g. “the God of the fathers” which had “enormous 
theological implications, first in the work of Gerhard von Rad, and eventually 
in the Theology of Hope by Jürgen Moltmann.”156 He also affirms Noth’s idea 
of YHWH as a warrior God. Noth also made the case that there is distinctive-
                                                     
154 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 26-27. 
155 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 53. 
156 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 22. 
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ness about Israel that is “rooted in the peculiar character of Yahweh, the puta-
tive God of the federation.”157 Brueggemann critically comments that Al-
bright’s work on archeology functioned as an apologetic work in order to prove 
the reliability of the Old Testament. More positively, Brueggemann affirms 
Albright’s idea that Israel’s theological self-understanding was not a late phe-
nomenon, but present already in Moses. It is important to emphasize this con-
clusion; every description of history presupposes a specific perspective and he 
writes: 
There is no innocent ‘history’; all ‘history’ carries with it some 
theological intentionality. This is equally true for those scholars 
who now expose the ideology operative in the Albrightian syn-
thesis.
158
  
Wright and Mendenhall, theologians in the aftermath of Albright’s approach, 
argued against the liberal theology and defended the notion that monotheism 
was peculiar to Israel’s faith. Concerning Mendenhall, Brueggemann gives 
prominence to his theory that Moses’ covenant had nothing in common with 
the Canaanite religion. Instead, he agrees with Mendenhall that “Israel’s cov-
enant was a political theory of justice.”159 
EICHRODT AND VON RAD  
Previous theologians stand in the shadow of the two giants within the field of 
Old Testament Theology in the 20th century. It is therefore impossible to char-
acterize the modern history of the discipline without relating Brueggemann to 
Walter Eichrodt (1890–1978) and Gerhard von Rad (1901–1971). 
Brueggemann devotes pp. 27–49 to describing them, and refers frequently to 
them throughout ToT. Brueggemann’s analysis of Eichrodt is that his method 
                                                     
157 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 23. 
158 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 24. 
159 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 25: “Mendelhall proposed that the Mosaic 
covenant was patterned on international political treaties of the fourteenth century B.C.E., so 
that the idiom and intent of Moses´ covenant at Sinai had nothing in common with Canaanite 
religion. From its beginning, Israel’s covenant was a political theory of justice.” 
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is a kind of theological eisegesis wherein he incorporates theological insights 
into a coherent system through the use of the covenants in the Old Testament. 
Brueggemann points out that other attempts to find a center like Eichrodt’s 
have failed, e.g. those of Edmond Jakob and Th.C. Vrizen. His conclusion is 
that there is no fundamental principle which is able to support the entire Old 
Testament belief.160 With regard to von Rad, Brueggemann believes that his 
method is not a genuine theological one but rather a historical one. In his view, 
von Rad also failed to bridge the gap between confessed history and secular 
history in a satisfactory way. Von Rad emphasizes that the theological reality 
is tied up with history. Brueggemann believes that this approach has led some 
to conclude that it is impossible to present Old Testament theology.161 There 
is, he argues, a “great tension in von Rad’s work between historical and sapi-
ential materials, a tension that reflects a foundational detector of Old Testa-
ment faith.”162 He also stresses how important it is to underline the internal 
difference between Eichrodt and von Rad. While Eichrodt in his model 
searches “to overcome the developmentalism fostered by historical criticism” 
von Rad “seeks to underscore the dynamic of Israel’s faith that is constantly 
being articulated in new versions of the ancient creedal formulation.”163  
Brueggemann urges to focus attention, not on the method used by Eichrodt and 
von Rad, but rather on the results achieved by them and he draws two important 
conclusions; firstly, that the pluralism that von Rad emphasized, and the co-
herence that Eichrodt rightly stressed, together formulate the major problems 
and the challenges for the discipline.164 Stated as a question, one has to ask 
how it is possible to formulate a theology that incorporates the pluralism of 
testimonies into a coherent system. Brueggemann concludes that there is a new 
                                                     
160 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 38-42. 
161 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 40: “This is why many scholars have con-
cluded that Old Testament Theology is at the outset an impossibility, because the material re-
ferred to as Old Testament refuses a casting as theology.” 
162 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 38. 
163 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 39. 
164 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 41: “… it is the matter of pluralism and co-
herence that poses the most difficult issue for the ongoing work of Old Testament theology.” 
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opportunity for fresh approaches through the gateway of postmodernism. It is, 
however, impossible to use the approaches of either Eichrodt or von Rad: 
In the face of such a new interpretative situation, it is evident that 
matters must be conducted differently from the dominant models 
available to us from Eichrodt and von Rad.
165
  
This means that Eichrodt and Von Rad are not theological pathfinders for a 
future approach for the discipline of Old Testament theology. They offer great 
inspiration, however, because of what they have achieved. In an article “Fu-
tures in Old Testament Theology”, Brueggemann suggests that the discipline 
should move on from the methods of Eichrodt and von Rad.166 His methodo-
logical alternative is to focus on the text:  
The restless character of the text that refuses excessive closure, 
which von Rad understood so well, is reflective of the One who 
is its main Character, who also refuses tameness or systematiza-
tion. Thus it is the very God uttered in these texts who lies behind 
the problems of perspective and method.
167
 
MUILENBURG AND RHETORIC  
Among influential theologians, James Muilenburg (1896–1974) is 
Brueggemann’s Doctorvater, and therefore fills a most prominent role.168 
                                                     
165 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, xvi. 
166 Brueggemann, “Futures in Old Testament Theology,” 1-11. 
167 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 42. 
168 Walter Brueggemann, “James Muilenburg as Theologian,” USQR 50 (1997): 72. See also 
Timothy F. Simpson, Not “Who Is on the Lord’s Side?” But “Whose Side Is the Lord On?” 
Contesting Claims and Divine Inscrutability in 2 Samuel 16:5-14 (New York, NY, USA: Peter 
Lang AG, 2014): 49: “Brueggemann was trained at a time when the historical-critical method 
was at its zenith among biblical scholars, but he had the good fortune to do his Ph.D. at Union 
Theological Seminary in New York under the direction of James Muilenburg. His teacher’s 
path-breaking commentary on Isaiah, using rhetorical analysis, in The Interpreter’s Scripture, 
was one of the first attempts to, as Muilenburg understood things, to take the Old Testament on 
its own terms by classifying its own rhetorical features and making this the goal of interpretation, 
rather than finding history. Brueggemann, over time, has come to be, for his generation of schol-
ars, the champion of that approach.” 
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Muilenburg introduced and trained Brueggemann in rhetorical-critical think-
ing. Brueggemann defines his mentor as the primary founder of rhetorical crit-
icism:  
Muilenburg almost single-handedly made credible the practice 
of close reading, whereby one notices the detail of the text, such 
as word patterns and arrangements, the use of key words in rep-
etition, the careful placement of prepositions and conjunctions, 
and the reiteration of sounds of certain consonants.
169
 
Muilenburg explains the main idea of the rhetorical approach in the article 
“Form Criticism and Beyond”:  
What I am interested in, above all, is in understanding the nature 
of Hebrew literary composition, in exhibiting the structural pat-
terns that are employed for the fashioning of a literary unit, 
whether in poetry or in prose, and in discerning the many and 
various devices by which the predications are formulated and or-
dered into a unified whole.
170
 
This quotation could just as well have been formulated by Brueggemann. 
When Muilenburg argues that the form-critical method has hermeneutical and 
theological implications he predicted a theological use for the rhetorical 
method.171 This prediction is fulfilled through Brueggemann who developed 
the rhetorical-critical method as the key tool to serve theological interpreta-
tion. Brueggemann argues that how something is said in the Old Testament is 
important for what is said.172 This means that, for him, rhetorical aspects in the 
                                                     
169 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 55. 
170 James Muilenburg, “Form Criticism and Beyond,” JBL Vol. 88, No. 1 (1969): 8. 
171 Muilenburg, “Form Criticism and Beyond,” 3: “Equally significant is the important role that 
form criticism has played in hermeneutics. In theology, too, it has influenced not only the form 
and structure of the exposition, but also the understanding of the nature of biblical theology, as 
in the work of Gerhard von Rad, which is based upon form-critical presuppositions.” 
172 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 54: “Rhetorical criticism is a method that 
insists that how what is said is crucial and definitive for what is said.” See also 55: “In terms of 
theological interpretation, because the what is linked to the how, one cannot generalize or sum-
marize but must pay attention to the detail.” This standpoint is supported by Knierim, see The 
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texts are sustainers of theological information. Muilenburg also inspired 
Brueggemann to interact with the Jewish tradition and we can see in ToT how 
the Jewish tradition forms one of the three basic elements in his hermeneutics 
(see chapter 5).173 Brueggemann could as well be described as a Christian Mid-
rash theologian. In sum, in 1996, one year before the publication of ToT, and 
in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of Muilenburg´s birth, 
Brueggemann presented a paper at SBL entitled “James Muilenburg as Theo-
logian.” His characterization of Muilenburg serves as a self-description of his 
own approach: 
This man, believer and lover of words, never separated theos from 
logos, in theo-logy. He had no meanness of spirit for heresy. The clos-
est he could come to spotting heresy was to comment on an interpre-
tation:  ‘l do not find it felicitous.’ Heresy as infelicity makes clear that 
the what of truth is linked to the how of speech. He understood that 
both are one.174 
RICOEUR: IMAGINATION AND TESTIMONY 
Paul Ricoeur is considered one of the most influential philosopher in the 20th 
century and his impact is evident upon Brueggemann’s thinking, especially 
when it comes to two terms: imagination and testimony.175 In the Introduction 
                                                     
Task of Old Testament Theology, 9: “The criteria for discerning the theologically legitimate pri-
orities must obviously be found in primary substansive aspects. They depend on what is said…” 
173 Brueggemann, “James Muilenburg as Theologian,” 79: “It is my judgment that the practice 
Muilenburg embodied—attentiveness to speech, openness to Jewishness, full personal engage-
ment—are the marks of Old Testament theology most to be celebrated and now much needed in 
our common work.” 
174 Brueggemann, “James Muilenburg as Theologian,” 81. 
175 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 120, note 7. He refers specifically to Paul 
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Testimony,” in Essays on Biblical Interpretation (ed. Mudge 
Lewis. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 119-54. As will be shown, there are important simi-
larities between Brueggemann and Ricoeur. It is notable that they criticize, using Ricoeur’s 
word, the Western search for the absolute. See also Brueggemann’s appreciation of Ricoeur in 
Walter Brueggemann, The Psalms & the Life of Faith (ed. Patrick. D. Miller; Minneapolis: For-
tress Press, 1995), 7, note 16: “The works of Ricoeur that I have found especially helpful are 
Freud and Philosophy [New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970], Interpretation Theory [Forth 
Worth: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976]; The Conflict of Interpretations [Evanston, Ill: North-
western Univ. Press, 1974]; and “Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 4 (1975): 29-128.” 
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I referred to Jeanrond’s distinction between theological hermeneutics and her-
meneutical theology. We can now see that Ricoeur in a broad sense stands at 
one end of a development towards a hermeneutical theology that started with 
Schleiermacher.176 Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is a practice of hermeneutical the-
ology that has influenced Brueggemann to a large extent. In this reflection on 
the nature of hermeneutics, the term imagination becomes crucial, and 
Brueggemann develops the use of imagination in a unique way. He writes that 
“… a student of Old Testament theology will do well to attend to Ricoeur’s 
work on time, narrative and imagination.”177 What he particularly embraces 
concerning Ricoeur’s theory of imagination is the formulation “the world in 
the text.”178 This phrase stands in contrast to “the world behind the text”, which 
forms the primary focus within the historical-critical method. For 
Brueggemann, relying on Ricoeur, “the world in the text” does not depend on 
“the world behind the text”.179 This means that the text is not primarily in-
tended to describe a reality, but rather to generate a new reality, and by way of 
imagination the text becomes interpreted as a new reality. Concerning the 
                                                     
176 See Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, 50: “By submitting biblical/theological hermeneu-
tics to the principles of general hermeneutics, Schleiermacher diversified the study of herme-
neutics. From now on a still uninterrupted tradition of philosophical hermeneutics has emerged. 
On the one hand, this tradition has been viewed with great suspicion by those biblical herme-
neutist who refused to agree with Schleiermacher’s acceptance of the validity of general herme-
neutics even for biblical exegesis. On the other hand, those interpreters of the Bible who could 
agree with Schleiermacher have felt very positively influenced by the now emerging tradition 
of philosophical hermeneutics.” See also Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, 77: “Our narra-
tive of the history of philosophical hermeneutics began with a theologian, Friedrich Schleierma-
cher, who discovered that theological interpretation need a thorough foundation in philosophical 
hermeneutics. Now the development of philosophical hermeneutics by Ricoeur has revealed the 
need to include the interpretation of religious texts in an adequate human existential reflection. 
The symmetry between the theological endeavors of Schleiermacher and the philosophical en-
terprise of Ricoeur is striking.” 
177 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 57, note 167. 
178 See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 88: “To be precise, texts offer to the reader a possible way 
of being -in-the-world, a new way of living in the world.” See also ibid 110, note 15: “Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic is reminiscent of Heidegger. Ricoeur, on the textual level has recreated the whole 
process of Heideggerian interpretation, i.e., understanding by projecting possibilities.” 
179 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 57: “Ricoeur has given us phrasing for two 
alternative ways in which to consider the relation of text to ‘world’. First, he speaks about ‘the 
world in the text.’…58/ Second, Ricoeur speaks of ‘the world in front of the text’”. 
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method that has dominated the Old Testament discipline i.e. the historical-crit-
ical method, Brueggemann argues that the real world is not given by this 
method but is created. A direct encounter with the text and its world changes 
the “given” reality, as presented by the historical-critical method. If the priority 
is on “the world in the text” and not “the world behind the text”, the world 
behind the text becomes deabsolutized: 
The ultimate consequence of this generative sense of rhetoric is 
the deabsolutizing of ‘the world behind the text’ that historical 
criticism takes as normative, and that the hegemonic authority of 
the high critical period has had no intention of challenging. Thus 
when the imaginative forays of a generative text are measured by 
the assumed world behind the text, the outcome is that the text is 
measured by the status quo, which comes to be valued as a given 
beyond criticism. Ricoeur’s programmatic statement suggests 
that such generative literature as we have in the Scripture in the 
end destabilizes ‘the given’ and lets us entertain the thought that 
long-honored givens may turn out to be only avidly accepted im-
aginative construals of reality.
180
  
Brueggemann suggests that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics creates an alternative re-
ality, without deciding whether the biblical world could be defined as reason-
able or not: “… the text may indeed subvert, offering an alternative version of 
reality that creates new perspective, new possibility, and new activity well be-
yond the assumed world behind the text.”181 Concerning testimony, we have 
already confirmed Barth’s influence in this regard. Notable is that 
Brueggemann, in two unpublished lectures 2/22/90 and 2/26/90, presents an 
analysis of Ricoeur’s use of testimony. These lectures emphasize the im-
portance of understanding Ricoeur’s view of testimony. Brueggemann de-
                                                     
180 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 58. 
181 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 58. 
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scribes testimony as a sentence and not a word. Moreover he writes: “It is im-
possible to go behind it. It generates a new reality.”182 He also writes that this 
claim is based on a very odd epistemology. According to Mudge Lewis, who 
wrote the introduction to Ricoeur’s essays on testimony, Ricoeur describes the 
term testimony as generating revelation.183 In ToT Brueggemann has come to 
the same conclusion: “If we describe this process theologically – or, more spe-
cifically, in the practice of the Old Testament – we may say that testimony 
becomes revelation.”184 We will come back to Ricoeur’s influence on 
Brueggemann in this regard, but already now we can conclude that 
Brueggemann’s new postmodern epistemology is - to a large extent - influ-
enced by Ricoeur. 
GOTTWALD AND SOCIOLOGY 
Another important scholar, previously referred to in relation to Brueggemann’s 
terminology of the concept of God as specifically in the fray, is Norman K. 
Gottwald (1926–), who is also a student of Muilenburg.185 In his most famous 
book, The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 
1250–1050 B.C.E, published in 1979, Gottwald presents the theory that Israel 
came to existence, not primarily as a result of an immigration around 1200 
B.C.E, but rather as a result of struggles between Canaanite tribes.186 Gottwald 
formed this argument partly on a presupposition in Mendenhall’s conclusions 
in “The Hebrew Conquest of Palestine.”187 Together with influences from Karl 
Marx, Gottwald concludes that Israel’s faith is - to a larger extent than many 
have previously understood - shaped by sociological factors, such as land-
scape, population growth, political parties and food availability.  
                                                     
182 Brueggemann, Unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, Box 37, 1315. 
183 See Mudge, “Introduction,” in Essays on Biblical Interpretation (ed. L Mudge. Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1980), 27. Mudge writes that Ricoeur defines testimony as generating revelation: 
“testimony generates forms of discourse which can be called revelatory.”  
184 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 121. 
185 Phyllis Trible (1932- ) is also a student of Muilenburg and has influenced Brueggemann, see 
e.g. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 55f, 99ff, 216, 259, 452. 
186 See Norman K. Gottwald, The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated 
Israel, 1250-1050 B.C.E. (Orbis Books: Sheffield Academic Press, 1979), 5-17. 
187 George Mendenhall, “The Hebrew Conquest of Palestine,” BA 25 (1962): 66-87. 
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Gottwald’s influence on Brueggemann is visible in some articles prior to ToT, 
redacted by Miller and published in 1993 under the title A Social Reading of 
the Old Testament: Prophetic Approaches to Israel’s Communal Life. In this 
volume, Miller comments that Brueggemann stresses the “the social character 
of our theology …”188 Miller also describes Brueggemann’s social attention as 
an intention to acknowledge the social systems and ideologies visible in the 
Old Testament. In addition to referring to Gottwald for his theological articu-
lation of God as in the fray, Gottwald is also important for Brueggemann’s 
argument that normative statements are statements formed in a conflict situa-
tion serving various interests. Brueggemann argues that normative statements 
must be related to justice.189 In light of Gottwald’s method, Brueggemann con-
cludes:  
This means that the Old Testament contains no innocent, one-
dimensional, or disembodied theological statements, but that 
every theological articulation in the text is, in important ways, 
intimately and inexorably linked to lived reality.
190
  
In sum, we can say that the sociological approach stands as an alternative for 
Brueggemann in relation to the historical-critical method when he wants to 
articulate an Old Testament theology that shall focus on the text. This means 
that the text becomes linked through the sociological perspective to “lived re-
ality” and God becomes connected to the fray of human struggle. 
CENTRIST THEOLOGIANS 
In ToT Brueggemann characterizes some theologians as centrist theologians 
because they have been “enormously influential scholars at major research in-
stitutions, thus representing the best of scholarship in the classical tradition.”191 
                                                     
188 Walter Brueggemann, A Social Reading of the Old Testament Prophetic Approaches to Is-
rael’s Communal Life (ed. Patrick D. Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994). 
189 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 53: “Rather normativeness is that on which 
one will stake one’s life.” 
190 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 51. 
191 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 89. 
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These centrist theologians are Brevard Childs, James Barr, Jon Levenson, and 
Rolf Rentdorff. Brueggemann has been inspired by them but also marks a dis-
tance towards them. Moreover, all of them have responded to ToT in articles, 
reviews and personal letters. 
The first centrist theologian is Childs. His importance cannot be underesti-
mated. Childs, together with Rendtorff, Goldingay and Brueggemann, shares 
a common focus on the canonical text as the basis for Old Testament theology. 
In this regard, Childs stands out as the front figure within the discipline 
throughout the 20th century,192 in his emphasis of the canonical text as the 
proper context for interpreting Scripture theologically:  
As a fresh alternative, we would like to defend the thesis that the 
canon of the Christian church is the most appropriate context 
from which to do Biblical Theology.
193
  
Together with Barr, Childs argued that there was a theological crisis within the 
discipline of biblical theology and also stresses that Scripture must “be inter-
preted within the community of faith that treasured them.”194 According to 
Childs, biblical scholars have been more focused on historical, literal and phil-
ological problems than on presenting a theology for the purpose of serving the 
Church. Here the problem with the historical-critical method becomes crucial. 
Childs defines the problem with the historical-critical method as follows; it 
is…  
… an inadequate method for studying the Scripture as the Scriptures of 
the church because it does not work from the needed context. This is not 
                                                     
192 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 90: “Childs’s alternative to theological expo-
sition informed by historical criticism is to work at what he terms a canonical perspective.” See 
also Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 401-38. 
193 Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 99. 
194 Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 99. See also Christopher R. Seitz, and Kent H. Richards, 
The Bible As Christian Scripture: The Work of Brevard S. Childs (Society of Biblical Literature 
2014), 158: “In Childs’s way of thinking, therefore, reading canonically is not a general “solve-
all-problems” exegetical program, or a simple application of one type of literary criticism, or a 
new critical methodology.” 
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to say for a moment that the critical method is incompatible with the 
Christian faith – we regard the fundamentalist position as indefensible – 
but rather that the critical method, when operating from its own chosen 
context, is incapable of either raising or answering the full range of ques-
tions which the church is constrained to direct to its Scripture.195 
Brueggemann appreciates Childs for his boldness in moving out from the the-
ological exile created by the historical-critical method, and honors Childs in a 
review of Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments (1993):  
With almost no conversation partners in the twentieth century 
whom he regards as consistently reliable or worthy of consider-
ation (with the decisive exception of Barth), Childs has staked 
out a position and vocation for biblical theology that is sure to 
reshape our common work and that will require intense engage-
ment by any who dare take up the task.
196
  
My conclusion is that when Brueggemann entered the academic scene at the 
beginning of the 1960s, the acceptance for trying new trajectories within Old 
Testament Theology was dawning simultaneously with the demise of the 
BThM. There was now a new way of writing theology because of the work of 
Childs. 
The second centrist theologian is Barr. A specific concern in his methodology 
is how semantic rules could be used within biblical interpretation. In the book 
The Semantics of Biblical Language 1961, he stresses the sentence as carrier 
of theological information in opposition to words.197 Brueggemann makes con-
siderable use of this insight and argues “that it is not a word but a sentence—
words in context—that has theological significance.”198 In sharp contrast to 
Childs, Barr defends the use of the historical-critical method within the disci-
pline of Old Testament theology. In ToT Brueggemann anticipates that Barr’s 
                                                     
195 Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 141.  
196 Brueggemann, review of Childs, 279. 
197 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
198 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 45. 
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forthcoming theology (The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old Testament 
Perspective, 1999) would avoid connecting Old Testament theology to the 
dogmatic tradition, but would instead focus on the results of the historical-crit-
ical method and “exposit textual claims as much as possible on their own 
terms.”199 If Brueggemann was polite in his judgment of Barr’s book, the op-
posite opinion was not. According to Barr, Brueggemann has completely mis-
understood the age of Enlightenment.200 Barr even defends Childs, who he oth-
erwise criticizes, and concludes that Brueggemann is “the greater hater of the 
Enlightenment and should win the prize.”201 Barr also critically compares 
Brueggemann with Childs on various topics and conclude that both ignore the 
historical question what happened?202 Another difference is their use of ideol-
ogy and how they understand Judaism. Barr agrees with Brueggemann that the 
Old Testament does not univocally point to Jesus, but when Brueggemann crit-
icizes Childs’ canonical approach, Barr surprisingly comes to the rescue and 
argues that…  
… Childs’s insistence that Old Testament theology was a ‘Chris-
tian theological’ operation was intended not so much to exclude 
Jews but to exclude the supposedly ‘secular’ investigations of 
(mainly Christian) historical and sociological critics.
203
  
Finally, Barr describes the courtroom metaphor as an absurd idea and believes 
that no ordinary court is forced to accept a testimony without a thorough ex-
amination of the witness who presents the testimony.204  
                                                     
199 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 97. 
200 Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 559-61. See also James Barr, History and Ideology 
in the Old Testament Biblical Studies at the End of a Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 55: “It is interesting, however, to note that the anti-Enlightenment arguments now 
take two forms. In Old Testament theology they are well represented by the contrary positions 
of Childs and Brueggemann.” 
201 Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 553. 
202 Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 548-49. 
203 Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 552. 
204 Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 548. 
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The third centrist theologian is Levenson, described in ToT as one of “the most 
serious and imaginative Jewish theological interpreters of the Scripture, with 
whom Christian interpreters can expect to have serious interaction”.205 
Brueggemann pays special attention to Levenson’s book The Hebrew Scrip-
ture, the Old Testament and Historical Criticism (1993). Here Levenson ar-
gues that… 
1) …there is a theological problem with the historical-critical method. 
2) …Jews and Christians do not read the same Scripture. 
3) …each particular text must be read in the light of the whole.  
According to Brueggemann, Levenson and Childs preempt the text. Levenson 
preempts the text in favor of a Jewish reading, whereas Childs preempts it in 
favor of a Christian reading. Brueggemann defines himself and his method as 
the middle way.206 In response to ToT, Levenson writes the article “Is 
Brueggemann really a pluralist?” According to Levenson, Childs is not critical 
of the historical-critical method in general, but reluctant to read the Old Testa-
ment merely through the eyes of the historical-critical method. Brueggemann, 
Levenson writes, believes that “Childs regards historical criticism in principle 
as a distorting enterprise that casts the Scripture in categories alien to its own 
intention.”207 However, according to Levenson, Childs stands independent in 
relation to the Christian tradition: 
One should also note that the order of discussion of the books in 
Childs’s Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture is that 
of the [Jewish] Tanakh and not that of the [Christian] Old Testa-
ment. The conclusion is inescapable: Childs acts deliberately in 
opposition to some aspects of his own Christian tradition in order 
to preserve the very possibility of a ‘shared reading’ of the 
                                                     
205 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 93-95. 
206 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 95: “This text simply will not be contained in 
any such vested reading, which is what makes the text both compelling and subversive.” 
207 Levenson, “Is Brueggemann really a Pluralist?” 273. 
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Tanakh/Old Testament by Jews and Christians that 
Brueggemann thinks he destroys.
208
 
Levenson also dislikes Brueggemann’s seemingly neutral point of de-
parture. For him, Childs’s approach is more honest and easier to grasp:  
Unlike Brueggemann, Childs’s respect for Judaism is rooted in 
his Christian faith and not in some hypothetical vantage point 
that is neutral as between the two traditions and therefore able to 
pronounce them of equal worth.
 
By forthrightly owning his par-
ticularism as a Christian, Childs is able to respect and learn from 
the particular tradition that is Judaism.
209
 
The fourth centrist theologian is Rendtorff. Brueggemann defines him as the 
mediating theologian between himself and Childs. Both Rendtorff and 
Brueggemann argue that a theological interpretation must be done in relation 
to Jewish readers and the tremendous disaster of the Holocaust as a theological 
measure.210 In some way, Rendtorff anticipates ToT in the article “The Para-
digm is Changing” wherein he argues for a change in perspective for the dis-
cipline of Old Testament text, away from history towards the text itself.211 
Rendtorff is very impressed with ToT but poses two important and critical 
questions to Brueggemann: 
                                                     
208 Levenson, “Is Brueggemann really a Pluralist?” 275. 
209 Levenson, “Is Brueggemann really a Pluralist?” 279. 
210 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 97-98. 
211 Rolf Rendtorff, “The Paradigm is Changing,” Biblical Interpretation 1/1 (1993): 52: “What 
will continue, I hope, is the attitude of taking the text seriously in its given form, in its final 
shape. In this respect there are close connections between some of the new literary approaches 
and so-called canon criticism. It would require another paper to explain in detail how I see the 
similarities as well as the differences between these approaches. But, firstly, I want to stress that 
taking a synchronic approach to the text in its given shape is a task Old Testament scholarship 
has neglected too long and too intentionally.” 
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Aber wer ist der ‘Gerichtshof’ [court of law], der eine Entschei-
dung, einen ‘Spruch’ fällt, durch den ‘das Zeugnis in Realität 
verwandelt’ wird.212 
Nur selten wird mehr als ein Vers oder einige wenige Verse 
zitiert, ganze Kapitel oder größere Kompositionen kommen 
nicht zur Sprache. Die Bibel als Buch oder als eine Sammlung 
von Büchern kommt nicht in Blick.
213 
Both questions are hermeneutical and deserve attention. The first question con-
cerns biblical referentiality, i.e. how Brueggemann in ToT refers the biblical 
text to God. This question have been asked by others previously and raises an 
interesting problem in his theology and will be saved to further discussion in 
chapter 5. The second question refers to the importance of relating the testi-
mony to its context in order to achieve a correct interpretation. Brueggemann 
responds and argues that characteristic speech is not limited to specific con-
texts or genres. According to Brueggemann, Israel’s most characteristic 
speech is “the sort of utterances that recur in many genres and many circum-
stances… This specific utterance can be traced across genres and contexts.”214 
In sum, with regard to Childs, the important question is to understand in what 
ways they differ. With regard to Barr, the important question is epistemologi-
cal—are there epistemological problems with the historical-critical method as 
a tool for a theological interpretation of the Old Testament? With regard to 
Levenson, an important question is the relationship to the Jewish traditions and 
if a middle way between a Jewish and Church theological interpretation is pos-
sible or not. Finally, Rendtorff raises important questions concerning biblical 
referentiality. Brueggemann’s dialogue with the centrist theologians are ad-
dressed in the chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
                                                     
212 Rendtorff, reviews of Brueggemann, 15-16. 
213 Rendtorff, reviews of Brueggemann, 16. 
214 See Walter Brueggemann, “Response by Brueggemann,” RBL 1 (1999): 22. 
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3.4 CONTEXT IV) THE BIBLICAL THEOLOGY MOVEMENT 
The fourth context for understanding ToT is to situate Brueggemann within the 
crisis of the BThM.215 This movement had two roots, one European, with von 
Rad as its prominent representative,216 and one American, mostly connected 
with the Niebuhr brothers (Reinold (1892–1971) and H. Richard (1894–1962). 
According to Brueggemann, the European movement could not bridge the gap 
between salvation history and secular history, which alludes to von Rad’s own 
unresolved problem as mentioned previously. Understanding the American 
BThM is most important here. It traces its history and identity back to the 
1930s’ controversy between the fundamentalists and liberals, mostly within 
academic circles.217 The outcome of this controversy forged the BThM into 
becoming a movement that was influential across all theological disciplines.218 
Muilenburg, Albright, Wright, and Mendenhall were all important second gen-
eration representatives of BThM.219 Margaret S. Odell writes that 
Brueggemann, at the beginning of his academic career, was fostered within 
this movement:  
                                                     
215 See Walter Brueggemann, “The Role of Old Testament Theology in Old Testament Interpre-
tation,” in In Search of True Wisdom: Essays in Old Testament Interpretation in Honour of 
Ronald E. Clement (ed. E. Ball. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 74: “It is now com-
mon to cite 1970 as the break point of what came to be called (pejoratively) ‘the Biblical The-
ology Movement,’ that interpretive enterprise propelled by Barth and especially voiced by von 
Rad and Wright.” 
216 See “Biblical Theology Movement.” BELIEVE Religious Information Source web-site. 
2012. A Christ Walk Church Public Service. (2018 8th November) http://mb-soft.com/be-
lieve/indexaz.html: “It has been shown by James Barr and James D. Smart that the biblical 
theology movement is not a uniquely American phenomenon (so Childs). In Great Britain and 
on the European continent the same tendencies inherent in the American aspect of the move-
ment were present, although the setting in Europe was different.” See also Brueggemann, The-
ology of the Old Testament, 43: “The general approach that he (von Rad) represented came to 
be called the biblical theology movement.” 
217 See Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 31. 
218 Hasel, Old Testament Theology Basic Issues in the Current Debate, 27: “B.S. Childs provides 
a valuable survey of the ‘Biblical Theology Movement’ in America which, although derivative 
of European Biblical theology, is primarily an outgrowth of the polarity of the battle over the 
Scripture in the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy fought from 1910 to the 1930s in the 
USA.” 
219 See Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 21. “...very shortly all the major Protestant denom-
inations were influenced and many contributed their own first-rate scholars (Paul Minear, 
James Muilenburg, Bernhard Andersson).” 
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Brueggemann began his career at the height of the biblical the-
ology movement. He has also weathered its demise and kept 
abreast of the enormous changes in the field since then. One can 
hardly think of a less coherent period of biblical scholarship; yet 
Brueggemann has energetically embraced these new ap-
proaches.
220
 
The crisis within BThM motivated Childs to reclaim Scripture back to its orig-
inal context, i.e. to the Church.221 Brueggemann comments:  
In any case, for Childs, von Rad’s entire program was a betrayal 
of the larger canonical intention, of ‘the final form of the text,’ 
an abandonment of too much that responsible Christian theology 
has valued and must value.
222
   
Childs started, together with Barr, what Ollenburger coined as the third wave 
of Old Testament theologies.223 This wave opened up a scholarly shift in North 
America towards social and rhetorical methods and it is within this context that 
Brueggemann is situated. He reacted against the strong emphasis within the 
BThM on history and archaeology as tools for theological interpretation. In 
this respect his reaction is not unique. Previously, Childs and Barr, and also 
Langdon B. Gilkey (1919–2004), had raised critical questions about BThM’s 
epistemology.224 Waltke summarizes Childs’s critique very well. BThM com-
bined “a liberal critical methodology with normative biblical theology.”225 
Brueggemann’s negative reaction to BThM can be seen in the foreword of the 
                                                     
220 Odell, reviews of Brueggemann, 7. 
221 Xun Chen, Theological Exegesis in the Canonical Context: Brevard Springs Childs’s Meth-
odology of Biblical Theology (New York: Peter Lang AG, 2010), 79. 
222 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 45. 
223 Ollenburger, The Flowering of Old Testament Theology, 406: “The first wave in the 1930s 
and the second wave in the 1950s.” 
224 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 43. 
225 See Waltke, An Old Testament Theology, 45: “In his view, the biblical theology movement 
tried to combine a liberal critical methodology with normative biblical theology but could not 
bridge the gap between exegesis based on historical criticism and theology. Childs feels the gap 
between exegesis and theology can be bridged only by viewing the texts in the context of their 
own literature, namely, the canon of Scripture.” 
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second edition of The Land. This book, published in 1977, is the first book in 
the series Overtures to Biblical Theology of which he was one of two editors 
for many years.226 The purpose of this series is to “articulate the main theolog-
ical claims and resources in the text.”227 Brueggemann refers to the situation in 
the 1970s in the preface to the Land and writes: 
It was in that context that I begin to see that the Old Testament, 
in its theological articulation was not all about ‘deeds,’ but was 
concerned with place, specific real estate that was invested with 
powerful promises and with strategic arrangements for presence 
in the place as well.
228
  
To sum up, Brueggemann was formed within BThM but reacted against its 
strong emphasis on history. Instead he continued with a focus on social and 
rhetorical issues on the basis of the canonical text. 
3.5 CONTEXT V) POSTMODERNISM  
The fifth context for understanding ToT is the postmodern situation.229 Almost 
everyone who has given a response to ToT describes Brueggemann as a post-
modern scholar, but there are some who question this epithet. Before com-
menting on this fact, A.K. M Adam summarizes postmodernism with particu-
lar attention to biblical criticism: 
Postmodernism is antifoundational in that it resolutely refuses to 
posit any one premise as the privileged and unassailable starting 
point for establishing claims of truth. It is anti-totalizing because 
                                                     
226 Perdue, Reconstructing Old Testament Theology after the Collapse of History, 46: “The se-
ries Overtures to Biblical Theology, which began in the late 1970s and has recently passed its 
thirtieth year, is still edited by one of its founders, Walter Brueggemann, who eschewed doctri-
naire approaches and a primary focus on methodology, in order to obtain theological insights 
into the biblical texts.” 
227 See Brueggemann’s foreword to Terence Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament 
Perspective (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), xi. 
228 Brueggemann, The Land, xi. 
229 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 61: “As yet no consensus exists about how to 
characterize the new sociopolitical -interpretative situation, but here I shall use the term post-
modern.” 
87 
 
postmodern discourse suspects that any theory that claims to ac-
count everything is suppressing counterexamples... Postmodern-
ism is also demystifying: it attends to claims that certain assump-
tions are ‘natural’ and tries to show that these are in fact ideolog-
ical projections.
230
 
Adam also defines Brueggemann’s Texts under Negotiation as an appropriate 
introduction to a postmodern reading of Scripture.231 Perdue describes 
Brueggemann as a postmodern theologian, even though “he does not embrace 
other rather significant ones.”232 Collins argues that Brueggemann is a post-
modern theologian because firstly, he stresses pluralism within the interpreta-
tive communities. Secondly, he pays attention to rhetoric as a tool for biblical 
interpretation. Thirdly, because Brueggemann’s use of the courtroom meta-
phor is a typical postmodern feature.233 Forth and finally, Paul R. House de-
fines Brueggemann as a postmodern scholar.234 Levenson however, does raise 
doubt as to whether Brueggemann really is a postmodern scholar, arguing crit-
ically that Brueggemann has misunderstood Lyotard’s definition of postmod-
ernism:  
Indeed, if we take as definitional Jean-François Lyotard’s influ-
ential characterization of postmodern thought as the suspicion of 
metanarratives, Brueggemann, for all his invocation of postmod-
ernist terminology, would not qualify as postmodern at all. For 
he rejects the claim that Lyotard’s definition is characteristic of 
                                                     
230 Andrew K.M Adam, What is Postmodern Biblical Criticism? (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1995), 5. Childs refers to Adam as an authority of postmodern hermeneutics. See Childs, The 
Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture, 291: “A.K.M Adam trying to chart the 
beginning of the cycle of postmodernism in biblical studies…” 
231 Adam, What is Postmodern Biblical Criticism? 25. 
232 Perdue, Reconstructing Old Testament Theology after the Collapse of History, 251. 
233 Collins, The Scripture after Babel, 143-45. 
234 See House, Old Testament in the Life of God's People, 35: “It is difficult to overstate Walter 
Brueggemann’s prominence in American OT studies over the past three decades. He has au-
thored and edited dozens of books, and his works are cited extensively in the discipline.” 
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our age and maintains instead that our situation is one of conflict 
and competition between deeply held metanarratives.
235
 
In this regard, Collins agrees with Levenson; and argues that whereas 
Brueggemann’s understanding of postmodernism stresses a conflict between 
various metanarratives, Lyotard actually stresses the loss of confidence in 
metanarratives. Collins concludes that Brueggemann’s appropriation of post-
modernism is “partial, and has a familiar Protestant, Barthian, look.”236  
My own conclusion is that Brueggemann is a postmodern theologian and as 
such, suits perfectly within the stretchable context that embraces postmodern-
ism. To deny him this epithet is to define postmodernism within too narrow 
boundaries. As Levenson also points out, Brueggemann describes postmodern-
ism in ToT as a situation without any “universal assumption at the outset of 
reading.”237 In this way, Brueggemann first of all works from the supposition 
that postmodernism is a “breakup of any broad consensus about what we know 
or how we know what we know”.238 This fact motivates him to present a new 
approach that differs from both church theology and the historical-critical 
method.  
Also important to emphasize is that postmodernism is a very complex term, 
with vast and different connotations. Brueggemann is postmodern in the sense 
that he also presupposes pluralism within the interpretative community and the 
biblical text. For him, the postmodern situation is a context that is marked by 
various different approaches within the discipline of Old Testament theology, 
such as canonical theology (e.g. Childs), Jewish theology (e.g. Levenson) his-
torical-critical theology (e.g. Barr), feminist theology (e.g. Phyllis Trible), lib-
eration theology (e.g. George Pixel), and black theology (e.g. Itumeleng 
                                                     
235 Levenson, “Is Brueggemann Really a Pluralist?” 266. 
236 Collins, The Scripture after Babel, 145. 
237 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 62. 
238 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 709. 
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Mosala).239 This situation, Brueggemann argues, constitutes the postmodern 
situation and “cuts off the core of the matter of interpretation.”240  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Brueggemann refers positively to Albertz’ 
interpretative reflection of a “no agreed-on consensus point, but the canon it-
self is an exercise in adjudication.”241 Adjudication for both Brueggemann and 
Albertz means that the biblical text itself contains a pluralistic character. He 
refers to Albertz for this conclusion as a presupposition for doing Old Testa-
ment theology. There is no doubt that Brueggemann is a postmodern theolo-
gian because he presupposes a shift within the interpretative communities, 
from a modern epistemology and hermeneutics that believed in the possibility 
of an objective interpretation towards the use of many different approaches that 
partly stand as competing and partly as complementary approaches. 
3.6 CONTEXT VI) IMAGINATION 
Imagination, too, belongs no less legitimately to the human pos-
sibility of knowing. A man without an imagination is more of an 
invalid than one who lacks a leg.
242
 
Pointing to one feature as being the most significant for characterizing 
Brueggemann’s hermeneutical thinking, many would probably suggest imagi-
nation. This term has been traced back to his influence from Ricoeur and has, 
at least since the late 1970s, been the driving force in his theology, because, by 
use of imagination, he has been able to go beyond church theology and the 
historical-critical methods. Perdue writes that Brueggemann, more than any 
other Old Testament scholar, “has articulated a theology of imagination as a 
                                                     
239 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 89-102. 
240 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 62. 
241 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 64. See also xvi: “a pluralism of faith affir-
mations and articulations of Yahweh in the text itself, a pluralism that von Rad had begun to see 
in his break with unilateral developmentalism and which Rainer Albertz has more fully expli-
cated;…” 
242 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 91. Karl Barth— Studies 
of His Theological Method (ed. S. W. Sykes; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 69. 
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way of approaching, understanding and appropriating Old Testament texts.”243 
His use of imagination in the interpretation of the Old Testament then forms 
the sixth context for understanding ToT. It is important to stress that for 
Brueggemann imagination is not equal to fantasy.244 He uses the term as anal-
ogous with Garett Green’s term “realistic imagination.”245 Brueggemann ex-
presses his meaning of imagination in An Introduction to the Old Testament: 
The Canon and Christian Imagination: 
It is, moreover, clear that an accent upon imagination may sound 
like an invitation to wild fantasy in any direction. There is, how-
ever, an important and extensive literature on imagination as 
faithful interpretation that sharply distinguishes imagination 
from undisciplined, uncritical fantasy.246  
Imagination is crucial to understand in Brueggemann’s thinking because it 
opens up for an extra-referential reality that I will come back to in chapter 5. I 
proceed and describe how he uses imagination in books prior to ToT as well as 
one book of imagination coming after ToT. The purpose is to see how he de-
fines imagination prior to ToT and see if this term stands in a process of conti-
nuity towards ToT or if there is signal of the reverse. I will then come back to 
this topic in chapter 5 where Brueggemann’s hermeneutical use of imagination 
in ToT will be examined.  
                                                     
243 Leo Perdue, The Collapse of History, Reconstructing Old Testament Theology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1994), 286. 
244 Walter Brueggemann, An Introduction to the Old Testament: The Canon and Christian Im-
agination (Louisville: Westminster Jon Knox Press, 2003), 396-97: “It is moreover; clear that 
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245 Garrett Green, Imagining God, Theology and the religious Imagination (San Francisco: Har-
per & Row, 1989), 64. 
246 Brueggemann, An Introduction to the Old Testament, 397. 
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IMAGINATION AND PROPHECY 
The Prophetic Imagination, first published in 1978,247 forms the logical start-
ing point for a study of Brueggemann’s understanding of imagination. Ricoeur, 
as noted previously, has been important for him. He explains: 
Eventually Ricoeur permitted me to think again about imagina-
tion, though I had already written Prophetic Imagination before 
I happened onto Ricoeur. Since then I have, for a very long time, 
worked on understanding imagination as a practice of interpreta-
tion that required me to move out beyond the methods in which 
I had been inducted.
248
 
The Prophetic Imagination starts a development in Brueggemann’s thinking 
that in many ways finds a logical end in ToT.249 The book was published during 
his time at Eden Theological seminary and was written for both the academic 
guild and pastoral ministry. In the book, Brueggemann argues that American 
society could be described by two words: consumerism and amnesia. Consum-
erism leads to amnesia, with the result that society forgets its deepest identity, 
i.e. that “we are really made in the image of some God.”250 In this situation, the 
Church has the calling to act in prophetic ministry, to imagine an alternative, 
i.e. to perceive an alternative consciousness.251 Brueggemann takes his position 
between liberals, who define prophetic ministry in terms of “social action” and 
conservatives, who tend to see the prophets only as “future tellers.” He does 
not deny either of these definitions but nonetheless develops his own perspec-
tive: 
The hypothesis I will explore here is this: the task of prophetic 
ministry is to nurture, nourish, and evoke a consciousness and 
                                                     
247 I use the new revised edition that was published in 2000. 
248 Brueggemann, “A Pathway of Interpretation,” XX. Brueggemann informs the reader in a 
note to pay special attention to Texts under Negotiation for his understanding of the word imag-
ination. 
249 C.f. Izaak J Hulster, “Imagination: A Hermeneutical Tool for the Study of the Hebrew Scrip-
ture,” Biblical Interpretation 18 (2010): 124 ff.  
250 Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, 8. 
251 Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, 1-2. 
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perception alternative to the consciousness and perception of the 
dominant culture around us.
252
 
According to Brueggemann, the perception of an alternative ultimately has 
God as its source. He writes: “Prophecy begins in discerning how genuinely 
alternative He is.”253 For him the Church is the context wherein this alternative 
can be created:  
In any case, my governing hypothesis is that the alternative pro-
phetic community is concerned both with criticizing and ener-
gizing. On the one hand to show that the dominant, royal con-
sciousness (which I have termed ‘royal’) will indeed end and that 
it has no final claim upon us. On the other hand, it is the task of 
the alternative prophetic community to present an alternative 
consciousness that can energize the community.
254
 
Brueggemann shows that the biblical text itself presents a conflict between two 
systems of thoughts and ideologies, visible in contemporary society as well.255 
The community that is fostered by the prophetic imagination becomes an alter-
native community that can challenge the religion of static triumphalism. This 
religion is marked by a structure and order without the necessity of imagining 
an alternative. However, in Egypt, Moses imagined an alternative for the 
twelve tribes of Israel. From the beginning of the Solomonic kingdom to the 
last King of Judah, the prophets of Israel imagined an alternative for the people. 
In the Babylonian empire the prophets imagined an alternative to the empire 
and freedom for the exiled people. For Brueggemann, the royal consciousness 
creates amnesia. Only by remembering the traditions of God and reestablishing 
                                                     
252 Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, 3. 
253 Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, 1-2, 7. 
254 Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, 59. 
255 Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, 7: “We will not understand the meaning of pro-
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God as the center—through the act of imagination— can one can withstand the 
ideology from Egypt, Babylon and secular society. Brueggemann writes:  
So, this is the paradigm I suggest for prophetic imagination: a 
royal consciousness committed to achievable satiation. An alter-
native prophetic consciousness devoted to the pathos and passion 
of covenanting. The royal consciousness with its program of 
achievable satisfaction has redefined our notions of humanness, 
and it had one that to all of us. It has created a subjective con-
sciousness concerned only with self-satisfaction. It has denied us 
the legitimacy of tradition that requires us to remember, of au-
thority that expects us to answer, and of community that calls us 
to care.
256
  
The prophetic community returns to the memories from earlier history and by 
use of symbols and metaphors this community then creates a hope for another 
world. Brueggemann’s use of memory at this point closely associates him with 
von Rad’s understanding of the prophet’s reuse of the great traditions in the 
history of Israel. Like von Rad, Brueggemann argues that by memorizing the 
traditions and using this material in new situations it becomes possible for the 
prophets to find energy. It is by returning to memory that energizing is made 
possible.257 
IMAGINATION AND RHETORICAL CRITICISM 
In 1981, in the article “Vine and Fig Tree: A Case study in Imagination and 
Criticism,” Brueggemann highlights the imaginative nature that he believes is 
inherent in the biblical text. He does so in a case study of Micah 4:1–5 and 1 
Kings 4:20–28 by use of the rhetorical-critical approach with an imaginative 
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perspective.258 A main argument in the article is that because the metaphor of 
the Vine and Fig Tree is used in both texts, the act of imagining becomes cru-
cial in order to interpret them. In the first text, Micah 4:1-5 it is written: 
In days to come the mountain of the LORD’S house 
shall be established as the highest of the mountains, 
and shall be raised up above the hills. 
Peoples shall stream to it, 
and many nations shall come and say: 
“Come, let us go up to the mountain of the LORD, 
to the house of the God of Jacob; 
that he may teach us his ways 
and that we may walk in his paths.” 
For out of Zion shall go forth instruction, 
and the word of the LORD from Jerusalem. 
He shall judge between many peoples, 
and shall arbitrate between strong nations far away; 
they shall beat their swords into plowshares, 
and their spears into pruning hooks; 
nation shall not lift up sword against nation, 
neither shall they learn war any more; 
but they shall all sit under their own vines and under their own 
fig trees, 
and no one shall make them afraid; 
for the mouth of the LORD of hosts has spoken. 
For all the peoples walk, 
each in the name of its god, 
but we will walk in the name of the LORD our God 
forever and ever. 
For Brueggemann, the metaphor of wine and the fig tree in Micah is used in 
an eschatological sense to present “an alternative world”.259 The text, he ar-
gues, can be seen as poetry with the intention to “lead Israel to an alternative 
reality”:  
That hope is not simply for a disarmed world. It is much more 
personal. What one wishes for is to be secure enough to produce 
                                                     
258 See Walter Brueggemann, “Vine and Fig Tree: A Case Study in Imagination and Criticism,” 
CBQ 43 (1981): 188-204. This article is reprinted in Brueggemann, A Social Reading of the Old 
Testament, 245-62. In the foreword to this book, Miller writes that this article is… “…a prime 
example of Brueggemann’s approach. It is textual and exegetical, giving attention to important 
features in the text—in this case, irony—for their interpretative significance.” 
259 Brueggemann, “Vine and Fig Tree,” 189: “THE POEM OF Mic 4:1-5 is an example of im-
aginative use of concrete and anticipatory metaphor to evoke an alternative world in the con-
sciousness of Israel.” 
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and enjoy produce unmolested, either by lawlessness or the usur-
pation of the state.
260
 
Brueggemann then compares the metaphor of the vine and fig tree in Micah 
with the same metaphor, but now in another context, in 1 Kings 4:20–28:  
Judah and Israel were as numerous as the sand by the sea; they 
ate and drank and were happy. 21 Solomon was sovereign over 
all the kingdoms from the Euphrates to the land of the Philistines, 
even to the border of Egypt; they brought tribute and served Sol-
omon all the days of his life. Solomon’s provision for one day 
was thirty cors of choice flour, and sixty cors of meal, 23 ten fat 
oxen, and twenty pasture-fed cattle, one hundred sheep, besides 
deer, gazelles, roebucks, and fatted fowl. 24 For he had dominion 
over all the region west of the Euphrates from Tiphsah to Gaza, 
over all the kings west of the Euphrates; and he had peace on all 
sides. 25 During Solomon’s lifetime Judah and Israel lived in 
safety, from Dan even to Beer-sheba, all of them under their 
vines and fig trees. 26 Solomon also had forty thousand stalls of 
horses for his chariots, and twelve thousand horsemen. 27 Those 
officials supplied provisions for King Solomon and for all who 
came to King Solomon’s table, each one in his month; they let 
nothing be lacking. 28 They also brought to the required place 
barley and straw for the horses and swift steeds, each according 
to his charge. 
Because the contexts of Micah 4:1-5 and 1 Kings 4.20–28 are so different, 
Brueggemann draws the conclusion that the metaphor of vine and fig tree is 
used in 1 Kings with an ironical intention. The text of 1 Kings 4:20–28 is “an 
example of ironic criticism, designed to show that the present royal order, ab-
solute and comprehensive in its claims, cannot keep its promises.”261 Even 
though his argument as such could be questioned, e.g. it could be argued that 
the state system in 1 Kings was actually good for Israel, the major point to 
draw is that he combines imagination with rhetorical criticism and argues that 
this feature belongs to the text itself so that imagination is a visible sign in the 
final text.  
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IMAGINATION AND THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH 
Early in his career, Brueggemann wrote an article that was finally transmitted 
into the book David’s Truth in Israel’s Imagination (1985).262 In this book he 
again stresses how rhetorical criticism is closely related to imagination in a 
way that… 
… texts are acts of imaginative construal of a world that the char-
acters of the text inhabit. This means that rhetorical methods of 
interpretation, well-honed by Phyllis Trible, pay primary atten-
tion to the act of imagination.
263
 
In the foreword to the second edition of this book (2002), Brueggemann de-
scribes David’s Truth as a beginning point for an “interaction between” core 
and counter-testimonies: 
In retrospect, I think I can legitimately say that in David’s Truth 
I offered an inchoate tracing of what I later fleshed out in Theol-
ogy of the Old Testament [1997], namely, that Israel’s textual 
testimony is an ongoing interaction between ‘core testimony’ 
and testimony that critiques core testimony, which I have termed 
‘counter-testimony.’264 
The main point in David’s Truth is that the concept of truth, within human 
limitations, must be seen from many perspectives and contexts.265 David has 
many faces, and in order to reach the true David one has to discern them all. 
According to Brueggemann, there are at least four different portraits to be 
seen: 1) David as young, 2) the painful truth of David, e.g. the Bathsheba in-
cident (2 Samuel 8–20 and 1 Kings 1–2), 3) David as king (2 Samuel 5:6–
                                                     
262 Walter Brueggemann, David’s Truth in Israel’s Imagination and Memory, Second Edition 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002).  
263 Brueggemann, David’s Truth, xiii. 
264 Brueggemann, David’s Truth, xiv. 
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8:18) and 4) David from a theological perspective (e.g. Psalm 89). 
Brueggemann’s conclusion is that the narrative of David has four versions of 
David and all are true.266 In these different portraits there are different modes 
of truth and every concept of truth is surrounded by both ideology and advo-
cacy.267 In order to arrive at the truth, one has to go beyond and behind these 
ideologies. 
IMAGINATION AND MEMORY 
Brueggemann continues to develop his ideas of imagination in Hopeful Imag-
ination: Prophetic Voices in Exile (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986). In this 
book he argues that the biblical exile has a contemporary exile for the Ameri-
can churches:  
If the church is in fact in exile, as I believe it to be, then to try to 
do ministry as if we are practicing imperial religion robs us of 
energy. My own judgment is that honestly facing exile as our real 
situation generates energy for imaginative and faithful living.
268
 
In this situation of exile, the task of the Church is “to nurture, nourish, and 
evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the consciousness and 
perception of the dominant culture around us.”269 He discerns a hopeful prac-
tice of imagination in Second Isaiah. The prophet makes use of Israel’s older 
memories in order to create a prophetic alternative. In this situation of exile, 
the pain and the use of memory creates a speech of hope: 
                                                     
266 See Brueggemann, David’s Truth, 7. 
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The poetry is not aimed first of all at external conduct, as though 
the poet expected people immediately to start packing for travel. 
Rather, the poetry cuts underneath behavior to begin to transform 
the self-image, communal image, and image of historical possi-
bility.
270
 
Imagination is not a freelance, ad hoc operation that spins out 
novelty. Imagination, of the kind we are speaking, is a fresh, lib-
erated return to the memory.
271
 
From Isaiah 54:1–10 he suggests that biblical imagination can recall the mem-
ories of the past in order to evoke new hope for a new reality. The task of the 
prophet is to “announce the possibility of homecoming even though the empire 
declared it impossible.”272 In Isaiah 54:1-4 there are some imperatives that are 
followed by motivations which together create the structure of hymn. 273 All 
these imperatives “play upon the theme of barrenness and appeal to the 
memory of mother Sarah.” The poem inspires the listener to remember the 
“former things” and see that “this same God who caused birth in the midst of 
barrenness is about to act again in transformative ways.”274 The text is as fol-
lows: 
Sing, O barren one who did not bear; 
burst into song and shout, 
you who have not been in labor! 
For the children of the desolate woman will be more 
than the children of her that is married, says the LORD. 
Enlarge the site of your tent, 
and let the curtains of your habitations be stretched out; 
do not hold back; lengthen your cords 
and strengthen your stakes. 
For you will spread out to the right and to the left, 
and your descendants will possess the nations 
and will settle the desolate towns. 
                                                     
270 Brueggemann, Hopeful Imagination, 96-97. 
271 Brueggemann, Hopeful Imagination, 102. 
272 Brueggemann, Hopeful Imagination, 115. 
273 Brueggemann, Hopeful Imagination, 117. Verses 1-4 have three sets of imperatives: in v. 1a 
(shout), v. 2 (enlarge), and v. 4a (fear not), with a corresponding set of motivations v. 1b (for 
the sons of the desolate one will be more numerous), v. 3 (For you will spread abroad to the 
right and to the left), and v. 4b (for you will not be disregarded) 
274 Brueggemann, Hopeful Imagination, 118. 
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Do not fear, for you will not be ashamed; 
do not be discouraged, for you will not suffer disgrace; 
for you will forget the shame of your youth, 
and the disgrace of your widowhood you will remember no 
more. 
Verses 5-9 are modeled on the theme of divorce-remarriage. These verses, es-
pecially 6-8, later play an important theological role for his concept of YHWH 
in ToT (see chapter 1 and chapter 5):  
For your Maker is your husband, 
the LORD of hosts is his name; 
the Holy One of Israel is your Redeemer, 
the God of the whole earth he is called. 
For the LORD has called you 
like a wife forsaken and grieved in spirit, 
like the wife of a man’s youth when she is cast off, 
says your God. 
For a brief moment I abandoned you, 
but with great compassion I will gather you. 
In overflowing wrath for a moment 
I hid my face from you, 
but with everlasting love I will have compassion on you, 
says the LORD, your Redeemer. 
This is like the days of Noah to me: 
Just as I swore that the waters of Noah 
would never again go over the earth, 
so I have sworn that I will not be angry with you 
and will not rebuke you. 
Brueggemann uses the theme of divorce-remarriage to articulate the idea that 
even though the exile causes abandonment (cf. v. 7) the important thing for the 
community to remember is God’s enduring love. He writes:  
If possibility can come from other than memory, then memory 
need not finally be bothered with. But we argued that it is only 
memory that allows possibility—nothing else.275  
He maintains that memory is the only foundation that can create an imagination 
that will lead to homecoming: “It is nothing other than the memory that permits 
the poet to articulate new possibility, out beyond the empire.”276 
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In sum, this book emphasizes imagination as the memorizing tool to foster a 
biblical worldview that with the help of imagination can stand up against the 
royal, static consciousness.  
IMAGINATION AND ESCHATOLOGY  
Brueggemann also includes eschatology in relation to his use of imagination. 
In the article “Convergence in recent OT theologies”, first published in 1980, 
later republished in 1992, he makes a distinction between an anticipatory epis-
temology277, equivalent to a foreseeing epistemology, and a hermeneutical 
epistemology. The problem with a hermeneutical epistemology is that it pays 
too much attention to the presuppositions of the interpreter which renders it 
impossible to reach forward to a truth. He writes:  
The hermeneutical enterprise by itself may lead to a relativizing, 
so that we end up being unable to say anything because we are 
so aware of our own relative vantage points.
278
 
In contrast to a hermeneutical epistemology, an anticipatory epistemology is 
open to imagination and focuses attention on the future as the verification of 
truth. Such an epistemology hopes and longs for the future to begin. The an-
ticipation of the coming future for the people of God is the convergence point 
that unites all the different theologies within the Old Testament. 
Brueggemann’s verification of truth is thus placed in an eschatological fu-
ture.279 
IMAGINATION AND INTERPRETATION 
In Texts under Negotiation: the Scripture and Postmodern Imagination (1993), 
Brueggemann presents an interpretative program for ToT. He argues that the 
                                                     
277 Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 116. He refers to Jürgen Habermas as inspiratory 
source for this term. 
278 Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 117. 
279 This view has some similarities with Wolfhart Pannenberg’s eschatological verification the-
ory of truth. This theory means that the truth is revealed within the secular history, see Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology. vol. I (trans. George H. Kehm. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press. 1970), 12.  
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new “postmodern climate” points to a changed epistemological context that 
justifies a new approach for biblical interpretation.280 The use of imagination 
then becomes central for him in order to prepare for this change of epistemol-
ogy. This book is therefore especially important and he describes it as the meth-
odological book for ToT,281 and imagination becomes a vehicle for him to take 
the step from a modern world into the postmodern one. A dominant thought 
for him is that modernity is a constructed imagination that is now displaced by 
a postmodern imagination of the world:  
A postmodern climate recognizes that there is no given definition 
and that the rival claims must simply be argued out.
282
  
The formal premise I urge is that our knowing is essentially im-
aginative, that is, an act of organizing social reality around dom-
inant, authoritative images. This means that the assumptions that 
have long had unexamined privilege among us are now seen to 
be sturdy, powerful acts of imagination, reinforced, imposed, and 
legitimated by power.
283
 
Brueggemann supports the idea that modernity is a constructed imagination 
and not a given, objective reality. He refers to an analysis of the epistemology 
of the Enlightenment through the eyes of two authors, Stephen Toulmin and 
Susan Bordo.284 According to Toulmin and Bordo, the collapse of modernism 
                                                     
280 Walter Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation: The Scripture and Postmodern Imagination 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), vii: “This book has an eminently practical concern, the 
liberation of the biblical text for the church in a new situation, for interpretation, proclamation, 
teaching, and practice. There can be little doubt that we are in a wholly new interpretative situ-
ation. While this new pluralistic, postmodern situation is perceived by many as a threat to ‘main-
line’ churches and to the long-settled claims of conventional text-reading, it is my judgment and 
my urging that the new situation is in fact a positive opportunity to which church interpreters of 
the Scripture may attend with considerable eagerness.” 
281 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, with CD-ROM. At the back of the book 
Texts under Negotiation is described as Brueggemann’s interpretative program for ToT. 
282 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 15. 
283 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 18. 
284 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 3-5. See S. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, The Hidden 
Agenda of Modernity. (New York: Free Press, 1990), and S. Bordo, Flight to Objectivity: Essays 
on Cartesianism and Culture (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1987).  
102 
 
is analogous to another, earlier, collapse; namely, the collapse of the medieval 
world. At that time it was Descartes, Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau among oth-
ers who, while facing the collapse of the medieval synthesis, were searching 
for new solid ground for their thinking.285 Bordo’s interpretation of Descartes 
is especially important for Brueggemann. According to Bordo, Descartes’ 
search for a new epistemological foundation should be seen as a way to save 
the world in light of the downfall of the medieval world. Bordo’s analysis is 
that Descartes’ epistemological solution - linking objectivity to the self - has 
two, mainly negative, results. Firstly, “a new separated individual conscious-
ness that in fact has no reference point outside itself” and secondly, an episte-
mology which created an objectivity that confirmed much too masculine 
power.286 Real knowledge, since Descartes, has been grounded in terms of…  
… rational, logical coherence, discerned by a detached, disinter-
ested, disembodied mind. … Real knowledge is written, univer-
sal, general and timeless.
287
 
According to Brueggemann, the historical-critical method is based on Enlight-
enment epistemology. For a long time this method has been the only valid the-
ological interpretation tool for discerning objective knowledge. However, a 
postmodern situation includes skepticism towards this objective certitude and 
also suggests an alternative. Brueggemann writes: 
Less important but worth noting, the end of modernity requires 
a critique of method in scripture study. It is clear to me that con-
ventional historical criticism is, in scripture study, our particular 
practice of modernity, whereby the text was made to fit our 
modes of knowledge and control. As we stand before the text, no 
                                                     
285 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 2-3. 
286 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 4. 
287 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 5. 
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longer as its master but as its advocate, we will have to find new 
methods of reading.
288
 
The postmodern shift asks for new criteria for a justified knowledge, and he 
finds them by help of imagination: 
By imagination, I mean very simply the human capacity to pic-
ture, portray, receive and practice the world in ways other than it 
appears to be at first glance when seen through a dominant, ha-
bitual, unexamined lens.
289 
According to Brueggemann, a postmodern epistemology is then based upon a 
new imagination—an imagination where knowing consists of a dynamic think-
ing where reality is birthed into existence by a combination of former memo-
ries in a new situations, with imagination providing the dynamic energy.290 He 
argues, in Texts under Negotiation, that human knowing is “essentially imagi-
native” which means that human thinking is constructed upon dominant im-
ages that are legitimated by various hegemonic powers. This is his formal 
premise for an imaginative thinking:  
On the basis of this formal premise, I assert the substantive claim 
that the practice of modernity, of which we are all children, since 
the seventeenth century has given us a world imagined through 
the privilege of white, male, Western, colonial hegemony, with 
all its pluses and minuses.
291
 
Concerning hermeneutics, Brueggemann’s emphasis is that the biblical text 
should transform the community, i.e. reshape the mind of the community.292 
                                                     
288 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 11. 
289 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 13. 
290 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 13: “knowing consists not in settled certitudes but 
in the actual work of Imagination.” 
291 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 18. 
292 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 24: “…the preacher must take care not to compro-
mise but to stay very close to the odd text that is the source of this proposed alternative.” 
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He argues that the Church must leave the boundaries of a modern epistemology 
otherwise she will disappear with the rest of modernity. On the other hand, if 
the Church has the courage to enter into postmodernity, the result will be trans-
formation, i.e. “the slow, steady process of inviting each other into a counter 
story about God, world, neighbor, and self.”293 A transformative preaching is 
then evidenced in the way the interpreter dares to take an examining attitude 
to the text, following its message wherever it takes him or her. As for the 
Church in the postmodern context, the pastor must have a method that can cor-
respond to both the biblical worldview and to the postmodern worldview and 
for different reasons the historical-critical method does not match these crite-
ria. He draws parallels between the therapist and the pastor. Like the therapist, 
a pastor does not need to know everything in advance: 
In parallel fashion, the pastor does not see and know everything 
in advance, but lives patiently and faithfully while the new pieces 
of disclosure surface and do their work.
294
  
In the encounter with the text the reader is able to see the world as God imagi-
nes it. According to Brueggemann, in a postmodern context it is necessary to 
unlearn what has formerly been learned in theological education, whether it 
comes from the historical-critical paradigm or church theology. Brueggemann 
wants to save the biblical message from, on the one hand, liberal questions, 
asking whether this really could happen, and on the other hand, conservatism 
marked by stereotyped doctrinal statements. His proposal for scriptural inter-
pretation is to use the metaphor of the drama as a suitable alternative: 
Thus I propose, as a way of moving beyond eighteenth-century 
absolutism and beyond nineteenth–century developmentalism, 
that biblical faith as drama for our time and place is a way of 
reading that respects and takes full account of the text.
295
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295 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 67. 
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According to Brueggemann, a biblical hermeneutics enters into the “zone of 
imagination.” This zone stands between the reader and the text and is situated 
in the mind of the reader. The text enters the reader through this zone and “no 
one, not the preacher or the interpreter has any access to this zone of imagina-
tion or control over the outcome.”296 In practice, this means that the goal for 
the preacher is to support the zone of imagination for the listener. The purpose 
for the preacher is to “make sure the text is offered as input in the liveliest way 
as possible. Beyond that, the subjects themselves must answer for the pro-
cess.”297 
To conclude, imagination takes its form in the mind but is fostered by the bib-
lical text. This text is in turn formed by God. A pastor’s purpose is to help the 
listener to enter into the text by creating a dialogue between the listener and 
the text, after which transformation can take place. 
IMAGINATION AND TESTIMONY 
In the foreword to Deep Memory Exuberant Hope: Contested Truth in a Post 
– Christian World (2000), the redactor Miller writes: “In various ways, they 
lay the groundwork for Brueggemann’s magisterial Theology of the Old Tes-
tament.”298 An important theme in these articles is Brueggemann’s combina-
tion of imagination with testimony. In short, he argues that understanding the 
Old Testament text as a testimony is congruent with a faithful imagination. 
This means, first of all, that there is a thickness or density in the biblical testi-
mony that is only possible to enter through the act of imagination: “The thick-
ness requires many readings, many hearings, many interpretations, and many 
                                                     
296 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 63. 
297 Brueggemann, Texts under Negotiation, 68-69: “The minister enacts the drama and invites 
members of the listening, participating congregation to come be in the drama as he or she 
chooses and is able. That is, preaching in frame of reference is not for instruction [doctrinal or 
moral] or even for advocacy, but it is for one more re-enactment of the drama of the text.” 
298 Patrick D Miller, Foreword to Walter Brueggemann, Deep Memory Exuberant Hope: Con-
tested Truth in a post–Christian World (ed. Patrick D. Miller: Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2000), viii: “Here the reader will encounter Brueggemann’s development of the image of the 
courtroom and of the Old Testament as various forms of testimony, a way of approaching the 
Scriptures that points to the centrality of rhetoric and speech and suggests the character of the 
Scripture as requiring decision.” 
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acts of faithful imagination…”299 Secondly, the theological foundation for an 
old testament theology should be done on the foundation of the testimony. 
However, the Church, for too long a time, has interpreted this testimony 
through the imagination of rationalism and logic. Rationalism is not the bibli-
cal imaginative mode.300 Rationalism is “Latin-like” imagination. In contrast, 
he wants to stress a far more biblical alternative: “the clearest evidence for this 
process of testimony, I take it, is the poetry of 2 Isaiah [40–55].”301 By using 
testimony in an imaginative way the reader observes how another “world is 
possible.”302 
IMAGINATION IN PROCESS OF CONTINUITY BEFORE AND AFTER 
TOT 
In the final study of imagination we take a closer look at how Brueggemann 
describes imagination after ToT. Such a comparison makes it possible to con-
clude as to whether there is continuity in his use of imagination both prior to 
and after ToT. It is also possible to suggest a continuity that embraces ToT as 
well. The book An Introduction to the Old Testament - the Canon and Chris-
tian Imagination, published in 2003, is suitable for this purpose. Here, 
Brueggemann interprets all the Old Testament books by way of an imaginative 
approach, stressing the combination of imagination and memory:  
This act of imaginative remembering, I believe, is the clue to val-
uing the Scripture as a trustworthy voice of faith while still tak-
ing seriously our best critical learning.303  
The act of imagining creates the possibility of going beyond the historical 
question what happened? and stepping into what Brueggemann calls beyond 
                                                     
299 Brueggemann, Deep Memory Exuberant Hope, 22. 
300 Brueggemann, Deep Memory Exuberant Hope, 3: “For those of us who left the Latin liturgy 
in the sixteenth century, our alternative strategy has been historical criticism, another ‘Latin-
like’ attempt to control and reduce and tame and understand and reduce and control and reduce.” 
301 Brueggemann, Deep Memory Exuberant Hope, 22. 
302 Brueggemann, Deep Memory Exuberant Hope, 17. 
303 Brueggemann, An Introduction to the Old Testament, 8. 
107 
 
the given. Translating beyond the given is for him equal to discerning the real-
ity from YHWH’s perspective.304 He discusses the historical books of Judges, 
Samuels and Kings and argues that these books are actually prophetical in the 
sense they present history from YHWH’s perspective. The historical reportage 
is filled with sociological and rhetorical aspects.305 “What we have is a text that 
stands some distance removed from whatever historical encounter might have 
happened.”306 So, the text in our hand does not give the objective information 
concerning what really happened, but rather the real historical encounter is 
transposed through the act of imagination. The text is a “stylized, artistic act 
of imagination” and this act has also “transposed history into artistry.” 307 He 
develops his hermeneutical thinking from this in three interpretative stages: 
- The first stage means simply that there is a story that is constructed 
from the eyes of YHWH, i.e. an act of imagination remembering.  
- The second stage is the story retold, i.e., re-imagined in other sources 
in the Old Testament.  
- The third stage is when the story becomes a metaphor whereby the old 
imagined event becomes a “type whereby new experiences are imag-
ined differently in the light of the older extant types.”308  
Consequently for him, the Old Testament texts are filled with many possible 
readings because there is more than one stage in the text:  
In a quite similar way, it is clear that interpretation of Scripture 
[that is, readings beyond the final form of the text] continues in 
                                                     
304 Brueggemann, An Introduction to the Old Testament, 263: “…the category of ‘prophet’ in-
dicates that a more or less ‘historical’ narrative is ‘prophetic’ in the sense that it retells or re 
imagines the past from a quite particular perspective, namely, the rule of YHWH….” 
305 Brueggemann, An Introduction to the Old Testament, 7: “One may assume that what is re-
membered is rooted in some occurrence. Thus, for example, the great Exod narrative surely has 
behind it some defining emancipatory happening.” 
306 Walter Brueggemann, Inscribing the Text, Sermons and prayers by Walter Brueggemann 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2004), 12. 
307 Brueggemann, Inscribing the Text, 12. 
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faithful church practice to be an act of imagination congruent 
with the imaginative character of the text itself.
309
 
Faithful imagination becomes a hermeneutical act that is performed by the 
modern interpreter of the Old Testament and done within the confessing 
Church. Finally, imagination is related to truth, and while we do not have direct 
access to the real object, which is the history of Israel, the use of imagination 
does enter into the truth: 
The Scripture is never simply reportage and description, but is 
always interpretative commentary that pushes upon the observa-
ble to the constructed, that is, imagination, beyond the ‘given.’ 
We may think of imagination as the generation of images that lie 
beyond the socially acceptable consensus guaranteed: …310 
Brueggemann stresses that the text has its own voice, regardless of whether it 
suits the reality outside the text or not. In sum, this last book on a series of 
imaginative books, shares the same context as the others, i.e. understanding the 
reality of YHWH by memorizing the history of Israel, and in such a way an 
alternative consciousness takes form. For Brueggemann, the testimony of the 
Old Testament must be understood on its own premises, and this is possible 
with the help of imagination.  
CONCLUSION ON IMAGINATION 
A summary of the books on imagination gives the handle that Brueggemann 
uses the term to describe imagination as the source to present the alternative, 
i.e. God’s agenda against the royal consciousness in The Prophetic Imagina-
tion. The article “Wine and Fig Tree” is an example of how he combines im-
agination with rhetorical criticism. This combination forms the argument that 
the metaphor of the wine and fig tree is used in an ironic sense in 1 Kings 4. 
Another combination, in Hopeful Imagination, is that of imagination and 
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memory. According to him, a hopeful imagination becomes visible when im-
aginative remembering of the past is presented in a new context. In one of his 
most important books on imagination, Texts under Negotiation, he presents his 
interpretative program: with the use of imagination a new epistemology and 
hermeneutics can take form. In Deep Memory Exuberant Hope, he argues that 
the correct way of understanding Scripture is to approach the biblical text spe-
cifically as a testimony. In An Introduction to the Old Testament-the Canon 
and Christian Imagination, published after ToT, again stresses the importance 
of connecting imagination with memory. This combination, he argues, forms 
the key to interpreting Scripture in a faithful way.  
My conclusion is that in Brueggemann’s theological work, imagination has 
been developed in a process of continuity. For Brueggemann Imagination pri-
marily means creating an alternative. The German equivalent of imagination 
is Vorstellung. Imagination also means the alternative as a prophetic vision for 
the future. His rhetorical and imaginative interpretation creates an alternative 
consciousness which opens up new ways of understanding the Old Testament. 
Imagination is, for Brueggemann, a hermeneutical act that is visible both in the 
biblical text itself as well in the text’s interpreter. He is not a relativistic post-
modern scholar because he argues that every theology of the Old Testament 
becomes verified in the eschatology.  
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3.7 CONTEXT VII) RENAISSANCE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT 
The seventh and final context for understanding ToT is to situate the discipline 
of Old Testament theology in the period of the 1980s and 1990s, which was 
simultaneously a period of Renaissance,311 with many new publications of Old 
Testament theology, and a period of crisis and conflict. Rendtorff aptly de-
scribes the crisis in his article “The Paradigm is Changing:” 
Old Testament scholarship at present is in crisis. The Wellhausen 
paradigm no longer functions as a commonly accepted presup-
position for Old Testament exegesis. And at present, no other 
concept is visible that could replace such a widely accepted po-
sition.
312
 
Rendtorff argues for a change of perspective—from defining the discipline as 
a historical discipline to defining it as a textual discipline.313 This change was 
                                                     
311 See Henning Reventlow, History of Biblical Interpretation, Volume 4: From the Enlighten-
ment to the Twentieth Century (Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 408: “The period following 
World War I also brought about a reawakening of Old and New Testament theology [we have 
already mentioned the works of Bultmann and von Rad], which in the course of the nineteenth 
century had begun entirely as a history of religion. Walter Eichrodt (1890– 1978) offered a sys-
tematically constructed Theology of the Old Testament (1933– 1939) as did Ludwig Köhler 
(1880– 1956). Since then, increasing numbers of new studies have appeared.” 
See also Stordalen, “Gammaltestamentlig Teologi anno 2002,” 8ff. See also Hasel, Old Testa-
ment Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, 3: “Five new OT theologies have appeared 
within a four-year period, a record never before achieved and not easily duplicated in the future.” 
312 Rendtorff, “The Paradigm is Changing,” 44. See also Rendtorff, “Approaches to the Old 
Testament,” 19. See also Craig G. Bartholomew, “Reading the OT in Postmodern Times,” Tyn-
Bul 49.1 (1998): 91-114. In this article, Bartholomew refers to Rendtorff’s analysis as pivotal 
when it comes to define the new paradigm for the discipline of Old Testament theology. 
313 Rendtorff, “The Paradigm is Changing,” 52-53: “Moreover, the consequences for reading 
the book of Genesis as a whole, the Pentateuch as a whole, and the canon of the Hebrew Scrip-
ture as a whole will be more fascinating if we go beyond the diachronic observation of diversity 
to the search for the inner, or even overarching unity. Such a unity in some cases might appear 
to be full of tensions. But even this tension was surely not hidden from the later writers, so that 
we can try to follow their guidance in reading their texts. I believe it has changed already. But 
the field is open. Many new and fruitful approaches are visible that will lead Old Testament 
scholarship into the twenty-first century. At the moment there is no new model that could be 
expected to achieve common acceptance as a paradigm, and there will probably be none in the 
near future. This will give considerable freedom to those who are looking for new approaches 
and who are ready to move ahead. They are many, and therefore there will be hope.” 
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also greatly approved by Perdue in the Collapse of History (1994).314 Perdue 
argues that the methodological crisis within the discipline is a result of the 
collapse of the historical-critical method as the common and approved method 
for the discipline. An important hypostasis in Perdue’s book is that it is difficult 
to apply the term history, when used in our secular meaning, to the Old Testa-
ment. The problem for the discipline of Old Testament theology has been the 
“tyranny of positivistic history”:  
Certainly, the tyranny of positivistic history is now at an end, and 
its domination of the theological enterprise among Old Testa-
ment scholarship has been questioned sufficiently enough to al-
low, not only for other philosophies of history [e.g., feminism or 
neo — Marxism] to make their contributions, but also for quite 
different methodologies to develop and be applied.
315
 
Brueggemann writes in his review of Perdue’s book: “I am enormously posi-
tive about this book and intend to use it as a required text.”316 Brueggemann 
concludes: “The work of Perdue is a most important effort to redefine and re-
habilitate the task of theological interpretation that has recently languished.”317 
As Rendtorff and Perdue have shown, there was a crisis during this period, but 
also an apparent conflict—between the discipline of Old Testament theology 
and the discipline of the religious–historical approach—concerning which one 
should perform the final thematization of the Old Testament. Perdue describes 
an important difference between the two disciplines: Old Testament theology 
relates primarily to the Church, whereas the religious-historical approach re-
lates primarily to the academy. The purpose of Old Testament theology is to 
shape doctrines, whereas the purpose of the religious-historical approach is to 
                                                     
314 The series Overtures to Biblical Theology started in 1978 and from its start Brueggemann 
was one of two redactors. Perdue has published two books for the series: The Collapse of His-
tory: Reconstructing Old Testament Theology (1994) and Reconstructing Old Testament Theol-
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315 Perdue, The Collapse of History, Reconstructing Old Testament Theology, 104. 
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Testament Theology, JOR (1996): 352. 
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describe the religion of ancient Israel.318 The fact that no methodological con-
sensus within the discipline of Old Testament theology exists caused Albertz 
in 1995 to declare the death of the discipline of Old Testament theology.319 It 
is important to highlight Albertz’ criticism because he plays an important role 
in ToT.320 We can say that Albertz and Brueggemann draw diametrically dif-
ferent conclusions from the same basic assumption, namely, the notion of a 
pluralistic character within the Old Testament text. While Brueggemann ar-
gues for the possibility of describing God, and asserts that the pluralistic fea-
ture of the Old Testament yields a contradictive concept of YHWH, Albertz 
argues that a scientific method cannot describe God but is limited to describing 
only the rites and their function within a religious community.321 Moreover, 
Albertz argues that it is unclear which contexts should be assumed whenever 
making an interpretation. Does the correct context correspond with the author’s 
historical context or should the canon determine the interpretation?322 Finally, 
Albertz argues that the discipline of Old Testament theology, because of its 
theological claims, risks becoming an apologetic discipline, while stressing Is-
rael’s distinctiveness in relation to the surrounding cultures. Albertz argues for 
a religious-historical basis as the proper approach for a study of the Old Testa-
ment text material. The discipline then has a clearly defined task: to understand 
the historical world of the Old Testament writers. Even though the relationship 
between God and mankind is impossible to define scientifically, it is possible 
to present Israel’s religious history in a descriptive way: 
A) Religion ist ein Wechselgeschehen zwischen Gott und 
Mensch. Dieses ist für de wissenschaftliche Betrachtung aller-
dings nicht direct greifbar, sondern nur indirect in the sprach-
lichen Äusserungen von Menschen und Ihren Handlungen B)  
                                                     
318 Perdue, Reconstructing Old Testament Theology after the Collapse of History, 47-48. 
319 Albertz, R., “Religionsgeschichte Israels statt Theologie des Alten Testaments?” 7ff. 
320 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 64, 710. 
321 Albertz, “Religionsgeschichte Israels oder Theologie des Alten Testaments?” 18. 
322 Albertz, “Religionsgeschichte Israels oder Theologie des Alten Testaments?” 22. 
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Religion steht in einem the functional Wechselverhältnis zur Ge-
sellsschaft: gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse, die in den Menschen 
leben, Wirken auf ihre Religion ein, und diese wirkt auf ihre ge-
sellschaftlichen Verhältnisse zurück.
323
 
The task of a religious-historical approach is to re-translate “the frozen” dia-
logue and portray different groups and describe their different descriptions of 
God.324 Hagelia suggests that there is neither a Christian Old Testament nor a 
Jewish Hebrew Bible.325 The watershed between a Christian and a Jewish read-
ing of the Old Testament/Hebrew Bible is also the question whether Jesus from 
Nazareth is Messiah or not. Hagelia seems to argue that the postmodern context 
opens up new interesting perspectives for the discipline: 
Every Theology should open with a discussion of questions that 
are basic for the whole discipline: epistemological questions, 
how it should be edited or redacted, including how it should re-
late to its New Testament reception. This is the place to take up 
methodological and hermeneutical questions, such as the value 
and/or limitations of the historical-critical method and the value 
of and/or limitations of postmodern ways of thinking.326 
Hagelia suggests that Brueggemann’s approach could be seen as a “supple-
ment” to modern approaches within the field of the discipline of Old Testament 
theology. Another perspective on the conflict is given by Barr. He favors a 
theological study of the Old Testament, but in contrast to Brueggemann, he 
supports a descriptive theological approach to the Old Testament. He strives to 
achieve this purpose by use of natural theology.327 The discipline describes the 
various theologies that exist in the Old Testament. According to Barr, it is nec-
essary for the discipline to live in close relationship with a religious-historical 
                                                     
323 Albertz, “Religionsgeschichte Israels oder Theologie des Alten Testaments?” 18. 
324 Albertz, “Religionsgeschichte Israels oder Theologie des Alten Testaments?” 23. 
325 Se Hagelia, Three Old Testament Theologies for Today, 180-181. 
326 Hagelia, Three Old Testament theologies for Today, 192. 
327 Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 138-39. See also Knierim, The Task of Old Testament 
Theology, 54. 
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approach. Old Testament theology cannot exist if it stands apart from the his-
torical, socio-political and religious context.328 For Barr, the difference be-
tween the disciplines lies in the fact that Old Testament theology emphasizes 
the intellectual aspect of religion; ideas, arguments, concepts and theological 
developments, whereas a religious-historical approach emphasizes rituals, sa-
cred objects, iconography, architecture, and psychology.329  
Finally, the Old Testament theologian Terje Stordalen argues that both disci-
plines share the same kind of requirements and accountabilities. A religious-
historical approach to Israel also has indirect normative claims, e.g. the point 
of departure for the discipline is writings that are treated as sacred Scriptures 
in the current culture. The aim for the discipline is then to describe the religion 
in this text and describe how the religion should be practiced, which then opens 
up for normative questions.330 According to Stordalen, one difference is that 
theology is primarily a linguistic and textual phenomenon whereas religion, 
besides embracing this phenomenon, also has a non-linguistic dimension 
which means that the discipline must be based on sources outside the Old Tes-
tament. It thus becomes dependent upon models which reconstruct the histori-
cal realities. This circumstance makes the discipline as problematic as Old Tes-
tament theology. 
In sum, Rendtorff and Perdue point to the fact that the historical approach to 
the Old Testament has failed. A textual approach is what is now needed. This 
makes the whole situation both interesting and unpredictable. Albertz’s criti-
cism of the impossibility of the discipline of Old Testament theology affects 
Brueggemann. Barr and Stordalen argue that Old Testament theology should 
exist, not as a normative discipline as Brueggemann suggests, but rather as a 
descriptive discipline. The search for solid ground is a quest indeed, but the 
question of how to find it awaits answers. 
                                                     
328 Stordalen, “Gammaltestamentlig Teologi anno 2002,” 30. 
329 Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 101-38. 
330 Stordalen, “Gammaltestamentlig Teologi anno 2002,” 26. 
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3.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Concluding this chapter, Brueggemann is first of all formed by a Protestant 
context. This means that for him, the message of the Scripture stands in quite 
sharp contrast to church theology. He is specifically inspired by theologians 
such as Barth, Muilenburg, Gottwald, Childs, Levenson, Barr, and Rentdorff 
and philosophers such as Ricoeur and partly Derrida. The above mentioned 
have both influenced his thinking but also demarcated his approach against 
others. He works within a dissolutive context. The BThM, within which he was 
fostered, underwent a crisis at the end of the 1950s. The conundrum was to 
combine a historical approach with a theological concern. This led 
Brueggemann to focus on rhetorical criticism. The rhetorical and imaginative 
concern together forms much of his theological approach and could be labeled 
postmodern—he is a postmodern theologian because he uses imaginative and 
rhetorical insights in biblical interpretation of the canonical texts—and this 
combination makes him conclude that there is an inherent discrepancy in the 
text. During the 1990s, there was a new unrelated crisis within the discipline 
of Old Testament theology. This paved the way for a renaissance of many new 
Old Testament theologies. Among them, ToT was published in 1997. There are 
at least two important problems that Brueggemann faced at the time of pub-
lishing ToT; firstly, how could the discipline of Old Testament theology estab-
lish criteria by which biblical truths can be presented? Secondly, was it possi-
ble from an epistemological point of view to present normative theology for 
the Church at the end of the 20th Century? Brueggemann’s normative claim 
challenges previous attempts and particularly those metanarratives that were 
dominant during this period, i.e. the historical-critical method and church the-
ology. At the end of the 20th century, Brueggemann stands as a representative 
of a totally new approach, one which challenges both a historical-critical ap-
proach and a pre-modern church theology approach. ToT presents an alterna-
tive to these two metanarratives. This alternative is based upon a new episte-
mological and hermeneutical situation. Both Rendtorff and Perdue await and 
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anticipate the consequences of such a new attempt to interpret the Old Testa-
ment theologically, and ToT can definitely be seen as an answer to this calling; 
a theology that performs a great epistemological move away from both the 
historical-critical method and church theology and moves towards a rhetorical-
theological interpretation of the Old Testament.  
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PART II BRUEGGEMANN’S FOUNDATION 
Give me a place to stand on, and I will move the Earth. (Archi-
medes) 
Epistemological, hermeneutical, and theological issues embrace this study and 
the quotation from Archimedes summarizes an epistemological discussion that 
relates to the title of this study; how can Brueggemann acquire a new episte-
mological foundation for a justified belief when neither the liberal nor the con-
servative approaches have a satisfactory foundation. His epistemology is par-
adigmatic in the sense that it breaks with previous church theology and the 
historical-critical method. This is a turning point and supported by e.g. Perdue 
who argues that it is critical to embrace the postmodern understanding of epis-
temology and hermeneutics in order to develop the discipline of Old Testament 
study.331  
A question that stands at the center of chapter 4 is also if Brueggemann’s epis-
temology should be defined as non-foundational or as weak foundational. If it 
is non-foundational, then his hermeneutics from necessity would be non-refer-
ential. This means that a question in chapter 5 must be to understand if his 
hermeneutics refers to a presupposed reality outside the text or not. What we 
do know is that Brueggemann locates meaning primarily within the testimony 
and the community that reads the text. But his use of imagination creates a 
possibility of entering outside the text and the community. However, if his her-
meneutics is extra-referential, another interesting problem arises, should the 
rhetorical tension be understood also as an ontological tension?  
  
                                                     
331 See Perdue, Reconstructing Old Testament Theology after the Collapse of History, 1-76. Per-
due explains in the introduction how a new approach can be formulated in light of the collapse 
of the historical-critical method. He argues that the present status of Old Testament Theology 
must take into account the postmodern situation, i.e. the crisis in epistemology and the require-
ments of hermeneutics.  
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CHAPTER 4 EPISTEMOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER 
Three things have to be clarified concerning Brueggemann’s epistemology.332  
Firstly, we have to find out if his epistemology is non-foundational or weak 
foundational. This topic then concerns an epistemological discussion, at a cer-
tain distance from biblical theology, but nonetheless very much related to it. 
Christian faith has always stood in close relationship to knowledge, meaning 
and faith.333 The clarification of Brueggemann’s epistemology is central for the 
discipline of Old Testament theology because the epistemology paves the way 
for the hermeneutics and, thus, the theology. We have so far concluded that 
Brueggemann’s theological basis for the possibility of knowing the God of Is-
rael in the Old Testament is on the basis of the testimony.334 I will in this chap-
ter argue that these testimonies function as his epistemological foundation. His 
epistemology is then weak foundational and not non-foundational.335 A main 
                                                     
332 Brueggemann does not present his epistemology in ToT in a separate chapter but reflects on 
this issue especially in the first and final parts of ToT, i.e. “Retrospect I & II” (pp. 1–116) and 
“Prospects for Biblical Interpretation” (pp. 707–70). Epistemology is the study of the structure 
of justification of knowledge. See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text? The 
Scripture, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
1998), 19: “Whether there is something to be known in texts is a question of the ‘epistemology’ 
of meaning.” 
333 James Barr describes in The Concept of Biblical Theology those various epistemological the-
ories that occur within the discipline of the Old Testament and how important it is for a scholar 
to be aware of these epistemological issues in order to comprehend the discipline of Old Testa-
ment theology. The Norwegian Old Testament theologian Terje Stordalen stresses the same, i.e. 
that epistemological and hermeneutical questions are key topics within the discipline. Stordalen 
also argues that each of these terms carry the potential to change the direction of the discipline. 
See Terje Stordalen, “Gammaltestamentlig Teologi anno 2002,” SEÅ 68, Uppsala, (2003): 8. 
334 Cf. Walter Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: A Prompt Retrospect,” Pages 
307-21 in God in the Fray: A Tribute to Brueggemann Walter (ed. T. Linafelt and T. Beal. 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1998), 310: “More specifically, it is the focus upon juridical lan-
guage of testimony that I hope will be the major gain of my work.” 
335 It is necessary to explain the term foundationalism because Brueggemann critically refers to 
some foundational epistemologies. Moreover, within the discipline of Old Testament theology 
there is a certain kind of ambiguity involved, which motivates a clarification, e.g. weak founda-
tionalism is also defined as Reformed Epistemology or Theo-Foundationalism. Foundationalism 
can also be formulated as an internalist or an externalist view. An internalist holds that basic 
beliefs are justified by mental events or states, such as experiences that do not constitute beliefs. 
An externalist, by contrast, denies that one can always have this sort of access to the basis for 
one’s knowledge and justified belief. Instead, this form argues that external (outside the mental 
belief) serve as the justification for a belief.  
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argument for describing his epistemology as weak foundational is the combi-
nation of Brueggemann’s “appeal to testimony as a mode of knowledge”336 
with Ricoeur’s understanding of the function of a testimony within the herme-
neutical process of interpretation:  
A hermeneutic without testimony is condemned to an infinite re-
gress in a perspectivism with neither beginning nor end.
337
 
What Ricoeur argues for is that a testimony delivers knowledge that can be 
described as basic, i.e. foundational. This means that, according to Ricoeur, a 
testimony constitutes a solid foundation.  
Secondly, the clarification of Brueggemann’s epistemology is related to the 
question of legitimacy.338 This study is concerned with whether or not 
Brueggemann is justified or has warrant for his epistemology. He eagerly op-
poses attempts to dismiss a theological method. Rainer Albertz (1943-), much 
appreciated by Brueggemann in ToT, argues that a scientific method cannot 
describe God but merely the rites and how these rites function within a reli-
gious community. The question of legitimacy then relates to the question of 
primacy—whether the discipline of Old Testament theology or a religious his-
torical approach should perform the final systematization of the Old Testa-
ment. 
Thirdly, a clarification of Brueggemann’s epistemology is related to explaining 
the consequences of Brueggemann’s epistemology for his hermeneutics and 
theology. Barr, Waltke and John Collins argue that his epistemology limits the 
reality inside a web of beliefs with no logical references to a reality outside the 
text.339 This would mean that Brueggemann only describes YHWH inside the 
                                                     
336 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 119.  
337 Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, 144. 
338 Perdue relates postmodernism to an epistemological discussion. See Perdue, Reconstructing 
Old Testament Theology after the Collapse of History, 240: “Postmodern approaches, in essence, 
possess the common feature of deconstructing the epistemologies of the Enlightenment and any 
theory based on them.” 
339 See Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 561 ff. Waltke, An Old Testament Theology, 70: 
“In his epistemology we can be sure only that I AM exists in the text, not in his existence and 
historicity outside the text.” John Collins, The Scripture after Babel: Historical Criticism in a 
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text with no reference to an outside reality. On this particular point, it will be 
obvious that I disagree with Barr, Waltke, and Collins and argue that 
Brueggemann’s epistemology reaches out to an ontological reality. My argu-
ment for this conclusion is based upon his affinity with Karl Barth (1886–
1968) and Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), two very important sources for his epis-
temology. In order to accomplish a satisfactory description of Brueggemann’s 
epistemology, the structure of this chapter is as follows; firstly, foundational-
ism is explained, followed secondly, by the term non-foundationalism (herein-
after abbreviated as NF). Thirdly, Brueggemann will be related to Barth and 
Ricoeur. It would be beyond the scope of this study to perform a self-sufficient 
analysis of Barth’s epistemology and then compare it with Brueggemann’s. 
Instead, I will rely in this study specifically upon Kevin Diller’s analysis of 
Barth’s epistemology, I will demonstrate that Brueggemann’s epistemology 
shares similarities with that of Barth.340 I will also show that Brueggemann, 
like Ricoeur, defines the term testimony as delivering non-inferential 
knowledge. Fourthly and finally, I will offer the suggestion that 
Brueggemann’s epistemology could be defined as a kind of weak foundation-
alism, which I term testimonial foundationalism. This epistemology can also 
be termed as fallibilism. 
4.2 DEFINING FOUNDATIONALISM 
According to Richard Fumerton and Ali Hassan, there is no standard terminol-
ogy that defines foundationalism in detail.341 What can be confirmed, however, 
                                                     
Postmodern Age (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 145: “Like most non-foundationalist theolo-
gians, Brueggemann wants to exempt the sacred text from the suspicion to which all other 
metanarratives are subjected…” 
340 Kevin Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga 
Provide a Unified Response (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2014). There is a sim-
ilarity between Childs and Barth, see Chen, Theological Exegesis in the Canonical Context, 225: 
“Among biblical scholars, there seems to be common agreement that Childs’s canonical theo-
logical exegesis in general assimilates John Calvin, Walter Zimmerli, and Karl Barth.” 
341Cf. the term foundationalism in Ali Hasan and Richard Fumerton,  “Foundationalist Theories 
of Epistemic Justification”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Ed-
ward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/justep-founda-
tional/>. Non-inferential knowledge is the same as basic knowledge. Inferential knowledge is 
the same as derived knowledge. The ambiguity might be caused by an undifferentiated use of 
the term within theological circles. 
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is that “for literally thousands of years foundationalism was taken to be almost 
trivially true.”342 Randalf Rauser writes that if there were one “single episte-
mological issue” that could define the shift from modernism to postmodernism, 
it would be …  
…the topic of foundationalism, for this brings us to the heart of 
a nexus of shifting views concerning the nature of justification, 
knowledge, truth, and reality.
343
 
Rauser also emphasizes foundationalism when he explains the shift from 
modernism to postmodernism. His analysis relates closely to Brueggemann’s, 
who wants to see a shift from a modern epistemology towards a postmodern 
alternative. The epistemological term foundationalism can be defined by way 
of three examples.  
Firstly, the term foundationalism entails an epistemological discussion about 
the justification of belief. A foundationalist epistemology implies that all 
knowledge ultimately rests on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or 
basic knowledge.  
Secondly, foundationalism can be explained by relating it to the so called re-
gress problem, which concerns how propositions are to be justified epistemo-
logically. The premise in the regress problem is that any justification itself re-
quires support. This means that any proposition can be regressed, i.e. going 
back endlessly by asking the simple question “Why” again and again, until the 
foundationalist finally reaches a non-inferential foundation. This is also called 
a basic belief and this is a belief which is not based on other knowledge but is 
solid ground in itself. Other forms of knowledge are derived from this non-
inferential foundation, i.e. they are inferential or non-basic. An inferential 
knowledge is a derived knowledge and is dependent on non-inferential 
knowledge.  
                                                     
342 See Hasan and Fumerton, “Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.” 
343 Randalf Rauser, Theology in Search of Foundations (Oxford: University Press, 2009), 3. 
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Thirdly and finally, the term foundationalism could also be defined by use of 
the metaphor of a foundation that supports a building. The building consists of 
various materials that are placed on the foundation of the house.  
The critical question within foundationalism is what kind of knowledge that 
can be defined as non-inferential. Classical foundationalism (hereinafter ab-
breviated as CF) argues that non-inferential knowledge must be infallible or 
inerrant. René Descartes (1596–1650) is often regarded as a typical repre-
sentant of CF. His search for non-inferential knowledge through the use of 
skepticism ended in his famous non-inferential thought: cogito ergo sum (I 
think, therefore I am). CF can also be based on empiricism or idealism. To-
gether with rationalism these two are the three major philosophical directions 
that in many ways form what we term modernism.344 
OTHER MODELS OF FOUNDATIONALISM 
There are other models of foundationalism although all share the same episte-
mological structure. A special model of foundationalism is weak foundation-
alism. Weak is not equivalent with faint, but stands as a soft alternative to a 
strong foundation that is presented within CF, wherein the foundation must be 
infallible. A prominent supporter of a weak foundationalism is Alvin Plantinga 
(1932–) who argues that one is justified in having a religious experience as a 
non-inferential foundation.345 This is particularly interesting since this is ex-
actly what Brueggemann writes in ToT. Within their different disciplines it 
must be stressed that both refer to Barth as an important source of inspiration. 
                                                     
344 See Nancy Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism, How Modern and Postmodern 
Philosophy set the Theological Agenda (Trinity Press: Pennsylvania, 2007), 15-28. She argues 
that liberal theology and its counterpart fundamentalism, even though their conclusions stand in 
sharp opposition, are united in the same epistemology, i.e. CF. Both opposite theologies are 
based on unchallengeable foundations; in the case of fundamentalism, the inerrant Scripture, in 
the case of liberal theology, experience. 
345 See Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, 
Incorporated, 1999), 188: “On the other hand, if theistic belief is true, then it seems likely that 
it does have warrant. If it is true, then there is, indeed, such a person as God, a person who has 
created us in his image [so that we resemble him, among other things, in having the capacity for 
knowledge], who loves us, who desires that we know and love him, and who is such that it is 
our end and good to know and love him.” See also Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 
42, 46-47, 64, 73, 85-88. 
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Concerning Plantinga, Diller argues that Plantinga’s weak foundationalism 
shares many similarities with Barth’s theology of revelation, and this argument 
is also accepted by Plantinga.346 As I have already demonstrated in chapter 3, 
Brueggemann has to a large extent based his theology on Barth’s understand-
ing of the term testimony. I will argue, by use of Diller that Barth’s theology 
of revelation is comparable to Brueggemann’s epistemology based on testi-
mony in ToT. In this way, we can see that Brueggemann’s epistemology is 
weak foundational. To exemplify, a weak foundational belief means that one 
has a justified belief e.g. Saul was the first King in Israel based solely on the 
argument that it is written in the book of 1 Samuel. In this way the text—spe-
cifically described as a testimony— is the foundation that delivers non-infer-
ential knowledge. Of course many would argue that this kind of epistemology 
is incoherent, i.e. not justified. At this point, however, it is unnecessary to enter 
this debate. What has been shown is that his epistemological foundation is 
based on the term testimony, and this kind of epistemology share many features 
with Barth, and to some extent Plantinga too.  
4.3 HISTORICAL-CRITICAL METHOD 
For Brueggemann, the emergence of the rhetorical critical method is a search 
for a new solid ground after the collapse of the historical-critical method. He 
does not explicitly write in ToT that the historical-critical method is based on 
                                                     
346 See Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, foreword by Alvin Plantinga: “Barth re-
jects the fundamental claims of the Enlightenment; I agree. Barth rejects any attempt to come to 
knowledge of God ‘from below’; I agree. Barth argues that serious Christian believers should 
not be apologetic [they have nothing for which to apologize]; again, I agree.” See also Rauser 
for the same conclusion, Theology in Search of Foundations, 244. 
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CF.347 However, he describes the method as “something like foundational-
ism”348 and he also writes in ToT that this method is “congruent with moder-
nity” and equal to modern assumptions such as “objectivity, scientific, and pos-
itivistic”: 
…Historical criticism is reflective of a certain set of epistemo-
logical assumptions that go under the general terms objective, 
scientific, and positivistic, assumptions that sought to overcome 
the temptations of fideism.
349
 
Moreover, in his description of modernism during the 18th and 19th centuries, 
it is obvious that he presupposes a close relationship between the historical-
critical method and the epistemology of CF: 
By the end of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth cen-
tury, history had acquired a very different dimension and signif-
icance from all previous understandings. First, history had taken 
on a positivistic character, so that events came to be regarded as 
completely decipherable, to the exclusion of an inscrutable den-
sity.
350
 
Brueggemann presents three problems with the historical-critical method.351 
Firstly, a consequence of this method is that generations of students have ig-
nored the text because they have believed that non-inferential knowledge lies 
behind the text:  
                                                     
347 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 84. Brueggemann defines Friedrisch Schlei-
ermacher (1768-1834) as a foundationalist. Schleiermacher is a foundationalist who wanted to 
make the faith “available for the cultured despises of religion.” 
348 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 84: “Not many Old Testament scholars are 
drawn to foundationalism, for our proper work is exactly to take up the oddity of this peculiarity 
Jewish text, which in any case will not be accommodated to the dominant reason of culture. And 
yet much of what passes for historical criticism is in fact in the service of something like foun-
dationalism.” 
349 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 103. 
350 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 11. 
351 Brueggemann does not deny that the historical-critical method is a crucial tool for Old Tes-
tament theology, see e.g. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 726: “No doubt Brevard 
Childs is correct in his contention that the relationship between Old Testament theology and 
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The student of Old Testament theology will not appreciate what 
is given and demanded in the rise of criticism unless the emer-
gence of historical criticism is seen as a part of this greatly shift-
ing sensibility away from authority and tradition and toward con-
fidence in objective, dethatched scholarship.
352
  
Brueggemann argues that in contrast to the historical-critical method the real 
is in the text, not behind the text. 
Secondly, a problem with the historical-critical method is the illusion of an 
objective interpreter.353 The historical-critical method presupposes that a hu-
man person is capable of performing an objective interpretation of the text. 
However, according to Brueggemann, the historical-critical method cannot tol-
erate an objectivity that runs against the rules that guard the historical-critical 
method.354 His analysis is that the method has been developed into fideism: 
“… the Cartesian program of autonomous reason, which issued in historical 
criticism, is also an act of philosophical fideism.”355 According to 
                                                     
historical criticism is of crucial importance to any advance in Old Testament theology. Equally, 
there is no doubt that historical criticism, broadly constructed, is crucial for responsible biblical 
theology …” See also Anderson’s interesting analysis of Brueggemann’s relationship to the his-
torical-critical method. Anderson, W, Bernhard, Contours of Old Testament Theology (Minne-
apolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 23: “…despite his criticisms of historical criticism, as a child of 
the Enlightenment he is profoundly under its influence when he concentrates on the ‘multiplic-
ity’ and ‘density’ of the Old Testament texts.” Brueggemann responds positively to Anderson’s 
article in “ABC’s of Old Testament Theology in the US,” 429-430. Also important, as noted 
earlier, Brueggemann regards church theology as problematic as the historical-critical method. 
See e.g. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 105. Brueggemann comments in ToT on 
Childs, the most prominent defender of church theology, and argues that he wants to “align Old 
Testament theology completely with the doctrinal clams of the church [Calvinism in his case, 
but the particular tradition of church theology to which the principle is applied is a matter of 
indifference in this regard].” 
352 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 9. See also Brueggemann, Theology of the 
Old Testament. 53: “Conservatives have characteristically been intensely interested in whether 
something reported in the biblical text ‘actually happened,’…liberals have been endlessly inter-
ested in explanatory, comparative material outside the text….Thus in both historical investiga-
tion and in theological investigation, reality was assumed to be elsewhere than in the text.” 
353 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 13: “…an epistemology of the human knower 
as an unencumbered objective interpreter who was understood to be a nonpartian, uninvolved 
reader of the data.” 
354 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 14. The historical-critical method cannot “tol-
erate intellectual or theological claims and affirmations that run against its thin objectivism, 
which is itself an acknowledged intellectual, theological claim.” 
355 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 17.  
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Brueggemann, the epistemology of the historical-critical method is neither ob-
jective nor innocent. As Barth argued, faith is not based on a number of con-
clusions that emerged from a theological reflection, but on non-negotiable 
premises. The same goes for the historical-critical method. This method is not 
based on a number of conclusions, such as archeological excavations, but ra-
ther on non-negotiable naturalistic presuppositions. 
Thirdly, the most serious problem with the historical-critical method is that it 
is unable to give access to the main theological message of the text. 
Brueggemann writes: 
In my judgment, historical criticism [by which I shall refer to the 
entire Enlightenment enterprise that came to be associated with 
Julius Wellhausen and that now seems to reappear as neo-Well-
hausianism] was committed to a Cartesian program that was hos-
tile [in effect if not in intention] to the main theological claims 
of the text.
356
 
The method has become a purely historical product that refuses to discuss God 
as an agent in Israel’s life. The discipline of Old Testament theology has, in its 
encounter with the historical-critical method, “ceased to be a part of Scripture 
with any authoritative claim for the church.”357 According to Brueggemann, 
the fundamental beliefs of modernism, devised by “Baconian science, of Car-
tesian rationalism, of Lockean empiricism, and eventually of Hegelian his-
tory,”358 are neither basic nor infallible and the critical response of postmod-
ernism is a reminder of that.  
Brueggemann has been heavily criticized for his negative attitude towards the 
historical-critical method. Barr, for example, argues that “the main impact of 
historical criticism, as felt by the earlier twentieth century, has been to empha-
size the strangeness of the biblical world, its distance from the world of modern 
                                                     
356 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 727. 
357 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 14-15. 
358 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 12. 
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rationality.”359 Brueggemann’s response is that Barr, as a foundationalist, can-
not tolerate an anti-foundational epistemology.360 Other scholars such as Han-
son and Dozeman argue that it is impossible to ignore the historical questions 
in the way Brueggemann suggests. Hanson argues that history as such belongs 
to the identity of Israel’s faith. Israel claimed that their God acted in “human 
history, e.g., an Exodus from enslavement” while Babylon made “absolute 
truth claims without reference to mundane realities.”361 Brueggemann, in a re-
sponse to Hanson’s criticism, answers that history is presented as testimonies:  
But what we have is the recount [account] in utterance, and what 
counts as history is given us only in the recount- ing. It is the 
recounting that lets history count, and my attempt is to pay atten-
tion to the recounting [testimony] which is what we have in 
hand.
362
 
Dozeman admits that Brueggemann is correct in his criticism of the historical-
critical method in many ways. For example, the method is obsessed with the 
world behind the text. However, “the rise of historical criticism is certainly 
more complex, requiring a more nuanced assessment of its positive and nega-
tive impact on Old Testament theology” than Brueggemann seems to be-
lieve.363 Finally, it is worth mention Goldingay, who refers both positively and 
critically to Brueggemann’s criticism of the historical-critical method. Gold-
ingay can be placed between Barr and Brueggemann. Goldingay argues for a 
position that begins in the final text, focusing on the narrative “rather than on 
the putative historical context” and in this sense stands close to Brueggemann. 
However, at the same time Goldingay presupposes that the historical events 
                                                     
359 Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology, 554. 
360 Brueggemann, “ABC’s of Old Testament Theology in the US,” 430: “I have taken an anti-
foundational posture. Barr is unembarrassedly a foundationalist, and such anti-foundationalism 
as mine strikes him as flimsy on the one hand and as absolutist and authoritarian on the other, 
because it attempts to make authoritative claims outside the domain of consensus reason.” 
361 Hanson, “A New Challenge to Biblical Theology,” 449. 
362 Brueggemann, “ABC’s of Old Testament Theology in the US,” 429. 
363 Dozeman, review of Brueggemann, 486. 
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actually happened “without having the historical information we would like to 
have.”364  
In sum, Brueggemann’s criticism of the historical-critical method primarily 
concerns epistemological matters and not its results. The historical-critical 
method is based on the epistemology of CF. He points to three major problems 
with the historical-critical method that cannot be ignored: 1) the method has 
ignored the text. 2) It is an illusion that the method is objective. 3) The method 
is unsuitable for a theological approach to the Old Testament.  
4.4 CLARIFYING BRUEGGEMANN’S EPISTEMOLOGY 
Clarifying Brueggemann’s own epistemology is the next step in order to un-
derstand his approach in ToT. It is notable that Brueggemann argues that an 
appropriate method for the discipline of Old Testament theology must be in 
accordance with the text and the intellectual environment in which it is pre-
sented.365 Every scientist, he argues, has to be accepted in the environment in 
which he or she belongs and has to live in close dialogue with its philosophical 
and methodological issues. In this way, all research is “a child of its time.” 
This means that the Old Testament research in the 20th century must be differ-
ent from the methodological starting points that prevailed during the 18th and 
early 19th century.366 He specifies his own epistemological point of departure 
in ToT as follows. It is… 
...postliberal, or nonfoundational, as this approach is variously 
articulated by Hans Frei, George Lindbeck and Stanley Hau-
erwas. I understand this approach to refer to an attempt to exposit 
the theological perspectives and claims of the text itself, in all its 
                                                     
364 Goldingay, Old Testament Theology: Israel’s Gospel, 867. He quotes Brueggemann, Theol-
ogy of the Old Testament, 75. 
365 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 727: “I insist that what is appropriate as crit-
icism in relation to Old Testament theology is to be measured by two criteria: (a) an approach 
that is congruent with the material of the text itself, and (b) an approach that is congruent with 
the intellectual environment in which exposition is to be done.” 
366 The matrix period for the historical-critical method is around 1814-1914. 
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odd particularity, without any attempt to accommodate to a large 
rationality, either of modernity or of classical Christianity.
367
 
The quotation is a clear expression of his own position. It is a non-foundational 
approach and he refers to important authorities of this epistemology, e.g. 
George Lindbeck (1923-2018), and Stanley Hauerwas (1940- ) and the Yale 
school. In a lecture he writes the following concerning Yale: “Our work as 
biblical theologians is in the Yale camp because the other doesn´t claim any-
thing. Postmodernity is our cultural climate.”368 Moreover, a non-foundational 
epistemology is a “resistance to any appeal to universal warrants beyond the 
specificities of the text.”369 In a response to ToT, he describes his epistemology 
as non-foundational: 
1. A non-foundationalist perspective. There is now available a 
huge literature moving in this direction. But no one in the biblical 
field known to me has tried to make the case as directly as have 
I. Thus, my formulation of the matter leaves me with some con-
siderable uneasiness.
370
 
It is also important to emphasize that he is skeptical of inserting a dualism 
between the text and the reality that the text refers to: 
It is a great problem for Old Testament scholars who, for reasons 
of their own, are resistant to what they regard as theological in-
terpretation, to imagine that the character of God lives ‘outside 
the text,’ that is, has metaphysical substance. But that objection 
in principle imposes a dualism of text/nontext that passionate tes-
timony never entertains. Thus I am content to have theological 
interpretation stay inside the text-to refrain from either historical 
                                                     
367 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 86. See also his foreword to Theology of the 
Old Testament, xi: “In my recent work, I have sought to be as deeply and consistently antifoun-
dational as I am able to be.” See also Brueggemann, Deep Memory, Exuberant Hope, xi. “In my 
recent work, I have sought to be as deeply and consistently antifoundational as I am able to be.” 
368 Brueggemann, W. Preaching as Testimony. Unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, 
Box 37, folder 1298. 
369 Brueggemann, Deep Memory, Exuberant Hope, xi. 
370 Linafelt & Beal, God in the Fray, 314.  
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or ontological claim extrinsic to the text-but take the text seri-
ously as testimony and to let it have its say alongside other testi-
monies,…371 
Brueggemann, in the quotation above, describes an epistemology that is inside 
the text. His alternative to church theology and the historical-critical methods 
is to base his theology on the testimonies alone. This way of approaching the 
Old Testament reminds one of a spider web, a metaphor often used to define 
NF. There is then no basic belief that supports the building but many testimo-
nies that describe God and which- in this sense - create a coherent web of be-
liefs. However, as noted in the above quotation, Brueggemann admits that he 
uses the term non-foundational with “considerable uneasiness.” He seems to 
be aware of the various definitions that surround the term. Rosalind M. Selby 
questions the presupposition that a non-foundational epistemology really can 
manage to avoid all kinds of foundations.372 She argues that NF operates with 
some kind of presuppositions. Following Selby, the question is not whether 
Brueggemann has presuppositions for his theology but whether they are non-
foundational or not. There are two objections against defining his epistemol-
ogy as non-foundational. Firstly, the discipline has many understandings of 
NF. For example, Collins defines both Brueggemann and Childs as non-foun-
dational theologians. Because these two otherwise sharply disagree on many 
topics, whether they really seem to stand together when it comes to defining 
their epistemology must also be questioned.373 Notably, Childs was professor 
of Old Testament at Yale (1958-1999), a university where many prominent 
non-foundational theologians and philosophers worked. Collins notices a dis-
tinction between Brueggemann and Childs; whereas Childs bases his non-
                                                     
371 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 718. 
372 Selby, The Comical Doctrine, 49. 
373 Collins, The Scripture after Babel, 142: “In the field of Old Testament theology, the most 
influential non-foundationalist approach [in the theological sense] is undoubtedly that of Bre-
vard Childs.” See also 145: “Like most non-foundationalist theologians, Brueggemann wants to 
exempt the sacred text from the suspicion to which all other metanarratives are subjected…” 
See also 145-46: “And, in good antifoundational fashion, he insists that ‘what ‘happened’ [what-
ever it may mean] depends on testimony and tradition that will not submit to any other warrant.’” 
Collins quotes from Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 714. 
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foundational epistemology on the Rule of Faith, Brueggemann bases his epis-
temology on the existence of postmodernity, i.e. that there is no epistemologi-
cal consensus within the academic community. Collins also writes that 
Brueggemann is the “only scholar who has attempted to formulate a theology 
of the Old Testament that is explicitly postmodern.”374  
Secondly, according to Waltke, Brueggemann intends to present a concept of 
God where God is an agent only within the text and not outside it.375 Collins 
critically argues that Brueggemann ignores building his epistemology on a 
foundation outside the text stating that he is then incoherent because at the 
same time he accepts an ontological reality. Hagelia, however, argues that 
Brueggemann uses the concept of the court metaphor as a foundation that 
comes from outside the text.376 For Collins, a NF epistemology, by necessity, 
ignores questions of realism and extra referential references. According to Col-
lins, NF is equal to a closed universe.377 Thirdly, and finally, it is also interest-
ing to comment that the American philosopher Clarence I. Lewis argued that 
NF, loyal to his own premises, can only present isolated testimonies without 
connection to the world outside.378  
In sum, there are arguments that makes me hesitant in determining 
Brueggemann’s epistemology as non-foundational. There is an apparent con-
fusion, namely that Brueggemann is inconsistent in claiming an ontological 
                                                     
374 Collins, The Scripture after Babel, 143: “To my knowledge, the only scholar who has at-
tempted to formulate a Theology of the Old Testament that is explicitly postmodern is Walter 
Brueggemann.” 
375 Waltke, An Old Testament Theology, 70 ff. See also Dubbink, “Reality is Highly Overrated,” 
241. 
376 See Hagelia, Three Old Testament Theologies for Today, 183: “These [i.e. Helge Kvanvig, 
Walter Brueggemann and Erhard Gerstenberger, my emphasis] theological presentations have 
in common that they borrow a frame of presentation from outside of the Old Testament itself, 
using this as the frame around which their respective theologies are built.” 
377 See Collins, The Scripture after Babel, 147: “In short, there is a reality of God behind or 
beyond the text, but it is known sola fide, sola scriptura.” 
378 Clarence Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 
1946), 346: “...on any other hypothesis than that of truth-telling, this agreement is highly un-
likely; the story any one false witness might tell being one out of so very large a number of 
equally possible choices. [It is comparable to the improbability that successive drawings of one 
marble out of a very large number will each result in the one white marble in the lot.] And the 
one hypothesis which itself is congruent with this agreement becomes thereby commensurably 
well established.” 
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reality and at the same time basing this reference on a non-foundational epis-
temology. However, in the light of Childs’ strong emphasis on the reality out-
side the text, it is strange that Collins can claim that Childs and Brueggemann 
are non-foundational theologians. Finally, Hagelia points to the court metaphor 
as a foundation from outside the text and I suggest that Hagelia’s analysis is 
correct, because even though the metaphor is biblical, the court functions as a 
community outside the text that discuss the testimonies and must have the will-
ingness to believe them.  
4.5 DEFINING NON-FOUNDATIONALISM 
It is now necessary to accomplish a kind of independent description of the term 
NF. Richard Pruitt traces the emergence of NF back to the 1970s and 1980s 
and associates it with scholars from Yale University.379 Prominent predeces-
sors of this epistemology are Hans Frei (1922-1988), Lindbeck and Hauerwas. 
These three developed an epistemological, hermeneutical and theological re-
action against classical liberalism. They described themselves as post liberal-
ists or/and nonfoundationalists. A NF epistemology, in its various forms, en-
tails a common criticism of modern and premodern epistemologies. Conse-
quently many relate the term closely to postmodernism.380 Rauser defines NF 
in the following way: 
The flexibility of the term non-foundationalism becomes evident 
when one considers the broad range of philosophers who have 
been identified as non-foundationalist, including Charles Peirce, 
John Dewey, William James, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin 
Heidegger, Wilfred Sellars, W. V. O. Quine, Donald Davidson, 
Jacques Derrida, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Rorty. In order to 
work toward an understanding of non-foundationalism we will 
begin by exploring how it relates to post-modernism.
381
 
                                                     
379 Richard Pruitt, “Rethinking Postliberal Theology: Comparing and Contrasting Lindbeck and 
Vanhoozer,” Evangelical Review of Theology. Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr 2012): 161-75. 
380 Collins, The Scripture after Babel, 138. 
381 Rauser, Theology in Search of Foundations, 108. 
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It is interesting that Rauser describes Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) as a 
NF philosopher. It will be shown in the next chapter that there is an important 
connection between Brueggemann’s idea that reality coexists through speech 
and Wittgenstein’s language theory mediated through Lindbeck.382 Whereas 
foundationalism, both classical and weak, argues that a justified belief is rooted 
in some kind of non-inferential or basic belief, NF means that someone’s belief 
is true if - and only if - it is coherent with other beliefs. A significant argument 
among proponents of NF is that their approach has the capacity to tame “the 
Enlightenment primacy of science and focuses on lived truth in marked con-
trast to the cognitive-propositionalism that tends to go with foundational-
ism.”383 Many advocates of NF also argue that foundationalism leads to skep-
ticism; a skepticism due to the fact that foundationalism inserts a dualism be-
tween the world and our knowledge, whereas NF allows for a “method that 
grounds epistemological analysis in paradigmatic instances of rational belief 
and/or knowledge, thereby ensuring the accessibility of knowledge.”384 Rauser 
also states that some versions of NF reject metaphysical realism.385 Metaphys-
ical realism is the hypothesis that the objects, properties and relations to the 
world exist independently of our thoughts or perceptions of them.386 Against 
                                                     
382 Neil MacDonald, “Language – Game,” in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the 
Scripture (General Editor K. J. Vanhoozer. Associate Editors, C. Bartholomew D. J. Treier and 
N.T Wright., Michigan: Baker Academic, 2005), 436: “In common with Phillips’s ‘internalist’ 
approach, George Lindbeck’s ‘intratextual’ interpretation of Wittgenstein in The Nature of Doc-
trine advocates a Wittgenstein who is maintained that philosophy was limited to describing the 
grammar of each individual ‘language-game’ or ‘form of life.’ In this context ‘grammar’ coin-
cide with rules of truth, intelligibility, reality, and rationality, whose final court of appeal was 
how these rules were used in each [communal] language-game….” 
383 Rauser, Theology in Search of Foundations, 110: “While the core non-foundationalist thesis 
concerns a denial of epistemic foundations, token versions of non-foundationalism also fre-
quently include other post-modern elements, especially a rejection of (1), metaphysical realism, 
(2), the correspondence theory of truth, and (6), the primacy of thought over language.” 
384 Rauser, Theology in Search of Foundations, 111. 
385 Rauser, Theology in Search of Foundations, 110. 
386 See Selby, The Comical Doctrine, 11: “Theological realism is an enormous topic in itself but 
a short comment must be made here which, at the same time, provides an honest statement of 
my own presuppositions. The linguistic issues which are raised, how our speech may refer to 
the reality of God without postulating direct correspondence, are central to chapter 2. The onto-
logical dimension is presupposed—that nothing short of realism is adequate in Christian theol-
ogy and idealism can only arrogate to the human mind decisions which it is not entitled nor 
qualified to make. The independent reality of God is so basic a presupposition that one might 
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metaphysical realism stands anti-realism which doubts or denies the existence 
of the entities outside our reality. The term anti-realism is derived from the 
Sophists in ancient Greece and in modern times from Immanuel Kant (1724 - 
1808) and his famous distinction Das Ding an Sich, Das Ding für Mich.387 
Brueggemann frequently defends Sophism against Platonism: 
…, I mention in this connection the role of the Sophists in ancient 
Greece, practitioners of the public activity of rhetorical persua-
sion. The entire story of realist philosophy has tended to silence 
and discredit the Sophists, for their appeal to rhetoric continually 
subverted the would-be settled claims of the Platonic realist.
388  
In sum, there are indeed many good arguments that point in the direction of 
defining Brueggemann’s epistemology as NF, as he also expresses himself in 
ToT. However, the reason for my doubts is the criterion for defining an episte-
mology as foundational is whether or not it refers to a reality outside the text. 
There are more observations that contribute to my reluctance to explain 
Brueggemann’s epistemology as NF and this includes his close connection 
with Barth and Ricoeur 
4.6 BARTH AND RICOEUR—WEAK FOUNDATIONALISM 
In what follows, Barth and Ricoeur’s understanding of the term testimony will 
be examined.389 Concerning Barth, we have already seen that his understanding 
of testimony in Church Dogmatics inspired Brueggemann’s understanding of 
                                                     
ask, does this function as a foundation, an a priori which is untestable and upon which all else 
is built?”  
387 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (German: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, KrV) 
first published in 1781, second edition 1787, is one of the most influential works in the history 
of philosophy. 
388 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 119, note 6. (c). Brueggemann constantly 
supports the Sophists against Platonism, see Theology of the Old Testament, 54, 64, 119, 330, 
714.  
389 See Blundell, Boyd. Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy: Detour and Return 
(Indiana University Press, 2010), 46: “I attempt to cash in the wager I made in the introduction, 
that Barth’s theology and Ricoeur’s philosophy will prove compatible. In one sense, this is a 
natural pairing because of their similarities: they share not only a Christian faith, but also a 
background in the Reformed tradition, a dialectical method, an appreciation of narrative, and a 
concern for the integrity of both philosophy and theology.”  
135 
 
the word testimony.390 Firstly Brueggemann, describes Barth in Deep Memory 
Exuberant Hope as non-foundational.391 Jon Thiel also makes that conclu-
sion.392 Notable is that Brueggemann refers to Thiel for his conclusion.393 
However, Collins, Diller, and Murphy argue that Barth is a foundationalist, 
even though Murphy describes Barth as a key figure for the further develop-
ment of the origin of NF. Murphy asks: “An important question that needs to 
be settled in order to give an account of the historical origins of nonfounda-
tional theology is how to understand Barth.”394 Collins, Diller, and Murphy all 
agree that Barth has a foundation in his epistemology. Murphy suggests defin-
ing Barth as a scriptural foundationalist, 395whereas Diller defines Barth as a 
Theo-foundationalist.396 Collins writes: “To affirm that the church has one 
foundation, whether Christ or the Scriptures, is quite incompatible with philo-
sophical non-foundationalism.” 397 To sum up, all three argue that Barth has a 
foundation in his epistemology: 
                                                     
390 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 119, note 6 (a): “The appeal to testimony 
as a ground of certitude has particular and peculiar importance for the thought of Karl Barth. [I 
am grateful to Mark D. J. Smith for specific references.] See Church Dogmatics 1/1 (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1975) 98- 124; Church Dogmatics 1/2 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956) 457- 740, 
especially 457- 72, 514- 26. See also Martin Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology: An Analysis 
of the Barth-Harnack Correspondence of 1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 
29- 53, especially 45- 47. For efforts to understand Barth’s peculiar assumptions, see David 
Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975); David 
Ford, ‘Barth’s Interpretation of Scripture,’ Karl Barth— Studies of His Theological Method (ed. 
S. W. Sykes; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); and Ford, Barth and God’s Story (Frankfurt: 
Peter Lang, 1981).” See also Theology of the Old Testament, 18, note 47: “My own beginning 
point concerning testimony is resonant with what I understand to be Barth’s point.” See also 
Theology of the Old Testament 714, note 20. Brueggemann here stresses that Paul’s argumenta-
tion in 1 Cor. 15 is based on testimony “and no other mode of certainty or evidence. Certitude 
arises in the process of testimony, and not in ‘objective’ recovery of data.” 
391 Brueggemann, Deep Memory, Exuberant Hope, xi. Brueggemann here argues that Barth’s 
use of the phrase “The strange new world of the Scripture” is an antifoundational sign. 
392 Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism, 95, note 19. 
393 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament A Prompt Retrospect,” 314. 
394 Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism, 95. 
395 Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism, 95, note 20. Murphy quotes from Thiel’s 
book Non-foundationalism, 50. Thiel in turn quotes from Barth, but as Murphy comments, “un-
fortunately without citing the location in Church Dogmatics.” 
396 I.e. WF. 
397 Collins, The Scripture after Babel, 140: “But in any case, non-foundational or antifounda-
tional theology is indebted far more to Karl Barth than to Rorty or Ludwig Wittgenstein…The 
affinity between Barthian theology and philosophical non-foundationalism is superficial. To af-
firm that the church has one foundation, whether Christ or the Scriptures, is quite incompatible 
with philosophical non-foundationalism, which rejects any foundation at all.” 
136 
 
- Barth’s epistemological foundation is based on Scripture (Murphy and 
Brueggemann). 
- Barth’s epistemological foundation is based on God (Diller). 
- Barth’s epistemological foundation is based on Church (Collins). 
In what follows I interact with Diller’s conclusions and compare those with 
Brueggemann.  
THEO-FOUNDATIONALISM 
According to Diller, Barth does not hold to a CF but is a theo-foundationalist: 
We should resist, nevertheless, referring to Barth’s position as 
‘non-foundational,’ as if it lacked grounding altogether. Barth is 
a foundationalist—not a classical foundationalist but a theo-
foundationalist.
398
 
According to Diller, a theo-foundationalist has an ontological foundation, i.e. 
God as the primary foundation.399 This means that God’s supreme initiative 
functions as the foundation:  
The initiating move in Barth’s theological epistemology is not 
the claim that the Scripture by itself, or the Scripture read in the 
light of human reason, is the foundation or source of knowledge. 
Barth believes that the real initiating move is not a claim we 
make but a claim made on us. The initial move is made by God 
himself.
400
  
Relating Diller’s analysis of Barth to Brueggemann, a minor difference arises. 
Whereas Diller argues that Barth starts with God, Brueggemann and Murphy 
argue that Barth starts with Scripture.401 Irrespective of this, the important thing 
                                                     
398 Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 85. 
399 Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 85: “Theological knowing does not require 
human access or defense in order to be considered legitimate knowing, primarily because it is 
self-grounded by its object-God.”  
400 Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 45. 
401 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 17. 
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to emphasize is that Brueggemann describes Barth’s starting point as an “enor-
mous epistemological manoeuver” that reaches behind Descartes’ skepticism 
and back to a classical position, … 
[back]…to Anselm’s notion of ‘faith seeking understanding. 
That is, faith is not a conclusion that may or may not result from 
reflection. It is, rather, a nonnegotiable premise and assumption. 
In this enormous epistemological manoeuver, Barth placed in 
question the entire enterprise of modern criticism, which sought 
to conform the text to the canon of modern reason.
402
 
Barth does not require “human access or defense” as necessary “in order to be 
considered legitimate knowing.”403 In a similar way, Brueggemann builds his 
epistemological foundation from above. This way stands in contrast to a below 
perspective, which begins with natural revelation. An above perspective has a 
revelational source as its starting point. In Brueggemann’s case, he starts with 
the presupposition that the testimonies function as a foundation of certitude for 
delivering knowledge. This means that he has no apologetic interest of going 
behind the testimonies, either historically or ontologically, in order to argue 
for their reliability. Instead he presupposes that the testimonies are the founda-
tion for delivering theological information. In this way, his foundation upon 
the testimonies distances him from the historical-critical method and church 
theology:  
This means that theological interpretation does not go behind the 
witness with questions of history, wondering ‘what happened.’ 
What happened, so our ‘verdict’ is, is what these witnesses said 
happened. In complementary fashion, this means that theological 
interpretation does not go behind this witness with questions of 
ontology, wondering ‘what is real.’ What is real, so our ‘verdict’ 
is, is what these witnesses say is real. Nothing more historical or 
                                                     
402 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 17. 
403 Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 85. 
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ontological is available. But this mode of ‘knowing’ finds such 
a claim to be adequate.
404
 
Whereas CF starts from below, with reason or natural revelation as the way of 
building a solid ground, Barth and Brueggemann start from above, from the 
inside, with an ontological foundation. In Barth’s case the foundation is God, 
in Brueggemann’s case, the foundation is the testimonies. Brueggemann ad-
mits that Barth seems to define being as more than speech.405 In contrast, 
Brueggemann argues that being and speech coincide:  
In making this claim, it is important to recognize that there is, 
outside speech, no objectively given world that stands as a meas-
uring rod of reality whereby one can test to see if Israel is ‘real-
istic.’406 
In Barth’s theology of revelation everything starts with God. In 
Brueggemann’s ToT, everything starts with the testimony. Clearly there are 
diversities here. Nevertheless, they both start from above. Clearly both have an 
epistemological foundation in their theology. 
According to Brueggemann, the problem for the historical-critical method as a 
theological tool is the a priori exclusion of the testimonies in the Old Testa-
ment as a solid ground for presenting theology. In his theology, using his own 
description of Barth, “the reality of God is asserted first, not as an afterthought 
after one asserts the ‘possibility of God’ established in modernist catego-
ries.”407 Brueggemann’s epistemological alternative to modernism is the use of 
                                                     
404 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 120-21: “The actual event, however, is enor-
mously supple and elusive and admits of many retellings, some of which are only shaded differ-
ently, but some of which are drastically different. The court, however, has no access to the ‘ac-
tual event’ besides the testimony.” 
405 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 721, note 2: “Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 
1/1 [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975] focuses on the word as testimony in a way congruent with 
what I am suggesting. Barth could not finally let the word as utterance [proclamation] stand 
apart from a threefold notion of word [Jesus, Scripture, proclamation] which for him in the end 
is more ‘being than speech.’” 
406 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 723. 
407 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 17. See also 18, note 46. Here he refers to 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics, 1-44 for the argumentation of a theology from above in contrast to 
modernist questions of “the possibility.” 
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testimony as a ground of certitude. He writes: “Barth saw that, despite all ap-
pearances, Enlightenment modernism begins with its ‘own ungrounded onto-
logical assumption.’”408 Brueggemann also concludes that Barth’s theological 
thoughts “resist an ontological reductionism that tends to eliminate most about 
the biblical God that is crucial and interesting.”409 The testimony in 
Brueggemann’s theology functions as a foundation that “brackets out historical 
judgments of positivism and brackets out the ontological claims which may 
yield a platonic God but not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.”410  
In sum, there are striking similarities between Brueggemann and Barth’s epis-
temology. Both share an ontological foundation using epistemological terms, 
but Brueggemann bases everything upon the testimony. The testimony in the 
Old Testament, using epistemological terms, delivers non-inferential 
knowledge. 
RESPONSE TO BRUEGGEMANN’S UNDERSTANDING OF BARTH 
Odell argues that Brueggemann has misunderstood Barth.411 In her opinion 
Brueggemann reads Barth through the eyes of Lindbeck. The correct under-
standing of Barth is not, as Brueggemann argues, to say that the biblical 
worldview creates a new world, but instead it is the testimonies in Scripture 
that refer to a reality outside the text, i.e. to God. In response to Odell, 
Brueggemann admits that his discussion about speech has “many unresolved 
questions.”412 However, he stresses that “we are at a beginning point of a rela-
tively new venture, informed by the past but moving into issues and categories 
not yet fully clear; the offer of unfinished business is unavoidable.”413 Childs 
also argues that Brueggemann has interpreted Barth through the eyes of 
                                                     
408 Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 75. 
409 Brueggemann, Theology 
of the Old Testament, 19. 
410 Brueggemann, Unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, Box 38, folder 1340. 
411 Odell, reviews of Brueggemann, 8; “One can certainly ask whether Brueggemann would see 
himself as a Barthian. The answers is, I think, a qualified yes.” 
412 Odell reviews of Brueggemann, response by Brueggemann, 21. 
413 Odell reviews of Brueggemann, response by Brueggemann, 21. 
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Lindbeck.414 It seems that Childs and Odell are correct in their analysis that 
Brueggemann read Barth through the eyes of Lindbeck. I will come back to 
this topic in chapter 5. At this point, however, I want to stress that this does not 
affect the similarity between Brueggemann and Barth with regard to epistemo-
logical issues. What I have shown is that both have an epistemological foun-
dation even though the foundation itself differs, an above perspective with 
God/testimony as its epistemological foundation.  
RICOERUR—TESTIMONY AS NON-INFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE 
According to Jeanrond, Ricoeur has moved a step away from the goal of 
achieving an ontological approach. This means that, according to Jeanrond, 
Ricoeur does not believe in the possibility for mankind to reach forward to an 
ontology “in our human existence. An always ‘broken ontology’ is therefore 
all we can hope to achieve.”415 Ricoeur argues that there is always a circular 
argumentation in hermeneutics between the sense of the text and the reference 
of the text. In short, this means that Ricoeur introduces a kind of suspicion in 
his hermeneutical theory, where the goal for the interpreter is to distinguish 
properly between the sense of the text and the reference of the text, i.e. one has 
to distinguish between what the text says (sense) and what the text talks about 
(reference). For Ricoeur, the only way to reach a meaning in the text is by 
returning, not to the mind as Schleiermacher suggested, but to the signs, i.e. 
the text. Therefore, Ricoeur has been interested in religious texts and what they 
say, as well as the possible world these texts refer to. It is only by reading 
(sense) that one can enter into the reference zone. Whereas Schleiermacher 
argued that biblical texts could be understood plainly through philosophical 
                                                     
414 See Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 22. See also Odell, reviews of 
Brueggemann, 11-12. She writes that Brueggemann has “fused cultural-linguistic analysis or 
religious language with a Barthian understanding of the living Word of God.” See also Dubbink, 
“Reality is highly overrated,” 245: “But Barth’s theology is confirming everywhere that God’s 
reality is more real than ours. In his view, the problem of speaking about God is not the fact that 
God is problematic but that theologians are human. It might be different for the older Barth. It 
is possible that he would appreciate the way Brueggemann describes the Theology of the Old 
Testament as ‘an enterprise of counter-reality.’” Dubbink refers to Karl Barth, Kirchliche Dog-
matik VI (München: Chr.Kaiser, 1932), § 3, p. 47. 
415 Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, 75. 
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hermeneutics, Ricoeur argues that in order to understand human existence, one 
has to introduce religious texts “in an adequate human existential reflection.”416 
In a comparison between Brueggemann and Ricoeur, Brueggemann’s appeal 
to testimony as a way to receive knowledge, has an important reference point 
with Ricoeur, and especially his essay “The Hermeneutics of Testimony”. 
Brueggemann writes:  
Appeal to testimony as a mode of knowledge, and inevitably as 
a mode of certainty that is accepted as revelatory, requires a 
wholesale break with all positivistic epistemology in the ancient 
world or in the contemporary world. In an appeal to testimony, 
one must begin at a different place and so end up with a different 
sort of certitude. Here I am much informed by an essay of Paul 
Ricoeur.
417 
For Brueggemann this article emphasizes the essence and meaning of the term 
testimony. A summary of the article gives the following; according to Ricoeur, 
a testimony is not based upon perception but on report. For Ricoeur, “there is 
the one who testifies and the one who hears the testimony.”418 The primary 
context for a testimony is in a dispute, in court. In this context, all testimonies 
are “directed towards a judgment.”419 The testimony is therefore never neutral 
or innocent. A testimony has a “quasi-empirical meaning.”420 This means that 
a witness has seen or understood something and then delivers a testimony. Ric-
oeur refers to Acts 4:20 where it is written: “for we cannot keep from speaking 
about what we have seen and heard.” Moreover, according to Ricoeur a testi-
                                                     
416 Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, 77. 
417 Brueggemann argues that the testimonies should be “accepted as revelatory.” See 
Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 119. See also 134, note 26: “In effect Ricoeur 
accepts all genre in biblical rhetoric as testimony that becomes revelation.” 
418 Ricoeur, Essays in Biblical Interpretation, 123. 
419 Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, 127. 
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mony presents a knowledge that is probable but not certain: “Thus the episte-
mological level proper is recognized to which judicial proofs belong: not the 
necessary but the probable.”421  
The most interesting thing in this article comes when Ricoeur writes that a 
testimony is an “action itself as it attests outside himself, to the interior man, 
to his conviction, to his faith.”422 An “action itself” means that the testimony 
is the starting point for presenting knowledge. Ricoeur defines testimony as 
presenting non-inferential knowledge. Ricoeur argues that a testimony is not 
“an interpretation of interpretation” because the testimony is based upon a 
fixed entity. He also writes that “a hermeneutic without testimony is con-
demned to an infinite regress in perspectivism with neither beginning nor 
end.”423 The term regress alludes to the regress problem within foundational-
ism. According to Ricoeur, a testimony as such ends the regression because it 
is a fixed entity. There is dialectic between a historical and a confessional 
event. A testimony is...  
… an act of consciousness of itself and an act of historical un-
derstanding based on the signs that the absolute gives of itself. 
The signs of the absolute’s self-disclosure are at the same time 
signs in which consciousness recognizes itself.’ The witness tes-
tifies about something or someone which goes beyond him.
424
 
In sum, Ricoeur’s definition of testimony presents the term as an absolute en-
tity which delivers non-inferential knowledge, and I would argue that 
Brueggemann strictly follows Ricoeur’s definition of the term testimony and 
conclude that his epistemology is weak foundational.  
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DOES BRUEGGEMANN DIVERGE FROM RICOEUR? 
However, a relevant question arises: does Brueggemann understand and apply 
Ricoeur correctly? Juno Ryan argues that he does not. At least Brueggemann 
diverges from important facets in Ricoeur’s understanding of the term testi-
mony. According to Ryan, Ricoeur stresses the important relationship between 
the witness and the testimony and Brueggemann has neglected this relationship 
in his approach. Ryan also argues that Brueggemann should have stressed that 
the final source in Christian theology is YHWH: 
Yahweh is presupposed in the testifying, the initiator and sub-
stance of Israel’s testimony. Yahweh’s ability in the world is not 
dependent on Israel’s testimony; rather, Israel’s ability to testify 
is dependent on Yahweh in the world.
425
  
Ryan argues that Brueggemann correctly maintains that Israel’s utterance is 
“all we have” for creating Old Testament theology, but he has neglected to 
observe the witnesses who must have had an encounter with the transcendent 
world. Similarly, Scott Ellington argues that Brueggemann has presented a 
limited understanding of how a testimony functions. Ellington sketches the 
contours for a “testimony-based hermeneutics in a Pentecostal context” and 
suggests that the core foundation of a testimony consists of three elements. 
These are: “… one’s personal experience, a divine encounter, and a faith com-
munity…”426 According to Ellington, Brueggemann has ignored Ricoeur’s dis-
tinction between a religious testimony and a court testimony. Brueggemann 
only points to the “purely past, while a religious testimony speaks of that which 
also intrudes on the present experience of the community.”427 In response to 
                                                     
425 Juno Ryan, “Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament. An Unsettled Testi-
mony?” CRUX 43, No 2 (Summer 2007): 26. 
426 See Scott Ellington, “Finding a Place in the Story,” in Imagination, Ideology & Inspiration 
Echoes of Brueggemann in a New Generation (ed. J Kaplan et al. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix 
Press, 2015), 215. 
427 See Ellington, “Finding a Place in the Story,” 217. See also Carolyn Sharp’s response to 
Ellington’s article on p. 285. She comments that Ellington “makes good use of Ricoeur to nuance 
Brueggemann’s framing of Israel’s testimony via the courtroom metaphor.” 
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his critics, Brueggemann affirms that the testimony as such traces its roots from 
witnesses, more precisely eyewitnesses: 
That is, it is an act of interpretative imagination done variously 
with some degree of artistic success. There is no doubt that bib-
lical ‘faith’ is constituted by a chain of witnesses that go clear 
back to what are purported to be eyewitnesses, but a chain that is 
hard to trace or rely on.
428 
My own response is that Brueggemann indeed pays attention to the role of the 
witness in ToT. Firstly, in relation to the testimonies in the courtroom metaphor 
he writes: 
The proper setting of testimony is a court of law, in which vari-
ous and diverse witnesses are called to ‘tell what happened,’ … 
Working with the metaphor of trial, we consider first the peculiar 
phenomenon of a witness.
429
 
Secondly, he argues that the witness has to be patient because the witness does 
not have the full picture: 
Like every witness who provides testimony, the witness of Israel 
to Yahweh must proceed slowly, patiently, one detail at a 
time.
430
  
Thirdly, Brueggemann stresses that the testimony is the fixed formulation that 
comes from the witness. The witness could have “had other options and could 
have spoken differently, could have chosen other words and images to portray 
reality with another nuance.”431  
                                                     
428 See Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 33. Brueggemann refers to 
Richard Baukham: “See the remarkable book of Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewit-
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Fourth finally, Brueggemann writes that the judgment of the testimony “de-
pends on the compelling case made regularly by the witnesses.”432 
Despite these four points, which together prove that in no way does 
Brueggemann ignore the witnesses, it is also clear that he hesitates to base his 
epistemology on the foundation of the witness. He argues that it is impossible 
to reach behind the testimony in order to arrive at solid epistemological 
ground: 
The actual event, however, is enormously supple and elusive and 
admits of many retellings, some of which are only shaded differ-
ently, but some of which are drastically different. The court, 
however, has no access to the ‘actual event’ besides the testi-
mony. It cannot go behind the testimony to the event, but must 
take the testimony as the ‘real portrayal.’ Indeed, it is futile for 
the court to speculate behind the testimony.
433
  
In this way, he gives priority to the testimony at the expense of the witness:  
This means that theological interpretation does not go behind the 
witness with questions of history, wondering ‘what happened.’ 
What happened, so our ‘verdict’ is, is what these witnesses said 
happened.
434
  
In sum, describing the process from witness to testimony, there is then a dif-
ference between Brueggemann and Ricoeur. Whereas Ricoeur has the follow-
ing process: Witness—Testimony—Court—Revelation, Brueggemann has the 
following: Imagination/Testimony—Court—Revelation. I think that if 
Brueggemann had incorporated the dual relationship between the witness and 
the testimony, his epistemology would have been slightly different, in a posi-
tive way. He would then have had a natural connection to an ontology and 
history before the testimony, and he would be justified in combining of the 
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witness with imagination and this link, i.e. between witness-imagination-testi-
mony would have retrieved and rehabilitated his epistemology. There is a close 
connection between testimony and imagination in Brueggemann’s approach 
and imagination presupposes a reality before the testimony. Imagining the al-
ternative is impossible unless one has seen the alternative world that YHWH 
wants to realize. Taking testimony and imagination together then creates an 
epistemology that logically reaches outside the text, and in this sense, his epis-
temology ceases to be NF. As Ricoeur also stresses, there has to be a witness 
for a testimony and a witness implies a historical reality. Despite this difference 
between them Brueggemann does not diverge to the extent that his understand-
ing of testimony separates him from Ricoeur’s understanding. I therefore con-
clude that his epistemology must be termed weak foundational. 
4.7 TESTIMONIAL FOUNDATIONALISM 
The final conclusion concerning Brueggemann’s epistemology is that this tes-
timonial foundationalism can be defined as fallibilism. This is a variant of weak 
foundationalism that argues that non-inferential knowledge does not strive for 
certainty but for probability. 435 Brueggemann is a fallibilist because he argues 
that the authority of the testimony is based on a willingness to believe it. He 
explains:  
The truth of the matter, as far as Israel is concerned, is that if one 
believes the testimony, one is near to reality. And if not, one is 
not near reality, for the Real is indeed uttered. Such a construal 
will not satisfy modernist historicism nor the philosophically 
minded.
436
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The witnesses sometimes claim to be eyewitnesses, but often no 
such claim is made. Even where it is not made, however, the au-
thority of the witness is grounded in nothing more and nothing 
less than the willingness of the text community to credit, believe, 
trust, and take seriously this testimony.
437
 
In these quotations, he stresses the willingness in the text community to believe 
the testimony. Moberly criticizes Brueggemann in this regard.438 According to 
Moberly “there is more to God than the biblical religious language, ancient 
history, and contemporary human actions.”439 In response to Moberly’s criti-
cism, Brueggemann emphasizes two things; firstly, that in his epistemology 
speech and reality coexist: “reality is deeply grounded in speech” and sec-
ondly, that when the testimonies are told, reality is delivered: “After testimony, 
the Old Testament provides a rich statement on ontology.”440 In response to 
Moberly’s criticism, Brueggemann could also argue that his epistemology was 
justified according to the fallibilistic assumption, as Ricoeur does: The testi-
mony is probable but not certain. One has to believe the testimony: 
The court must then determine, with no other data except testi-
mony, which version is reality. It is on the basis of testimony 
court reaches what is real.
441
 
4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Two epistemological theories, foundationalism and its counterpart NF have 
been studied in this chapter. Using metaphors to describe these epistemologies, 
CF is like the foundation of a building and NF as a web of beliefs. The major 
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difference between these two epistemological constructions is that foundation-
alism is based on a non-inferential knowledge, whereas a non-foundational 
epistemology is based upon many ideas and concepts with no non-inferential 
knowledge. In this chapter, I have shown that CF undergirds the historical-
critical method. According to Brueggemann, this epistemology leads the dis-
cipline in the wrong direction. His epistemological alternative is to highlight 
the term testimony as an alternative to the historical and/or ontological ques-
tions prior to the text. Brueggemann presupposes, using epistemological terms 
that the testimonies deliver non-inferential knowledge to the reader. His epis-
temology is best described as a variant of weak foundationalism. In his theol-
ogy, the testimonies function as a gateway to knowing God in the Old Testa-
ment—and believing these testimonies makes a new reality come alive. The 
testimonies become a way to the outside world. Despite differences, e.g. Barth 
presupposes God as the foundation and his theology of revelation, whereas 
Brueggemann presupposes the testimony, and Ricoeur stresses both the wit-
ness and the testimony in his thinking, whereas Brueggemann at least partly 
neglects the witness in this regard, Brueggemann is influenced by Barth’s the-
ology of revelation and Ricoeur’s non-inferential understanding of the term 
testimony. Brueggemann clearly shares an affinity with a weak foundational 
epistemology. This chapter has also shown that an important criterion of a 
foundational epistemology is its capability of reaching outside the text to a 
historical and/or an ontological reality. It seems that Brueggemann has a NF 
epistemology because he in relation to Ricoeur, has neglected to incorporate 
the dual relation between the testimony and the witness in his theology. How-
ever, Brueggemann’s attention to imagination actually presupposes a witness. 
The witness has been in contact with an ontological reality prior to the testi-
mony and through imagination the witness has presented a testimony. The wit-
ness has seen and encountered God and thereafter presented testimony through 
his personal imagination. A religious testimony is then partly a product of his-
torical factors, imaginative factors and ontological factors. Despite the fact that 
Brueggemann neglects the witness in his epistemological theory, it is evident 
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that he has created an epistemology that actually breaks through the gates of 
positivistic epistemology. Moreover—and this has a bearing on his epistemol-
ogy—in the same way as Ricoeur defines the term testimony as delivering non 
inferential knowledge, Brueggemann, in his formulation that the testimony is 
a ground of certitude, clearly stresses that the testimony should be understood 
as an epistemological foundation in his theology. He has created an epistemol-
ogy that is capable of passing through the skepticism of the historical-critical 
method and the foreclosing tendencies of church theology. This makes his 
epistemology unique and certainly worth more study. I define his epistemology 
as weak foundational and term it Testimonial Foundationalism. 
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CHAPTER 5 HERMENEUTICS 
There is none like Yahweh, who lives inside a rich, open, gener-
ative rhetoric…442 (Brueggemann) 
The relation between writing and the word and between the word 
and the event and its meaning is the crux of the hermeneutic 
problem.
443
 (Ricoeur) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND FOR THIS CHAPTER 
Concerning Brueggemann’s hermeneutics, it is obvious that he is influenced 
by postmodern hallmarks of interpretation. Within this vast and disparate con-
text termed postmodernism, intrinsically, extensive of various beliefs, a her-
meneutical change is apparent well-formulated by Kevin Vanhoozer (1957- ). 
Instead of defining exegesis and philology as the primary tools for interpreting 
the text, the postmodern context has turned the focus towards a more philo-
sophical reflection of what it means to understand and interpret a biblical text. 
Vanhoozer writes: 
Traditionally, hermeneutics – the reflection on the principles that 
undergird correct textual interpretation – was a matter for exe-
getes and philologists. More recently, however, hermeneutics 
has become the concern of philosophers, who wish to know not 
what such and such a text means, but what it means to under-
stand.
444
 
Vanhoozer’s observation clearly applies to Brueggemann who is well aware of 
the various philosophical traditions that have influenced the discipline of Old 
Testament theology, and use this awareness within a postmodern context. It is 
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also important to note that Brueggemann presupposes the Bible as Holy Scrip-
ture: “The Scripture is to be understood ‘as Scripture’ in the community that 
gathers in response to the claim that here God is decisively disclosed.”445 This 
quotation stresses the fact that he, despite his emphasis on the final text of the 
Old Testament as a norm for the discipline of Old Testament theology, also 
argues that every interpretation is situated within an ecclesial community, so 
that in sum, the text and the community together forms the meaning of the text:  
By insisting that Old Testament theology requires a certain form 
of life, I am, in the end, accepting that Old Testament theology 
is an enterprise that belongs properly to an ecclesial commu-
nity…446 
The German hermeneutist Werner Jeanrond makes an important distinction 
that relates to Brueggemann’s standpoint of an ecclesial community as the nat-
ural habitat for an Old Testament theology. Jeanrond distinguishes between 
theological hermeneutics and hermeneutical theology where theological her-
meneutics focus on the text and claims that a text has theological motives, 
whereas hermeneutical theology focus on the ecclesial community and claims 
that hermeneutics is by its nature a theological exercise.447 In Brueggemann’s 
thinking, we could say that both theological hermeneutics and hermeneutical 
theology appear simultaneously. For example, Brueggemann pays special at-
tention to theological motives in the Old Testament. He argues that the specific 
motive of Exodus 34:6–7 is to show that YHWH is incomparable.448 This is 
theological hermeneutics. At the same time it is evident that in ToT 
Brueggemann is involved in the exercise of hermeneutical theology, because 
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he presupposes that every interpretation takes place within a community and 
that every community has certain kinds of epistemological and hermeneutical 
perspectives that affect the reading of the text. There is then an interesting her-
meneutical-ecclesial angle in Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology be-
tween the presupposition of understanding the Bible as Scripture for the 
church, and a hermeneutical theology that reflects on the postmodern situation 
as the context for doing Old Testament theology. In sum, Brueggemann is in-
volved in a hermeneutical reflection that embraces both exegetical and philo-
sophical questions that forms a foundation for his undertaking of describing 
YHWH.449 
PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER 
With this broad background of Brueggemann’s hermeneutics, the main pur-
pose of this chapter is to analyze how he interprets the non-inferential testimo-
nies that his epistemology has concluded. This is done by paying attention to 
three minor purposes. 
The first purpose (5.2) is to introduce his hermeneutics within the overall con-
text of postmodern hermeneutics. Brueggemann frequently refers to Derrida, 
Ricoeur, and Lindbeck, three postmodern representatives. Vanhoozer refers to 
precisely these three and this fact, and a comparison between Brueggemann 
and Vanhoozer will therefore highlight Brueggemann as a postmodern herme-
neutic.  
The second purpose (5.3-5.5) is to describe his hermeneutics.450 This is ar-
ranged around three specific elements; the written testimony within an eccle-
sial community, imagination and the Jewish tradition.  
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The third purpose (5.6-5.7) refers to the above quotation from Ricoeur i.e. that 
interpreting Scripture includes a reflection on how religious language and bib-
lical referentiality is used. This third purpose is indeed complicated. Notable, 
is that Ryan writes that Brueggemann’s use of religious language is the “most 
problematic issue for Brueggemann’s project.”451 Brueggemann himself also 
admits this.452 Moberly welcomes Brueggemann’s approach precisely because 
he uses religious language in such a unique way.453 The interesting question to 
answer is precisely how Brueggemann intends to refer to God in ToT. If it is 
true that he only refers to YHWH in a non-referential way, his epistemology 
could be described as non-foundational if I am correct in my analysis in chapter 
4. If he refers to YHWH in an extra-referential way another problem arises; 
the tension that he concludes is within YHWH and thus becomes ontological. 
5.2 DECONSTRUCTION, TESTIMONY, AND LANGUAGE 
As previously shown, Brueggemann often refers to Derrida, Ricoeur, and 
Lindbeck, three prominent philosophers who in different ways characterize a 
postmodern approach. Because these three are so central in order to understand 
his hermeneutics, it could be interesting to use a theologian or philosopher who 
had analyzed the same sources of inspiration as Brueggemann himself. Such a 
comparison might deepen an understanding of Brueggemann’s hermeneutics 
even more. For such a purpose Vanhoozer suits very well, because he makes 
considerable use of Ricoeur and Lindbeck and formulates his own hermeneu-
tics in sharp contrast to Derrida, whereas Brueggemann, as has been shown 
already, is inspired by Ricoeur and Lindbeck, and according to Linafelt and 
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Beal, share striking similarities between him and Derrida.454 Vanhoozer’s her-
meneutics is a middle way between Derrida, who argues that the human mind 
is structured by language, and Descartes, who argues that humans can treat 
language in a totally objective way.455 Vanhoozer understands Derrida’s fa-
mous sentence “There is nothing outside of the text”456 so that words only have 
meaning in relation to other words. When Derrida wants to describe a car, for 
example, he always defines it in relation to other cars, but not in its essence as 
a specific car. A Ford is a word in a sentence and the car only receives its 
meaning when the word is set in relation to other cars. Without other cars, Ford 
is not a car. Vanhoozer’s hermeneutics, in contrast to Derrida’s, emphasizes 
that a Ford is a car, independently of the existence of other cars. The corporate 
intention of a human and language serves as a medium for Vanhoozer’s theory: 
The design plan of language is to serve as the medium of covenantal 
relations with God, with others, with the world.
457
 
According to Vanhoozer, there is always a specific meaning in a text and he 
uses three terms to explain the author’s intention in the hermeneutical process. 
Firstly, he makes an important distinction between brute fact, institutional fact 
and corporate intention. A brute fact could be 10 cm tall, a weight of 50 
grammes and steel. Meaning is not the same as a brute fact. This is not, how-
ever, the same as arguing that there is no meaning in this object. The object 
could be a knife. If the brute fact is a knife, then there is a reshaping of the 
                                                     
454 Timothy Beal and Tod Linafelt, “This Particular Manifestation of Holiness,” in Imagination, 
Ideology & Inspiration: Echoes of Brueggemann in a New Generation. (ed. J. Kaplan and R. 
Williamson; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2015), 83-97. Here 86: “The late philosopher 
Jacques Derrida—who, like Brueggemann, was interested in rehabilitating sophistic rhetoric 
against Platonic being—famously declared, ‘il n’y a pas de hors-text’, ‘there is nothing outside 
of the text’ or, perhaps better, ‘there is no outside to the text’. That is, there is nothing that is not 
contextual, not embedded in relations of signification and meaning. There is no ‘transcendental 
signified.’ Brueggemann is saying as much vis-`a-vis biblical theology: there is no biblical God 
outside the biblical text. Nowhere else.” 
455 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 207: “Cartesian certainty, an absolute 
knowledge grounded in the knowing subject, is neither possible nor Christian.” 
456 Leslie Hill, The Cambridge introduction to Jacques Derrida (Cambridge: University Press. 
2007), 45-46. From French “Ilný a pas de hors-texte´.” According to Hill it can also mean “text 
knows no bounds.”  
457 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 206. 
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object and the brute fact becomes an institutional fact. The difference between 
a brute fact and an institutional fact is that a brute fact exists independently of 
human institutions while an institutional fact can only exist via the medium of 
human institutions. In order to proceed from a brute fact to an institutional fact 
we need corporate intention. This last term is the human intention that trans-
forms the steel to change into becoming a knife. According Vanhoozer, the 
same relation is at hand in the process of interpreting a text.458 The paper, the 
pen, the alphabet, the words, the sentences become institutional through human 
corporate intention. A brute fact only becomes an institutional fact through a 
human being. The author’s intention constitutes the organizing and unifying 
factor that gives meaning to a linguistic system.459 Without the author’s inten-
tion, words become characters that can be interpreted by the reader’s pleas-
ure.460 In comparison with Vanhoozer, Brueggemann does not search for the 
author’s intention. However he stresses the testimony as the foundation and, I 
would add, that there could also be a similar relationship between a testimony 
and a witness because a testimony only becomes a testimony through a witness. 
Moreover, Brueggemann stresses the sentence and not the word as the consti-
tutive basic element for biblical interpretation: “my consideration of verbs, ad-
jectives, and nouns that speak of Yahweh is an effort to treat Israel’s charac-
teristic terms in context.”461 In stressing the sentence and not the word as the 
smallest testimonial foundation, Brueggemann differs from e.g. Derrida. 
Vanhoozer argues that a specific sign of a postmodern hermeneutics is the view 
                                                     
458 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 244-45. 
459 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 230: “What does authorship mean? The short 
answer, to be explained, is that the author is the one whose action determines the meaning of the 
text-its subject matter, its literary form, and its communicative energy.” 
460 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 234: “There is meaning in the text because it 
is the product of communicative agency.” 
461 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 123, note 14: “It is Barr’s now well-estab-
lished urging that words can only be understood in the context of their usage in sentences.” 
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that the word, not the sentence, is the basic fundament in biblical interpreta-
tion.462 Brueggemann is however influenced by Derrida’s famous deconstruc-
tion theory. For Brueggemann deconstruction functions as a way to stop “all 
false starts”.463 Israel is the agent that refuses to leave YHWH alone. In order 
to describe God properly, “Israel as the witness knows that if Yahweh is not 
endlessly criticized and subverted, Yahweh will also become an absolute, ab-
solutizing idol.”464 This is a deconstructive feature in his hermeneutics and he 
refers to Derrida for this conclusion:  
So yes, my claim, after Derrida, is hyperbolic. It is, however, a 
necessary hyperbole that echoes the larger intention of the pro-
gram of deconstruction. It is the text—on the lips of Israel—that 
precludes the reduction of YHWH to an irrelevant, boring 
idol.
465
 
According to Brueggemann, reading the text in a deconstructive way means to 
understand the texts not as reports but as portraits. Notable is that 
Brueggemann’s use of Derrida is criticized by Ryan:  
A Derridean reading of the Old Testament would suggest that 
Yahweh is not deconstructed by, but rather deconstructs human 
formulations as observed (in different terms) by Brueggemann 
elsewhere: ‘it is the very God uttered in these texts who lies be-
hind the problems of perspective and method’466 
Ryan - in opposition to Brueggemann - stresses that it is God who is the de-
constructor and not the witnesses. Ryan also points out that Derrida is closely 
connected with apophatic theology, a theology that refers to silence as a gate-
way to knowing God. Whereas Brueggemann argues that YHWH only comes 
                                                     
462 Vanhoozer, Is there a Meaning in this Text? 204: “Postmodern views of language are con-
cerned more with semiotics [the science of signs] than with semantics [the science of sen-
tences].”  
463 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 331. 
464 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 329-32. 
465 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony: Revisited,” 37. 
466 Ryan, “An Unsettled Testimony?” 25. 
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to existence through speech, Ryan argues that Derrida makes use of silence as 
a way to understand YHWH: 
For this reason, Derrida is often likened to the apophatic, with 
the assertion that despite our best efforts to speak of God, there 
is always a ‘remainder.’ Aspects of God’s character remain per-
ennially beyond our grasp, beyond our ability to enunciate, 
things about which we must pass over in silence. Such an ob-
servance can be suggested in Israel’s solemn treatment of the 
Name of God. In his meticulous attention to Israel’s things spo-
ken, has Brueggemann neglected the possibility of that which is 
left unspoken?
467
 
In contrast to Ryan’s reflection, Jonathan Hill argues that the correct under-
standing of deconstruction is that “everything in the world is mediated through 
words, and therefore, whether we like it or not, the only access to so-called 
reality is by way of the textual archive.”468 Hill’s conclusion is interesting and 
consolidates Brueggemann and Derrida.469 This means that both Brueggemann 
and Derrida have observed that each word and sentence, i.e. every piece of 
writing, forms the reality. Derrida describes this process as différance. The 
term applies to Brueggemann who raises critical assessments towards the mod-
ern presuppositions of objective knowledge. Différance moves on to explain 
that there is no pure presence but everything is contextualized. Brueggemann, 
following Derrida, then argues for a meaning of the text by way of deconstruct-
ing it in order to reach forward to the revolutionary propensity that is the basic 
emphasis in the Old Testament. This so called revolutionary propensity will be 
described later in this chapter.  
The second person that Brueggemann often refers to in ToT is Ricoeur. 
Whereas Vanhoozer uses Ricoeur to argue that it is possible to find a meaning 
                                                     
467 Ryan, “An Unsettled Testimony?” 27. 
468 Hill, The Cambridge Introduction to Jacques Derrida, 46. 
469 See Collins, The Scripture after Babel, 146: “The most radical part of Brueggemann’s pro-
posal is undoubtedly his insistence that ‘speech is constitutive of reality.’” 
158 
 
in the text, Brueggemann uses Ricoeur to argue that a testimony is the proper 
foundation for a theological approach.470 Vanhoozer’s conclusion is as follows: 
To inquire into what the text means is to ask what the author has 
done, in, with, and through the text. The goal of understanding 
is to grasp what has been done, together with its effects; the pos-
sibility of attaining such understanding is the presupposition of 
communicative action.
471
 
In order to find the meaning of the text, Vanhoozer relates meaning, not within 
the author’s mind as Descartes argues, nor within the structure of the words as 
Derrida argues, but to a human act, as is posited by Ricoeur. Meaning is located 
in the communicative act. Meaning is a verb: 
A word or text only has meaning [noun] if some person means 
[verb] something by it. ‘Meaning,’ like the word ‘act,’ refers not 
only to what is done but to the process of doing it. We can then 
say of meaning what has been said of guns: words don´t kill [or 
state, or question, or promise, etc.]; people do.
472
 
This means that Vanhoozer describes meaning as a communicative action in 
the past that is fixed not only in text, but also in history. It is the event that 
should be interpreted, not the mind of the author. If a person builds a house, it 
can be observed by other people, even several years afterwards. The same sit-
uation prevails when interpreting texts. To understand a text means to interpret 
human actions and not human thoughts. If an action can be interpreted, it fol-
lows logically that texts can be interpreted too. Historical information helps us 
to understand the environment in which the author lived. A text is a communi-
cative action, fixed in writing and with a purpose.473 It is important to comment 
                                                     
470 In addition to using Ricoeur, Vanhoozer also incorporates John Searle’s “speech act theory” 
and Jürgen Habermas’s social theory, and on the basis of these three he formulates meaning as 
a three-dimensional communicating action. 
471 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 218. 
472 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 202. 
473 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 228: “My thesis is twofold: that texts have 
determinate natures, and that authors determine what these are. A text is a story [or a history, or 
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on two things here. Firstly, in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics it is the text and not the 
author(s) behind the text that is the foundation.474 In this way, Brueggemann 
stands closer to Ricoeur than Vanhoozer because Brueggemann and Ricoeur 
stress the testimony as the basic principle for locating the meaning of the text. 
475 As we have seen, Brueggemann never mentions the historical author as be-
ing important for understanding the text in ToT. Instead, his epistemological 
foundation is based upon the written testimony. Secondly, as was shown in the 
previous chapter, Ricoeur stresses a link between the testimony and the wit-
ness.476 This feature is important for Vanhoozer—the testimony is a commu-
nicative action performed by the witness, and then fixed in writing as testi-
mony. This means that every testimony has a specific purpose. Even though 
there is a kind of independence between the testimony and the witness, 
Vanhoozer stresses that the witness and the testimony must be placed together 
in order to arrive at a justified interpretation. As shown in the previous chapter, 
this is partly absent in Brueggemann’s hermeneutics. 
The third person Brueggemann often refers to in ToT is the Yale theologian 
Lindbeck.477 Vanhoozer also pays attention to him, especially his cultural-lin-
guistic approach.478 With regard to Lindbeck it is important to stress that his 
cultural-linguistic approach is a criticism of both classical liberal theology and 
                                                     
a poem, or a parable] just because of what the author has done, just because of what the author 
has wrought in words.”  
474 Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, 100: “I mean that what is finally to be understood 
in a text is not the author or his presumed intention, but rather the sort of world intended beyond 
the text as its reference.”  
475 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 221: “Actions are thus like texts because they 
have a fixed propositional content, an illocutionary force, and a relevance that goes beyond what 
the agent could have foreseen. My point in drawing out this connection is, however, the opposite 
of Ricoeur’s. Whereas he invokes the comparison to show that human action needs to be inter-
preted, I argue that understanding texts is ultimately a matter of interpreting human action.”  
476 See Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, 134: “Therefore no witness of the absolute 
who is not a witness of historic signs …” 
477 See Brueggemann’s references to Lindbeck in Theology of the Old Testament, 79, 86f, 559, 
574, 596, 653, 747. 
478 Tim Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 90: “The Evangelical 
Kevin Vanhoozer critiques Lindbeck, and the Post-liberal Yale School connection generally, for 
using Wittgenstein to locate meaning in the community rather than some other reference.” 
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conservative theology.479 Lindbeck describes his own approach as a con-
trasting position to both the conservative propositional or doctrinal model of 
revelation and also to the liberal or experiential expressivist approach to reve-
lation.480 Brueggemann, as we have seen, is also opposed to these two positions 
and in this regard, he shares a similarity with Lindbeck.481 Lindbeck’s model 
emphasizes language as a symbol for constructing reality. For him, language 
functions as an authoritative rule within a specific community.482 He also ar-
gues that the function of doctrines is their use in their social engagement within 
a community and not specifically their truth claims. Lindbeck writes:  
We cannot identify, describe, or recognize experience qua expe-
rience without the use of signs and symbols… In short, it is nec-
essary to have the means for expressing an experience in order 
to have it, and the richer our expressive or linguistic system, the 
more subtle, varied, and differentiated can be our experience.
483
  
Lindbeck’s conclusion is that without a language it is impossible to refer to a 
religious reality. Moreover, he concludes that the richer our expressive or lin-
guistic system is the greater is our experience. Lindbeck also states that “it is 
the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text.”484 
This means that he argues for a non-referential interpretation: 
…for cultural-linguists the meaning is immanent. Meaning is 
constituted by the uses of a specific language rather than being 
                                                     
479 See Kevin Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Chris-
tian Theology (Louisville: John Knox Press, 2005), 10. 
480 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine; Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Phil-
adelphia: Westminster, 1984), 99. 
481 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 53: “Conservatives have characteristically 
been intensely interested in whether something reported in the biblical text ‘actually happened,’ 
and to determine that one had to go behind the texts, perhaps by means of archaeology. Con-
versely, liberals have been endlessly interested in explanatory, comparative material outside the 
text. The case was similar in the posing of theological questions. The text was thought only to 
point to the God who is ontologically situated somewhere else ‘in reality,’ but certainly not in 
the text as such.” 
482 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 17-18. 
483 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 22-23. 
484 Pruitt, “Rethinking Postliberal Theology: Comparing and Contrasting Lindbeck and 
Vanhoozer,” 161. 
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distinguishable from it. Thus the proper way to determine what 
´’God’ signifies, for example, is by examining meaning and re-
interpreting or reformulating its uses accordingly. It is in this 
sense that theological description in the cultural –linguistic mode 
is intrasemiotic or intratextual.
485
 
Lindbeck is in turn inspired by Barth. According to Lindbeck, the reality in 
Barth’s theology does not originate in doctrines that are above, behind, be-
neath, or in front of the text. Instead, the reality is within the Scripture itself. 
Lindbeck argues, moreover, that Barth’s intention was to discover the new 
world in Scripture and not to argue that there was a reality outside Scripture.486 
These thoughts from Lindbeck are echoed in Brueggemann’s theology. 
Like Lindbeck, Brueggemann also proposes a theology that focuses on 
speech, more specifically Israel’s speech about God: 
I have proposed that Old Testament Theology focus on Israel’s 
speech about God. The positive warrant for this proposal is that 
what we have in the Old Testament is speech, nothing else.
487
 
Relating Vanhoozer to Lindbeck, we can see that Vanhoozer is - to some extent 
- inspired by Lindbeck but also somewhat critical.488 Vanhoozer criticizes 
                                                     
485 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 100. 
486 George Lindbeck, “Barth and Textuality.” ThTo 3 (1986): 368: “The difficulty is that—at 
least to the unwary reader—Barth seems to think his doctrine of revelation is read off from the 
biblical world rather than baptized into it. Thus, those who find the doctrine nonsensical are 
disbarred from reading farther. Unable to make sense of what appears to be the foundation of 
the whole Church Dogmatics, they stop in mid-course. They do not realize that the heart of the 
enterprise is a retrieval of the Reformation version of the way of reading the Scripture which 
already begins in New Testament writers with their typological and Christological appropriation 
of the Hebrew Scriptures, and that this hermeneutics is logically independent of the apparent 
starting point. They never discover the strange new world of the Scripture as Barth describes it.” 
487 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 713. 
488 Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, 92: “The difference between Vanhoozer and Lindbeck 
is similar to that between the Alexandrians and Antiochians—they see the other through their 
own apologetic lens. The Alexandrians accuse the Antiochians of emphasizing the human nature 
too greatly, and the Antiochians accuse the Alexandrians of emphasizing the divine nature too 
greatly.” 
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Lindbeck’s idea that the normative sense of a doctrine is defined by the inter-
pretative context of the community and not by the biblical text as such.489 In 
this respect, Vanhoozer stands closer to Childs. Both Childs and Vanhoozer 
argue that the literal sense of the text is the primary foundation for a canonical 
approach, not the community that keeps them.490 However, Vanhoozer, like 
Brueggemann, presupposes that every interpreter is formed by a religious com-
munity. He expresses this presupposition: 
It is Andersons’s argument, informed by Clifford Geertz’s notion 
of ‘thick description’ and George Lindbeck’s proposal for theo-
logical authority as ‘cultural-linguistic,’ that religious ideas are 
embedded in religious experience and practice, and that religious 
reality is constituted and generated by actual, sustained, con-
crete, communal practice.
491
 
Whereas Vanhoozer stresses primarily the text as the source of locating the 
meaning of the text, Brueggemann stresses the community as the source of lo-
cating meaning in the text. Brueggemann is influenced by Lindbeck’s view 
concerning the community as the necessary context for the interpretation of the 
text. I also would argue that Brueggemann’s idea about speech and reality has 
a similarity with Wittgenstein’s language theory. I partially base this argument 
on Labron’s conclusion that Wittgenstein has influenced Lindbeck:  
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language in particular has fueled 
the work of George Lindbeck and Hans Frei as they move away 
from liberal theology. Lindbeck makes good use of Wittgen-
stein’s insights through his study of culture and language, but he 
uses Wittgenstein more to shed light on aspects of his theory than 
in a holistic manner.
492
 
                                                     
489 See Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 16. 
490 See Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 12, 88. 
491 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 574. 
492 Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, 95.  
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Brueggemann and Wittgenstein closely concur concerning language as the me-
dium for reality and I will develop this further in 5.3.4.  
In sum, Brueggemann and Vanhoozer are united in their critical assessment of 
modernism and its epistemology of autonomous reason. They relate to some 
of the same philosophers from this critical standpoint but draw different con-
clusions. Both are influenced by Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, especially his under-
standing of testimony as a fixed entity. However, they emphasize different as-
pects of Ricoeur. Vanhoozer uses him to show that the intention of the author 
is found within the event, whereas Brueggemann bases hermeneutics upon Ric-
oeur’s idea that the testimony stands in an independent relationship to the wit-
ness. Brueggemann and Vanhoozer differ totally regarding Derrida. Derrida’s 
deconstruction program is an important key for Brueggemann to discern the 
hidden facets of the text, whereas Derrida for Vanhoozer is the way to lose the 
intention of the text. Brueggemann and Vanhoozer converge, from different 
positions, in their treatment of Lindbeck. Like Lindbeck, Brueggemann locates 
meaning primarily within the testimony and the community which reads the 
text. It is the interpreter of the text and not the text itself that is carrier of mean-
ing. Vanhoozer, on the opposing side, argues against this and argues that the 
text itself is carrier of meaning—and thus locates meaning in the text as a hu-
man act and in this way reaches forward for the possibility of understanding 
the author’s intention. As will be shown in the next chapter, Childs also holds 
this position.  
5.3 THE TESTIMONY WITHIN AN ECCLESIAL COMMUNITY 
We will now continue and demarcate those three elements that together sums 
up Brueggemann’s hermeneutics. Basing his hermeneutics on the written tes-
timony, the central question that Brueggemann asks is as follows: “How does 
ancient Israel, in this text, speak about God?”493 This question is his gateway 
to access theological knowledge. He answers this question with the help of the 
five distinctive presuppositions he places on the testimonies. These are:  
                                                     
493 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 117. 
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- No interpretation is neutral. 
- Old Testament theology is normative. 
- Rhetorical criticism is the theological tool. 
- Speech and reality coexist. 
- There is a reader-response in every interpretation. 
NO INTERPRETATION IS NEUTRAL  
Brueggemann firstly presupposes that every interpretation of a testimony ad-
vocates a certain point of view. A neutral interpretation, i.e. an objective inter-
pretation is, for him, an illusion.494 This presupposition emerges in ToT and 
stands as the alternative towards the well-established distinction between 
meant and means.495 Grant R. Osborne, a representative of this kind hermeneu-
tics describes this distinction: 
The hermeneutical enterprise has three levels. I will discuss them 
from the standpoint of the personal pronoun that defines the 
thrust. We begin with a third-person approach, asking ‘what it 
meant’ [exegesis], then passing to a first-person approach, que-
rying ‘what it means for me’ [devotional] and finally taking a 
second-person approach, seeking ‘how to share with you what it 
means for me’ [sermonic].496  
According to Osborne, what a specific text means today (the normative sense), 
is achieved by finding what the original text meant (the descriptive sense). In 
order to understand why Brueggemann dismisses this distinction we have to 
understand Christer Stendahl.497 Stendahl argues that the proper perspective 
                                                     
494 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 63: “We now recognize that there is no inter-
est-free interpretation, no interpretation that is not in the service and in some sense advocacy. 
Indeed, it is an illusion of the Enlightenment that advocacy-free interpretation can exist.” 
495 This distinction means that historical meant has to be defined in order to explain the meaning 
of today. 
496 Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 6. 
497 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 731. See also Hasel, Old Testament Theology: 
Basic Issues in the Current Debate, 30: “The distinction between what a text meant and what a 
text means is at the core of the most fundamental problem of OT theology, because ‘what is 
meant’ is not simply discovering the meaning of the Biblical text within its own canonical Bib-
lical context; it is historical reconstruction.” 
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for biblical theology must be descriptive, i.e. the purpose of the discipline 
should be to describe what the text meant and not what it means. In a critical 
response to Stendahl, Ben Ollenburger argues that Stendahl’s proposal has cre-
ated a problematic hermeneutical gap (Ollenburger uses the term chasm) be-
tween meant and means. Ollenburger specifically criticizes that Stendahl has 
defined the historical meant in a way that negatively distinguishes it from the 
normative theological means. Ollenburger writes: 
If descriptions of texts are to be sharply differentiated from their 
normative appropriation, and if what texts meant is to be distin-
guished from what they mean, then it seems a chasm has been 
created between historical and theological study. Some biblical 
theologians have been troubled by the existence of this kind of 
chasm and have wondered how it might be bridged.
498
 
Ollenburger also criticizes that Stendahl implies that only the historical-critical 
method is the correct tool to define what the text meant.499 Brueggemann em-
braces Ollenburger’s criticism of Stendahl in ToT and argues that there is no 
visible or “recoverable ‘meant’ prior to all interpretative imaginative 
‘means.’”500 Instead Brueggemann, influenced by Gottwald’s sociological ap-
proach, develops a hermeneutics that is based on the argument that no inter-
pretation is objective but rather it is always advocating a specific point of per-
spective. This goes down to the very first written testimony: 
                                                     
498 Ben C. Ollenburger, “‘What Christer Stendahl meant’—A Normative Critique of ‘Descrip-
tive Biblical Theology,’” HBT 8 (1986): 62. 
499 Ollenburger, “What Christer Stendahl meant,” 90: “Had Stendahl claimed this much, and not 
more, there would be nothing controversial about his argument. But Stendahl goes on to make 
the much stronger claim, without sufficient argument, that historical-critical descriptions ex-
haust the work of biblical theology. Stendahl’s claim rests ultimately on his assumptions that 
with respect to the Scripture, i.e., the canonical text of a religious community, there is only 
historical criticism and ’theology per se,’ with nothing in between — and that theology operates 
by using the meta-physical tools of hermeneutics to do normative work on biblical texts.” See 
also Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, 35. Hasel refers to 
Anderson’s critic of Stendahl’s distinction and sums up that “there are two differencing episte-
mologies at work and two differing hermeneutics.” These two positions are between a descrip-
tive meant-means approach and a normative “Gadamer-Ricoeur hermeneutic.” 
500 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 731. 
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If Gottwald is correct about the material dimension of text and 
reading, as I believe he is, then there is no innocent or objective 
reading. Every reading in important ways is fideistic and confes-
sional, including those readings that reject the theological claim 
of the text.
501 
According to Brueggemann, Scripture is written within a reality of social con-
flicts. Even the final text of the Old Testament must be seen in light of this 
circumstance. Every text in the Old Testament is then performed by an author 
or a group of authors within a religious community who operate with and for 
a specific purpose. Not even the historical-critical method is objective but ra-
ther is a reading that is guided by presuppositions which are neither neutral nor 
innocent but serve, consciously or not, a specific normative reading of the Old 
Testament. Brueggemann writes: 
Indeed, we are now able to see that what has passed for objective 
reading (and still does in some quarters) is often the work of a 
privileged elite who agreed upon methods of reading that kept 
the text in the sphere of ideas where it did not come into contact 
with material advantage and disadvantage.
502
 
Gottwald admits that sometimes a sociological method has to hypothesize the 
textual information. This might create a speculative problem.503 However, a 
sociological approach is capable of explaining the “public and communal char-
acter of biblical texts as intelligible creations of people working out their social 
conflicts and contradictions in changing systemic contexts.”504 According to 
Brueggemann, Gottwald…  
insists that texts are to be understood within the density of social 
interaction and social conflict, bespeaking vested interest and 
                                                     
501 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 52. 
502 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 52. 
503 Norman K. Gottwald, The Hebrew Scripture, A Socio-literary Introduction (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1985), 33. 
504 Gottwald, The Hebrew Scripture, 32. 
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ideological cunning. If that density is neglected, it becomes too 
easy to take the text as innocent.
505
  
It is important to stress that Brueggemann uses Gottwald’s sociological ap-
proach for a theological purpose. This means that Brueggemann wants to relate 
the sociological facts, such as environmental factors, landscape, population 
growth and food availability, to a theological reality. This makes him conclude 
that the rendering of God in the Old Testament is a God who is consistently in 
the fray, i.e. in the battle of social conflicts. When God is in the fray, i.e. in-
volved in Israel in a specific way, Brueggemann, despite his presupposition 
that every interpretation advocates a certain point of view, nonetheless seems 
to advocate an objective standpoint. What he argues for is that every interpre-
tation of the Old Testament stands in a process of judgment which finally goes 
back to a “revolutionary propensity” that is inherent in the final text:  
.. the reader should understand that the present writer is unflag-
ging in his empathy toward that revolutionary propensity in the 
text. This is a long-term interpretive judgment, rooted perhaps in 
history and personal inclination as well as in more informed crit-
ical judgment.
506
 
This so called revolutionary propensity means that the Old Testament in its 
final form actually has an objective reading; a revolutionary energy for free-
dom that streams as an underground force beneath the text.507 This revolution-
ary propensity converge, I would argue, with the term God in the fray. This 
revolutionary propensity in his hermeneutics is also reminiscent of Derrida’s 
famous sentence that the end of “deconstruction is justice.” In the same way 
Brueggemann seems to argue that the end of biblical hermeneutics coincides 
with a revolutionary propensity. The fact that simultaneously he both criticizes 
                                                     
505 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 59. 
506 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 74. 
507 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 735: “This Mosaic revolution has political, 
economic, moral, and ethnic connotations, but its main force, I suggest, is to establish justice as 
the core focus of Yahweh’s life in the world and Israel’s life with Yahweh.” 
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an objective reading and presents an objective reading of the text may appear 
contradictory. However, this could also be seen as an example of an honest 
search for truth. Step by step, Brueggemann goes behind various epistemolo-
gies and hermeneutics that hold the text captive from a theological reading of 
the text and presents a new approach that reaches forward to the text where the 
theological content is visible. 
COMMUNITY AND THEOLOGY BECOMES NORMATIVE THEOLOGY 
The second presupposition in Brueggemann’s focus on the written testimony 
is his standpoint that Old Testament theology should be normative.508 He bases 
his opinion on four remarks. Firstly, the fact that the final form of the Old 
Testament is “a product of and a response to the Babylonian exile”509 has nor-
mative implications:  
Whatever older materials may have been utilized (and the use of 
older materials can hardly be doubted), the exilic and/ or postex-
ilic location of the final form of the text suggests that the Old 
Testament materials, understood normatively, are to be taken 
precisely in an acute crisis of displacement,… Indeed, the crisis 
of displacement looms as definitive in the self-understanding of 
Judaism that emerged in the exile and thereafter. With the failure 
of long-trusted institutions, the faith community that generated 
the final form of the text, and that was generated by it, was 
thrown back in a singular way on the textual-rhetorical possibil-
ity for life-space. In acute dislocation when appeal could no 
longer be made to city, king, or temple, it was to this text that 
Israel increasingly had to look.
510
 
                                                     
508 See also Bergsma, “Useful for the Church?” 105: “Does Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old 
Testament provide a basis for doing normative theology from the OT?” 
509 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 74. 
510 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 74-75. 
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The exile is the acute dislocation and in this situation the text becomes Israel’s 
sanctuary. The final form of the text, understood as a response to the exile, is 
the new normative foundation for Israel.  
Secondly, he defines normativeness in close relation to justice. A normative 
statement for him is equal to “that on which one will stake one’s life.”511 This 
means that normative statements are testimonies made in situations where the 
witness has to declare an opinion that stands against oppression and urges for 
justice: 
Theological interpreters of the Old Testament at the end of the 
twentieth century must, in my judgment, pay primal attention to 
this irreducible claim of justice, which is, in the most abrasive 
parts of the testimony, a demanding summons even to Yah-
weh.
512
 
This feature in his hermeneutics shares striking similarities with the way Ric-
oeur understands testimony.513 Brueggemann develops his understanding of 
biblical justice specifically as distributive justice.514 Distributive justice means 
that the rich should give to the poor and thus common wealth is distributed to 
everyone. His notion of distributive justice stands in opposition to the ideology 
of military consumerism.  
Thirdly, Brueggemann argues that the purpose of the discipline of Old Testa-
ment theology is not primarily to perform an analysis of the biblical text, but 
rather to define the truth.515 The truth, moreover, stands in a close relation to 
an ecclesial community because such a community “is unembarrassed about 
commitments that, in the parlance of ‘objective rationality’ may be categorized 
                                                     
511 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 53. Brueggemann adds to this quotation, see 
note 153: “Risk is crucial for his definition of normativeness.” 
512 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 740. 
513 Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, 129.  
514 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 736. 
515 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 743: “I mean by this that Old Testament the-
ology is not simply a detached analysis of ancient practice of speech, but it is an engagement 
with those speech practices, in order to adjudicate what is and what is not ‘true speech,’ that is, 
speech about the truth.” 
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as bias or ideology”.516 In chapter 3 I argued that the principal of sola scriptura 
is a context that defines Brueggemann’s theological program. Following this 
principal, we have here a tension in his theology between community and text 
that is interesting to comment on. Even though Brueggemann is loyal to the 
principal of sola scriptura he also argues that the ecclesial community is the 
sustainer of normative statements. This focus on the community is a postmod-
ern sign because, as Najeeb G. Awad shows, within postmodern hermeneutics 
a normative statement is based upon the question: “how does the church use 
Scripture to reflect the central claims of its lived or practiced faith?”517 
Brueggemann has shown how important it is to stay within an ecclesial com-
munity in order to interpret Scripture in a normative sense.518 His hermeneutics 
suits well within a postmodern context because he argues that normative state-
ments are created within the community:  
By insisting that Old Testament theology requires a certain form 
of life, I am, in the end, accepting that Old Testament theology 
is an enterprise that belongs properly to an ecclesial commu-
nity…519 
Fourthly, even though he defines normativeness in close relation to the eccle-
sial community, there is an interactive process between the ecclesial commu-
nity and the biblical text: 
… responsible Old Testament Theology in an ecclesial commu-
nity of interpretation is interpretation done in an idiom that is 
congruent with the life setting of the community, but that is 
                                                     
516 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 743. 
517 Najeeb G. Awad, “Should we Dispense with Sola Scriptura? Scripture, Tradition and Post-
modern Theology,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 47:1 (2008): 64-79. Awad also refers to 
Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 175. 
518 Moreover, Daniel Brown presents a good argument that actually supports Brueggemann’s 
position, i.e. that the ecclesial community is necessary for interpreting a text. Brown argues that 
if a person unfamiliar with Christianity starts reading the Old Testament on his own, reading 
through to the book of Joshua, he would probably conclude that Christianity is a morbid sacri-
ficing religion that kills everyone who does not believe in God. See Daniel W. Brown, A New 
Introduction to Islam (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, Second Edition, 2009), 75. 
519 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 743. 
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drawn from, informed by, and authorized by the idiom of the tes-
timony of the text.
520
 
The specific idiom of the testimony is to pay attention to the normative shape 
and the normative substance of the testimony.521 The normative shape of Is-
rael’s testimony is an active verb with YHWH as agent and Israel as object and 
the normative substance is a sentence that articulates a testimony of thanksgiv-
ing. Brueggemann concludes that a theological description of YHWH is best 
defined, not as being or substance, but as “forceful activity”, i.e. as a verb.522  
In sum, Brueggemann stresses that even though the testimony is the basis in 
his theology, this testimony is always situated within an ecclesial community 
that interprets the testimony and that is not embarrassed by putting God on the 
agenda. With Awad’s comments on the importance of a community as a frame 
for a biblical interpretation, it is difficult to agree with e.g. Olson who criticizes 
Brueggemann for ignoring the religious communities in the hermeneutical pro-
cess.523 
RHETORICAL CRITICISM AS A THEOLOGICAL TOOL 
The third presupposition of Brueggemann’s focus on the written testimony is 
his use of the rhetorical critical method as a tool for theological interpretation. 
He writes in ToT: 
The dramatic, courtroom location of Israel proceeds with a 
recognition that ‘what is’ (reality) effectively derives from ‘what 
                                                     
520 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 746. 
521 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 122 and 126. The normative shape is equal to 
the specific or the characteristic shape of Israel’s testimony. 
522 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 126. The nominal sentences (sentences with-
out a verb) describe YHWH as “… presence rather than action.” See also Brueggemann, Theol-
ogy of the Old Testament, 123, note 17. 
523 See also Olson, “Biblical Theology as Provisional Monologization,” 176: “First of all, 
Brueggemann seems to assume that the Christian and Jewish traditions are entirely alien imports 
onto the biblical text. But these venerable traditions are products of centuries of human and 
community struggles in their multiple particular contexts which have arisen as readings of Scrip-
ture.” 
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is said’ (testimony). Testimony leads reality and makes a deci-
sion for a certain kind of reality both possible and inescapable.524 
In the above quotation Brueggemann argues that reality (being, ontology, es-
sence) derives from testimony. He admits, as shown in the previous chapter, 
that the relationship between being and utterance is “exceedingly difficult” but 
he is sure that the two hegemonic voices, i.e. church theology and the histori-
cal-critical method, have not solved this complicated matter in a satisfactory 
way. For him the key to defining God is through the use of rhetorical tools:  
I shall insist, as consistently as I can, that the God of Old Testa-
ment theology as such lives in, with, and under the rhetorical 
enterprise of this text, and nowhere else and in no other way.
525
  
… primarily attention must be given to the rhetoric and rhetorical 
character of faith in the Old Testament.
526
  
Testimony leads reality and makes a decision for certain kind of 
reality both possible and inescapable.
527
  
The first quotation, no doubt, signals a non-foundational approach because 
Brueggemann stresses a description of God that is situated only within the text 
and not outside of it. For Brueggemann, reality is mediated; formed in, with, 
and under the testimonies. The phrase in, with, and under originates from a 
controversy between Lutherans and reformed theologians where the Lutherans 
formulated the view that Jesus Christ is in, with, and under the elements of 
bread and wine.528 In the same way as the Lutheran reformers argued that Jesus 
                                                     
524 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 750. 
525 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 66, see also 703. 
526 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 64. 
527 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 750. 
528 “In, with, and under” originally comes from Martin Chemnitz’s work Formula of the Con-
cord, see http://bookofconcord.org/sd-supper.php?setSidebar=min October 15, 2017: “For the 
reason why, in addition to the expressions of Christ and St. Paul [the bread in the Supper is the 
body of Christ or the communion of the body of Christ], also the forms: under the bread, with 
the bread, in the bread [the body of Christ is present and offered], are employed, is that by means 
of them the papistical transubstantiation may be rejected and the sacramental union of the un-
changed essence of the bread and of the body of Christ indicated.” (Italics mine).   
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Christ was present in, with, and under the elements, Brueggemann argues that 
YHWH in the Old Testament is present in, with, and under the text and in no 
other way. In this way the Real becomes present.  
SPEECH AND REALITY COINCIDE 
The fourth presupposition is closely related to the third feature described 
above. This presupposition pays attention to the fact that in Brueggemann’s 
hermeneutics speech and reality coincide.529 This fourth feature can in turn be 
presented around three important topics. Firstly, he argues in ToT that religious 
language is specifically performative, i.e. the testimony does what it says, and 
evocative, i.e. imaginative.530 The latter term can be traced back to 
Brueggemann’s book The Psalms & and the Life of Faith, wherein he refers to 
Ricoeur’s use of religious Language. Brueggemann writes:  
The use and function of this language are not descriptive but 
evocative. Its knowing use can receive new worlds for the com-
munity given by God.
531
 
The terms performative and evocative are not synonymous but closely related 
to each other. Brueggemann uses them in order to distance his hermeneutical 
thinking from a descriptive understanding of language towards a more imagi-
native and transformative understanding. His understanding of religious lan-
guage is analyzed more fully in the second part of this chapter, but already here 
we can say that for him, in, with, and under the rules of the language, either 
used performativity or evocatively, the reality of God is present. 
Secondly, Brueggemann admits that his discussion about speech, text and re-
ality has many unresolved questions.532 It is here possible to discern a change 
                                                     
529 See Brueggemann, “The Role of Old Testament Theology in Old Testament Interpretation,” 
76: “Emphasis upon the power of rhetoric, when considered in the context of pluralism and 
ideology, makes clear that speech about God is not simply reportage on ‘what happened’ in 
history or ‘what is’ in ontology, but the speech itself is powerfully constitutive of theological 
claim as it is of ‘historical’ past.” 
530 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 703. 
531 Brueggemann, The Psalms & and the Life of Faith, 30. 
532 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 36: “Of course it would have 
been better not to say that in that blatant way, because in an appeal to ontol-ogy, we [all of us!] 
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or development in this regard. Before ToT, Brueggemann clearly believes that 
there is a reality outside the text, i.e. he had a realist position. However, in ToT, 
while still presupposing a reality outside the text, his position has changed as 
shown in the following quotation from ToT:  
While there is assumed reality outside the text (God) that as-
sumed reality depends on utterance for force, authority, and 
availability in the community. God in the Old Testament is not a 
mere rhetorical construct, but is endlessly in the process of being 
rhetorically reconstructed.
533
  
Brueggemann stresses that the Real is dependent on speech: 
Thus it appears to me that in a practical way, speech leads reality 
in the Old Testament. Speech constitutes reality and who God 
turns out to be in Israel depends on the utterance of the Israelites 
or, derivatively, the utterance of the text.
534
  
For him, utterance is everything.535 Speech and reality coincide. Brueggemann 
has changed from locating reality prior to the text, to arguing in ToT that speech 
and reality coincide. He writes in ToT that he finds it difficult to locate God 
prior to the testimony having been uttered.536 His answer to those who criticize 
him is to respond with questions: if reality is not formed by words, where else 
                                                     
are schooled to think or believe or imagine that God dwells elsewhere—in heaven or in the 
temple or in the world. And of course that is what the text itself says—but it is the text that says 
it!” 
533 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 65, note 11. 
534 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 65. 
535 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 122.  
536 See Brueggemann’s response to Kaminsky in J. S. Kaminsky, reviews of Brueggemann, 23: 
“The strategic decision to bracket out ontology is not to be taken as a great philosophical ma-
neuver, but as a characterization of pastoral activity. That is the testimony of the Scripture when 
taken as true [in the metaphor, when found as reliable witness] yield ample ontology that is 
offered to those who come without any such assurance. That is surely what people hear from 
the text, something deeply new given nowhere else, certainly not in any prior ontology. Con-
versely, if one refuses the claims of these witnesses, one is left, so I suggest, without ontology. 
But if one argues that ontology is given to Israel prior to the text or outside of the text, then one 
is at pains to say from where that ontology comes, and if from elsewhere, how does it qualify 
for Israel’s faith. I do not doubt that one may arrive at ‘the being of God’ apart from this text. 
Is it then, the God of Abraham, Jacob, or the God of the philosophers?” 
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is it formed? He concludes that ‘nowhere else’ other than in speech is ontology 
capable of coming to life for the community:  
Thus, I concede that ‘nowhere else’ is an unfortunate way to put 
it. It continues to be, however, close to what I intended. And I 
continue to be haunted, as I hope the reader is haunted, by the 
durable question, where else?’537 
Thirdly, as I argued in the previous part of this chapter, when comparing 
Brueggemann and Lindbeck, a probable link between Brueggemann and Witt-
genstein, mediated through Lindbeck, is visible. Notable is that Brueggemann 
never refers to Wittgenstein in ToT. However, as Labron shows, as also noted 
earlier in this chapter, Lindbeck is influenced by Wittgenstein. Concerning 
Wittgenstein, Selby points out that “without question it is through the later 
work of Wittgenstein that we come to see our knowledge of our world as ir-
revocably linked with our language.”538 In a comparison with Brueggemann 
and the later Wittgenstein striking similarities emerge.539 The later Wittgen-
stein neither favors reality before language nor language before reality but ar-
gues that they coincide. Labron defines Wittgenstein’s thinking as “Hebraic”: 
                                                     
537 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 37. 
538 Selby, The Comical Doctrine, 14, 24. 
539 “The later Wittgenstein” is Wittgenstein’s self expression of his development, see Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophiche Untersuchung (Herausgegeben von Eike von Savigny Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1998), X: “Vor vier Jahren aber hatte ich Veranlassungen, mein erstes Buch 
[die Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung] wider zu lessen unde seine Gedanken erklären. Da 
schien es mir plötzlisch, dass ich jene alten Gedanken und die neuen zu Samemen veröffent-
lischen sollten… Seit ich nämlich vor 16 Jahren mich wieder mit Philosophie zu beschäftigen 
anfing, musste ich schwere irrtümer in dem erkennen, was ich in jenem ersten Buche niederge-
legt hatte.” As Wittgenstein comments, he changed his mind dramatically after 1945. Before 
1945 he is defined as the early Wittgenstein and after 1945 he is defined as the later Wittgenstein. 
See also MacDonald, “language-Game,” 435, who describes the later Wittgenstein in a clear 
sense: “The term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking 
of language is part of an activity, or of form of life.” See also 436: “the emphasis on meaning as 
use—and the correlative concept of teachability and learning—is central to Wittgenstein´s un-
derstanding of language-games.” The conclusion to make is that for Wittgenstein there is a close 
link between meaning and activity, and meaning and use. 
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The Later Wittgenstein, however, takes one more step away from 
the Greek conception and shows that logic is revealed in lan-
guage…Theologically speaking this is like a turn from the un-
seen Greek Forms and symbolic world, to the Hebraic God work-
ing in the visible and non-symbolic world, culminating in the 
Christian revealed God.
540
  
…the result, I suggest, is that we can see how Wittgenstein’s 
thought moves from holding some aspects of Platonic realism in 
the Tractatus, to a more worldly and concrete Hebraic point of 
view, and ultimately his conception of logic shows similarities 
with the Word revealed.
541
 
When Brueggemann stresses that “what we have in the Old Testament is 
speech, nothing else”, it is clearly reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s idea that the 
word revealed is the only gateway to defining reality. In this way, there is in 
Brueggemann’s thinking an allusion to Wittgenstein’s famous sentence 
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”542 According to 
Brueggemann, Israel must speak of YHWH. Failing to do so will lead to idol-
atry: 
Israel as witness knows that if Yahweh is not endlessly criticized 
and subverted, Yahweh will also become an absolute, absolutiz-
ing idol, the very kind about which Moses aimed his protesting, 
deconstructive work at Sinai. Thus the deconstructive program 
in all of these dimensions is a characteristically Jewish enterprise 
of ‘smashing the idols.’543 
                                                     
540 Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, 68. 
541 Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, 56. 
542 See Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, 36: “What is shown, in contrast to what can be said, 
is beyond propositions and is transcendental.” From Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 34e. 
543 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 332. 
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READER-RESPONSE  
The fifth presupposition of Brueggemann’s focus on the testimony is the dia-
lectic between the reader and the text. He does not explicitly use the term 
reader-response in ToT but he writes: “there are no innocent texts, so there are 
no innocent readers.”544 The reader-response dialectic stresses a dialogue be-
tween the text and the reader in ToT through the courtroom metaphor.545 The 
courtroom metaphor can be understood as a hermeneutical tool that creates a 
reader-response hermeneutics. In an unpublished lecture entitled “Preaching as 
Testimony: the Testimonial Risk of Preaching,” he develops his thinking con-
cerning this topic:  
By using the category of testimony, I mean to imagine a court-
room metaphor and suggest that Christian truth now is not judge 
and jury, but is one among many witnesses, each of whom tells 
the court a different tale of reality...
546
 
The use of the courtroom metaphor implies at least three agents that either 
present testimonies or listen to testimonies. These agents play different roles 
in the courtroom metaphor. The first agent is the court. The court is the creator 
of a portrayal of YHWH: “That is the business of the court and not of the wit-
ness.”547 As creator of this portrayal, the court must listen to the testimonies 
that come from the witnesses. The second agent then consists of those wit-
nesses who testify to the court. They tell the court what they have seen and 
what they have heard. In his comparison of Joshua 24:23 with Isaiah 43:8-9 
Brueggemann pays attention to advocacy; whether YHWH is the true God or 
the gods from Babylon. He here stresses a close connection between “the role 
of the witnesses and the singular theological claims of Yahweh.” For 
                                                     
544 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 52. 
545 As mentioned earlier, the inspirational sources for the courtroom metaphor come from Ric-
oeur. However, Isaiah 40-55 is also important for him as a source. See Brueggemann, Theology 
of the Old Testament. 120, note 7 and 8. 
546 Brueggemann, Unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, Box 37, Folder 1298. 
547 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 267. 
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Brueggemann, the main point is that there is a choice to be made: “Which wit-
nesses are believed – concerning Yahweh or the gods of the empire – will de-
termine the shape of the world.”548  
The third and final agent is the community that hears the testimonies and be-
lieves them. With regard to the third agent, in addition to being Israel, the com-
munity is also the reader of the testimonies, i.e. the Jewish and Christian com-
munities. In this way, the metaphor - with Israel as court, as witness, and as 
community in the courtroom metaphor - functions as a hermeneutical tool that 
creates a reader and a response. According to Brueggemann, the reader of the 
final text is involved in a process which stretches from the past to the present 
day; the revelation continues, generation after generation. This is for 
Brueggemann intertextuality: 
Intertextuality is a process of conversation by which the entire 
past and memory of the textual community is kept available and 
present in concrete and detailed ways.
549
 
CONCLUSIONS 
When describing Brueggemann’s focus on the written testimony, five presup-
positions sum up his hermeneutics. Firstly, no interpretation is neutral which 
means that every interpretation advocates a certain point of view. Behind the 
text Brueggemann discerns a revolutionary propensity that could be described 
as his Rule of Faith. Secondly, Old Testament theology is normative and the 
discipline should work in close relationship with an ecclesial community. 
Thirdly, he uses rhetorical criticism as a theological tool and finds a tension 
in the text that corresponds to a tension within God. Fourthly, speech and re-
ality coexist. He searches for the real but in order to reveal the real, speech 
must be used. Fifthly and finally, Brueggemann creates a reader and a response 
between the court and the witness where the court responds to the testimony 
from the witness. The rhetorical critical tool combined with the idea that 
                                                     
548 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 750. 
549 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 79. 
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speech and reality coexist is his theological hermeneutics and his hermeneuti-
cal theology is based on the fact that no interpretation is neutral. Therefore it 
seems that he actually presupposes that every theology has a normative inten-
tion, unconsciously or consciously. 
5.4 IMAGINATION IN ToT 
The second significant element in Brueggemann’s hermeneutics is his use of 
imagination as a source in his hermeneutical enterprise. As shown in chapter 
3, imagination has played a decisive role in his theological approach through-
out his career and characterizes him among other scholars. In chapter 3 I con-
cluded that his understanding of imagination prior to and after ToT stands in a 
process of continuity. In this part I will pay attention to firstly, a summary of 
how he defines imagination in ToT and compare. Secondly, some examples of 
how he uses imagination as an interpretative tool on specific passages in the 
Old Testament; and thirdly and finally, his use of imagination in relation to 
revelation. 
IMAGINATION AS FORCE 
Imagination is the force that is capable of changing reality. Brueggemann gives 
the following definition of imagination in ToT: 
Without a precise definition of imagination, we may characterize 
its work as the capacity to generate, evoke, and articulate alter-
native images of reality, images that counter what hegemonic 
power and knowledge have declared to be impossible. This coun-
terversion (sub-version) of reality thereby deabsolutizes and de-
stabilizes what ‘the world’ regards as given, and invites the hear-
ers of the text to recharacterize what is given or taken as real.
550
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It is obvious that he wants to present a counter-version.551 The goal for him is 
to foster the ecclesial community to work for a vision that will change the 
world, and work towards a vision wherein distributive justice is at work.552 He 
presupposes that our world is constructed, not given, and that there is a com-
petition between various other imaginative constructions of the world. The 
world, imagined through the eyes of YHWH, is a metanarrative wherein the 
imaginative force of the text in the Old Testament is capable of transforming a 
new reality. He defines imagination as the “crucial ingredient in Israel’s ren-
dering of reality.”553 In order to render this reality, the prophets use imagination 
as the tool to reshape the reality of YHWH. The narratives in Israel’s final text 
are also eschatological, i.e. they anticipate a future and are open to an imagi-
native perception of reality that is not bound to “sober reality”…“Israel’s rhet-
oric notices and bears witness to what the world judges to be impossible.”554  
IMAGINATION AS INTERPRETATIVE TOOL 
Some examples from ToT how Brueggemann uses imagination in his interpre-
tation now follow. Firstly, there is an example in his interpretation of Genesis 
1-2. These chapters function as a liturgical narrative. The purpose of the nar-
rative is to present a “contrast-world” to the exile world in Babylon: “The ef-
fect of the liturgy is to create an alternative world of ordered life, made possible 
by Yahweh’s powerful word and will.”555 Another example is the Exodus story 
(Exodus 12-14). According to Brueggemann, this narrative is reused so that 
“wilderness is regularly reciphered as ‘exile.’”556 In this way, imagination 
                                                     
551 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 76: “At the outset, then, it is important for a 
student of Old Testament theology to recognize that this material is an enterprise of counter-
reality.” 
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subversive, and uncompromising.” 
Brueggemann, Walter. Theology of the Old Testament (p. 745). Fortress Press. Kindle Edition.” 
553 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 68. 
554 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 68. 
555 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 153. 
556 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 75. See also 263: “Israel, in its appropriation 
of nouns for Yahweh, never simply takes over and uses available nouns, but always reuses them, 
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functions as the tool for reusing material in new situations. Secondly, imagi-
nation plays an important role in theology of the nouns.557 Brueggemann sug-
gests that the noun metaphors provide a way in which the oddity of YHWH 
can be expressed. This oddity is created by the use of imagination, not in the 
sense of reusing biblical materials but in the sense of explaining the incompa-
rability of YHWH. He refers to e.g. Isaiah 40:10-11: 
10 Behold, the Lord GOD will come with might, With His arm 
ruling for Him. Behold, His reward is with Him And His recom-
pense before Him. 11 Like a shepherd He will tend His flock, In 
His arm He will gather the lambs And carry them in His bosom; 
He will gently lead the nursing ewes.  
He highlights that YHWH is described as both warrior and nursemaid.558 This 
is an example of an imaginative playfulness with nouns, where different noun 
metaphors are set side by side, with no attempt at harmonization.559 
Brueggemann also gives a hint of how the interpretations of the metaphors 
have theological implications: 
If we push underneath this rationalizing justification for Yah-
weh’s severity, however, we are bound to say that each of these 
metaphors contains an unresolved tension. This tension may be 
understood as a contradiction within the very character of Yah-
weh.560 
My conclusion is that Brueggemann interprets the metaphors literarily, and 
therefore he concludes that these metaphors reveal a contradiction within 
YHWH. What I suggest is that Brueggemann argues that the character of 
YHWH must be understood on the premise of the theological agenda that the 
                                                     
so that they participate in the density of Israel’s rhetoric and Israel’s imaginative construal of its 
life in relation to Yahweh.” 
557 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 230-66. 
558 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 233. YHWH as Judge, King, Warrior, 
Father, Artist, Healer, Gardener, Mother and Shepherd. 
559 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 230. 
560 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 249. 
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community of Israel share on the basis of the imaginative testimony in the Old 
Testament: 
Or one could say that there is some development in Yahweh from 
wild destructiveness to compassion as Israel’s religion matures, 
and so we may credit this oddness to the history of religion. No 
doubt there is something in this as well. But here the issue that 
concerns us is not exhausted with imaginative literature nor with 
developmental history, for we intend to be asking about the God 
given us in the speech of Israel; that is, we have a theological 
agenda.
561
 
IMAGINATION AS REVELATION 
Imagination also plays an important role for Brueggemann whereby Israel 
transforms her testimony to become revelation: 
That is, the testimony that Israel bears to the character of God is 
taken by the ecclesial community of the text as a reliable disclo-
sure about the true character of God. Here we touch on the diffi-
culty of the authority of the Scripture, which has usually been 
articulated in the scholastic categories of inspiration and revela-
tion.
562
 
He expresses this in terms of “revelation-as-human imagination.”563 What 
Brueggemann wants to achieve in his hermeneutics is to emphasize the imag-
inative force that human beings have in their imagination of God. The process 
from human testimony to revelation can be explained as follows: the testimo-
nies are the fixed sentences of a human witness who has seen God. 
Brueggemann argues that it is quite uncertain how the process from testimony 
                                                     
561 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 281. 
562 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 121. 
563 Walter Brueggemann, An Unsettling God: The Heart of the Hebrew Scripture (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2009), 16: “What is revealed here is a Holy One who is undomesticated available 
for dialogic transaction; p. 17: Beyond its own performance, moreover, it also imagined [was 
led by the spirit to imagine] that all other creatures are also partners of the same God and so 
recruited into the same dialogic transaction.” 
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to revelation actually takes place.564 In this sense, imagination is a crucial ele-
ment that convinces the court to make a positive decision: “when utterance in 
the Scripture is taken as truthful, human testimony is taken as revelation that 
discloses the true reality of God.”565 He is skeptical about using classical for-
mulations to describe revelation: 
Having said that the Scripture is taken as revelation, it is none-
theless important and difficult to specify what is referenced by 
the term revelation. The term may refer to the inscrutable disclo-
sure of the mystery of God, but it easily slides into scholastic 
assumption that revelation is settled package of propositions.
566
 
When Brueggemann discusses the complicated relationship between the Old 
and the New Testaments, he describes the Christian interpretation as an “im-
aginative construal of the Old Testament”, one which it is possible to perform 
but which, nonetheless, is not the only possible alternative to make.567 A char-
acteristic Christian imagination of the relationship between the Old and the 
New Testaments is a “transposition of ‘messiah’ to ‘the messiah’ and identifi-
cation of the Church with ‘the Israel of God.’”568 This means that he defines 
imagination as a source that performs a Christian interpretation. The Christian 
interpretation is then not inherent in the text as such, but instead is formed 
through the interpreter within the ecclesial community. This standpoint stands 
in sharp contrast to Childs’ hermeneutical program, which argues that the text 
itself is the carrier of the Christian interpretation (see chapter 6).  
                                                     
564 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 122: “It is by no means clear how this trans-
position from testimony to revelation is accomplished, though we assume it all the time in our 
theological treatment of the Scripture.” 
565 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 121. 
566 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 3, note 6. 
567 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 732: “That is, Old Testament theology, in my 
judgment, must prepare the material and fully respect the interpretative connections made in the 
New Testament and the subsequent church, but it must not make those connections, precisely 
because the connections are not to be found in the testimony of ancient Israel, but in the subse-
quent work of imaginative construal that lies beyond the text of the Old Testament.” 
568 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 733. 
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CONCLUSION: IMAGINATION AS SOURCE FOR KNOWING GOD 
Brueggemann seems to use imagination as a primary tool to create the alterna-
tive. This makes imagination a sources for knowing God. According to Green, 
an author that Brueggemann refers to, “Imagination is the faculty of represent-
ing in intuition an object that is not itself present.”569 This view of imagination 
is a human capacity for understanding reality from the biblical point of view and it 
creates an alternative. For Brueggemann to imagine is to read the biblical text before 
in this sense. The encounter with the world and the encounter with the biblical text 
reinforce the society of military consumerism—in this way that creates a revolutionary 
force to change so that the society becomes part of the kingdom of God. Brueggemann, 
by the use of imagination, connects the witness with God; and even though he hardly 
connects imagination with the Holy Spirit, he links the witness to a sociological con-
text and community, so that the community forms a vision of God that becomes fixed 
in testimony and uttered in the ecclesial community. Imagination is therefore far re-
moved from fantasy, but is rooted in the memories of the past and forms its future 
around earlier experiences of God. Imagination becomes for Brueggemann the link 
between the text and the reality that the text refers to. By use of imagination in his 
hermeneutics Brueggemann, even though he seems to be satisfied to stay inside 
the drama of the text, relates the text to the reality outside the text. 
5.5 JEWISH TRADITION: READING BEYOND THE VISIBLE 
The third and final element in Brueggemann’s hermeneutics is his inspiration 
from the Jewish tradition. In two chapters, “The Jewishness of the Old Testa-
ment” (pp. 107-112) and “Old Testament Theology in Relation to Jewish Tra-
dition and the Jewish Community” (pp. 733-735) he develops the Jewish tra-
dition as an element for interpreting the Old Testament. It is important to em-
phasize that Brueggemann defines himself as a Christian interpreter as the use 
of the term Old Testament clearly indicates.570 Nevertheless, as we have al-
                                                     
569 Green, Imagine God, 62. 
570 The use of Old and New defines a specifically Christian hermeneutical perspective on the 
Scripture. Some use the term First instead of Old, to identify the continuity with the Jewish 
canon. Levenson uses the term Hebrew Scripture. Brueggemann comments in ToT on the issue 
of proper terminology as follows, see Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 1: “I am 
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ready seen in the comparison with Wittgenstein, his thinking could be de-
scribed as Hebraic. Likewise, his hermeneutics entails a clear skepticism to-
wards Christian theology, either formulated conservative or liberal. Instead his 
approach favors the Jewish traditions. J.S Bergsma summarizes 
Brueggemann’s opinion on this concisely:  
The Christian tradition: totalizing, absolutizing, generalizing, 
schematizing, Hellenistic, Platonic, body-denying, reduction-
istic, supersessionist, transcendental, hegemonic, moves to clo-
sure and (2) the Jewish tradition: specific, immanent, disputa-
tious, dialectical, dialogical, Hebraic, playful, concrete, body af-
firming, dense, ambiguous, resistant to closure.
571
  
Brueggemann’s influence from the Jewish traditions does not mean that he 
honors a special “Jewish spirit or a Jewish genius, nor do I suggest that there 
is something given as ethnic about Jewish modes of discourse.”572 His interest 
in the Jewish tradition is based on two “resiliently Jewish” aspects.573 Firstly, 
the text is written for the Jewish community. Secondly, the Jewish tradition 
highlights many different readings. This reading then stands in sharp contrast 
to that of western Christendom which has been influenced too much by “Aris-
totelian logic that could not countenance the existence of opposites at the same 
time.”574 In this way, Brueggemann appreciates a reading that favors a reading 
beyond the visible, beyond the logic towards the Hebraic and Jewish sense of 
the Old Testament text. 
                                                     
not unaware of the problematic nature of the phrase Old Testament. I use the term with diffi-
dence, but use it nonetheless, because I write and exposit as a Christian interpreter. At the same 
time it will be clear that I am acutely aware of and concerned about the destructiveness implicit 
in every form of supersessionism.” 
571 Bergsma, “Useful for the Church?” 121. 
572 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 81. 
573 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 80. 
574 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 82. 
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DISCERNING DISRUPTIONS IN THE TEXT  
According to Brueggemann, a Jewish reading focuses on the disruptions that 
are visible in the text. There are four ways that demarcates this disruption. The 
first way that presents this disruption is the Midrashic interpretation of the Old 
Testament. This ancient way of interpreting the text is not a theological inter-
pretation in a Christian sense.575 However, such a reading makes it possible to 
pay attention to and “expose what is hidden in the text, which might be an 
embarrassment to the main claim of the text.”576 Brueggemann’s interpretation 
of Amos 9:8 (see chapter 2) functions as a good example of influence from a 
Midrashic reading. 
The second way that highlights a disruption in the text is by paying attention 
to Freud’s psychoanalysis. Brueggemann is influenced by Susan Handelman, 
who has demonstrated a link between Freud and Midrashic interpretation. In-
terpreting texts by use of Freud’s psychoanalysis means “listening and watch-
ing for the incongruity between what is said and what is hidden but sig-
naled.”577 Brueggemann does not suggest a psychological analysis of YHWH 
but rather a cross-examination that is motivated by Freud’s psychoanalysis. 
The cross-examination pays specific interest to those texts that give attention 
to “Yahweh’s history of violence and absence”. For him, such texts are not 
only historical portraits but… 
…theological data about the Character in the narrative who has 
continuity and constancy, then we may rightly wonder about the 
                                                     
575 Benjamin Sommer stresses that the primary focus within Judaism is to write commentaries 
and not theologies, even though both kinds of literature are well known within Judaism. See 
Benjamin Sommer, “Scriptures in Jewish Tradition, and Traditions as Jewish Scripture,” pages 
1-15 in Jewish Concepts of Scripture, (ed. B. Sommer et. al. New York, NYU Press, 2012), 9: 
“The discipline of Theology does not have the same place within Judaism as it has in Christian-
ity.” Brueggemann’s intention is to combine Jewish Midrashic interpretation within a Christian 
Theology of the Old Testament. 
576 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 326: “James Kugel has shown how Midrash 
works to express dissonance, which he characterizes as ‘surface irregularities’ in the text.” 
577 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 327. 
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ongoing significance of this remembered violence in Yahweh’s 
life and character.
578  
The third way in which Brueggemann demarcates a disruption in the text is the 
tremendous problem of the Holocaust. The discipline of “Old Testament the-
ology cannot proceed” without taking notice of this catastrophe in the history 
of mankind.579 In the next chapter this disruption will be explored by Blumen-
thal’s argument that YHWH is abusive. At this point, it is suffice to state that 
Brueggemann is very influenced by Blumenthal’s theological proposal that 
YHWH is abusive, and moreover, that Blumenthal draws such a controversial 
conclusion in light of the holocaust. Blumenthal’s conclusion is indeed contro-
versial and it is important to comment that Brueggemann hesitates to go as far 
as Blumenthal does.580  
Finally, the fourth way that discern disruptions in the text is by paying attention 
to Derrida’s deconstruction theory. Brueggemann writes that deconstruction 
is… 
… an important payout in which we can see coming together (a) 
the affinity of disruption in midrash, (b) the ‘slips’ of Freudian 
discernment that are clues to emancipatory truth, and (c) the so-
ciopolitical –moral-intellectual disruption that is the Holo-
caust.
581
  
                                                     
578 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 328. 
579 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 328-29. 
580 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 329: “Or we may, with David Blumenthal, 
hold the God of the Holocaust to the covenantal categories of the Old Testament, and conclude 
that the God of Israel is ‘abusive…but not always.’” Weinandy, in his argumentation that 
YHWH does not suffer fears that a concept of God without the possibility of suffering would 
lack emotions, see Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 2000), 
viii: “With the Holocaust and similar events of horrendous human suffering as the existential 
backdrop, how could I write a book in which I would argue that God is impassible and so does 
not suffer?”  
581 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 330. 
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I conclude that for Brueggemann, a Jewish reading is - to a large extent - equiv-
alent to a deconstructive reading and shares many similarities with Derrida.582 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO TESTAMENTS  
Brueggemann has an understanding of the relationship between the Old and 
the New Testament that could be described as a middle way between a Chris-
tian perspective and a Jewish perspective. I comment in more detail on this 
issue in chapter 7. At this point, it is suffice to highlight that M. Gershom, a 
Jewish scholar, describes this middle way of Brueggemann as particularly in-
teresting.583 Brueggemann argues that traditional theological categories such 
as “promise-fulfillment, law-gospel, salvation history and topology” do not 
catch the importance of the Old Testament for the New Testament and for 
Christian faith.584 Moreover, whereas Von Rad argues that the Old Testament 
has a continuing story which finds its logical end in the New Testament,585 
Brueggemann argues that the relationship between the two testaments is based 
on the fulfillment of the promise in the Old Testament but the Old Testament 
is not exclusively aimed at the New Testament.586 Instead, he argues that the 
interpreter of the Old Testament should articulate the theology of the Old Tes-
tament in all its various nuances and then…“offer it to the church for its con-
tinuing work of construal toward Jesus.”587 In sum, this imaginative and rhe-
torically playful Old Testament testimonies make room for at least two read-
ings of the Old Testament, a Jewish and a Christian reading. Brueggemann 
hesitates to read the Old Testament from the point of New Testament, even 
though he in no way ignores such a reading. His approach favors a reading that 
                                                     
582 See also Hill, The Cambridge Introduction to Jacques Derrida, 49 ff. Hill writes that Derrida 
is influenced by Freud (compare Brueggemann’s influence of Freud). 
583 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 69, 206. Gershom M. H. Ratheiser, Mitz-
voth Ethics and the Jewish Scripture (ed. Gershom M. H. Ratheiser, Bloomsbury Academic & 
Professional, 2007), 89 ff. According to Gershom, Brueggemann presents, together with Childs, 
the most important Christian approach to the Hebrew Scripture: “For now, then, there are two 
more major works that deserve attention: the study of B. S. Childs and that of W. Brueggemann.” 
584 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 730. 
585 David L. Baker, Two Testaments, One Scripture: The Theological Relationship Between the 
Old and the New Testament. Third Edition (Downers Groove: InterVarsity Press, 2010), 305. 
586 Baker, Two Testaments, One Scripture, 305. 
587 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 732. 
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takes the Old Testament as a text in itself into account. This text should be read 
in its own context, i.e. the Jewish context, in order to be understood correctly.  
CONCLUSION: GOD IN THE FRAY 
In sum, by using the Jewish tradition Brueggemann pays attention to the visible 
tension and diversity that exist in the text. As Jewish sources he refers to Mid-
rashic interpretation, Freudian reading, the tremendous problem of the Holo-
caust and Derrida’s deconstruction. These sources, are crucial for his theolog-
ical conclusion about YHWH, as a God who is in the fray. This concept of God 
stands in close parallel to the dialectic between passion and sovereignty, which 
often converges but which sometimes stands in sharp tension and precludes a 
scholastic conclusion. Brueggemann’s previous distinction between God 
above the fray and God in the fray, visible in articles before ToT, has changed, 
and in ToT he stresses that God is specifically in the fray. On the basis of his 
influence from the Jewish tradition, Brueggemann presents a dialectical con-
cept of God in ToT:  
The Old Testament in its theological articulation is characteris-
tically dialectical and dialogical, and not transcendentalist… 
And because the God of Israel lives in Israel’s rhetoric, we may 
say finally that Israel’s God also partakes of this provisional way 
in the world.
588
  
In stating this dialectic, which therefore requires both centrist 
and marginated interpreters, I have tried to stay within the 
bounds of the Old Testament itself and to heed its unmistakably 
Jewish propensity.
589
  
Brueggemann argues that this dialectic concept of God is both Jewish but also 
typically Christian. He refers to Jürgen Moltmann, among others, for this 
standpoint: 
                                                     
588 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 83. 
589 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 401.  
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Jürgen Moltmann has seen that crucifixion and resurrection in 
Christian theological interpretation are not, together, a once – 
for-all sequenced event. They are together, rather, a ‘dialectic of 
reconciliation,’ in which both sides of the dialectic are still ur-
gent.
590
 
His theological conclusion of a dialectical concept of God is based on his the-
ological interpretation of the Old Testament. He pays attention to texts that 
present both a convergence and a tension between God’s love and God’s anger. 
The convergence is visible in texts such as Psalm 115:1:  
Not to us, O LORD, not to us, but to your name give glory, 
for the sake of your steadfast love and your faithfulness.  
 
Here in Psalm 115:1 YHWH is described as righteous because he shows grace 
and covenantal fidelity.591 However, there are also texts in which there is a 
visible tension between YHWH’s righteousness and fidelity, e.g. Numbers 14 
and Ezekiel 36:22-32. These texts clearly show that YHWH will “hold count-
able and destroy all of those who have ‘not listened.’” 592 Brueggemann’s con-
clusion is that there is no final convergence between fidelity and mercy. There 
is a limit for YHWH’s fidelity towards Israel, “a limit already anticipated in 
Exodus 34:7b.” This limit is located within YHWH and stands in tension to-
wards YHWH’s compassion. In Ezekiel 36:22-32 the tension within YHWH 
means that YHWH will act in a passionate way, but without Israel. It seems 
that YHWH acts in a way that “is fully, without reservation, for the enhance-
ment of Yahweh.” Brueggemann then argues that the texts above create a dia-
lectic that is present within the Jewish tradition but is more absent within the 
tradition of the Church. Speaking theologically, this dialectic finally goes back 
to God, i.e. there is a dialectic between God above the fray and God in the fray 
but there is no convergence between them. In the end, in ToT, this dialectic 
                                                     
590 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 401. See Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of 
Hope: On the Ground and the Implication of Christian Eschatology (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1993). 
591 Also in Deuteronomy 10:12-22 and Isaiah 45:21-25 Brueggemann finds textual evidence for 
a convergence between YHWH’s righteousness and his fidelity towards the covenants. 
592 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 307-308. 
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then tilts towards becoming God in the fray at the expense of God above the 
fray.  
5.6 HISTORICAL OR THEOLOGICAL APPROACH? 
The important question that this study asks in this chapter is how Brueggemann 
intends to use religious language in ToT. To recall chapter 2, and the introduc-
tion of this chapter, there was a critical assessment from Hanson, Albertz, and 
Ryan concerning how to use religious language. What I will show is that 
Brueggemann actually intends to use religious language in a specific theolog-
ical sense. This is an important topic because Hanson’s proposal of a figurative 
understanding actually omits a theological interpretation and also Albertz ar-
gued for the impossibility of a theological approach.  
THE UGLY DITCH 
Before God has given language to mankind in order to communicate. It is 
equally clear that all religious language implies a gap between human beings 
and God. Brueggemann refers to this gap as the “the ugly ditch”.593 The ugly 
ditch is a “language vacuum” between the biblical text and its primary refer-
ence, God.594 An interpreter of the biblical text is automatically involved in 
bridging the space between the text and the reality that the text refers to. A 
passage from Hebrews 8:5 expresses the content of the problem. The author of 
the Hebrews refers to the priests who offer in the temple:  
They offer worship in a sanctuary that is a sketch and shadow of 
the heavenly one; for Moses, when he was about to erect the tent, 
was warned: ‘See that you make everything according to the pat-
tern that was shown you on the mountain.' 
                                                     
593 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 33: “The first of these problems 
is the historicity of the claims of OT traditions. This is a very old problem. On the one hand, 
there is Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s famous ‘ugly ditch’ in which the crossing from ‘history’ to 
‘meaning’ is difficult if not impossible. On the other hand, there is the endless sorting out of 
Historie and Geschichte. I have concluded that a theological interpreter can go only so far with 
‘history,’ in fact not very far at all.” 
594 See Rosalind Selby, The Comical Doctrine: An Epistemology of New Testament Hermeneu-
tics (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006), 9, 53. Selby argues that the fact that some deny God, 
some are resistant to defining God, and some believe in God proves the apparent problem of 
meaning and reference. 
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According to the author of the Hebrews, Moses had a blueprint from YHWH 
that should become visible in the community of Israel. The passage from He-
brews introduces in a good sense the question how theological words, meta-
phors and stories in Scripture refer to God. A theory of religious language nor-
mally refers meaning to God in at least three ways: in a univocal, analogical 
and/or equivocal sense.595 For example, understanding love univocally as-
sumes that God’s love is equal to human love and vice versa. Understanding 
love equivocally assumes that religious language is incapable of properly de-
fining love because God’s love is totally different from the human perception 
of love. An equivocal understanding of language means moreover, that the 
only way of referring to love is through metaphors that can describe das Ding 
für mich but not an sich. This way of using religious language has been domi-
nant within modernism. The third alternative is that religious language can be 
used in an analogical sense so that human love corresponds to God’s love. 
God’s love is not the same as human love but nonetheless is of a similar kind.596 
It is important to stress that religious language also can be used in all three 
senses. Childs, quoting an old hymn, catches this sense and something of the 
rich dynamic that religious language is capable of performing within an eccle-
sial community:  
My God, my God, Thou are a direct God, may I not say a literall 
God, a God that wouldest be understood literally, and according 
to the plaine sense of all that thou saidest? But thou are also 
[Lord I intend it to thy glory…] thou art a figurative, a metaphor-
icall God too: A God in whose words there is such a height of 
figures, such voyages, such peregrinations, to fetch remot and 
                                                     
595 Alan Torrance, “Analogy,” in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Scripture 
(General Editor K. J. Vanhoozer. Associate Editors, C. Bartholomew D. J. Treier and N.T 
Wright., Michigan: Baker Academic, 2005), 39. 
596 Torrance, “Analogy,” 39. 
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precious metaphors, such extensions… such Curtaines of Alle-
gories… O what words but thine, can expressed the inexpressible 
texture, and composition of thy Word.
597
 
GILKEY´S CRITERIA FOR A THEOLOGICAL APPROACH 
We now proceed and pay attention to Gilkey’s criticism of how religious lan-
guage was used within the BThM. At that time, in 1961, Gilkey wrote the ar-
ticle “Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language.”598 As 
shown in chapter 3, Brueggemann was fostered within BThM and Gilkey’s 
critique relates to Brueggemann in this way. In turn, Gilkey’s analysis of 
BThM is shared by Frei, whom Brueggemann mentions as an important source 
of inspiration.599 Brueggemann refers to Gilkey in ToT: 
Already in 1961, Langdon Gilkey had identified the problem 
covered over by language, and since that time a great deal of en-
ergy has been devoted to the question of what might be meant by 
the phrase ‘act of God.’’600  
A main point in the above-mentioned article by Gilkey is that BThM presented 
normative biblical theology based on a modern epistemology.  
The nub of this problem is the fact that, while the object of bib-
lical recital is God’s acts, the object of biblical theological in-
quiry is biblical faith—that is to say, biblical theology is, like 
                                                     
597 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 382. Childs quotes from Donne, 
Devotions upon Emergent Occassions, XIX Expostulation. 
598 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 43, 124, 163, 528. 
599 Hans Frei, Theology and Narrative, Selected Essays. (ed. G. Hussinger and W. C. Placher, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 118ff. 
600 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 43. See also Brueggemann, “ABC’s of Old 
Testament Theology in the US,” 415: “As Brevard Childs and Langdon Gilkey came to see that 
»his- tory« as an interpretive category is deeply problematic, we may notice the rapid disinte-
gration of the consensus claims of »history«.” See also Leonard Finn who argues that Frei shares 
Gilkey’s criticism (L.G Finn, “Reflections on the Rule of Faith,” Biblical Scholarship in North 
America, Volume 25: Scripture as Christian Scripture : The Work of Brevard S. Childs (ed. 
Christopher R Seitz and Kent H. Richards, Atlanta, GA, USA: Society of Biblical Literature), 
222-23: “Hans Frei’s analysis of the breakdown of the literal sense of the scriptures—or rather, 
the breakdown of western Christendom’s ability to read them according to the literal sense—
remains the classic exposition of what was lost and what has been made to serve in its place.” 
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liberalism, a study of Hebrew religion. Thus while the language 
of biblical theology is God-centered, the whole is included 
within gigantic parentheses marked ‘human religion.’601 
According to Gilkey, the problem of theology is related to change of meaning 
of religious language within the epistemology of modernism. Within the pre-
modern world, Scripture was understood as presenting the world in an accurate 
way. The entrance of modernism radically challenged that confidence. 
Gilkey’s conclusion is that normative theology based on a modern epistemol-
ogy is impossible due to fact that this epistemology, by its own presupposi-
tions, does not discuss YHWH as agent. The interesting conclusion of Gilkey’s 
article is that the meaning of religious language changes from referring to 
YHWH in a univocal sense to referring to YHWH only in an equivocal sense. 
Verbs and nouns lose their literal meaning as observable actions in space and 
time: 
Our problem is, therefore, twofold: (a) We have not realized that 
this crucial shift has taken place, and so we think we are merely 
speaking the biblical language because we use the same words. 
We do use these words, but we use them analogically rather than 
univocally, and these are vastly different usages. (b) Unless one 
knows in some sense what the analogy means, how the analogy 
is being used, and what it points to, an analogy is empty and un-
intelligible; that is, it becomes equivocal language. This is the 
crux of our present difficulty; …602 
Gilkey also argues that there is a huge difference between a theological prop-
osition that claims that “the God of Israel is merciful” and a religious historical 
proposition that claims that “ancient Israel defines God as merciful.” Gilkey 
explains the difference:  
                                                     
601 Langdon B. Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language,” JR: 41:3, 
(1961): 197. 
602 Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language,” 196. 
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For, as biblical scholars have reminded us, a religious confession 
that is biblical is a direct recital of God’s acts, not a recital of 
someone else’s belief, even if it be a recital of a Hebrew recita-
tion. If, therefore, Christian theology is to be the recitation in 
faith of God’s mighty acts, it must be composed of confessional 
and systematic statements of the form: ‘We believe that God did 
so and so,’ and not composed of statements of biblical the- ology 
of the form: ‘The Hebrews be- lieved that God did so and so.’603 
Relating first Gilkey’s criticism to Brueggemann, he is aware of the problem 
that Gilkey presents:  
In addition to Israel’s speech about God, much in the Old Testa-
ment is spoken by God to Israel. For our purposes, I do not make 
a distinction between the two modes of speech, because even 
where God speaks, the text is Israel’s testimony that God has 
spoken so.
604
 
The critical question to ask is as follows: could it be that Brueggemann actually 
uses a historical approach in ToT and not a theological one because his guiding 
questions is: “How does ancient Israel, in this text, speak about God?” Follow-
ing Gilkey’s reasoning, this is a historical question and not a theological ques-
tion. Brueggemann is aware that “there are many scholars who discount the 
God-speech of Israel in the name of 'disinterested' scholarship, who refuse the-
ological questions on the ground of 'history…”605 Moreover, he also admits 
that his theology comes from the lips of Israel, i.e. it is specifically testi-
mony.606 However, we have to accept that if he had followed Gilkey’s criteria, 
he would have asked: “how does God speak in this text to Israel?”607 However, 
                                                     
603 Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language,” 198. 
604 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 117. 
605 Brueggemann, “The Role of Old Testament Theology in Old Testament Interpretation,” 80. 
606 Brueggemann, “The Role of Old Testament Theology in Old Testament Interpretation,” 78: 
“More specifically, we may say that intentional human speech about God is testimony, an at-
tempt to give a particular account of reality with this God as agent and as character at its center.” 
607 In a response to ToT, see Childs, “A Review by Brevard Childs and a Response,” 172-73. 
Childs argues that Brueggemann “initially stands on the side of those scholars who view the 
Hebrew Scripture simply as a record of the religion of Israel to be studied phenomenologically, 
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I would argue that an important remark has to be made which changes the cal-
culations. Whereas Gilkey’s criticism focuses attention on a modern episte-
mology, Brueggemann’s epistemology, as shown in chapter 4, is not modern, 
but postmodern. I therefore argue that this circumstance escapes Gilkey’s crit-
ical assessments. A modern epistemology is preoccupied with answering the 
historical question: “what happened?” Brueggemann however, ignores this 
question and instead presupposes that the testimonies contain theological in-
formation: 
To take Israel’s God-speech as revelatory means that it is utter-
ance that seeks to speak about a mystery that attends to and in-
dwells the world in which Israel lives. That mystery, according 
to Israel’s utterance, is on the loose, wild and dangerous, often 
crude, inaccessible, unattractive, capable of violence, equally ca-
pable of positive transformation.608 
Additionally, Brueggemann also involves faith as a basic presupposition in his 
approach. Believing the testimonies, he argues, means that if they are accepted 
as real within the ecclesial community, there is a gateway into a theological 
reality. The epistemological foundation based on the testimonies is here com-
bined with a faith assertion within the ecclesial community—an assertion that 
Plantinga supported as a justified belief (see chapter 4). If we continue this 
reasoning, we can say that Brueggemann’s faith assertion incorporated into his 
imaginative thinking, and even further developed by Vanhoozer’s understand-
ing of Ricoeur’s understanding of the witness, creates a theological mode of 
knowledge that makes it possible to describe his approach as theological. The 
                                                     
and thus he recognizes in the biblical text the confessional element of Israel’s voice offering a 
witness to its experience with its God. But now the crucial hermeneutical issue turns on how one 
evaluates Israel’s own testimony.” Brueggemann argues that there is no need to make a distinc-
tion between Israel’s speech about God and God’s speech. See Theology of the Old Testament, 
117: “In addition to Israel’s speech about God, much in the Old Testament is spoken by God to 
Israel. For our purposes, I do not make a distinction between the two modes of speech, because 
even where God speaks, the text is Israel’s testimony that God has spoken so.” See also Ger-
shom, Mitzvoth Ethics and the Jewish Scripture, 93, who argues that Brueggemann presents a 
description of what Israel says about God: “In other words: Brueggemann’s subject is the ancient 
Jews’ speech about God.” 
608 Brueggemann, “The Role of Old Testament Theology in Old Testament Interpretation,” 79. 
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witness has an ontological contact with God and the testimonies that are pre-
sented, formed by human imagination, contain theological testimonies.  
5.7 NON-REFERENTIAL OR EXTRA-REFERENTIAL? 
As noted in the introduction and chapter 3, Rendtorff asked an important ques-
tion how Brueggemann refers to God in ToT. The first answer to this question 
is that Brueggemann seems to suggest a non-referential hermeneutics in ToT. 
In the Hungarian introduction to ToT he advocates the formulation that God 
“only exists in, with, and, under the text and nowhere else”: 
It is of course a danger to confine God to the pages of this testi-
mony. I knew that when I wrote it. In my judgment, however, it 
is a greater danger to reduce this peculiar God to the common-
place and the generic.
609
 
He makes an even more obvious non-referential assertion in ToT: 
…others are making a positive effort to reach outside the text to 
get at the ‘really real’– at the God who is outside and beyond the 
text, so that the text references beyond itself. This push, it ap-
pears to me, is pursued in the conviction that the utterance-be-
comes-text itself is not adequate,
610  
Moreover, according to George Aichele, a specific postmodern feature is the 
denial of an extra-referential perspective.611 Moberly explicitly argues that 
Brueggemann is a representative of a non-referential or postmodern approach, 
                                                     
609 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 37. 
610 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 721: “Conversely, in a reaction against 
such debunking historicism, others are making a positive effort to reach outside the text to get 
at the ‘really real’—at the God who is outside and beyond the text, so that the text references 
beyond itself.” He refers at p. 721 note 2 to Childs as representive of an extra - referential per-
spective. In this note he also argues that his opinion is similar to that of Barth’s. 
611 See Georg Aichele, The Control of Biblical Meaning, Canon as Semiotic Mechanism (Penn-
sylvania: Trinity Press, 2001), 100: “Language no longer denotes extra textual truth, but instead 
language is an exercise of power….” 
198 
 
because he does not intend to refer to God outside the text.612 Tod Linafelt and 
Timothy Beal, former students of Brueggemann, also argue that he is repre-
sentative of a non-referential hermeneutics.613 However, in contrast to 
Moberly, Linafelt and Beal, Strawn argues that Brueggemann presents an on-
tology that refers to a reality outside the text.614 Strawn asks the rhetorical ques-
tion:  
If there is no God beyond the text, there is, ultimately, no real [or 
ultimate] reason for Brueggemann to pay such urgent attention 
to the texts, nor to call from them beyond them—as he so often 
and consistently does—to urgent contemporary matters includ-
ing everything from religious affect to social policy.
615
 
Strawn refers back to Brueggemann’s earlier books as proof of an extra-refer-
ential hermeneutics in his theology.616 Brueggemann, in a response to Strawn, 
Linafelt and Beal, sums up the discussion with the following words: “more 
work to do on that!”617 My own conclusion is that Strawn, even though stand-
                                                     
612 See Moberly, review of Brueggemann, 102: “At the risk of oversimplifying, it seems to me 
that there are two basic options in Old Testament theology. One is to hold that although we have 
no access to God except via the language of scripture and appropriate ways of living, such lan-
guage and living are media of engagement with a reality beyond themselves [a ‘classic’ posi-
tion]. The other is to hold that the language and living themselves constitute the reality of God, 
and there is no ’further reality’ beyond them [a ‘postmodern’ position]. Brueggemann, as far as 
I can see [unless I misunderstand him] has opted for the latter, and in so doing has surrendered 
something that Jews and Christians alike down the ages [mutatis mutandis] have believed to be 
integral to their faiths.” 
613 See Beal and Linafelt, “This Particular Manifestation of Holiness,” 85-86. 
614 Strawn, “On Walter Brueggemann,” 26-31.  
615 See Strawn, “On Walter Brueggemann,” 29 ff. 
616 Strawn, “On Walter Brueggemann,” 30, note 82 and 31, note 87. In these notes, Strawn refers 
to quotations from ToT, books and articles wherein he finds proofs that Brueggemann expresses 
an extra-referential position.  
617 See also Brueggemann, Walter. “A Response,” in Imagination, Ideology & Inspiration Ech-
oes of Brueggemann in a New Generation. (ed. J. Kaplan and R. Jr Williamson; Sheffield: Shef-
field Phoenix Press, 2015), 294: “I have no doubt that the key issue Strawn raises is about ‘on-
tology’ and more specifically my costly phrase ‘nowhere else and in no other way.’ I might have 
said that better and differently and saved myself a lot of trouble, though I do not know how to 
say it better, even while I recognize how problematic that is. I do not believe that saying ‘God’ 
more insistently or more loudly [as Strawn does not propose] makes ontology any more com-
pelling. I am appreciative of the way in which Timothy Beal and Tod Linafelt have paid attention 
to my intention in that phrase, which led me yet again to judge my confession about ‘nowhere 
else and in no other way’ is not so easily dismissed. More work to do on that!” 
199 
 
ing alone, is standing firm in his analysis. There are more precisely five com-
pelling arguments which demonstrate that Brueggemann intends to refer to 
YHWH in an extra-referential way.  
Firstly, as referred to by Strawn, there are books prior to ToT, e.g. an article in 
1985, later published in Old Testament Theology, Essays on Structure, Theme, 
and Text (1992), where Brueggemann argues that the theological discipline 
presupposes a reality outside the text: 
Old Testament theology, as distinct from sociological, literary, 
or historical analysis, must assume some kind of realism in the 
text—that the poets and narrators in Israel do, in fact, speak the 
mind of God...  
…In claiming this realism, I mean to reject the notion that these 
texts are simply human probings or imagination as Israel discov-
ers more of God and finds, in fact that the stern God is gra-
cious.
618
 
He stresses that the reader cannot read the biblical text only from a sociological 
point of view. He claims the same option in his article “Futures in Old Testa-
ment Theology”:  
In some ways, the practice of Old Testament theology is contin-
uous with and builds upon other methods and disciplines in the 
field. In some other ways, however, it is distinctive, distinctive 
because the word ‘theology’ makes a claim. Old Testament the-
ology is not simply a synonym for ‘value’ or ‘meaning,’ but it 
has implicit within it a substantive acknowledgement. Or to say 
it another way, Old Testament theology is not free to handle the 
                                                     
618 I have quoted from Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 19. First published in Walter 
Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, I: Structure Legitimation”, CBQ 47 
(1985): 28-46. Reprinted [Same title] in Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 1-21. 
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text only in relation to its ‘sense’ but also must attend to its ‘ref-
erence.’619 
In sum, prior to ToT, there is no doubt that Brueggemann argues that the text 
refers to God outside the text.  
Secondly, he writes in ToT that Old Testament theology is not “the same en-
terprise as commenting on one text at the same time. Its work is to construe out 
of the texts a rendering of God.”620 In the introduction to A Social Reading of 
the Old Testament Miller writes that the phrase a rendering of God is a “favor-
ite term” for Brueggemann.621 I argue that this phrase alludes to a theological 
intention which, at the very least, implies an extra-referential position.  
Thirdly, as we concluded in the first part of this chapter, for him reality and 
speech coincide. This means for him in ToT that the biblical text “operates with 
ontological assumptions …”622 Moreover, he explains his own point of view 
on ontology as follows; the biblical texts are “constitutive of reality…” In this 
sense, he seems to presuppose a reality outside the text, not without the text, 
but a reality that coincides in, with, and under the text:  
It is my judgment that as far as Israel is concerned, ‘being’ is 
established in and through speech and not behind it. It is not my 
intention to be anti-ontological. It is rather to insist that whatever 
might be claimed for ontology in the purview of Israel’s speech 
can be claimed only in and through testimonial utterance. That 
is, once the testimony of Israel is accepted as true – once one 
believes what it claims – one has ontology, one has reality of 
Yahweh. 
623
 
                                                     
619 I have quoted from Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 112. First published in Walter 
Brueggemann, “Futures in Old Testament Theology,” HBT 6 (1984): 1-11. 
620 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 267. 
621 See Brueggemann, A Social Reading of the Old Testament, 2. According to Miller, “…our 
reading of the presentation, or ‘rendering’—to use a favorite term Brueggemann borrows from 
Dale Patrick—of God in the Scripture is very much shaped by our social situation, and one of 
Brueggemann’s aims is to shatter our picture of the biblical God by the reality of the biblical 
God.” 
622 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 66. 
623 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 713. See also 714 note 21. 
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This quotation clearly implies an ontology that is accessible “in and through 
testimonial utterance.” Believing in these testimonies is the gateway to the re-
ality of YHWH. As already demonstrated, Brueggemann stresses that the rhe-
torical character of the text defines the ontology in his theology:  
I do not which to claim that these textual utterances make no as-
sumptions about being, but I do wish to recognize that such as-
sumptions depend on speech for their establishment as viable, 
credible claims. While there is assumed reality outside the text 
[God], that assumed reality depends on utterance for force, au-
thority, and availability in the community. God in the Old Testa-
ment is not a mere rhetorical product, but is endlessly in the pro-
cess of being rhetorically reconstructed.
624 
Fourthly, when he presents theological arguments that there is a tension within 
God, it seems that he wants to present a normative description of how the God 
of Israel, YHWH, actually should be understood. The tension in the texts, he 
writes, must be defined as a theological tension: 
In many texts, but in exemplar fashion in Exodus 34:6-7, we 
have seen that, if the text is to be taken as ‘witnesses to the real,’ 
the ground of dispute is not to be found simply in modern, un-
disciplined pluralism or in Israel’s ancient disputatiousness, but 
in the very character of Yahweh.
625
 
The rhetorical tension has a corresponding theological tension: “Israel pushed 
the tension theologically and rhetorically, until it had pushed it into the very 
life, character, and person of Yahweh.”626 The witnesses present evidence of a 
theological tension:  
                                                     
624 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 65, note 11. 
625 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 715. 
626 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 272. 
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Old Testament theology must recognize that certain texts cele-
brate the convergence of sovereignty and pathos. Perhaps these 
texts should be regarded as normative for theological interpreta-
tion and allowed to govern other texts. Nonetheless, the wit-
nesses of Yahweh also give powerful evidence that things are not 
so coherent for Yahweh.
627
  
Fifth and finally, at the beginning of ToT Brueggemann reflects that …  
…the restless character of the text that refuses excessive closure, 
which von Rad understood so well, is reflective of the One who 
is its main Character, who also refuses tameness or systematiza-
tion. Thus it is the very God uttered in these texts who lies behind 
the problem of perspective and method.
628
  
Brueggemann criticizes those who understand the “Violence of God” as only 
“human projections” and not as theological data, and writes that such a con-
clusion is a form of contemporary Marcionism “in which we simply choose 
the ‘best parts’ of the text as reliable.”629 Instead he argues that “Israel had to 
reckon with a theological discernment that consists in a profound disjunction 
that is not only a matter of lived experience but also a crucial theological da-
tum.”630 
  
                                                     
627 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 309. 
628 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 42. 
629 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament: Revisited,” 30: “Since the publication of my 
book, we have, in U.S. scholarship of late, given much attention to ‘the violence of God’ in the 
text, both in the war narratives of the Book of Joshua and in the savage rhetoric of the prophets. 
It is usual now to conclude that such ‘texts of violence’ are ideological human projections and 
are not to be taken seriously as theological data. But that finesse strikes me as a contemporary 
form of Marcionism, in which we simply choose the ‘best parts’ of the text as reliable.” See also 
Blumenthal, Facing the Abusing God, 238 who argues in a similar way: “Second, there are ways 
of disposing of those parts of the tradition with which one does not agree… This is a very se-
ductive method…” 
630 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 309-310. 
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5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 5 consisted of two main parts. In the first part, Brueggemann was com-
pared by help of Vanhoozer with three important role models for a postmodern 
hermeneutic; Ricoeur, Derrida, and Lindbeck. Three elements were suggested 
to describe the structure in his hermeneutics. Brueggemann pays special atten-
tion to the written testimony, imagination and the Jewish traditions. In the sec-
ond part his use of religious language was analyzed and the way biblical texts 
refer to a possible reality outside the text was examined. The study of Gilkey 
concludes that Brueggemann’s approach shares a similarity with a history of 
religious approach because he actually asks the historical question “how does 
Israel in this text describe God” in ToT and not the theological question “how 
does God speak in this text?” However, in his epistemology we have concluded 
that he avoids the predetermined question that surrounds a modern reading, i.e. 
“what really happened?” This fact makes his epistemology becoming theolog-
ical; it is faith in the testimonies of Israel that is required. Concerning biblical 
referentiality, I suggested five arguments that support Strawn’s opinion that 
Brueggemann has an extra-referential hermeneutics. He emphasizes a theolog-
ical conviction that there is a possible ontological reality mediated in, with, and 
under the text. In a similar way as Christ is present in, with, and under the 
bread and wine, Brueggemann seems to argue that YHWH lives in, with, and 
under the text. Brueggemann’s hermeneutics then must conclude that the rhe-
torical tension in the text has a corresponding theological tension within 
YHWH. I would argue that this conclusion is not necessary to accept and this 
topic will be examined in the third and last part of this study. 
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PART III IN SEARCH OF YHWH  
According to John Goldingay (1942- ), Brueggemann wants to describe, in a 
normative way, the attributes of YHWH, the God of Israel.631 This reflection 
from Goldingay’s side is interesting to analyze because this normative inten-
tion on Brueggemann’s counter-testimony would have serious theological im-
plications for the church. Questions that logically searches for an answer is 
whether Brueggemann’s concept of God is in accordance with the ontological 
being that is referred to in the Old Testament. Is it possible to withhold unity 
in the concept of God amid the visible diversity in the testimonies? His most 
frequent counterpart, Brevard Childs emphasizes that the Rule of Faith is not 
an isolated idea without connection to the Old Testament, arguing rather that 
it is in conjunction with a Christian reflection of the Old Testament. This means 
that the Rule of Faith functions to conserve the understanding of a unity in the 
concept of God whereas Brueggemann wants to emphasize that the Rule of 
Faith is the end result of the interpretation of the Old Testament. Here emerges 
a watershed for Brueggemann in relation to Childs’s approach. In order to offer 
a deeper understanding of the question of a possible unity in the concept of 
God amid diverse testimonies, I will suggest that Brueggemann’s distinction 
of core and counter-testimony could be used as an organzing principle, not as 
a theological conclusion. However, his distinction of God above the fray and 
in the fray, slightly modified as God above the fray and Israel in the fray, could 
be used as a theological conclusion.  
  
                                                     
631 John Goldingay, Old Testament Theology: Israel’s Gospel (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 
2003), 19: “Like Walter Brueggemann (I think) and unlike David Clines, I want to try to subject 
my framework of thinking to the Old Testament’s.” According to Goldingay, Clines argues that 
there are only relative truth statements in the Old Testament, whereas, in contrast, Goldingay 
argues that he and Brueggemann attempts to present a normative Old Testament theology. 
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CHAPTER 6 RULE OF FAITH AS LENS OR AS 
RESULT 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Brueggemann’s theological conception of God in the Old Testament, 
YHWH, he becomes involved in an important disagreement with Childs con-
cerning the correct understanding of the Rule of Faith. Childs argues that the 
Rule of Faith as described by the Church Fathers is necessary for a correct 
description of the God that is revealed in the Old Testament. Brueggemann 
disagrees. It is interesting to analyze this disagreement. The Rule of Faith 
(Latin: regula fidei) is visible already in the New Testament632 and was natu-
rally established during the patristic period, closely related to the Church Fa-
thers Irenaeus of Lyon and Tertullian. This rule can be seen partly as a defense 
against Gnosticism and partly as a hermeneutical principle in biblical interpre-
tation. The Rule of Faith implies a guideline for understanding the Bible as 
Christian Scripture. The rule implies that the Christian God is presupposed be-
fore any encounter with the text.633 The term played a continuing important 
role in the Reformation when Luther, in opposition to the Rule of Faith as de-
fined within the Roman Catholic Church, furthered the Analogy of Faith 
(analogia fidei) as a principle of interpretation: Scripture alone, sola scriptura, 
he argued, should be the foundation and determine the doctrines of the 
Church.634 At first sight the Rule of Faith seems unimportant for Brueggemann. 
However, in his encounter with Childs’ approach, this rule becomes a herme-
neutical cliff between them and the comparison between him and Childs con-
cerning the Rule of Faith forges a deeper insight into Brueggemann’s concept 
of God. In short, chapter 6 demonstrates that whereas Childs argues for a return 
                                                     
632 See e.g. Romans 12:6: ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν διάφορα, εἴτε 
προφητείαν, κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως. 
633 E.g. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? 105: “The Regula Fidei [Rule of Faith] requires that we 
should first of all believe in the God of the Father and Lord Omnipotent; that is, the absolutely 
perfect Founder of all things.” 
634 Grant R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical In-
terpretation (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1991), 11. 
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to the Rule of Faith as a lens or as a basic structure in biblical interpretation, 
Brueggemann argues that this kind of hermeneutical pre-understanding pre-
cludes the text from conforming to a dogmatic concept of God. Instead, he 
argues that the result of the interpretation of the Scripture gives the Rule of 
Faith. My impression then is that understanding the Rule of Faith is of utmost 
importance in order to evaluate Brueggemann’s incorporation of core and 
counter-testimonies that together form his concept of God with a tension at the 
core. According to Brueggemann, a reading informed by the Rule of Faith fore-
closes or reduces the interpretation prior to any encounter with the text: 
Childs’s proposal seems difficult and problematic on many 
counts. Childs’s project strikes this writer as massively reduc-
tionist. To limit the reading of the Old Testament text to what is 
useful for Christian theology—That is, for witness to Jesus 
Christ—means that much in the text must be disregarded.635 
According to Brueggemann, Childs’s understanding of the Rule of Faith is a 
hermeneutical impasse: “The odd outcome of such a statement is an unquali-
fied embrace of the Tridentine inclination to subject the text and its possible 
interpretation to the control of church categories.”636 Childs, however, is criti-
cal of Brueggemann’s attempt at interpreting the Old Testament. He argues 
that Brueggemann has missed fulfilling the intention of serving the church with 
a confessing theology: 
The saddest part of the proposal is that Walter Brueggemann is 
sincerely striving to be a confessing theologian of the Christian 
                                                     
635 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 92. Even though Brueggemann is critical to-
wards Childs, it is also important to stress his appreciation of him. E.g. Brueggemann, review 
of Childs, 284: “Given these not inconsiderable wonderments, I have no doubt that, once again, 
Childs is the teacher of us all. He will move theologians, teachers, and preachers to greater nerve 
and passion, a nerve and passion not grounded in methodological cleverness or shrewdness but 
in nothing less than the truth, the ‘solid rock on which I stand.’ And even where one disagrees, 
we are mightily instructed, informed, and admonished.” 
636 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 92. 
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church, and would be horrified at being classified as a most elo-
quent defender of the Enlightenment, which his proposal respect-
ing the biblical canon actually represents.
637
  
The above juxtaposition describes a fundamental problem for the discipline of 
Old Testament theology. Should an Old Testament theology presuppose any 
dogmatic principles before the encounter with the text or should the text deter-
mine the result? The answer seems at first sight to favor the latter. However, 
as we have seen, Brueggemann’s theology has presented a concept of God with 
a tension which is deeply problematic. Therefore, it is interesting to compare 
the proposals put by both him and Childs. How do they converge and how do 
they differ? Should the Rule of Faith be understood as a lens in biblical inter-
pretation or as the result of biblical interpretation?  
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES 
Dennis T. Olson argues that Brueggemann and Childs stand closer in orienta-
tion than expected.638 Olson lists six common theological presuppositions:  
1) They both consider the present form of the text as the proper starting 
point for a biblical theology. 
2) Biblical theology must be fully aware of the diversity of the biblical 
witnesses. 
3) There is an inherent reductionism in the work of biblical theology. 
4) Biblical theology is enhanced by a dialogue between different social, 
cultural, and religious contexts. 
5) The practice of biblical theology is always provisional. 
6) Biblical interpretation is always contextual. 
Olson’s analysis is worth emphasizing. However, it is obvious that there are 
disagreements, which result in totally different presentations of the God in the 
Old Testament. In what follows, I structure the comparison of Brueggemann 
                                                     
637 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 73. 
638 Olson, “Biblical Theology as Provisional Monologization,” 170. 
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and Childs using Olson’s six presuppositions and critically analyze in what 
ways they agree and disagree.  
With regard to the first basic agreement, the present form of the text, it is ob-
vious that both Brueggemann and Childs start in the final form of the text. 
Moreover, Brueggemann bases his understanding of canon upon Childs’s im-
pressive work in this regard. From Brueggemann’s perspective, it is important 
to stress that he appreciates Childs’s canonical perspective because it functions 
as a way out of the hegemony of the historical-critical method. Brueggemann 
writes: “…Childs in his canonical perspective resists the fragmentation of the 
text by seeking to read all parts of the texts in terms of the whole.”639 Turning 
our eyes to Childs’s understanding of the canon it is worth mentioning that a 
correct understanding of the canonical approach is to place it in close relation-
ship with the Rule of Faith, wherein the formation of the historical canon func-
tions in itself “much like a regula fidei.”640 Moreover, to claim a canonical 
approach within biblical theology is to claim the normative character of the 
word of God.641 Childs explains:  
The text of Scripture points faithfully to the divine reality of 
Christ while, at the same time, our understanding of Jesus Christ 
leads us back to the Scripture, rather than away from it.
642
 
However, an important difference is that Brueggemann stresses that the inter-
preter of the text is the main carrier of canonical identity, and not the text itself. 
                                                     
639 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 85. 
640 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 71: “I also stressed in this descrip-
tion of the canonical shaping the enormous variety at work on the different levels of composi-
tion. This shaping activity functioned much like a regula fidei.” See also Chen, Theological 
Exegesis in the Canonical Context, 84. Chen makes the following important analysis of Childs’ 
thinking: “The idea of combining the canon with regula fidei is for Childs a way of emphasizing 
the importance for the Christian church of understanding the Holy Scripture theologically and 
of using it boldly in the modern secularized age.” 
641 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 100.  
642 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 103. 
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According to Childs, this would mean that Brueggemann denies a literal mean-
ing of the text.643 Childs also stresses that the Church never can make a book 
canonical, the Church can only bear witness to the divine Origin of Scripture. 
The Church accepts the Scripture as the Word of God and at the same time 
seeks to understand its origin: “These texts as Scripture of the Church are wit-
nesses to a divine reality.”644 Explaining this in more detail, Childs starts from 
the position that the canonical text is primarily based on the authority of the 
apostles.645 He admits that the canon—he suggests a narrow canon of 66 au-
thoritative books—has no strict boundaries and that the early Church did not 
have a perfect understanding of it. Nevertheless, the fixed canon of 66 books 
can be traced within the tradition of the Church.646 Childs relates the interpre-
tation of Scripture to what he calls the canonical intentionality of the text.647 
By using this term he means the confession “along with the church to the 
unique function that these writings have had in its life and faith as Sacred Scrip-
ture.”648 He explains the canonical intention of the text by way of the following 
example:  
…the book of Deuteronomy, which arose historically in the late 
monarchial period of Israel’s history, was assigned a particular 
canonical function as interpreter of the law by its structure and 
position within the Pentateuch….649 
                                                     
643 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 72. Childs argues for “the convic-
tion that the biblical text and its theological function as authoritative form belong inextricably 
together.”  
644 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 112. If we compare Childs with 
Brueggemann, the following difference emerge; whereas Brueggemann argues that after the text, 
one has reality, Childs presupposes a reality prior to the text.  
645 Chen, Theological Exegesis in the Canonical Context, 84. The authority of the Apostles was 
a criterion used by the early Christian church “to guarantee the oral and written continuity of the 
apostolic witness to its faith in Jesus Christ.” 
646 Chen, Theological Exegesis in the Canonical Context, 52: “Childs argues that the NT canon 
did not fall from heaven, and that the early Christian church did not claim that it had created a 
canon; rather, the early church aimed to discern among competing claims what it recognized as 
apostolic, though this process took hundreds of years and involved much controversy and un-
certainty.” 
647 Chen, Theological Exegesis in the Canonical Context, 80-82. 
648 Chen, Theological Exegesis in the Canonical Context, 80. 
649 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 71.  
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The problem for Childs is to justify this canonical intentionality of the text. He 
argues that the canonical intention of the text can only be understood within 
the framework of and on the presupposition of a faith within the community of 
the Church. Childs’s way of describing the canonical intention in relation to 
the community of the Church actually shares a kind of similarity with 
Brueggemann’s focus on the canonical interpreter of the text. However, there 
is one difference which is important to stress: Childs argues for a latent or fro-
zen meaning in the text that the modern interpreter is capable of finding. He 
stresses the existence of a literal, canonical intention in the text, whereas 
Brueggemann stresses that the canonical intention exists within the mindset of 
the interpreter in the midst of the community.650 This means that Brueggemann 
primarily situates the meaning of the text within the community that interprets 
the text, whereas Childs primarily stresses that the text itself has an inherent 
canonical identity and that there are obvious literary signs that prove this fact. 
Brueggemann argues for a more open interpretation that is formed in part by 
the community that interprets the text. He insists that “the canon of the OT 
itself contains suspicion as a part of its canonical claim.”651  
Finally, worth emphasizing, is that when Brueggemann relates the canon to 
imagination, he actually places a kind of Rule of Faith that guides the interpre-
tation. The canonical interpreter uses imagination in an equivalent way to 
Childs’s Rule of Faith. In this way imagination stands outside the text and 
forms the text and interprets it. Brueggemann writes: “The canon is an act of 
bold, venturesome imagination that is concerned to ground and sustain a pecu-
liar community.”652 
  
                                                     
650 Brueggemann discusses this topic in Interpretation and Obedience, 120: “It would be more 
helpful to claim this or assert authority in the content of the literature [a substantive articulation 
of what is true] than to try to assert authority in the literary shape of the material.” 
651 Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology, 115. 
652 Brueggemann, Deep Memory Exuberant Hope, 41. 
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With regard to the second basic agreement, that biblical theology must be fully 
aware of the diversity of the biblical witnesses, let us first pay attention to the 
term diversity and then secondly, witnesses. On diversity, Brueggemann ex-
plains it in his review of Childs’ Old Testament Theology in a Canonical Con-
text from 1985:  
Specifically, Childs regularly recognizes ‘diversity’ in the wit-
nesses but then works promptly and readily toward a unity of 
witness that is voiced in Christological categories. While Childs 
acknowledges diversity in the witnesses, he insists that the text 
is stable, that it has a persistent, clear meaning. I submit that this 
is a reader-response decision on Childs’s part to which he is en-
titled, but it is not self-evident.
653
  
Brueggemann’s conclusion is that Childs stresses the diversity in the text. 
However, they draw different hermeneutical conclusions of this shared obser-
vation. Childs works towards a unity of the text whereas Brueggemann works 
towards diversity or tension, stressing the polyphonic and elusive character of 
the text.654 Concerning the biblical witnesses, both scholars agree that the per-
spective in the Old Testament must be on Israel as the subject, i.e. Israel is the 
witness who presents the testimony. Childs writes: “The position which is be-
ing defended in this book is that the object of historical study is Israel’s own 
testimony to God’s redemptive activity.”655 Defending this starting point in his 
theology, Childs’ approach has three hermeneutical implications. Firstly, Israel 
has a privileged role, a normative role in relation to other religions. Secondly, 
the focus in biblical theology should be on defining the text as witness and not 
as the source. This implies that the testimonies refer to a divine reality. Thirdly, 
the history that these witnesses describe is Israel’s canonical history, which 
                                                     
653 Brueggemann, review of Childs, 282. 
654 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 731: “One must recognize that the Old 
Testament is powerfully polyphonic in its testimony, both in its substantive claims and in its 
characteristically elusive modes of articulation.” 
655 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 97. 
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means that this history is the authoritative history. Childs’s conclusion is that 
neither the conservative nor the liberal approach to Scripture has succeeded on 
this point: 
Because I do not feel that either of these two theological reac-
tions to modern historical-critical scholarship has been success-
ful, I would like to outline a different approach which I shall at-
tempt to employ in the more detailed historical analysis of Is-
rael’s traditions which follows.656 
Childs’s outline concerning the biblical witnesses closely parallels 
Brueggemann’s approach in this regard. Brueggemann also begins with Israel 
as witness, i.e. Israel is the subject and YHWH the object. He is not impressed 
by neither the liberal nor the conservative approach. However, alongside these 
two similarities, there are also striking differences. Brueggemann stresses that 
Israel’s testimony is to be found within the whole text corpus of the canonical 
books, regardless of genre. Childs argues that the biblical testimony is found 
in “its historical, literary, and canonical context.”657 Childs argues that God is 
never the object alongside other objects. God is always the knowing subject 
who knows us first. By grace YHWH can reveal his nature to mankind. The 
object of our knowing, i.e. God, is then always subject in a theological sense.658 
Understanding Israel as a witness involves both “divine and human agency.”659 
Childs writes: 
Rather, it is constitutive of true interpretation to move within a 
circle which encompasses both the movement from text to reality 
as well as from reality to the text.
660
 
                                                     
656 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 99. 
657 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 379. 
658 Selby, The Comical Doctrine, 44-45. 
659 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 9: “The role of the Scripture is not 
being understood simply as a cultural expression of ancient peoples, but as testimony pointing 
beyond itself to a divine reality to which it bears witness.”  
660 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 381. 
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Childs also stresses the importance of the Holy Spirit, not as a hermeneutical 
principle but as a theological principle.661 The Spirit is necessary in order to 
understand the text: 
If the church confesses that the spirit of God opens up the text to 
a perception of its true reality, it also follows that the Spirit also 
works in applying the reality of God in its fullness to an under-
standing of the text.
662
 
In Brueggemann’s approach, the above reflection of God as the ultimate sub-
ject, known by grace, and any discussion of the Holy Spirit is notably absent.663 
For him, revelation takes part in the community, after the process of court. 
With regard to the third basic agreement, that there is an inherent reductionism 
in the work of biblical theology, both affirm a reductionism, but on different 
grounds. Brueggemann admits that the discipline as such implies a thematiza-
tion of the text material. This necessarily implies a kind of reductionism.664 
However, as commented above, he criticizes Childs of reductionism due to his 
understanding of the canon.665 Brueggemann endeavors to show the poly-
phonic tension in the text. Childs endeavors to construct his approach around 
                                                     
661 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 87: “The Christian doctrine of the 
role of the Holy Spirit is not a hermeneutical principle, but that divine reality itself who makes 
understanding of God possible.” 
662 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 382. 
663 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 121: “Here we touch on the difficulty of 
the authority of Scripture, which has usually been articulated in the scholastic categories of in-
spiration and revelation. It is simpler and more helpful, I believe, to recognize that when utter-
ance in the Bible is taken as truthful, human testimony is taken as revelation that discloses the 
true reality of God.”  
664 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 267: “Doing Old Testament theology is 
not finally the same enterprise as commenting on one text at a time. Its work is to construe out 
of the texts a rendering of God. But at the same time, this work of thematization [not systemati-
zation] is the great hazard of an Old Testament theology.” 
665 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament, a Prompt Retrospect,” 315.  
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the risen Christ and stresses a Christian reading of the Old Testament.666 This 
makes one conclude that Childs has a specifically Christian approach.  
With regard to the fourth basic agreement, that biblical theology is enhanced 
by a dialogue between different social, cultural and religious contexts, the dif-
ference between Brueggemann and Childs is quite limited, with one exception, 
the sociological method. Brueggemann is very positive to Gottwald’s socio-
logical approach, whereas Childs argues that Gottwald’s sociological approach 
introduces a critical perspective to the concept of revelation.667 Childs con-
cludes that the sociological method decreases the differences between sociol-
ogy and theology and therefore it becomes difficult to discern the real truth 
behind the confession of the text. Instead, for him, the canon presents the text 
as it should be understood.668 Childs and Brueggemann both acknowledge the 
importance of a dialogue between Old Testament theology and the historical-
critical method. Childs uses the historical-critical method, but at the same time 
he argues that it is… 
…an inadequate method for studying the Scripture as the Scrip-
tures of the church because it does not work from the needed 
context. This is not to say for a moment that the critical method 
is incompatible with the Christian faith – we regard the funda-
mentalist position as indefensible – but rather that the critical 
                                                     
666 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 86: “But the heart of the enterprise 
is Christological; its content is Jesus Christ and not its own self-understanding or identity. There-
fore the aim of the enterprise involves the classic movement of faith seeking knowledge, of those 
who confess Christ struggling to understand the nature and will of the One who has already been 
revealed as Lord.” 
667 Brevard Childs, Old Testament Theology in a Canonical Context (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1985), 25: “Gottwald’s attempt to replace biblical theology with biblical sociology by 
offering examples of his method of demythologizing the tradition only illustrates the high level 
of reductionism at work.” 
668 Childs, Old Testament Theology in a Canonical Context, 25: “To claim that these confessions 
are simply symbolic expressions of common social phenomena not only renders the uniquely 
biblical witness mute, but destroys the need for closely hearing the text on its verbal level.” 
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method, when operating from its own chosen context, is incapa-
ble of either raising or answering the full range of questions 
which the church is constrained to direct to its Scripture.
669
 
Brueggemann ultimately seems to be more negative towards the historical-crit-
ical method than Childs. He argues that the historical-critical method “cannot 
tolerate intellectual or theological claims and affirmations that run against its 
thin objectivism, which is itself an acknowledged intellectual, theological 
claim.”670 With regard to the Jewish tradition, it is important to acknowledge 
that both emphasize the Jewish heritage but elaborate in different directions; 
in Brueggemann’s case towards an acknowledgement of the Jewish heritage, 
in Childs’s case towards a distinctive Christian confession.  
The fifth and sixth basic agreements both concern the provisional character of 
biblical interpretations. Brueggemann and Childs stress that the proper context 
for the discipline of biblical theology is “within the community of faith that 
treasured them.”671 This means that of necessity there is a tradition that stands 
behind and forms their respective biblical interpretation. Brueggemann ex-
plains this fact aptly when he writes that “every interpretative gesture is a pro-
visional one that must be adjudicated yet again.”672 In comparison with Childs, 
it is important to stress that he is a postmodern scholar whereas Childs stands 
close in orientation to a classical Christian confession. This means in sum that 
Childs’s interpretation is formed by a doctrinal church theology going back to 
the Reformation and beyond, whereas Brueggemann is formed by approaches 
that stem in part from the epistemology of the postmodern context.  
                                                     
669 Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 141. See also Levenson, “Is Really Brueggemann a Plu-
ralist?” 273: “It is only when historical criticism gains a monopoly in the interpretive process, 
so that a theological reading of the Scripture in its integrity is ruled out of order, that Childs 
finds it ‘a distorting enterprise.’” 
670 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 14. 
671 Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 99. Compare with Brueggemann, Theology of the Old 
Testament, 745. 
672 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 711. 
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CONCLUSION: THE RULE OF FAITH IS THE WATERSHED 
The main conclusion of the comparison of Brueggemann and Childs is that 
even though they have many apparent similarities they differ at a deeper level. 
The reason for their deeper level of disagreements deserves investigation and 
I will proceed by comparing Brueggemann with Childs on four areas, episte-
mology, hermeneutics, theology, and finally the Rule of Faith. Some com-
ments on each of these areas introduce the importance of study: 
Concerning epistemology, Collins’ conclusion that both Childs and 
Brueggemann share a non-foundational epistemology must be analyzed.  
Concerning hermeneutics, both Brueggemann and Childs have written com-
mentaries on the book of Isaiah. This is interesting to compare.  
Concerning theology, Childs accuses Brueggemann for a gnostic reading of 
the Old Testament and a gnostic concept of YHWH. What does this actually 
mean? 
Concerning the Rule of Faith, we have already seen that this term creates a 
watershed between Brueggemann and Childs. An independent description of 
the Rule of Faith will be offered in order to suggest a conclusion how to un-
derstand this rule within the discipline of Old Testament theology. 
6.2 DIFFERENT OR SIMILAR EPISTEMOLOGY?  
As noted in chapter 4, Collins described both Brueggemann and Childs as non-
foundationalists. Interestingly, Brueggemann defines Childs as a foundation-
alist. He argues that Childs’s theological approach presupposes categories 
from outside the texts, categories that come from dogmatic statements prior to 
the text.673 Moreover, in a letter to Arthur L. Merrill, Brueggemann notes that 
most of the critique concerning ToT comes from “Childs’s people.”674 One 
such theologian who fits well into this group is Walter Moberly, who is closely 
connected with Childs. In a letter correspondence with Moberly, Brueggemann 
                                                     
673 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 92: “It is my impression that to force this text 
into such categories prepares the way for a programmatic misreading.” 
674 See Walter Brueggemann, Letter to Arthur L. Merrill, March 9, 1999. See also Merrill, review 
of Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament. BSac 157 no 625 (2000): 109-11.  
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uses the term foundationalism when he criticizes Childs’s approach. The back-
ground for the correspondence is that Moberly has written a handout review of 
ToT, in which he defends Childs against Brueggemann’s criticism. 
Brueggemann thanks Moberly for letting him read a second and “greatly im-
proved” version of this review. Brueggemann writes: “I do not think it matters 
at all that we disagree but that is different from simply dismissing the book. 
And in this draft I think you have not done that.”675 In the same letter to 
Moberly, Brueggemann discusses whether a CF or a NF epistemology should 
be used within the discipline of Old Testament theology: 
…foundationalism strikes me as a circular argument to prevent 
anything but evangelical from being said…. It might be useful, 
to reflect on “social location” in terms of the draw to foundation-
alism and non-foundationalism.
676 
Brueggemann also writes: “I suspect it would be fair if you would in the review 
also acknowledge there are deep problems in foundationalism as well.”677 In 
this letter he also sharply distances himself from Childs’s approach:  
I am suspicious of Childs or anyone else who finds the ‘more’ in 
the history of doctrine that is derivative. Indeed, Childs seems 
very close to returning to Trent, wherein the text of the Scripture 
must yield to the claims of traditions, a judgment I reject…. 
…I think we are dead in the water if we claim that the text of the 
Scripture must derive from and conform to the tradition. I do not 
think it has functioned that way in the great ones, and surely there 
is no gospel in such a move…. 678 
                                                     
675 Brueggemann, Letter to Walter Moberly, April 8, 1998. 
676 Brueggemann, Letter to Walter Moberly, April 8, 1998. 
677 Brueggemann, Letter to Walter Moberly, April 8, 1998. 
678 Brueggemann, Letter to Walter Moberly, April 8, 1998. 
218 
 
Finally, Brueggemann also responds to Childs’s critique in the Scottish Jour-
nal of Theology and argues that the text must give the theology and not the 
other way around:  
If one cannot discuss the texts, then it seems to me that one is left 
with an ‘up or down’ decision about whether your particular way 
of saying things offers the final solution for interpretation. I can 
hardly imagine the claim of arriving at such a final solution that 
cannot be explored and critiqued by looking at texts. I would not 
have thought that one could so easily claim such high ground.
679
 
Even though Brueggemann defines Childs as a foundationalist, it is important 
to stress that Childs defines himself as a non-foundationalist. As noted previ-
ously, he served as professor at Yale, where this epistemology has its origin. 
Childs writes “that the reality of God cannot be defined within any kind of 
foundationalist categories and then transferred to God. Rather, it is crucial that 
the reality of God be understood as primary.”680 Childs has also criticized the 
BThM for seeking to establish a foundation outside the text. Instead, he argues 
that “Scripture does not exist as a book of truth in itself, yet there is no church 
tradition independent of the Biblical text.”681  
In sum, there are many opinions concerning Childs and Brueggemann’s epis-
temologies, and there is no doubt that they have quite different presuppositions 
in their theologies, e.g. Brueggemann focuses on the testimony, whereas Childs 
pays attention to canon/God as the foundation in his theology. However, I think 
that exactly this circumstance also could justify describing them both as weak 
foundationalist.  
                                                     
679 Brueggemann, Letter to Walter Moberly, April 8, 1998. 
680 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 82. 
681 Childs, Theology in Crisis, 103. 
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6.3 THE COMMENTARIES ON THE BOOK OF ISAIAH  
Both Brueggemann and Childs have written commentaries on the book of 
Isaiah.682 After Childs published his Isaiah commentary, he also wrote the book 
The Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture. The purpose for 
Childs was to describe how Christians throughout centuries have interpreted 
Isaiah.683 Childs has a chapter to postmodern interpretation and here 
Brueggemann is used as the role model. Childs is mainly critical towards post-
modern hermeneutics: 
Many are negative: there is no single substantive concept of ra-
tionality, no method leading to a scientific concept of the whole 
of reality, no single determinate meaning accessible to later gen-
erations of interpreters, no sort of semantic property with which 
texts are imbued.
684
 
However, Childs acknowledges Brueggemann as a postmodern theologian and 
a brilliant interpreter of homiletics:  
Brueggemann, as with many postmodernists, shares features of 
his interpretation with other approaches not dependent on post-
modernism in origin, goals, and techniques…. 
Finally one can see a further development of his use of postmod-
ern categories in his Theology of the Old Testament (1997) that 
reflects a more radical postmodern formulation than found in his 
Isaiah commentary. Readers should also acknowledge 
Brueggemann’s brilliant homiletical interpretations, which are 
often fresh, probing, and skillfully applied.
685
 
                                                     
682 Brevard Childs, Isaiah: A Commentary, Old Testament Library (Kentucky: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2001), Walter Brueggemann, Isaiah, Vol. 1: Chapters 1-39 (Kentucky: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1998). Walter Brueggemann, Isaiah, Vol. 2: Chapters 40-66 (Kentucky: West-
minster John Knox Press, 1998).  
683 Childs, The Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture, x. 
684 Childs, The Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture, 291. 
685 Childs, The Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture, 292. 
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When comparing Brueggemann and Childs on Isaiah, the most striking differ-
ence is that Brueggemann divides his commentary into two volumes, Isaiah 1-
39 and Isaiah 40-66, whereas Childs’s commentary is in one book. No doubt, 
Childs accepts a first, second and third Isaiah, and in the commentary he also 
frequently relates to the historical-critical discussion of various authors of the 
book of Isaiah.686 However, Childs also clearly wants to see a commentary in 
the service of the Church and believes that a commentary that treats the canon-
ical shape of Isaiah is important for hearing the evangelical witness:  
The effect of coercion of the text itself in faithfully shaping the 
faith of the church—its doctrine, liturgy, and practice—in such a 
way as to leave a family resemblance of faith throughout the 
ages. In search of this goal, the voices of the great interpreters—
Chrysostomon, Augustine, Thomas, Luther, Calvin—remain an 
enduring guide for truthfully hearing the evangelical witness of 
Isaiah in a manner seldom encountered since the Enlighten-
ment.687 
Brueggemann, like Childs, frequently refers to Calvin. Both share a reformed 
heritage, but in his commentaries on the book of Isaiah, as in ToT, 
Brueggemann, in contrast to Childs, is skeptical of the classical church theol-
ogy that Calvin represents:  
Isaiah is enormously open in more than one direction. It is a mat-
ter of considerable importance, in my judgment, that Christians 
should not pre-empt the book of Isaiah… But that is very differ-
ent from any claim that the book of Isaiah predicts or specifically 
anticipates Jesus. Such a pre-emption, as has often occurred in 
the reading of the church, constitutes not only a failure to respect 
Jewish readers, but is a distortion of the book itself.
688
 
                                                     
686 See Childs, Isaiah, 7. 
687 See Childs, Isaiah, 5. 
688 Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, 6. 
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His criticism against “classical Christianity” or “high theology” is also visible 
in his interpretation of Isaiah 54:7 where Brueggemann argues against Calvin’s 
interpretation of the same verse. Whereas Calvin argues that this verse shows 
Israel’s deepest feelings of despair in the face of God’s abandonment, 
Brueggemann argues that the verse proves that God really abandons Israel: 
God’s own testimony here is that God did abandon Israel in ex-
ile. What this means is that even though God’s compassion over-
rides the moment of abandonment the verse is a testimony of 
God’s real abandonment. In contrast, Calvin interprets this verse 
as Israel’s feelings of despair.689 
In relation to the historical-critical method that tends to describe the servant 
songs as later additions, Brueggemann argues that these songs should be 
treated as integrated parts of Isaiah 40-55.690 The servant is “Israel and seems 
to have a mission to Israel.”691 Moreover, both Brueggemann and Childs are 
especially dependent upon Westermann’s Second Isaiah commentary (Claus 
Westermann, Isaiah 40-66, Westminster John Knox Press, 1969). Wester-
mann’s terms, e.g. oracle of salvation, speech of disputations, and hymns set 
the standard for defining the genre of the text for the interpretation. For exam-
ple, Brueggemann writes: “Chapter 41 contains a series of speech of disputa-
tion and oracle of salvation. Together they permit the exile to see Yahweh.”692 
He also comments: “This statement is meaningless if not the merciful also is 
powerful. Yahweh energizes, authorizes and empowers Israel do the safe.”693 
Even though he frequently refers to Westermann’s commentary, he also dis-
tances himself from Westermann’s search behind the text. For Brueggemann, 
the recital of the texts is of primary concern:  
                                                     
689 Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, 153.  
690 Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, 141. 
691 Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, 13, 42. 
692 Brueggemann, Isaiah 1-39, 28. 
693 Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, 33, 128. 
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Israel’s faith is rooted in a recital of ancient miracles that affirm 
the reality and force of Yahweh as the definitive player in its 
life.
694
 
In sum, it is important to acknowledge that Childs chooses Brueggemann as 
the role model for a postmodern interpretation of the book of Isaiah. From their 
different interpretations of the book of Isaiah they orient in different directions. 
Whereas Childs stresses a commentary that could appeal to the evangelical 
witness of the Church, Brueggemann wants to pay attention to the wide range 
of possible interpretations which omit a specific Christian interpretation.  
6.4 BRUEGGEMANN –A MODERN GNOSTIC? 
Childs and Hanson criticize Brueggemann’s concept of God as being gnostic. 
When they use such a strong term, they argue that Brueggemann’s concept of 
God shares a similarity with the gnostic theologian Marcion who argued 
against the Church Father Irenaeus of Lyon and said that the God of the Old 
Testament is different from Jesus in the New Testament.695 It is worth empha-
sizing that Irenaeus, who used the Rule of Faith in the debate against Marcion, 
did so primarily in order to defend the use of the Old Testament within the 
Christian tradition.696 Childs, in his criticism of Brueggemann, argues in the 
Scottish Journal of Theology that Brueggemann has misunderstood the concept 
of canon.697 According to Childs, the Scripture itself refers to biblical persons 
and presents Moses not Korah, Jeremiah not Hananiah and argues that they 
were considered to be credible witnesses of divine revelation. Therefore, when 
Brueggemann believes that the lament literature constitutes part of the counter-
testimony, he actually cuts off access to understanding the lament literature as 
a constituent element in Israel’s faith. Childs therefore accuses him of being 
                                                     
694 Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, 58. 
695 See also Childs, “Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dis-
pute, Advocacy: A Review by Brevard Childs and a Response,” 174-75.  
696 See Irenaeus in Against Heresies (Create space Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), Chap-
ter 10:1.—“Unity of the faith of the Church throughout the whole world.” 
697 Childs, “Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament. Testimony, Dispute, Advo-
cacy,” 231. 
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Gnostic—Brueggemann’s concept of God includes an unsolved dualism that 
actually does not exist and he has created a dualism by a mixture of rationalism 
and intuition. In sum, Childs believes that Brueggemann has turned in a nega-
tive way “the identity of the Church for future generations.”698  
Brueggemann responds to Childs’ critical conclusion and he writes that Childs’ 
“major charge against my book in his critique is that its ‘closest’ analogy is 
found in the early Church’s struggle with Gnosticism.”699 According to 
Brueggemann, Childs has completely misunderstood him and accuses him of 
being a Docetist in the way he seeks to capture everything in a closed transcen-
dental system.700 When he characterizes Childs as a Docetist, he refers to the 
idea that Jesus only seemed to be a human, i.e. that Jesus´ human body was an 
illusion. During the doctrinal conflicts in the early Church, Docetism was re-
jected at the first council of Nicaea (325) and is regarded as heretical by those 
churches that accept the Nicene Creed. We can say that Brueggemann criti-
cizes Childs’ concept of God for neglecting the suffering to which the counter-
testimony specifically refers. In contrast, Brueggemann defends his own con-
cept of God. There is no dualism in his description of YHWH but a tension 
between self-regard and passion. For Brueggemann, this means that his con-
cept of God tilts towards the suffering and pain that embraces the counter-tes-
timony, as well God in his essence. He wants to achieve an approach that high-
lights those “other voices” that are visible in the Old Testament and give them 
a serious treatment. He also hesitates to agree that he has rejected “any appeal 
to an ecclesial reading.”701 His interpretation of the counter-testimony is there-
fore an example of Luther’s “theology of the cross.”702 Likewise, his term 
countertestimony could also be termed “Good Friday” because Brueggemann 
argues that his reading of the Old Testament is a reading that is informed by 
the lived reality of the believing Church and here in particular there is a tension 
                                                     
698 Childs, “Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament. Testimony, Dispute, Advo-
cacy,” 230. 
699 Brueggemann, “A Response to Professor Childs by Walter Brueggemann,” 175.  
700 Brueggemann, “A Response to Professor Childs,” 228. 
701 Brueggemann, “A Response to Professor Childs by Walter Brueggemann,” 177. 
702 See Allister McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross (Blackwell Publishing, 1990). 
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between crucifixion and resurrection. In this reading there are no “‘large’ 
claims” but rather a reading marked by attention to the silence and absence of 
God: 
In both liturgy and pastoral reality, one is endlessly aware of the 
disjunction and tension that must be faced and embraced and not 
overcome rationally. It is therefore not surprising that I am drawn 
to a particular range of texts in a certain way.
703
 
Finally, Brueggemann reacts against Childs’s canonical approach which fore-
closes a reading of the Scripture that will be “too costly for the faith of the 
church.”’704 Brueggemann also argues that the early appeal to the Rule of Faith 
is equivalent to the Rule of Love.705  
6.5 DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE RULE OF FAITH 
It is crucial to understand the different understandings that Brueggemann and 
Childs have when it comes to use the Rule of Faith within Biblical theology. It 
is apparent that already in the 1980s Brueggemann disagreed with Childs’s 
understanding of the Rule of Faith. In a review of Childs’s book The Old Tes-
tament Theology in a Canonical Context (1985) he writes:  
The book is a disappointment, because I had hoped that Childs’s 
program would lead to a genuinely fresh shaping of Old Testa-
ment theology.
706
  
Brueggemann ends this review with a hope that Childs’s next work would 
“help us more on the matter of canonical construal”. He could not have been 
more disappointed by the next book. In Childs’s Biblical Theology of the Old 
and New Testaments, published in 1993, Childs has developed his approach to 
                                                     
703 Brueggemann, “A Response to Professor Childs by Walter Brueggemann,” 177 
704 Brueggemann, “A Response to Professor Childs by Walter Brueggemann,” 178. 
705 Brueggemann, “A Response to Professor Childs by Walter Brueggemann,” 177. 
706 Walter Brueggemann, review of Brevard Childs, Old Testament Theology in a Canonical 
Context, ThTo (1985): 286. 
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a point which is completely unacceptable for Brueggemann. In ToT, he high-
lights Childs’s development by making a sharp difference between the later 
Childs (1993) and the early Childs (1985). He accepts the early Childs of 1985, 
who argues that the text of the Old Testament “constitutes the Rule of Faith”, 
but cannot accept the later Childs of 1993: 
Earlier, Childs had suggested that it is the shape of the text itself that 
constitutes the ‘Rule of Faith for Christians. … In his recent book, how-
ever, Childs makes a major and problematic interpretative move. Now 
he concludes that the Scripture is to be read ‘according to the Rule of 
Faith,’ by which he now apparently means the doctrinal tradition of the 
church.707 
Brueggemann fears the standpoint that Childs presented in 1993 because he 
believes that it will lead to a theological conclusion that is formed by Church 
doctrines prior to the encounter with text itself.708 Brueggemann’s own posi-
tion is the opposite of Childs’s. For him, the testimony of the Old Testament 
constitutes the Rule of Faith and such reading is not easy to submit to church 
theology.709 Brueggemann writes:  
No amount of careful formulation can completely conceal the 
deep problematic of the Scripture’s relation to church faith.710  
In order to understand his criticism of Childs it is necessary to become ac-
quainted more deeply with Childs’s understanding of the Rule of Faith. L.G. 
Finn notes that to a large extent Childs is informed by the Swedish theologian 
                                                     
707 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 92. See also Fretheim for the same analysis 
as Brueggemann, Fretheim, review of Childs, 324. 
708 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 92: “The odd outcome of such a statement is 
an unqualified embrace of the Tridentine inclination to subject the text and its possible interpre-
tation to the control of church categories.” 
709 See Brueggemann, An Introduction to the Old Testament, 394: “I do not believe that even in 
its most intentional and normative canonical achievement does the text serve so easily and so 
readily what subsequently became the church’s Rule of Faith.”  
710 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 5. 
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Bengt Hägglund (1925-2015).711 Hägglund takes an historical perspective on 
the Rule of Faith.712 Hägglund describes four points of this rule that are im-
portant to highlight:  
- The Rule of Faith is not the Scripture as such but it is equivalent to the 
content in the Scripture. 
- The Rule of Faith does not concern a specific text or a fixed doctrine. In-
stead it is a guiding principle for the teaching in the Church. 
- The presupposition for grasping the Rule of Faith is to treat it, not as the 
Creed or Scripture, but rather as faith which is in harmony with the Creed 
and the content of Scripture.  
- The Rule of Faith is not a fixed formulated doctrine but should be under-
stood as the instrument of discerning what is true or false.713 
The conclusion I draw is that Hägglund understands the Rule of Faith as some-
thing external, not in contradiction to the message of the Bible but in harmony 
with it, not explicitly defined in the Scripture itself but explicitly presupposed 
in Scripture. Finn shows that Childs to a large extent is dependent on Häg-
glund’s view. Childs shares Hägglund’s conclusion that the Rule of Faith 
                                                     
711 Childs refers positively to Bengt Hägglund’s article, “Die Bedeutung der regula fidei Als 
Grundlage Theologische Aussage,” Studia Theologica 12 (1958): 1-44, see Childs, The Struggle 
to Understand Isaiah, 54, Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 30-32. See 
also Childs, “Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Ad-
vocacy: A Review by Brevard Childs and a Response,” 175: “When Irenaeus countered the 
Gnostic threat [Adversus haereses], he appealed to a regula fidei [rule of faith] grounded in the 
truth of Israel’s faith…” See also Finn, “Reflections on the Rule of Faith,” 221: “Driver’s own 
extended discussion of the rule and what it specifically means for Childs is instead derived more 
from a study of Childs’s influences - The work of Hans von Campenhausen and particularly 
Bengt Hägglund…” Childs refers especially to Hägglund’s understanding of the Church Father 
Irenaeus of Lyon (c.130-c. 202). Irenaeus uses the term regula veritatis as equivalent with the 
Rule of Faith. The Rule of Faith was for Irenaeus the truth itself. In its historical setting the term 
can be defined as a concept of truth that stands in sharp contrast to the Gnostics. See also Chen, 
Theological Exegesis in the Canonical Context, 99: “Childs gives prominence to Irenaeus’ ap-
proach, which sought to present a comprehensive summary of the Christian faith in terms of the 
testimony of the Scripture as the written form of the church’s rule of faith.” Finally, there is an 
important distinction to make between the historical understanding of the Rule of Faith as Häg-
glund describes it in his article and the confessional understanding as formed within the Roman 
Catholic Church where the Rule of Faith is strictly identified with the Roman Catholic confes-
sion. 
712 Finn, “Reflections on the Rule of Faith,” 232. 
713 Hägglund, “Die Bedeutung der Regula fidei,” 7.  
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should be seen as an external hermeneutical tool for interpreting the Old Tes-
tament text.714 Moreover, this affinity between Hägglund and Childs, leads all 
the way to Irenaeus, the Church Father who used the Rule of Faith in his argu-
mentation for the legitimism of the Old Testament as part of the Christian 
Scripture.715 When comparing Childs’s approach with Brueggemann’s on the 
concept of the Rule of Faith it is this matter, it is obvious that they disagree. 716 
There are of course many similarities, e.g. each stresses that the New Testa-
ment authors return to the Old Testament in the light of the revelation of Jesus 
Christ. Moreover, they both stress the uniqueness of the Old Testament as dis-
tinct from the New Testament. In Childs’s words: 
Old Testament bears its true witness as the Old which remains 
distinct from the New. It is promise, not fulfilment. Yet its voice 
continues to sound and it has not been stilled by the fulfillment 
of the promise.
717
 
But Brueggemann nevertheless clearly opposes Childs’s link between the ca-
nonical approach and the Rule of Faith.718 Childs’s description of God is not 
based on the text but on a pre-understanding that stands over the text, i.e. the 
Rule of Faith.719 According to Brueggemann, the Rule of Faith creates a reduc-
tion and forecloses the polyphonic character of the Old Testament texts. The 
                                                     
714 Finn, “Reflections on the Rule of Faith,” 222. 
715 See Finn, “Reflections on the Rule of Faith,” 233. According to Finn, Irenaeus argued that 
“the rule was not identical with scripture, but was that sacred apostolic tradition, both in oral 
and written form, that comprised the church’s story.” This understanding occurs in Childs, 
Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Scripture, 47. 
716 According to Finn, I would argue that Brueggemann understands the Rule of Faith as a kind 
of “metanarrative, a grand plot, that can be discerned in the scriptures that then provides coher-
ence to the Christian life” See Finn, “Reflections on the Rule of Faith,” 224. 
717 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 77. Confer Brueggemann, Theol-
ogy of the Old Testament, 732: “Old Testament theology, as a Christian enterprise, it seems to 
me, must resist both (a) the untenable claim that such mutations in meaning are at all intended 
by or hinted at in the Old Testament; and (b) the historical-critical, rationalistic notion that the 
Old Testament precludes such interpretive moves, for such a notion of preclusion fails to recog-
nize the polyphonic, elusive, generative intentionality of the text.” 
718 Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament, a Prompt Retrospect,” 318. 
719 Brueggemann, Deep Memory, Exuberant Hope, 87: “It becomes clear that Childs’ under-
standing of God in the text, ’extra-biblical reality,’ is not constructed or nuanced according to 
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Rule of Faith tries to keep the message within a fixed form, but this is impos-
sible: “The holy one of Israel will not be held in Church claims.”720 His com-
ments on Childs’s approach are as follows: 
In his most recent and most mature book, it is now more clear 
than in his earlier work, that Childs means by ‘canonical’ reading 
the text according to Christian norms and categories.
721
 
In effect, however, it appears for Brueggemann that Childs approach has gen-
erated a reading of the Old Testament in and through the categories of Christian 
systematic theology. Such an approach features its own reductionism which, 
in turn, overrides and distorts the specificity of the text. The gain of a canonical 
perspective is that without embarrassment it takes up theological themes that 
modernist foundationalism must eschew. An accent on such themes, though 
theological as they are, tends to override the specific theological data of the 
text that refuse to be flatly thematized.722  
6.6 BRUEGGEMANN’S APPROACH: JEWISH OR CHRIS-
TIAN? 
In the encounter with the Jewish tradition the question emerges as to whether 
Brueggemann’s position is best defined as Jewish or Christian or neither. 
Childs argues that a Christian and a Jewish reading of the same text functions 
differently: “it is crucial to recognize that the Christian understanding of canon 
functions theologically in a very different way from Judaism.”723 In contrast, 
Brueggemann stresses the similarity between a Christian and a Jewish reading: 
“if the church has no interpretative monopoly on the Old Testament, then it 
must recognize the legitimacy of other interpretative communities, of whom 
                                                     
the detail of the text, but is a reference that is known apart from and at times over against the 
text.” 
720 Linafelt & Beal, God in the Fray, 319. 
721 Brueggemann, Deep Memory, Exuberant Hope, 86. 
722 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 85. 
723 Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 64. 
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the primary and principal one is the Jewish community.”724 Brueggemann is 
ambivalent towards an exclusive Christian interpretation because he fears a 
supersessionist reading of the Old Testament.725 He therefore argues that a 
Christian interpretation of the Old Testament is a legitimate one, but not the 
only one. In sum, Brueggemann stands between, on the one side, Childs, and 
on the other side, a Jewish reading. In a letter to Tracy Early, date April 14 
1998, Brueggemann writes:  
Your second point about Christian exclusivism and Jewish faith claims 
seems to me to be very important questions to which I do not have an 
answer. I do not doubt at all that as a confessing Christian to read the 
Old Testament toward Jesus is exactly right. I do note, however, that you 
say that Karl Barth said the New Testament is ‘a commentary’ on the 
Old Testament. I think that the burden of my argument is that it is pre-
cisely a commentary and not the commentary.726 
In this letter he hesitates to stress that he proposes a specific Christian approach 
and instead argues for a middle way. Levenson, as noted previously, together 
with Joel Kaminsky, are two Jewish scholars who would have preferred 
Brueggemann to have had a more specific Christian approach.727 Kaminsky 
comments that Brueggemann has good intentions, but fails to understand that 
his theology also “prevents him from fully accepting the validity of either a 
Jewish or Christian reading of the Scripture.”728 Brueggemann responds to Ka-
minsky’s criticism and claims that he is a Christian interpreter. According to 
Brueggemann, Kaminsky’s criticism depends on a deeper disagreement on 
biblical interpretation.729  
                                                     
724 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 733. 
725 See Brueggemann, “Theology of the Old Testament, a Prompt Retrospect,” 316. Superses-
sionism is equivalent to replacement theology, i.e. that the Christian community forms the new 
Israel and that God has abandoned his covenant with the historical people of Israel.  
726 Brueggemann, unpublished from Jon Bulow Campell Library, Box 15, Letter to Dr Tracy 
early, April 14, 1998. 
727 See Joel Kaminsky. Review of W. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, in RBL 1: 
1-21 (Kaminsky 1-6). 1999.  
728 Kaminsky, review of Brueggemann, 4-5. 
729 Kaminsky, review of Brueggemann, 5. 
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My own and reflection is that Brueggemann wants to combine a kind of Jewish 
Midrashic interpretation with a Christian theologization of the Old Testament 
and this is indeed not easy to accomplish. Benjamin Sommer’s conclusion is 
worth emphasizing: “the discipline of Theology does not have the same place 
within Judaism as in Christianity,”730 Formulated as questions reads: is it pos-
sible to combine a Jewish reading with a Christian theological thematization 
of the Old Testament? In what ways do the hermeneutics of writing a commen-
tary differ from the hermeneutics of writing an Old Testament theology? I 
would suggest and answer by notate that in ToT Brueggemann’s point of de-
parture is that the Old Testament in no way points directly to Christ. Instead 
he argues that as a confessing Christian he performs “the imaginative construal 
of the Old Testament towards Jesus” and this is “a credible act” but in no way 
obvious because the text is so “polyphonic”.731 In a response to Brueggemann 
Peter Enns suggests that one must be able to combine a Christian confession 
(Theology) with recognition of the polyphonic character (Midrashic interpre-
tation) of the Old Testament text. This means, according to Enns, that there is 
no tension between a Christian confession and the polyphonic nature of the 
biblical witnesses:  
We must continually balance the way in which the Old Testa-
ment story was given, in all its ‘polyphonic and elusive’ glory, 
with the Christian confession that the Old Testament story finds 
its final and ultimate purpose in God’s revelation in Christ.732 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Whereas Childs reads the Scripture through the lens of the Rule of Faith, 
Brueggemann argues that the result of biblical interpretation presents the Rule 
of Faith. I conclude that Child’s use of the Rule of Faith stands in accordance 
                                                     
730 Benjamin Sommer, Jewish Concepts of Scripture: A Comparative Introduction (New York: 
NYU Press, 2012), 9. 
731 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 732. 
732 Peter Enns, review of Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, Westminster 
Theological Journal 64 no 1 (2002) 207. 
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with that of Hägglund’s. This means that Child’s epistemology is clearly a 
foundational epistemology because the Rule of Faith is defined as something 
external. It could now be suggested that Brueggemann’s approach in this re-
gard is neither in keeping with a classical Christian nor a classical Jewish read-
ing of the Old Testament. His approach is best defined as a mixture: a Christian 
who believes that Jesus is the Messiah, but who interprets the Old Testament 
from the position of the Jewish tradition. 
  
232 
 
CHAPTER 7 A THEOLOGY OF THE FRAY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose in this chapter is to analyze Brueggemann’s theology. 
Brueggemann’s description in no way fits in with a classical Christian descrip-
tion of God: 
The God of this countertestimony is clearly not the God of the philoso-
phers.733 
If it is claimed that God is morally perfect, the rather devious 
ways of the God of the Old Testament must either be disregarded 
or explained away.
734
 
Who God turns out to be in Israel depends on the utterance of the 
Israelites, or, derivately, the utterance of the text.
735
 
As the title of this chapter indicates, the God of Israel, YHWH, according to 
Brueggemann, is a God who stands in the fray of human suffering. My conclu-
sion is that his description of YHWH is concluded in three steps: 
Step I: On the foundation of testimony, the description of YHWH becomes 
available. This is his epistemology. 
Step II: By use of a rhetorical approach, a concern that speech and reality co-
exist, informed by a Jewish reading that honors irruption, he argues that the 
various testimonies refer to YHWH in an extra-referential way. This is his her-
meneutics. 
Step III: When the core-testimony and the counter-testimony give their full 
meaning in the context of the court, the theological conclusion is as follows: 
YHWH’s incomparability yields a “profound disjunction at the core of the 
Subject’s life.” This is his theology.  
                                                     
733 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 384. 
734 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 106. 
735 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 65. 
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The procedure in order to analyze Brueggemann’s theology is as follows; 
firstly, I will first pay attention to some biblical passages that aptly describe 
Brueggemann’s interpretation of a tension within YHWH. Secondly, I will de-
scribe some important theologians that have influenced Brueggemann. Thirdly 
and finally, I will analyze his theology by applying it to Psalm 44 as a kind of 
case-study.736 In this analyze I will also suggest a modified alternative to 
Brueggemann’s term of God above and God in the fray. 
7.2 YHWH IS UNFAIR 
An important theme in Brueggemann’s theology, previously referred to in 
chapter 2, is his attention to the dark side of YHWH. This can be traced back 
at least to 1982 in his Genesis commentary wherein he worked on the topic of 
“divine deception.”737 The dark side of YHWH plays an integral role in ToT, 
and I will here present three examples which he uses to argue that YHWH is 
deceitful. These are as follows: 
- The verb התפ (patah). 
- The narrative of David and Saul. 
- The tension between Isaiah 49:14 and Isaiah 54:6-7. 
THE VERB התפ 
The verb התפ (patah) is important for Brueggemann when he argues that 
YHWH is unfair. He makes this conclusion on the basis of Jeremiah 20:7, I 
Kings 22:20-22, and Hosea 2:14 where this verb occurs. The verb means “to 
be open like a child”, but also that someone is persuading or enticing the person 
                                                     
736 I am inspired by Nathan Tiessen’s use of Brueggemann’s core and counter-testimony in the 
book of Ruth. See Tiessen, “A Theology of Ruth,” 258-62. Notable is that Brueggemann does 
not quote from the book of Ruth in ToT. 
737 J.E. Andersson, Jacob and the Divine Trickster, A Theology of Deception and YHWH´s Fi-
delty to the Ancestral Promise in the Jacob Cycle. Siphrut 5 (Wiona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 
11: “The question of divine deception in Genesis has been raised surprisingly few times within 
the last century, with Hermann Gunkel being the earliest proponent of the view that God engaged 
in deception, yet it is only fairly recently that the issue has begun to be addressed in any mean-
ingful way. Investigation remains inchoate and embryonic. Works by three scholars warrant 
more thorough mention: Hermann Gunkel, Walter Brueggemann, and Michael James Wil-
liams.” 
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to do something negative.738 For Brueggemann, the problem becomes apparent 
when YHWH is the subject of this verb: “It is astonishing that in three cases, 
including the Jeremiah text we have cited, the verb is used for Yahweh with 
such implications.”739 In Jeremiah 20:7, he draws the conclusion that YHWH 
has been dishonest towards Jeremiah: 
7 O LORD, you have enticed me, 
and I was enticed; 
you have overpowered me, 
and you have prevailed. 
I have become a laughingstock all day long; 
everyone mocks me.
740
 
The prophet has been “pressed into a relationship for loyalty toward Yahweh 
(cf. 1:4-10), a relationship in which Yahweh has not been fair, supportive, or 
constructive.”741 In 1 Kings 22:20, Brueggemann draws the same theological 
conclusion:  
20 And the LORD said, ‘Who will entice Ahab, so that he may 
go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead?’ Then one said one thing, and 
another said another.
742
 
Here the verb is used in the heavenly court in order to entice King Ahab. 
YHWH acts in this way because he wants to deceive the king, “even if it means 
deceptive violence.”743 Finally, in Hosea 2:14 it is written:  
14 Therefore, I will now allure her, 
and bring her into the wilderness, 
and speak tenderly to her.744 
                                                     
738 See Brown, Francis, Samuel Rolles Driver, and Charles August Briggs. Enhanced Brown-
Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). Abridged [הָתָפּ] 
vb. denom. be simple—Qal 1. be open-minded (?), simple. 2. be enticed, deceived. Niph. be 
deceived; c. לַע enticed unto. Piel 1. persuade, woman (fig., ’י subj.), seduce, virgin; entice, hus-
band. 2. deceive; subj. ’י, obj. proph.; obj. ’י. Pual 1. be persuaded. 2. be deceived; be beguiled; 
by ’י. 
739 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 360. 
740 Biblica Hebraica: ׃י ִָֽל ג ֵ֥  עלֹ ה ַ֖לֻּכּ םוֹ ָ֔יַּה־לָכּ ֙קוֹחְשִׂל יִתי ִַ֤יָה לָָ֑כוּתַּו יִנ ַַ֖תְּקַזֲח ת ָָ֔פֶּא ָָֽו ֙הָוהְי יִנ ַַ֤תיִתִּפּ 
741 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 362. Cf. 1 Sam. 8:7: “And the LORD said to 
Samuel, ‘Obey the voice of the people in all that they say to you, for they have not rejected you, 
but they have rejected me from being king over them.’” Cf. 1 Sam. 15:24 where Saul said to 
Samuel: “I have sinned, for I have transgressed the commandment of the LORD and your words, 
because I feared the people and obeyed their voice.” 
742 Biblica Hebraica: ׃ה ָֹֽכְבּ ר ַ֖  מֹא הֵֶ֥זְו ה ָֹ֔כְבּ ֙הֶז רֶמא ַֹ֤ יַּו ד ָָ֑עְלִגּ ת ֹֹ֣מָרְבּ ל ַֹ֖פִּיְו לַע ַַ֕יְו בָ֔אְָחאַ־תֶא ֙הֶתַּפְי י ִַ֤מ ה ָָ֗והְי רֶמא ֹֹ֣ יַּו 
743 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 361. 
744 Biblica Hebraica: ׃הּ ָָֽבִּל לַע י ִַ֖תְּרַבִּד ְו ר ָָ֑בְּדִמַּה ָהי ִַ֖תְּכַל ָֹֽהְו ָהי ֶָ֔תַּפְמ ֙יִכֹנָֽאָ הַ֤  נִּה ן ָ֗ כָל 
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Brueggemann argues that the same verb as used in Jeremiah and 1 Kings, here 
translated as allure, “also bespeaks something forcible, coercive or violent 
about Yahweh.”745 In sum, basing his argument on the interpretation of the 
verb התפ (patah) he draws the conclusion that YHWH is deceitful and acts 
unfair. 
DAVID AND SAUL 
In the narrative of David and Saul, Brueggemann pays attention to the fact that 
within the Jewish tradition Saul has been understood in a more positive way 
than within the Christian tradition.746 According to him, there are at least three 
arguments from the narrative that show that YHWH is unfair towards Saul:  
1) Samuel obeys the people in 1 Samuel 8:7 but when Saul does the same, 
“at least to some extent”, he is condemned in a negative way (see 1 
Samuel 15:24).747  
2) When Saul defeats the Amalekites in 1 Samuel 15, he does not follow 
the ḥerem demands, i.e. total annihilation in accordance with Exodus 
17:8-16 (cf. Deuteronomy 25:17-19).748 However, when David defeats 
the same tribe in 1 Samuel 30, the narrator does not show any interest 
in ḥerem theology. 
                                                     
745 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 362. 
746 David M. Gunn, the Fate of King Saul, An Interpretation of a Biblical Story (Sheffield: Shef-
field University Press, 1980), 23-27. 
747 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 369. 
748 See BDB Abridged [םַרָח] “vb. Hiph. ban, devote, exterminate — ban, devote (esp. religiously, 
sq. objects hostile to the theocracy; this involved gen. their destruction; when a city was ‘de-
voted’ the inhab. were put to death, the spoil being destroyed or not acc. to the gravity of the 
occasion; 1. most oft. of devoting to destruction cities of Canaanites and other neighbors of Isr., 
exterminating inhabitants, and destroying or appropriating their possessions: a. Isr. and her lead-
ers subj. (destructions acc. to vow); (commanded through Moses), (commanded by ’י); quite 
secondary is simple exterminate. b. secondary mng. destroy, exterminate, also with other nations 
subj.   c. God as subj., fig. all nations and their armies; the nations of Western Asia; the tongue 
of the Egyptian sea (by drying it up). d. so also of devoting even Israelites: a. a city of Isr. for 
worshipping other gods; residents of Jabesh-Gilead for not joining in campaign against Benj.” 
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3) Saul seeks forgiveness in 1 Samuel 15:24, but Samuel does not forgive 
him. In contrast, David is forgiven for his crime against Uriah in 2 
Samuel 12:13.  
Brueggemann draws the conclusion that in contrast to David Saul is unfairly 
treated by YHWH. David becomes connected to YHWH in a new and special 
way; he is accepted by “Yahweh in modes of acceptance and affirmation here-
tofore unavailable in Israel and certainly unavailable to Saul.”749  
A TWO-STEP SEQUENCE TEXT 
The third example that compels Brueggemann to conclude that YHWH is un-
fair is his analysis of some exile texts. He terms these texts as two-step se-
quence texts. In the first step of the sequence, YHWH’s sovereignty is visible 
as a destructive force. In the second step of the sequence, YHWH shows his 
loyalty to Israel by maintaining the covenant.750 A serious theological interpre-
tation, he argues, must assume that there is no visible convergence between 
these two steps, i.e. between YHWH’s sovereignty and mercy. There is evi-
dence that YHWH loves Israel during the exile, but there are also texts which 
suggest that YHWH has abandoned Israel in the exile. As proof text for an 
exile two-step sequence, he compares Isaiah 49:14 with Isaiah 54:7-8. In Isaiah 
49:14 it is written: 
14 Can a woman forget her nursing child, 
Or show no compassion for the child of her womb? 
Even these may forget,  
Yet I will not forget you. 
This text clearly says that YHWH will never forget Israel. Within the same 
genre, however, stands Isaiah 54:7-8 which argues that for a moment YHWH 
did exactly that: 
7 For a brief moment I abandoned you 
But with great compassion I will gather you. 
8 In overflowing wrath for a moment 
                                                     
749 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 370. 
750 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 310-11. 
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I hid my face from you, 
But with everlasting love  
I will have compassion on you, 
the Lord, your Redeemer.  
According to him, interpreting these texts theologically means that there is a 
theological tension in YHWH:  
These voices of witness, nonetheless, constitute part of Israel’s 
countertestimony, and while these texts are commonly disre-
garded in more formal theology, they are important data for our 
understanding of who Yahweh is said by Israel to be.
751
 
It is worth noting that even though Brueggemann stresses that YHWH is unfair, 
he likewise emphasizes that it belongs to the core-testimony to say that YHWH 
is a compassionate God: “To be sure, even these texts bespeak a two-stage 
sequence, in which the outcome is great compassion.”752  
7.3 INFLUENTIAL THEOLOGIANS 
Brueggemann’s theological conclusion of a tension within YHWH does not 
rely only on biblical texts. He is also indebted to some influential theologians: 
- Blumenthal’s theological conclusion that God is abusive.  
- Lindström’s analysis of the Psalms of complaint.  
- Fretheim’s exegetical and Moltmann’s theological criticism of the ax-
iom of divine impassibility. 
ATTRIBUTE OF GOD: ABUSIVE 
As shown previously, Brueggemann orients his theology towards the Jewish 
tradition. In this respect, he has been inspired particularly by Blumenthal’s so 
called seriatim reading. A seriatim reading pays attention to the fragmentation 
and irruption in the text, “of course the very matters which Childs wants to 
                                                     
751 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 359. 
752 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 311. 
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exclude.”753 In practice, a seriatim reading means that Brueggemann wants to 
avoid any kind of systematization of the biblical message. The message of the 
Old Testament must be heard without being reduced by various philosophical 
presuppositions. Brueggemann is particularly impressed by Blumenthal’s book 
Facing the Abusive God, A Theology of Protest (1993), in which Blumenthal 
argues that the rather provocative word abusive is actually an attribute that 
belongs to the concept of God. Blumenthal defines attribute as follows: 
A quality said to be inherent in the subject it describes; for God, 
there are ‘essential’ attributes without which one cannot under-
stand God and ‘accidental’ attributes which are metaphors.754 
The tremendous problem of the Holocaust and the problematic but apparent 
context of child abuse in general stand in the foreground for his conclusion that 
YHWH is abusive. Of major importance is also his interpretation of various 
texts, especially a close reading of Psalm 44. Blumenthal argues that the God 
of the Hebrew Bible, as a provident God, is capable of causing suffering and 
this must define God in terms of abuse. Referring back to medieval theologi-
ans, Blumenthal argues that holiness and personality belong to the essential 
attributes of God: “Using the language of the medieval thinkers, we can say 
that God has two essential attributes: holiness and personality.”755 Blumenthal, 
however, adds a third attribute, YHWH is abusive:  
Is abusiveness, then, an attribute of God? Is abusiveness a quality 
without which we cannot understand the ultimate reality that we 
call God? Yes; and to the six personalist attributes listed in ‘Per-
sonality,’ I must add a seventh: God is abusive, but not always. 
God as portrayed in our holy sources and as experienced by hu-
mans throughout the ages, acts, from time to time, in a manner 
                                                     
753 Brueggemann, Deep Memory, Exuberant Hope, 86. 
754 See Blumenthal, Facing the Abusive God, 301. 
755 See Blumenthal, Facing the Abusive God, 7. He also argues that humanity is related to God 
through the fact that male and female are created in the image of God. This, he concludes, means 
that God and humanity stand in relation to each other. 
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that is so unjust that it can only be characterized by the term 
‘abusive.’756  
Even though Brueggemann does not make such a provocative claim as Blu-
menthal, he refers very positively to Blumenthal’s conclusion of an abusive 
God. Blumenthal also refers positively to Brueggemann’s theological efforts. 
According to him, Brueggemann’s theological interpretation of the Psalms 
“seems to me the most serious scholarly and theological effort to deal with the 
dark side of human being.”757 Nevertheless, he also criticizes Brueggemann for 
charging only God with having the dark side of humanity: 
Because Brueggemann cannot accept the dark side of humanity 
as a permanent and equally valid moment in human experience, 
he proposes that the solution to rage in the book of Psalms is not 
to repress anger and rage but to state it clearly and forcefully to 
God.
758
 
“The Holocaust was abuse, and, in a theology of divine provi-
dence, God is an abuser.”759 
This quotation shows that according to Blumenthal, Brueggemann describes 
YHWH as the ultimate source of the anger that is expressed in the book of 
Psalms, whereas Blumenthal seems to try to balance suffering between God 
and humanity.  
SUFFERING AND SIN 
Lindström has worked intensively on the origin of evil and suffering in the 
Psalms. Brueggemann refers primarily to Lindström’s conclusion as presented 
                                                     
756 See Blumenthal, Facing the Abusive God, 247. See also pp.14-20 for the six Personalist at-
tributes of God. According to Blumenthal, God must be fair, God addresses and can be ad-
dressed, God is powerful but not perfect, God is loving, God gets angry, God chooses, God is 
partian. 
757 Blumenthal, Facing the Abusive God, 243. 
758 Blumenthal, Facing the Abusive God, 246. 
759 See David R. Blumenthal, “Confronting the Character of God, Text and Practice,” in God in 
the Fray, A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann (ed. T Linafelt and T, Beal Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press 1998), 47. 
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in his book Suffering and Sin: Interpretations of Illness in the Individual Com-
plaint Psalms (1994) when he discusses the counter-testimony.760 Lindström 
argues that the reason for human suffering is the absence of the presence of 
YHWH. Brueggemann writes that Israel prevails and suffers not only because 
of the sin of the people but because YHWH is absent. Lindström argues that 
retribution in no way contains a satisfactory answer to the suffering which is 
described in some Psalms of complaint. Instead, Lindström’s solution is that 
the problem of suffering and sin is related to God’s absence and hiddenness.761 
The divine presence is not absent because of human sin, but because of an 
enemy that competes with God. Brueggemann affirms many of Lindström’s 
conclusions and writes: 
But in many other Psalms, as Fredrik Lindström has effectively 
shown, Israel is indeed innocent, and the suffering inflicted or 
allowed by Yahweh is unwarranted and indicates a failure in the 
covenant on Yahweh’s part cf. (Ps 25:21; 26:11).762 
Despite Lindström’s influence on Brueggemann, it is likewise so that 
Brueggemann always stresses the sovereignty of YHWH and it is because of 
this conclusion in his theology that he draws the conclusion that it is YHWH 
that is unfair. 
BRUEGGEMANN ON DIVINE IMPASSIBILITY 
According to Brueggemann, it is in the encounter with divine impassibility that 
the problem with classical church theology becomes most apparent. A long and 
established Church tradition has held this axiom which insists that it is impos-
sible that God in his essence can suffer from pain.763 Brueggemann strongly 
                                                     
760 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 321, 354, 375, 378, 471, 537, 660f, 741. 
761 Lindström, Suffering and Sin, 460: “Suffering in the individual complaint Psalms is a sure 
sign that the kingdom of Death is at hand [e.g., Ps 143:5]. Just as certain, is that this is possible 
if YHWH is absent. The reason for this is and remains uncertain.” 
762 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 378. 
763 See Weinandy, Does God Suffer? 152ff. The axiom of divine impassibility implies that the 
son suffers as human and not as God, the Father in the trinity.  
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rejects this axiom and falls back the German systematic theologian Jürgen 
Moltmann in particular.764 Brueggemann writes:  
If Moltmann’s rendering of the issue is correct, as I take it to be, 
then Christian theology is pushed into issues that are as difficult 
for Christians as for these witnesses in the Old Testament. We 
are left with solidarity that is short of sovereignty…except for 
Easter. This is a huge exception. The Old Testament witnesses, 
of course, appeal to no Easter, and that may make all the differ-
ence.
765
 
In contrast to the doctrine of Divine impassibility, Brueggemann formulates 
the thesis that YHWH have passions for, and can suffer with and for his people:  
I mean not an acknowledged change, but a powerful insistence, 
assertion, or decision that flies in the face of a previous insist-
ence, assertion, or decision, without any acknowledgment of a 
reversal.
766
 
YHWH is devoted to his partners in freedom and passion. This 
is a dialectical relationship marked by strong feelings for some-
one, and the capacity to suffer with someone and for someone.
767
 
According to Brueggemann, change and passion include the capacity to suffer 
with someone and for someone.768 YHWH’s partner exists because of God’s 
sovereignty, but when the partners sin they continue to exist because of 
YHWH’s passion.769  
                                                     
764 Brueggemann, An Unsettling God, 17. 
765 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 312.  
766 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 362. 
767 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 412. 
768 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 411: “But the term passion means, secondly, 
the capacity and readiness to suffer with and to suffer for, to stay with a partner in trouble, 
vexation, and danger.” 
769 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament. 411: “The most characteristic thing to be said 
about Yahweh’s partners is that the partners exist in the first place because of Yahweh’s sover-
eign freedom, and that the partners continue to exist because of Yahweh’s faithful passion.” 
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FRETHEIM’S RESPONSE TO BRUEGGEMANN’S THEOLOGY 
Fretheim, author of The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective 
(1984), has inspired both Brueggemann and Moltmann. Fretheim is somewhat 
critical of some of Brueggemann’s theological conclusions. For example, he 
questions Brueggemann’s interpretation of Exodus 34:6-7. Whereas 
Brueggemann argues that anger is an attribute of YHWH, Fretheim argues that 
Exodus 34:6-7 and other similar texts should be interpreted as God’s holiness 
that is turned towards the sin of Israel’s people.770 Fretheim describes God’s 
anger as related to a kind of mourning that comes from God’s passion for Israel 
when Israel has hardened her heart. This kind of passion is described well by 
the prophet Jeremiah (Jer. 4:19): 
19 My anguish, my anguish! I writhe in pain! 
Oh, the walls of my heart! 
My heart is beating wildly; 
I cannot keep silent; 
According to Fretheim, God’s anger here should not be related to some psy-
chological attribute within YHWH resulting in YHWH being described as ir-
rational: 
Walter Brueggemann speaks of the ‘profound irrationality’ of 
Yahweh, a ‘Yahweh who is out of control with the violent, sex-
ual rage of a husband who assaults his own beloved’ (Theology 
of the Old Testament [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997] 383). He ap-
                                                     
770 Fretheim, “Some Reflections on Brueggemann’s God,” 30: “I would claim that divine judg-
ment is always in the service of God’s loving and saving purposes, and their juxtaposition in 
Exod 34:6-7 says precisely this.” See also Terence Fretheim, What Kind of God? Collected Es-
says of Terence E. Fretheim (ed. B. Strawn et al. Eisenbrauns, 2015), 297: “Or, for Walter 
Brueggemann, the judging God and the faithful God are [215] incongruous; ‘the completed tra-
dition of Jeremiah makes in turn two quite different theological emphases which are impossible 
to coalesce,’ namely, judgment and promise. 13 Thus, regarding various texts in chapters 1– 25, 
he makes the following statements: 'God has withdrawn fidelity”; God ‘has ceased to care’; a 
‘complete absence of fidelity on God’s part.’ 14 I have dealt with this dimension of 
Brueggemann’s thought elsewhere. 15 I reiterate: “Why should love be inconsistent with ‘just 
judgment’? Why is divine judgment an act of unfaithfulness? Why cannot judgment be in the 
service of graciousness? Why is a word or act ‘against Israel’ by Yhwh incongruous with God’s 
will ‘for Israel’? I would claim that divine judgment is always in the service of God’s loving and 
saving purposes.” 
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peals to Ezekiel 16 and 23 as examples. These are deeply prob-
lematic texts, but God’s wrath is clearly motivated by infidelity, 
so the word ‘irrational’ is not appropriate.771 
However, despite Fretheim’s critical assessment of part of Brueggemann’s the-
ological conclusion, they are both united in their criticism towards the axiom 
of divine impassibility. According to Fretheim, God suffers because he has 
completely and intimately bound himself in relation to the created world, es-
pecially his people Israel.772  
Mattew R. Schlimm makes a comparative study of the Jewish rabbi and leading 
Jewish theologian Abraham Heschel (1907-1972. He and concludes that 
Brueggemann and Fretheim are both influenced by Heschel.773 Schlimm’s po-
sition is that the axiom of divine impassibility is a negative heritage that derives 
more from “Plato and Aristotle than from Hosea and Jeremiah.”774 However, 
Schlimm argues that Brueggemann goes far beyond both Heschel and Fretheim 
in his understanding of the meaning of passions: 
Heschel stresses that God is never overcome by passion, but 
Brueggemann describes God as ‘one who goes wholly overboard 
in passion, to Israel’s great gain and then to Israel’s greatest 
loss.’ Brueggemann diverges considerably from Heschel and 
Fretheim.775 
Schlimm also observes that Brueggemann, in contrast to Heschel in particular, 
but also to Fretheim, ignores the distinction between human metaphorical lan-
guage and ontological language about God. According to Schlimm, 
Brueggemann seems to take “Bible’s descriptions of God at face value without 
                                                     
771 Fretheim, What Kind of God? 151, note 39. 
772 Fretheim, The Suffering of God, 11. 
773 See Mattew Schlimm, “Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos: An Examination of Herme-
neutics in Biblical Theology,” CBQ 69, 2007. All three also agree that God experiences pathos. 
Fretheim, in his book The Suffering of God, argues that God suffers (a) ‘because of the people’s 
rejection of God as Lord,’ (b) ‘with the people who are suffering,’ and (c) ‘for the people.’ In a 
statement that sounds strikingly similar to Fretheim’s writings, Brueggemann talks of God’s 
‘propensity to suffer with and suffer for, to be in solidarity with Israel in its suffering.’” 
774 Schlimm, “Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos”, 673. 
775 See Schlimm, “Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos”, 677. 
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pausing to explore the limits of each description.”776 According to Schlimm, 
Brueggemann also in a partial way stresses the sovereignty of YHWH to the 
expense of the free will of humanity: 
The careful differentiation between the ways of God and the 
ways of humanity is largely missing from Brueggemann’s de-
scriptions of God’s wrath.777 
In sum, Schlimm, like Blumenthal, argues that Brueggemann understands the 
wrath of God as steaming from God’s own self-regard, i.e. from the essence of 
God. According to Schlimm, this makes Brueggemann’s description of God’s 
wrath unique.  
WEINANDY DEFENDS THE AXIOM OF DIVINE IMPASSIBILITY 
There are few theologians today who defend the axiom of divine impassibility 
because it seems that the idea of a God who cannot suffer, stands as an extreme 
alternative to a suffering God. Tomas Weinandy (1946 - ) is, however, one 
who defends the axiom. He writes: “God is never in a state of inner angst.”778 
Such a theological conclusion stands in sharp contrast to that of Brueggemann 
and Blumenthal. The interesting thing is that whereas Weinandy searches for 
hermeneutical tools from the presupposition of a constant concept of God, 
comparable with Childs—tools that can bring various disparate texts together 
without changing the concept of God—Brueggemann begins in the other end, 
with the presupposition of a polyphonic text and concludes that on the basis of 
the text, the God in the Old Testament has a tension that ultimately goes back 
to a divine tension within YHWH. Weinandy, like Fretheim, argues that suf-
fering primarily depends on humans sinning against God: 
Moreover, according to the Judeo-Christian tradition, it is sin 
then which has brought the evil of suffering into the world. This 
                                                     
776 See Schlimm, “Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos”, 681. See also 682: “Brueggemann’s 
writings give significantly less attention to metaphorical discontinuity than those of Heschel and 
Fretheim.” 
777 Schlimm, “Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos,”684. 
778 See Weinandy, Does God Suffer? 153. 
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suffering is fourfold as witnessed already in the Genesis account 
of ‘the fall.’779 
The British philosopher Paul Helm (1940- ) also defends the axiom of divine 
impassibility and argues that the interpreter of the Bible must make a choice 
between a “metaphysical” and an “anthropomorphic” interpretation of the 
text.780 This means that one has to choose between descriptions of YHWH as 
infinite, eternal and immutable, and let such descriptions have priority when 
interpreting Scripture, or basing a description of God on a more literal inter-
pretation of Scripture. No doubt that the axiom of divine impassibility forms a 
demarcation between classical and postmodern theology. Helm’s choice 
means that the battle of the correct interpretation of God in the Old Testament 
begins not in the text but prior to the text, in the epistemological and herme-
neutical discussion. We can conclude that Brueggemann stresses, using Helm’s 
terminology, an anthropomorphic interpretation of the Bible. 
ILLOCUTIONARY AND LOCUTIONARY ACTIONS  
A help to solve the hermeneutical problem of interpreting the Old Testament 
without reducing the message of the counter-testimony comes from Neil B. 
MacDonald in his book Metaphysics and the God of Israel: Systematic Theol-
ogy of the Old and New Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 2006). 
MacDonald makes a distinction between illocutionary action and locutionary 
action where the former is expressed in a literal sense, i.e. “the illocutionary 
action is identified with the locutionary action.”781 However, the illocutionary 
action can also be other than the locutionary action, expressed in the sentence: 
“‘Jones is a pig.’ This sentence might be used to mean that Jones treats people 
dreadfully or that he has abominable eating, or table-manners.”782 From this 
                                                     
779 Weinandy, Does God Suffer? 147 ff. Sin affects the relationship between God and human-
kind, human beings against human beings, God and Creation and humanity. 
780 See Paul Helm, “The Impossibility of Divine Passibility,” in The Power and Weakness of 
God: Impassibility and Orthodoxy (ed. N M. Cameron; Edinburgh: Rutherford House Books, 
1990), 129. 
781 MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel, 5: “We mean the literal sense of our utter-
ance. We utter the sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ and we mean that the cat is on the mat.” 
782 MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel, 5. 
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discussion, MacDonald concludes that biblical interpretation must be informed 
by the literal sense, i.e. the illocutionary action of the word, but adds that if this 
literal sense conflicts with the identity of God (locutionary action as a propo-
sitional act) “the meaning of Scripture at this point is other than the literal 
sense.”783 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have seen that the theological tension within YHWH, suggested by 
Brueggemann, is based on an interpretation of the verb patah, the narratives of 
David and Saul, and the two-stage texts of Isaiah 49:14 and Isaiah 54:7-8. He 
also supports his conclusion by inspiration from Blumenthal’s argumentation 
that God is abusive, Lindström’s thesis that suffering does not always depend 
on sin and Fretheim’s exegetical and Moltmann’s systematical criticism of the 
axiom of divine impassibility. Taken together, Brueggemann concludes that 
there is a kind of unsettledness within the very concept of God, that in no way 
fit within a classical understanding of the God of Israel, YHWH, in the Old 
Testament. 
This chapter has also shown that Moltmann, Fretheim and Brueggemann, de-
spite having come to various different conclusions, and despite their different 
understandings of the meaning of passion, all agree that the Old Testament 
clearly stresses a suffering God. This conclusion stands in contrast to Wei-
nandy and Helm, and partly MacDonald, who argue that God’s concept must 
be the beginning point for every interpretation. They argue that it is impossible 
to interpret every testimony literally, and that one has to make a decision be-
tween literal and non-literal interpretations of the Old Testament. A relevant 
question to ask now is: if we accept a theological understanding of the counter-
testimony, how should such a testimony be understood without being tamed? 
Moreover, how should such an interpretation avoid accusing YHWH with a 
profound disjunction at the core of the Subject’s life?  
                                                     
783 MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel, 6. See the definition of a locutionary act: 
Richard Nordquist, “Locutionary Act Definition in Speech-Act Theory.” ThoughtCo, Jul. 18, 
2019, thoughtco.com/locutionary-act-speech-1691257. 
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CORE AND COUNTER-TESTIMONY AS AN ORGANZING PRINCI-
PLE? 
According to Bruce Birch, the search for a theological center around e.g. sal-
vation history or covenant or the metaphor of the court should be understood 
not as a theological principle but as an organizing principle: 
No single understanding of the mode of God’s working [salva-
tion history, von Rad] nor a single central theme [covenant, Ei-
chrodt] is capable of doing justice to the multi-faceted witness of 
the Old Testament.784 
Could Birch’s suggestion become a possible solution to the above questions? 
I think so. This means that we do not treat Brueggemann’s distinction of core 
and counter-testimony as a theological conclusion of the nature of God. The 
God of Israel is not in a state of inner anger, or disjunctive, even though there 
are testimonies that describe YHWH in like manner. However, we cannot and 
should not avoid these texts and by help of Brueggemann’s distinction of core 
and counter-testimony we can organize the Old Testament testimonies in a 
fruitful way. His approach makes justice to the suffering side of the Old Tes-
tament. However, the logical question arise, if the counter-testimony should be 
understood primarily as an organizing principal, in what way is it then a theo-
logical testimony? I would argue that the counter-testimony is a theological 
testimony in the way it expresses a suffering of YHWH through his chosen 
people Israel. The counter-testimony is a theological testimony that alludes to 
how Jesus Christ suffers as human, not as God, within the Trinity.785 The coun-
ter-testimony is a theological testimony that alludes to an incarnational aspect 
of YHWH already in the Old Testament that is immanent within the chosen 
people of Israel. This aspect within biblical theology I will develop in part 7.5 
                                                     
784 See Bruce C. Birch, “OT Theology: Its task and Future,” HBT, 6/1 (1984), vi. 
785 Even though it is obvious that the distinction of core and counter-testimonies and God above 
and in the fray relates to the Christological discussion of the two natures of Jesus Christ, it falls 
outside this study to develop the topic of Communicatio Idiomatum further within the Old Tes-
tament. What I suggest in part 7.5 must be understood as an alternative solution to 
Brueggemann’s concept of God as described in ToT.  
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of this chapter. But before that I want to show how the distinction of core and 
counter-testimony could function as an organizing principle for observing the 
suffering side of the Old Testament. For this purpose, I have chosen Psalm 44. 
7.4 APPLYING BRUEGGEMANN’S APPROACH ON PSALM 44 
I have chosen Psalm 44 for many reasons, primarily because, as Bob Becking 
comments, Brueggemann himself pays special attention to this Psalm,786 and 
moreover it was important for Blumenthal’s conclusion that God is abusive. It 
is also obvious that Brueggemann stands somewhat resistant to most Christian 
interpretations of Psalm 44 which to easily tilt towards an ignorance of the 
darker side of the psalm: 
In that way, they insist that nothing shall separate us from the 
love of God. Such a ‘mismatch’ between our life experience of 
disortation and our faith speech of orientation could be a great 
evangelical ‘nevertheless’ (as in Habakkuk 3:18). …But at best, 
this is only partly true. It is my judgment that this action of the 
church is less a defiance guided by faith and founded in the good 
news, and much more frightened, numb denial and deception that 
does not want to acknowledge or experience the disorientation 
of life. The reason for such relentless affirmation of orientation 
seems to come, not from faith, but from the wishful optimism of 
our culture.
787
 
I will now interpret this Psalm by applying Brueggemann’s distinction between 
core and counter-testimonies. I will try to highlight the counter-testimony as 
an organizing principle and not as a theological conclusion on YHWH. 
                                                     
786 Bob Becking, Reflections on the Silence of God: A Discussion with Marjo Korpel and Jo-
hannes de Moor (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 134: “It is not surprising that Brueggemann discusses 
Psalms 44, Psalms 74, Lamentations 5, and many other provocative ‘witnesses’ in Part II, which 
deals with this ‘countertestimony’.” 
787 Walter Brueggemann, Spirituality of the Psalms (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1984, repub-
lished 2002), 25-26. 
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CORE AND COUNTER-TESTIMONY IN PSALM 44 
In Psalm 44:1-8 we read788: 
1 O God, we have heard with our ears, Our fathers have told us 
The work that You did in their days, In the days of old.  
2 You with Your own hand drove out the nations; Then You 
planted them; You afflicted the peoples, Then You spread them 
abroad.  
3 For by their own sword they did not possess the land, And their 
own arm did not save them, But Your right hand and Your arm 
and the light of Your presence, For You favored them.  
4 You are my King, O God; Command victories for Jacob.  
5 Through You we will push back our adversaries; Through Your 
name we will trample down those who rise up against us.  
6 For I will not trust in my bow, Nor will my sword save me.  
7 But You have saved us from our adversaries, And You have 
put to shame those who hate us. 
8 In God we have boasted all day long, And we will give thanks 
to Your name forever. Selah. 
It is quite obvious that the above passage is a core-testimony. For example, in 
verses 1-8 the Psalmist praises YHWH for his marvelous deeds in “the days of 
the old.” Verse 1 is an example of the re-use of previous materials that allude 
to the Exodus narrative. This is a practice of imagination in combination with 
memory. Israel retells, in a new situation of despair, how great their God has 
been in the past.789 Verse 2 refers to the narrative of the Tower of Babel (Gen-
esis 9) and how the nations were formed through the affection of disparate 
languages. Verses 3-4 present YHWH as a mighty King who will save Israel 
from its adversaries. The word ללה (boast) in verse 8 and the word הָדוֹתּ (give 
thanks) both clearly have YHWH as the object.  
In sharp contrast to verses 1-8, verses 9–26 present Israel’s despair. The author 
now accuses YHWH using imperative verbs, e.g. verses 12, 13 and 14: 
12 You sell Your people cheaply, And have not profited by 
their sale.  
13 You make us a reproach to our neighbors, A scoffing 
and a derision to those around us.   
14 You make us a byword among the nations, A laugh-
ingstock among the peoples.  
                                                     
788 Verse 1 in ISV is verse 2 in Biblica Hebraica. I hear follow the ISV.  
789 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 177-81. 
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It is shame that fills the inner man. The author/s of this Psalm writes in verses 
15-16: 
15 All day long my disgrace is before me, and shame has 
covered my face  
16 at the sound of the taunter and reviler, at the sight of the 
enemy and the avenger.”  
The author wants to correct YHWH and, using Lindström’s phrasing, the one 
who suffers imagines that his suffering is in no way parallel to his sins—suf-
fering without sin. Brueggemann here depends on Lindström and maintains 
that the counter-testimony is in force when YHWH punishes in disproportion 
to the sin of the people and this is exactly what happens now in verses 17-25: 
17 All this has come upon us, but we have not forgotten 
You, And we have not dealt falsely with Your covenant.  
18 Our heart has not turned back, And our steps have not 
deviated from Your way,  
19 Yet You have crushed us in a place of jackals And cov-
ered us with the shadow of death.  
20 If we had forgotten the name of our God Or extended 
our hands to a strange god,  
21 Would not God find this out? For He knows the secrets 
of the heart.  
22 But for Your sake we are killed all day long; We are 
considered as sheep to be slaughtered.  
23 Arouse Yourself, why do You sleep, O Lord? Awake, 
do not reject us forever.  
24 Why do You hide Your face And forget our affliction 
and our oppression?  
25 For our soul has sunk down into the dust; Our body 
cleaves to the earth.  
Israel stresses her innocence, e.g. verse 17: “we have not dealt falsely with 
Your covenant.” Psalm 44 ends with the accusation that YHWH is not 
awake.790 The Psalmist presupposes the schema or retribution, i.e. that those 
who do not honor the covenant will face suffering. However, the Psalmist 
strongly opposes that the situation is such. Instead, Israel is placed in a context 
of great despair and shame and accuses YHWH as the source of the despair. 
                                                     
790 See Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 320: “The accusation is that Yahweh, 
who promised to be present and in whose very character it is to be present, is noticeably absent. 
And when Yahweh is absent, bad things happen.” 
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Israel begs for mercy because Israel believes that YHWH shall honor the cov-
enant. In the final verse 26, Israel urges YHWH to rise: “Rise up, be our help, 
And redeem us for the sake of Your loving kindness.” In understanding Psalm 
44 in terms of Brueggemann’s distinction of core and counter-testimony, the 
second part, i.e. Psalm 44:9-26 could easily be defined as a counter-testimony.  
CONCLUSIONS  
Following Brueggemann’s approach all the way, the rhetorical tension be-
tween core testimonies in verses 1-8 and the counter-testimonies in verses 9-
26 have a corresponding theological tension within YHWH. However, this is 
not the only theological reading of Psalm 44. My response is that it is fruitful 
to organize Psalm 44 and other passages in the Old Testament according to the 
distinction of core and counter-testimony, especially because such organiza-
tion of the texts highlights the various facets of human suffering within the Old 
Testament. However, to address the rhetorical tension as a corresponding the-
ological tension within YHWH is neither necessary nor preferable. Instead, I 
would argue that the main theological message of the counter-testimony is the 
unconditional suffering of being in relationship with YHWH which does not 
stand in relation to either sin or suffering but to being in covenant with the God 
of Israel, YHWH.791 If we focus on Israel, the chosen people of God, this peo-
ple is elected as an instrument for YHWH for the salvation of the world and 
therefore this people suffers. At least Psalm 44:22 presupposes that there are 
evil forces that stand against YHWH and his people, and this enemy is - at that 
particular moment - more mighty than expected. The context of Psalm 44 gives 
no possibility of explaining God as the source of evil, as Lindström correctly 
emphasizes in Suffering and Sin. Instead, Psalm 44 stands as a testimony to the 
unconditional violence between on the one side, YHWH and his people, and 
                                                     
791 For this conclusion I am partly indebted to Nicolaus T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of 
God, Part III & IV (Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 2013), 810: “Are we saying, then, that in Paul’s 
view God chose Israel for a purpose he intended to accomplish through Israel? Yes. Does this 
‘instrumentalize’ Israel, and the notion of election, as has been suggested? Yes and no. It is a 
well-known phenomenon in Israel’s scriptures that God can use people or nations as ‘instru-
ments’ in his purpose: Assyria in Isaiah 10, Cyrus in Isaiah 45.” 
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on the other side, those who stand against YHWH. YHWH and Israel are in 
covenant and Israel argues that the covenant must be valid. Israel’s suffering 
and complaining presupposes a loving and involving God. Psalm 44 indeed 
embraces pain but does not embrace a theological tension within YHWH, be-
cause it is impossible to pray to a God who is unfair. It is, however, necessary 
to pray to a loving God in the face of evil. Being in covenant with YHWH is 
to stand in the fray unconditionally. Therefore Israel is indeed in the fray. In-
stead of defining God as an abuser in Psalm 44, this text presents YHWH as a 
God that stands in an immanent relationship to Israel.  
7.5 GOD ABOVE THE FRAY AND ISRAEL IN THE FRAY 
YHWH stands close to Israel in suffering, and how the relationship between 
them could be understood will complete this chapter. Let us begin with sum-
ming up three important conclusions that could function as cornerstones in a 
Rule of Faith within Old Testament biblical interpretation: 
Firstly, Blumenthal, Fretheim, and Schlimm argue that Brueggemann has 
missed to make the distinction between human, metaphorical language and on-
tological language about God, and God’s will and the will of Israel/mankind. 
We acknowledge that both MacDonald, Helm, and Weinandy stresses that a 
literal reading of the testimonies never can motivate a contradiction of the iden-
tity of God. This affirmation must be possible to withhold without ignoring the 
existence of counter-testimonies. 
Secondly, Brueggemann stresses the sovereignty of YHWH, and draws the 
conclusion that it is YHWH who is unfair. However, it must be possible to 
stress a sovereign God and simultaneously solve the problem of theodicy in 
another way. 
Thirdly and finally, Brueggemann, stresses a God that in his essence is rela-
tional. 792 As noted in chapter 2, Brueggemann refers positively to the orthodox 
                                                     
792 Cf. Meadowcroft, “Method and Old Testament Theology, Barr, Brueggemann and Goldingay 
considered,” 45: “Perhaps none speaks more clearly into our own age than his [read 
Brueggemann’, my emphasis] insistence on understanding God from the standpoint of God’s 
relationality rather than his attributes [pp. 201-28].” 
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theologian John Zizioulas for such a conclusion. Brueggemann recognizes that 
this orthodox theologian, like him, argues that God is always a God in rela-
tion.793 For Zizioulas being corresponds with community: 
Being of God is a relational being: without the concept of com-
munion it would not be possible to speak of the being of God. 
The tautology ‘God is God’ says nothing about ontology, just as 
the logical affirmation A = A is a dead logic and consequently a 
denial of being which is life.
794
  
Notably, Zizioulas does not stress a tension within God but argues that God’s 
most signifying substance is love.795 However, the connection between 
Brueggemann and Zizioulas could have important and be applied as a Rule of 
Faith on the interpretation of the Old Testament. Zizioulas’ relational concept 
of God could be used as a presupposition: “God exists thanks to an event of 
communion.”796  
In sum, I would argue that these three conclusions are important to 
acknowledge. This means that there must be a distinction between God’s will 
and Israel’s will, otherwise God becomes the controller and finally becomes 
the abuser of the abused, as Blumenthal argues for. Moreover, it must be pos-
sible to defend YHWH as sovereign, despite the counter-testimony, and with-
out arguing that YHWH is unfair. Finally, it is important to stress that the God 
of Israel is a God that always stands in relation to his creation and his people 
of Israel. These three conclusions, I would argue, could function like a Rule of 
Faith, as Childs stresses, with an understanding of God prior to the encounter 
with the text. Moreover, in order to understand the counter-testimony theolog-
ically, the appearance of God in the fray is immanent in the chosen people of 
Israel. God in the fray could therefore also be labeled as Israel in the fray. The 
                                                     
793 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 409. 
794 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 17. 
795 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 46: “Love is not an emanation or ‘property of the substance 
of God-this detail is significant in the light of what I have said so far-but is constitutive of His 
substance, i.e. it is that which makes God what He is, the one God.” 
796 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 17. 
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relationship between YHWH and Israel unconditionally leads to suffering. The 
voice of Israel in Psalm 22:1 alludes to the voice of Christ at the cross: “My 
God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Psalm 22:1). Instead of phrasing 
God in the fray, I would argue that the illocutionary action, using MacDonald’s 
terminology, of a visible tension in the text, could be identified with Israel’s 
testimony of e.g. the absence of YHWH. Israel is the instrument of YHWH 
that manifest the immanence of YHWH, through the Holy Spirit, in the Old 
Testament. My argument that God in the fray could be also be changed to Is-
rael in the fray is motivated by some passages in the Old Testament.  
YHWH AND ISRAEL IN RELATION 
Let us first look at Exodus 3:7-8. This passage sums up how the God of Israel, 
YHWH, is both transcendent, using Brueggemann’s distinction of God above 
the fray, and immanent, through his people: 
7 Then the LORD said, “I have observed the misery of my people 
who are in Egypt; I have heard their cry on account of their task-
masters. Indeed, I know their sufferings,  
8 and I have come down to deliver them from the Egyptians, and 
to bring them up out of that land to a good and broad land. 
In these verses from Exodus, YHWH is almost incarnated with the suffering 
of his people. YHWH has come down to deliver Israel and bring them up out, 
of the fray, to the holy land. The term immanence refers to the people of God 
– Israel.  
Secondly, there is in the Old Testament a close relationship between the name 
and the personality of the name, e.g. 1 Samuel 25:25. 797 In the narrative of 
Jacob, the patriarch, in Genesis 32:24-29 and his wrestling with the man with-
out name, Jacob receives a new name, Israel: 
24 And Jacob was left alone. And a man wrestled with him 
until the breaking of the day.  
25 When the man saw that he did not prevail against Jacob, 
he touched his hip socket, and Jacob’s hip was put out of 
joint as he wrestled with him. 
26 Then he said, “Let me go, for the day has broken.” But 
Jacob said, “I will not let you go unless you bless me.” 
                                                     
797 אוּ ָ֔ה־ןֶכּ ֙וֹמְשִׁכ י ִַ֤כּ ל ָָ֗בָנ־לַע ה ֶֶ֜זַּה לַע ַַ֨יִּלְבַּה ֩שׁיִא־לֶא וֹ֡בִּל־תֶא ׀ י ִֹ֣נֹדֲא םי ִֹ֣שָׂי אָֹ֣נ־לאַ 1 Sam. 25:25 
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27 And he said to him, “What is your name?” And he said, 
“Jacob.” 
28 Then he said, “Your name shall no longer be called Ja-
cob, but Israel, for you have striven with God and with 
men, and have prevailed.” 
29 Then Jacob asked him, “Please tell me your name.” But 
he said, “Why is it that you ask my name?” And there he 
blessed him. 
The translation of Israel is complicated. Following the Hebrew text, the word-
play leaves no doubt that fight is associated with Israel.798 In Eerdmans Dic-
tionary Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament we read: 
While most scholars render the verb ‘strive,’ ‘struggle,’ or 
‘fight,’ some believe the root to be śrr, “to have dominion,” and 
translate “prove himself ruler.” One tradition divides the conso-
nants and vocalizes śār ʾaṯā, rendering “you are a prince (śar) 
[with God]” (Genesis Rab. 78:3). While Hebrew usage would 
dictate that ‘Israel’ means ‘God fights,’ the story in Genesis 32 
takes Jacob as the subject, and understands the meaning to be 
“He who fights with God.”799 
Regardless of the exact meaning of the name of Israel, the narrative describes 
how Israel is in the fray with God, YHWH. In the book of Jeremiah, the prophet 
is in the fray and complains on behalf of Israel: “for I am called by your name, 
O LORD, God of hosts (Jeremiah 15:16b). Israel is now in deepest dissolution, 
due to Israel’s abusive behavior towards the covenant. However, the prophet 
Jeremiah formulates Israel’s pray: Israel, through the name, is connected with 
YHWH, and therefore salvation must come over Israel.  
Thirdly, coming back to Psalm 44, it is obvious that being identified with the 
name of Israel means to be identified with suffering on the edge. The people 
of Israel is in the fray because they are in relationship with YHWH. In order 
                                                     
798  ׃ל ָָֽכוּתַּו םי ִַ֖שָׁנֲא־םִעְו םי ִִ֛הלֱֹא־םִע ָָתי ִ֧  רָשׂ־י ִָֽכּ ל ָ֑  אָָרְשׂ  י־םִא י ִַ֖כּ ָ֔ךְמִשׁ ֙דוֹע ר ֵ֥  מאָ י ֙בֹקֲעַי א ַֹ֤ ל רֶמא ָֹ֗ יַּו Gen. 32:29 
799 Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible (Eerdmans, 2000), 655. 
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to understand a difficult verse such as Psalm 44:22800 a close relationship be-
tween YHWH and his people is necessary in order to find the correct interpre-
tation. From a Christian perspective, partly informed by N.T Wright801, this 
verse alludes to the New Testament and Romans 8:31-37:  
35 Who will come between us and the love of Christ? Will trou-
ble, or pain, or cruel acts, or the need of food or of clothing, or 
danger, or the sword? 
36 As it is written, “For your sake we are being killed all day 
long; we are accounted as sheep to be slaughtered.” 
According to Paul in Romans 8, Psalm 44:23 is directed to those Christians 
who live in the covenant with God but who must suffer. The question of the-
odicy has a point of departure also in the fact that suffering is the other side of 
being in relationship with the God of Israel. If one wants to find a similar par-
allel in a Jewish context one could read e.g. 2 Mack 7:20: “Although she saw 
her seven sons die in a single day, she endured it with great courage because 
she trusted in the Lord.” Here in this passage we have seven brothers who had 
to sacrifice their own life because they wanted to be faithful to the covenant. 
If one wants to find a similar parallel in the New Testament one could read 
Acts 9:4, When Saul, later Paul, was on his way to Damascus, he hears a voice:  
4 “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?” And he said, “Who 
are you, Lord?” And he said, “I am Jesus, whom you are perse-
cuting.  
It is Jesus, “I am” - “Ἐγώ εἰμι” - who identifies himself with the suffering of 
the persecuted Christians.  
Reading God above the fray and Israel in the fray means that the people of 
God, i.e., Israel and the church is in covenant with YHWH. It seems that the 
reading of the Old Testaments tilts gradually towards resurrection, because 
YHWH will ultimately take care of his people for the sake of the covenant. It 
is actually problematic that Brueggemann in ToT suggests a distinction be-
tween God above the fray and God in the fray and that this distinction finally 
                                                     
800 ׃ה ָָֽחְבִט ןא ֹֹ֣ צְכּ וּנְב ַָ֗שׁ ְְ֝חֶנ םוֹ ָ֑יַּה־לָכ וּנְג ַֹ֣רֹה ךי ֶֶ֭לָע־י ִָֽכּ Psa. 44:23.  
801 See Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 634. In the passage from Romans, Wright 
argues that Paul defines Jesus Christ as the one that redefines Monotheism around Jesus the 
Messiah.  
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leads to describing a tension within YHWH. This conclusion is neither neces-
sary nor biblical.  
A CRITIC OF GOD ABOVE AND ISRAEL IN THE FRAY 
A critique of my presentation could be that Israel in the fray cannot be equiv-
alent to God in the fray. Israel is simply not comparable with YHWH. There is 
of course a huge difference between Israel and YHWH. There is also a great 
difference between Israel and Jesus Christ, and, simultaneously, Jesus Christ 
and the Church. Jesus is without sin. Israel and Church are not. What I mean 
when I change God in the fray to Israel in the fray is that God in the Old Tes-
tament, YHWH, is intimately connected with Israel and the term Israel in the 
fray has the opportunity to imagine Israel (and the church) as the carrier of the 
same nature as the human side of Jesus. The distinction of God above and Israel 
in the fray, understood in this way, has its ultimate description in the fulfillment 
of the Old Testament in the revelation of Jesus of Nazareth. As Paul writes in 
the letter to Philippians 2:6-8: 
6   …though he was in the form of God, 
Did not regard equality with God 
As something to be exploited, 
7 but emptied himself, 
Taking the form of a slave, 
Being born in human likeness. 
8 And being found in human form, 
He humbled himself 
And became obedient to the point of death— 
Even death on a cross.802 
But, again, why cannot God be in the fray of human suffering? God is of course 
in the fray, but not in his ontology, only in his economy. As a Christian writer, 
believing in the Trinity, God is always in a relationship of love, as Zizioulas 
expresses. Because of that God is never the agent of suffering, even though 
God permits evil to exist. If God in his ontological trinity, would be in the fray, 
then God becomes victim to his own character because God becomes agent of 
                                                     
802 See Brueggemann, The Message of the Psalms, 11: “I find Phil 2.5-11 a helpful articulation 
of this movement. It can, without any forcing, be correlated: Orientation: ‘Though he was in the 
form of God…’ Disorientation: ‘[He] emptied himself.’ New Orientation: ‘Therefore God has 
highly exalted him…’” 
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the suffering that he is engaged to save. If God is sovereign, God then becomes 
the problem in the theodicy, because God of the Old Testament, YHWH has 
an inner anger. God is in the fray of human suffering, but through his economy, 
and in the Old Testament, this economy takes place through his chosen people 
Israel. In the New Testament, this immanence takes place through his son Jesus 
Christ, and in the new covenant, through the Church. God of the Old Testa-
ment, YHWH is transcendent, sovereign, above the fray of Israel’s suffering, 
but simultaneously, the counter-testimony reflects a suffering that affects 
YHWH. YHWH is in the fray through Israel. I do not argue that Israel is God, 
and God is not Israel, referring again to Zizioulas that outside the relationship 
of the Trinity there is no God.803 However, I argue that Israel is an instrument 
in service of YHWH and Messiah could only be born within this people, be-
cause Israel as a people is united with their God in a unique way.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, Brueggemann presents a theology that stresses that the God of Israel, 
YHWH, is in the fray on behalf of human suffering and his chosen people 
Israel. However, when Brueggemann combines a theology where he argues 
that the rhetorical tension between core and counter-testimonies also should 
lead to a theological tension, the theological problem of the nature of YHWH 
arises. The disjunction within YHWH stands in another tension with Old and 
New Testament testimonies who argue that God is light, and in him is no dark-
ness at all ( 1 John 1:4). What this chapter suggest is instead to use 
Brueggemann’s distinction between core and counter-testimony as an organ-
izing principle and God above the fray and Israel in the fray as a theological 
conclusion, where God above stands for transcendence and Israel in the fray 
stands for the Trinitarian God in his economy through his chosen people where 
the revelation of God’s immanence becomes completed in Jesus Christ.  
                                                     
803 See Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 41: “Outside the Trinity, there is no God, that is, no 
divine substance, because the ontological ‘principle’ of God is the Fater.” 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS  
Chapter 8 sums up this study. I conclude:  
- Brueggemann’s theology should be understood as an alternative to the 
historical-critical method and church theology, and thus formulate a 
stronger alternative to the destructive force of military consumerism. 
- Brueggemann’s epistemology is crucial for understanding his theol-
ogy. I argue that it is a justified epistemology for the discipline of Old 
Testament theology. 
- Brueggemann’s concept of God with a tension is no necessary conclu-
sion. The distinction of God above the fray and Israel in the fray could 
be used as a solution to the problem of a polyphonic text with a visible 
counter-testimony and a constant concept of God. This means that it is 
impossible to consequently use a literal hermeneutics within the disci-
pline of Old Testament theology. 
8.1 A THEOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE  
This study can confirm that Brueggemann intends to use religious language in 
a theological sense. In this way, he stands in sharp contrast to e.g. Hanson’s 
proposal of a figurative understanding of the counter-testimony. A figurative 
understanding here is equal to an equivocal referentiality. Such an understand-
ing, I argue, omits a theological interpretation of the counter-testimony. Al-
bertz, who also argued for the impossibility of a theological approach, along 
with Hanson, would be correct in maintaining their position if religious lan-
guage only had an equivocal reference point. However, religion would then be 
merely a human product and thus should be approached historically, as a social 
and empirical phenomenon. It would then also be true that the divine authority 
in whose name religious texts announce their theology has no justified episte-
mological foundation. Logically then, Scripture should be interpreted as a text 
laden only with symbolical meaning. However, if this were to be the case, one 
might just await the coming of a new Barth who criticizes Feuerbach. 
Brueggemann is in my opinion the new Barth within Old Testament theology 
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who criticizes a narrow, and inappropriate method that only presents a reli-
gious-historical result.  
Brueggemann’s hermeneutics is based upon the written testimony with imagi-
nation as the human process of inspiration and a deconstructive Jewish reading 
that goes beyond the visible and pays attention to the incongruities in the text. 
For him, imagination is both the energy that has produced the text and that 
which makes the text alive today in the ecclesial community. He does not 
equate imagination with the work of the Holy Spirit, but imagination is the 
human process of the witness who has had an encounter with the Holy Spirit. 
According to Brueggemann, the text sometimes converge, but not always, and 
this leads him to conclude that there is a disjunctive aspect or tension when it 
comes to describing YHWH. His hermeneutics is extra-referential but notable 
is that Beal and Linafelt find striking similarities between Brueggemann and 
Derrida. On this basis they argue that his hermeneutics is non-referential. 
Moberly also agree with Beal and Linafelt. Strawn, on the other hand, argues 
more convincingly that Brueggemann’s hermeneutics is extra-referential. 
Brueggemann uses a Lutheran communicatio idiomatum term when he argues 
that YHWH is available only in, with, and under the text. On the basis of this 
hermeneutical presupposition, he also believes that speech and reality coincide. 
Brueggemann shares an affinity with Wittgenstein that is mediated by 
Lindbeck. Brueggemann is very reluctant to use the term the Real. Childs’ 
search for the Real, according to Brueggemann, is the wrong approach, be-
cause the Real is encountered only in, with, and under the text. Again, this way 
of using dogmatic terms and embracing Wittgenstein’s thinking, mediated by 
Lindbeck, creates an inspiring hermeneutics that opens up for a text-based and 
at the same time extra-referential hermeneutics. Moreover, in the previous 
chapter 4, it was concluded that a weak foundational epistemology differs from 
a non-foundational epistemology in the way it refers to a reality outside the 
text. My conclusion is that he intends to present an interpretation of YHWH to 
be taken as a truth within the community that listens to it.  
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8.2 A CRUCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY  
This study can also affirm Brueggemann’s critical analysis of the epistemology 
of modernism and its method, the historical-critical method. This method is 
neither neutral nor objective. He has critically shown that the historical-critical 
method is an interpretation that is performed on the presupposition of classical 
foundationalism which, in turn, presupposes that the human mind is capable of 
perceiving the world with full control. His epistemology is brilliant because it 
creates a shortcut—passes through the hegemony of historical critical 
method—to a theological analysis of the Old Testament text. 
An alternative presupposition to the epistemology that undergirds the histori-
cal-critical method is presented by Brueggemann; an epistemology that waits 
for the answer to the historical question “What really happened?” and the on-
tological question “what is really real?” Instead he pays attention to the final 
and canonical text of the Old Testament and asks: “What is really written in 
this text?” Based on this question, he wants to describe God in the Old Testa-
ment, YHWH. His approach is based upon a weak foundational epistemology 
wherein his methodological ground stipulates a testimony that comes from out-
side the text, as a ground of certitude. His thinking does not require human 
access as necessary in order to be legitimate. His epistemology requires faith: 
if one believes these testimonies, one is near to reality. Believing the testimo-
nies is, for him, Barth’s and Plantinga’s, and Ricoeur’s way to the biblical his-
tory and ontology, and this history and ontology come after, and not before, 
the text, because without testimonies there is no written history or ontology in 
a Christian theology. The testimonies are being heard from above or inside a 
believing community, without any attempt to legitimate the testimonies by use 
of human reason. The proper encounter, relying on Ricoeur’s philosophical 
theory of the identity of a testimony, is a testimony which is accepted as prob-
able and not certain. One can never be certain concerning a testimony, because 
it stands in relation to a community that either accepts it or denies it. 
Brueggemann’s epistemology could be termed as testimonial foundationalism. 
In accordance with Ricoeur’s conclusion that a testimony is probable and not 
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certain, Brueggemann is consistent, and argues that when one believes the tes-
timony one is close to reality. A biblical notion of testimony and faith means 
that faith in the testimony is the way to reality and this process has been pre-
sented in an excellent way by him. 
8.3 A CHRISTIAN READING OF A POLYPHONIC TEXT  
ToT has inspired both Christian and Jewish theology with a fresh stimulation 
of imagination and with a theological reading of the Old Testament. Neverthe-
less, a problem arises when Brueggemann’s hermeneutics is extra-referential 
so that the rhetorical tension has a corresponding theological tension. The the-
ological outcome means that YHWH has an ontological tension. This study 
has also concluded that Brueggemann’s concept of God with a tension at the 
core is based on his epistemology and a hermeneutics where his rhetorical dis-
tinction between core and counter-testimonies creates a theological tension. 
This concept of God, formulated as God above the fray and God in the fray is 
important to understand in relation to the Rule of Faith and his criticism of 
Childs’ understanding in this regard. Olson wanted to emphasize that 
Brueggemann and Childs have many points in common, but these similarities 
are less fundamental than they seem to be at first sight. There is a watershed 
between them which becomes obvious in their different understanding of the 
function of the Rule of Faith in Old Testament theology. The God of Israel is 
described on the basis of the testimony in Brueggemann’s theology, whereas 
Childs uses the Rule of Faith as a lens to understand the Old Testament. In the 
analysis of Psalm 44, it seems that a faith in YHWH will lead to suffering, and 
that a Christian must thus be aware of taking up his cross and following him. 
In that case, Psalm 44 open the question about the need for suffering of loyal 
believers and such a horizon opens up the Resurrection and retribution after 
death. In the application of his theology on Psalm 44, there is an unconditional 
suffering involved in being in relationship with YHWH which does not stand 
in relation to either sin or suffering but to election. At least the author in Psalm 
44:22 presupposes that there are evil forces that stand against YHWH and his 
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people, and this enemy - at that moment – is mightier than expected. There is 
no tension within YHWH, but he is in the fray for his suffering people. Israel 
becomes God’s human instrument. YHWH is not source of the suffering be-
cause God as a perfectly good being could not create that which is ontologi-
cally evil. However, YHWH is in, with, and under the suffering of his chosen 
people Israel. In this way, the counter-testimony expresses Israel’s suffering 
and not the ontological presence of God. 
Brueggemann, in accordance with his intention, stipulates the testimony as his 
solid foundation. It is on the result of this foundation that he argues that the 
Rule of Faith is to be defined. This approach seems rational, i.e. he does not 
presuppose a concept of God before the encounter with the testimonies. He has 
only one foundation prior to the text, the testimony. Nevertheless, the result of 
this approach is an irrational concept of God, a God in tension. I argue that the 
theological solution to this problematic concept of God lies in the correct dis-
tinction of God above and Israel in the fray. I propose that it is theologically 
possible to connect Brueggemann’s hermeneutics of core and counter-testimo-
nies—apparently disparate and contradictive core and counter-testimonies—
into a harmonious theological conclusion, without neglecting the polyphonic 
character of the text.  
My conclusion from chapter 3 is that his theology has developed in a process 
of continuity where ToT can be understood as a synopsis of his theology. In 
this process of continuity, there was an exception: his distinction between God 
above the fray and God in the fray. In articles before ToT he maintains that 
God is involved both above the fray and in the fray. In ToT this distinction is 
absent and God becomes specifically in the fray. In ToT, his concept of God 
stresses a tension of suffering and pain that corresponds to a tension in YHWH. 
What I suggest from the conclusion in chapter 3 and chapter 7, is then that the 
metaphor of the court is the organizing principle that shows a counter-testi-
mony. This testimony indeed describes an ontological description of God, but 
not of God’s divine nature, but rather of God’s immanence. In this way, there 
is a mysterious incarnation of the God of Israel in the people of Israel. The God 
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of Israel, YHWH, is in the fray on behalf of Israel. The counter-testimony is a 
human testimony, not a figurative testimony, but a testimony from Israel, the 
people of God, which describes the human pain and suffering — presented as 
human testimonies of God’s absence in the light of apparent suffering. The 
counter-testimony stresses God’s immanence, i.e. that God is in the fray 
through his own people, wherein Jesus Christ was born, and the Church was 
incorporated into. In this way, there is a close Christian parallel between the 
counter-testimony, Christ’s human nature, and the apostolic church today. The 
core-testimony represents testimonies of transcendence, i.e. God as above the 
fray, i.e. Christ’s divine nature. The God above and Israel in the fray could 
then be related to the two natures of Christ—two natures in one Person. This 
in turn means that the suffering that the counter-testimony expose does not 
refer ontologically to God, but actually to Israel who in the Old Testament 
embraces the suffering as YHWH’s chosen people. There are of course many 
differences between Israel/church and Jesus Christ, but in the existence of Is-
rael/church there is a sacrifice that is incorporated in being God’s chosen peo-
ple and which corresponds to Jesus Christ suffering at the cross for all man-
kind. “  
8.4 CLOSURE 
Brueggemann’s postmodern approach for understanding the Old Testament 
opens up new landscapes. His convincing thought that the hegemony of the 
historical-critical method has diminished and that the reductive force of church 
theology has lost its attraction is indeed a new approach. In a sermon at Luther 
theological seminary, Minnesota, in 2000, he emphasizes that the western 
Church suffers from the same problem as the Pharisees; they do not understand 
the real point of issue that Jesus questions: “They missed the messianic decla-
ration that creation is now working well to produce and multiply and be fruit-
ful, enough, more than enough…”804 Likewise, I argue that the academy as 
                                                     
804 Brueggemann, Inscribing the Text, 67. 
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community has missed the theological message of the Old Testament. 
Brueggemann correctly stresses the following: 
 The primal subject of the Old Testament is God.  
 The problem with the epistemology of modernism is apparent.  
 The foundation of certitude upon the biblical testimonies constitutes a 
justified epistemology. 
 The testimonies in the Old Testament must be treated as referring to 
an ontological reality. 
Throughout this study, however, I have disagreed with Brueggemann’s theo-
logical conclusion in ToT. The problem with his approach is that the descrip-
tion of YHWH does not sufficiently discern and correctly dismantle the dis-
tinction between core and counter-testimonies. However, in the encounter with 
Brueggemann’s concept of God, I have suggested that the distinction between 
God above the fray and God in the fray can function as a hermeneutical key to 
distinguish correctly between the ontological and immanent reality of God 
without ignoring the visible counter-testimony in the biblical text. The Church 
does not believe in a God that is arbitrary. The Church believes in a God that 
is love, 100 %. The search for solid ground will have its answer when one 
believes the testimonies. A Christian reading anticipates that the polyphonic 
text has a corresponding relationship to the suffering and pain of this world. 
However, a Christian reading hopes for and believes that when one finally sees, 
in heaven, without a veil, every testimony will sing the perfect hymn to the 
elusive God who will enter into real presence with his children.  
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